Exploring Differences in Liberal and Conservative Moral Conviction and Moral Motivation

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THESIS
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<tr>
<td>HLM</td>
<td>Hierarchical Linear Model</td>
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<td>MFT</td>
<td>Moral Foundations Theory</td>
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<td>MMM</td>
<td>Model of Moral Motives</td>
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<td>SES</td>
<td>Socio-economic Status</td>
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<td>UIC</td>
<td>University of Illinois at Chicago</td>
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SUMMARY

Several recent theories in moral psychology have attempted to explain the differences in the morality of liberals and conservatives. To date, however, little research has tested whether the differences described in these theories actually predict differences in the moral relevance that liberals and conservatives attach to social phenomena. That is, it’s not yet clear whether the differences between liberals and conservatives that these theories predict reflect differences in the morality of the two groups rather than differences outside the moral domain. To this end, the current dissertation tested whether one such theory (the Model of Moral Motives, Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013) predicts the moral conviction liberals and conservatives attach to their social and political attitudes. In three studies, the current research tested whether (1) social justice moral motives better predict the moral conviction of liberals than conservatives, (2) social order moral motives better predict the moral conviction of conservatives than liberals, and (3) each of these two moral motives predict the morally motivated activism intentions of liberals and conservatives. Furthermore, I also tested whether social order and social justice motives reflect broader regulatory focus concerns about preventing societal harm and promoting societal wellbeing, respectively. The results of these three studies provided evidence that the motives described in the Moral Motives Model are, in fact, morally relevant and underlie the differences between liberal and conservative moral conviction. I also found mixed support for the prediction that the two motives underlie morally motivated activism, and little support for the prediction that the two motives reflect distinct regulatory focus concerns.
I. INTRODUCTION

“Conservatives simply see the world differently than do liberals, and both often have a difficult time understanding accurately what the other’s worldview is.” – Lakoff (2002, p. 1)

Reading the opening lines of George Lakoff’s book on the moral views of American liberals and conservatives, one gets the impression that the differences between the two groups are insurmountable. Although occupying the same country, liberals and conservatives in the United States would seem to live in two different worlds. Moreover, the differences between liberals and conservatives that Lakoff notes are mirrored both in media coverage on possible increases recently in political polarization in the United States (Roberts, 2009) and in psychological theories that lay out how those on the political left and right differ in their sense of morality (e.g., Emler, Palmer-Canton, & St James, 1998; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Janoff-Bulman, 2009). Despite this theoretical ground work, however, little research has yet explored whether the moral differences described in these theories actually predict (1) the extent to which people perceive moral relevance in the attitudes and beliefs they hold or (2) whether these differences in perceived moral relevance underlie the motivation for liberals’ and conservatives’ political behavior. Put simply, research has yet to fully determine whether the political orientation differences proposed in these theories are, in fact, moral in nature and, even if they are, whether these moral differences predict meaningful downstream consequences such as the motivation to engage politically.

Contrary to theories that propose moral differences between the political left and right, not all research in moral psychology finds differences between liberals and conservatives. Specifically, research on moral conviction has found little difference in either the overall
tendency of liberals and conservatives to view their social and political attitudes as a reflection of
their core moral beliefs (i.e., as strong moral convictions, Skitka, 2010) or for this perceived
moral relevance to differentially motivate the political behavior of each group (Skitka, Morgan,
& Wisneski, in press). For example, both liberals and conservatives whose candidate preferences
are high rather than low in moral conviction are more likely to vote in Presidential elections
(Morgan, Skitka, & Wisneski, 2010; Skitka & Bauman, 2008) and are more likely to be
politically engaged (Skitka, Wisneski, Hanson, & Morgan, 2013; Skitka & Wisneski, 2011; Zaal,
Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2011). In sum, although theory and research in moral psychology
often highlight the differences between liberal and conservative morality, these differences are
not reflected in research looking at what happens when each group imbues their political
attitudes with their subjective sense of moral conviction.

The current work seeks to reconcile past research on moral conviction that fails to find
differences between liberals and conservatives, with theories that make specific predictions about
how the morality and moral motivation of the political left and right will differ. To this end, the
current studies draw on the Model of Moral Motives (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013) in an
attempt to find differences between liberals’ and conservatives’ morally convicted attitudes. As
is implied by its name, the Model of Moral Motives (MMM) provides a map of different moral
motivations that theoretically could differ between liberals and conservatives. Furthermore, the
MMM provides an ideal framework for finding differences in liberal and conservative morality
that is also consistent with work on moral conviction that finds no political orientation
differences in the aggregate. Specifically, similar theories that describe differences in liberal and
conservative morality would lead to the prediction that moralization should occur more on one
end of the political spectrum than the other. For example, according to Moral Foundations
Theory (MFT), conservatives possess a broader array of moral “senses” than liberals (Graham et al., 2009). Thus, one would predict based on MFT that conservatives’ broader definition of what falls within the moral domain should lead them to moralize their political attitudes more often than liberals. Conversely, according to the MMM, liberals and conservatives can have roughly equal numbers of potential moral concerns (a point described in greater detail below). As a result, the MMM leads to predictions consistent with what was found in previous moral conviction research – liberals and conservatives can moralize their political attitudes to an equal degree, but will do so based on different conceptions of what makes something morally right or wrong.

Three studies tested whether the differences between liberals and conservatives proposed by the MMM underlie their perceptions of moral relevance (i.e., moral conviction) of their political attitudes as well as the motivational force provided by this perceived moral relevance. In other words, the three studies proposed here will test if the differences described in the MMM are, in fact, moral differences and if they are motivational – arguably the two central components of the MMM. Before I describe the details and results of each study, I will describe the MMM and review recent research that points to possible differences in what underlies the moral convictions and moral motivation of liberal and conservatives. Finally, I will briefly review the theory of moral conviction and why it provides a useful framework for testing hypotheses about the MMM.

A. Political Orientation and the Model of Moral Motives

The MMM attempts to “map” the content of the moral domain by creating six categories of morally relevant “motives” that span three levels of analysis. It begins with the basic distinction between the behavioral activation and inhibition systems of motivation and self-
regulation (Carver, 2006; Higgins, 1998). This distinction provides a template for different types of moral motives based in either (1) proscription and behavioral inhibition focused on what people *should not* do and to protect people from harm or (2) prescription and behavioral activation focused on what people *should* do and to provide for people’s wellbeing through morally good action. The MMM also describes how proscriptive and prescriptive morality plays out across three social contexts – the self, individual others, and the group or society (see Table I). The lowest level focuses on the self and contains moral motives related to self-restraint and moderation (proscriptive moral motives) as well as industriousness and hard work (prescriptive moral motives). The second level involves interpersonal interactions and includes moral motives related to not harming and avoiding taking advantage of others (proscriptive) as well as helping and treating others fairly (prescriptive). Also of note, according to the MMM these interpersonal level moral motives related to individual others are equivalent to the “individuating foundations” of harm/care and fairness/reciprocity described in Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al., 2009). Finally, at the group or societal level, the model includes moral motives related to maintaining social order, group loyalty, communal solidarity, and protecting the group from outside threats (proscriptive) as well as concerns related to social justice, equality, communal responsibility, and providing for group welfare (prescriptive).

Theoretically, liberals and conservatives differ in the moral motives that they tend to focus on within the MMM. Liberalism has been related to greater approach motivation and conservatism with greater avoidance (Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2010) and this difference is mirrored in the two groups’ differential focus on prescriptive versus proscriptive moral concern (Janoff-Bulman, 2009). Although the MMM predicts political orientation differences at all levels of analysis, considerable focus has been placed on differences at the group or societal level.
### Table I
THE MORAL MOTIVES MODEL

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<th>Individual others</th>
<th>Group/Society</th>
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<td>Not harming/Not taking advantage of others</td>
<td>Social order/Loyalty/Community solidarity</td>
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<td>Industriousness/Hard work</td>
<td>Helping/Treating others fairly</td>
<td>Social justice/Equity/Community responsibility</td>
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Moral motives at the lower levels of the model, such as for the self, are not as conflicting as those at the group or societal level. Moral motives related to self-restraint (the self-proscriptive cell) can exist within the same person alongside motives related to industriousness and self-reliance (the self-prescriptive cell) without conflict. In fact, research has found a positive correlation between individuals’ endorsement of the two types of moral motive at the self-level (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Baldacci, 2008). Similarly, the proscriptive and prescriptive motives at the interpersonal level are also unlikely to conflict. For example, most people have no problem holding the goal of not harming others while simultaneously holding the goal of helping others.

At the group/societal level, however, the proscriptive and prescriptive moral motives come into conflict (Janoff-Bulman, 2009, Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013) – a point supported by a negative correlation often found between people’s endorsement of social order and social justice (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008). Social order motives theoretically emphasize group safety, homogeneity, and clear boundaries between those in the group and those not. As a result, endorsement of social order motives lead to a diminished acceptance of societal change, heightened sensitivity to out-group threat, and greater regulation of counter-normative behavior of ingroup members. Conversely, social justice motives theoretically emphasize group wellbeing, shared responsibility, relatively permeable ingroup boundaries, and greater acceptance of both out-group members and heterogeneity in ingroup members. Thus, greater endorsement of social justice motives entails providing for group wellbeing via equal distribution of group resources, greater acceptance of societal change, and less sensitivity to threats from out-groups or counter-normative ingroup members.
According to the MMM, it is the differential endorsement of the group level moral motives by the political left versus the right that underlies the “culture war” in the United States. Conservatives tend to focus on protecting the group through social control and order and communal solidarity. This proscriptive focus leads conservatives to have a greater sensitivity to ingroup homogeneity, societal losses (versus gains), and a focus on stability (versus change). Liberals, however, tend to focus on providing for group welfare through social justice and communal responsibility. This prescriptive focus leads liberals to focus more on societal gains, equality, and to be more accepting of societal change and ingroup heterogeneity.

Beyond the social order and social justice motives described in the MMM, a secondary goal of the current studies was to test for possible additional moral motives that the theory may have missed. One could argue, based on the MMM, that liberals do not moralize issues related to protecting society and conservatives don’t moralize issues related to providing for society. Alternatively, it’s also possible that liberals and conservatives both have moral motives related to both protecting and providing for society that are simply not described in the MMM. Specifically, the current studies tested whether conservatives have moral motives about how societal resources should be distributed that emphasize allocation based on merit rather than equality and social justice. The current studies also tested whether liberals have moral motives about how best to protect society based on ensuring that everyone has an equal voice in the democratic process and that no person or organization has more than its share of political interest. That is, liberals may extend their concerns with equality beyond its emphasis on providing for the wellbeing of society to also include how our democracy ought to function to help protect its core values.
In sum, the current studies focused specifically on the group level to explain how the
different moral motives of liberals and conservatives might underlie each group’s feelings of
moral conviction and associated political activism. Theories such as the MMM posit differences
in what the content is of the moral motives endorsed by liberals and conservatives, but it is not
clear whether these differences translate into differences in the perceived moral relevance in their
actual policy attitudes or if they show any relationship to behavior. The theory of moral
conviction provides a useful framework for testing the hypotheses described in the MMM about
how the morality of liberals and conservatives relates to their perceived moral relevance on
specific political attitudes and how it might motivate political engagement and activism. The
theory of moral conviction assumes that for any given attitude object people will differ in the
extent to which they see it as a reflection of their core moral beliefs. Thus, this framework allows
for a direct test of when and for whom concerns about social order and social justice predict
people’s feelings of moral conviction, and whether moral conviction mediates the relationship
between the two societal level moral motives and political engagement.

B. The Theory of Moral Conviction

There is variation in the extent to which people view political issues in moral terms (e.g.,
Skitka & Bauman, 2008). A foundational premise of research on moral conviction is that it is
important to measure whether people view their attitudes on political issues through their
subjective sense of morality rather than to assume that morality is an objective property of the
attitude object. Indeed, the definition of moral conviction as a person’s subjective evaluation of
fundamental right and wrong, good and bad (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005) reflects this
attempt to capture the variation in the moral relevance people attach to various issues. Research
on moral conviction assumes that people hold the political positions they do for different reasons
– sometimes those reasons will include their subjective sense of morality and sometimes they will not. For example, people may support or oppose the death penalty for either moral or non-moral reasons. Some people’s support or opposition may reflect simple cost-benefit analyses leading to beliefs about how effective or ineffective the death penalty is at deterring crime. Still others may base their opinion on the death penalty on what the majority of the people in their social group believe, or on whatever happens to be the law of the land where they live. Each of these two groups of people are likely to view the fact that others disagree with them on the issue as relatively acceptable and that this variation in opinion reflects variation in such things as personal preference, self-interest, or cultural custom (Nucci & Turiel, 1978). A third group of people, however, may view their position on the death penalty in moral terms and as a reflection of their fundamental beliefs about what is right or wrong. People who base their stance on the death penalty on moral grounds are likely to differ markedly from those who do not, and are likely to view those who disagree with them on this issue as morally flawed if not downright evil (e.g., Skitka et al., 2005; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000).

Beyond how moral conviction affects how people view attitudinally dissimilar others, attitudes held with strong moral conviction are likely to differ from otherwise strong but non-moral attitudes in a variety of other ways. The theory of moral conviction (Skitka, 2010; 2013) has applied the domain theory of moral development (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Turiel, 1983) to people’s political attitudes to generate testable hypotheses about what differentiates moral from otherwise strong, but non-moral attitudes. Specifically, compared to people’s non-moral attitudes, those they hold with moral conviction are likely to be applied universally and viewed as objective facts about the world, to have strong ties to emotion, and to provide a strong motivation to engage in attitude relevant behavior (Skitka et al., 2005). Indeed, measures of
people’s level of moral conviction on political issues predict meaningful variance in attitude related affect, cognition, and behavior (see Skitka, 2010 for a review). Stronger (versus weaker) moral conviction felt towards political attitudes predicts (1) people’s feelings of trust and legitimacy of political authorities such as the U.S. Supreme Court (Skitka, Bauman, & Lytle, 2009; Wisneski, Lytle, & Skitka, 2009), (2) greater preferred physical and social distance from attitudinally dissimilar others (Skitka et al., 2005), and (3) greater willingness to engage in politically relevant behavior such as voting (Morgan et al., 2010; Skitka & Bauman, 2008) and activism (Morgan, 2011; Skitka & Wisneski, 2011; Skitka et al., 2013).

Of all the consequences of moral conviction, its relationship with motivation to engage in politically relevant behavior appears to be particularly robust and has been replicated across several studies and using a variety of political issues. For example, stronger (versus weaker) moral conviction about physician assisted suicide and same-sex marriage predicts greater willingness to engage in political activism on those issues (Skitka et al., 2013; Skitka & Wisneski, 2011). Similarly, moral conviction about people’s preferred presidential candidates as well as about important political issues of the day predicted a greater likelihood of turning out to vote in the 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 U.S. Presidential elections (Skitka, Brandt, & Wisneski, 2012; Morgan et al., 2010; Skitka & Bauman, 2008). Finally, none of the past work on moral conviction has found differences between liberals and conservatives in the overall level of moral conviction felt about their political attitudes or the relationship between moral conviction and activism (Skitka et al., in press).

Despite the lack of political orientation differences in past moral conviction research, the MMM points to several as yet unexplored ways that liberals and conservatives could differ in what predicts the moral convictions of each. Even if liberals and conservatives tend to moralize
their attitudes to an equal degree and this moral conviction is equally motivating, this does not mean that the moral convictions of each group are rooted in the same sources. Below, I will describe the specific hypothesis proposed by the MMM and how they, theoretically, should relate to the moral convictions of liberals and conservatives.

C. Overview of the Proposed Studies and Hypotheses

1. Hypotheses

Three studies tested several key aspects of the MMM. First, I tested whether the societal level moral motives proposed in the MMM are, in fact, related to people’s sense of moral conviction about political issues of the day (the moral relevance hypothesis) and whether these concerns underlie people’s willingness to become politically engaged in the name of their moral beliefs (the moral motivation hypothesis). Second, I also tested whether the relationship between the societal level moral motives, moral conviction, and political activism differs for liberals and conservatives (the moral differences hypothesis). That is, according to the moral differences hypothesis, liberals’ endorsement of social justice motives, and conservatives’ endorsement of social order motives, should each respectively predict their feeling of moral conviction about specific political attitudes (Study 1), and should drive their willingness to engage in political activism in morally convicted domains (Studies 2 and 3). Finally, in Study 3 I tested the prediction from the MMM that social order and social justice are rooted in broader regulatory focus concerns related to promotion (social justice) and prevention (social order). Specifically, I tested this regulatory focus hypothesis by manipulating people’s current regulatory state and assessing how it affects their endorsement of social order and social justice.
2. **The Current Studies**

Three studies tested the moral relevance, moral motivation, moral differences, and regulatory focus hypotheses. First, Study 1 tested whether the different group level moral motives endorsed by liberals and conservatives differentially predicts the level of moral conviction each feel about political issues of the day. Although previous research has found that endorsement of social justice versus social order motives predicts people’s attitude positions (Janoff-Bulman et al, 2008), it is not clear whether the different group level moral motives predict the moral relevance people attach to their attitudes. Thus, Study 1 attempted to test whether different group level motives predict people’s sense of moral conviction about their political attitudes. These tests extend previous research by determining whether the group level moral motives outlined in the MMM actually predict people’s tendency to perceive moral relevance in societal level political issues. In other words, Study 1 provided a necessary test of the MMM by testing whether the differences in group level motives endorsed by liberals and conservatives reflect differences in the *morality* of the two groups. If the different societal level motives described by the MMM are a reflection of the different moral concerns of liberals and conservatives, then these moral motives should predict each group’s feeling of moral conviction related to political attitudes relevant to those motives. Liberals’ endorsement of social justice, but not social order, motives should predict their level of moral conviction felt about their political attitudes. Conservatives’ level of moral conviction, however, should be predicted by their endorsement of social order motives, but not social justice. Furthermore, Study 1 also tested the possibility that liberals and conservatives have societal level moral motives not described in the MMM. It is possible that liberals moralize protecting society and conservatives moralize providing for society, but for reasons other than social order and social justice. Study 1 will test
whether (1) conservatives apply principles of merit rather than social justice when deciding how to distribute resources in society and (2) liberals focus on ensuring equal voice in the democratic process when attempting to protect our society and way of life.

Second, Studies 2 and 3 tested whether the different societal level moral motives endorsed by liberals and conservatives can help explain what motivates each group’s willingness to engage in morally motivated political activism. The MMM is, at its heart, a model of moral motivation – Studies 2 and 3 provide a test of this fundamental aspect of the MMM. Specifically, Studies 2 and 3 sought to determine whether the social justice and social order motives are motivational by testing whether they predict people’s willingness to engage in political activism, as well as whether this effect is mediated by people’s feeling of moral conviction. In addition to testing whether the results of Study 2 replicate, Study 3 attempted to manipulate the societal moral motives by manipulating participants’ current regulatory focus. This manipulation provided a test of whether social order and social justice are rooted in people’s more general promotion and prevention concerns.
II. STUDY 1

As described above, Study 1 was an initial test of whether the societal level moral motives predict people’s sense of moral conviction about their political attitudes and whether the relationships differ for liberals and conservatives. In doing this, Study 1 tested whether the motives described by the MMM actually reflect people’s sense of morality and whether they constitute moral differences between liberals and conservatives.

A. Method

1. Participants

Participants for Study 1 consisted of 511 people recruited though the University of Illinois at Chicago MassMail system ($N = 251$) and through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website (Mturk, $N = 260$). The MassMail system is a listserv that sends emails to all UIC faculty, staff, and students who have not unsubscribed from the list. MTurk is a website that allows people to complete short tasks for small amounts of money, and data collected from MTurk is at least of comparable quality to data collected from student subject pools (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Participants who completed the survey through the UIC MassMail system had the option of entering a lottery to win one of four $50 gift cards to Amazon.com. Participants who completed the survey through Mturk were each paid 60 cents for their time.\(^1\) Finally, data from ten participants were dropped for missing more than two of three instructional manipulation checks, leaving a final sample of 501.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Although samples from MTurk are more diverse than those collected from college student subject pools, they still suffer from several potential drawbacks (Busby, 2013). Of particular concern for the current study, MTurk samples tend to under-represent conservatives (Kahan, 2013). That said, studies with MTurk samples have replicated several results based on the MMM for liberal and conservative participants (Wisneski & Skitka, 2013).

\(^2\) None of the effects of social order and social justice reported below were moderated by sample. As such, this variable will not be discussed further.
2. **Sample Demographics**\(^3\)

The age of the sample ranged from 18 to 75 with an average age of 30.8 years (SD = 11.11). The sample was also slightly more male (59.4%) than female (40.6%). Finally, the sample was also highly educated, in general. In terms of the highest level of education the participants had achieved, roughly 7% had earned a high school diploma; 27% had some college experience, but had not earned a degree; 37% had earned a bachelor’s degree; and 20% had earned a Master’s, Doctorate, or other professional degree.

3. **Procedure**

Participants were each provided with a link to the survey website through an advertisement sent to them via their University email account (MassMail sample) or through a posting on the Mturk website. After consenting to participate in the study and verifying that they are at least 18 years of age, participants completed a series of measures presented in a random order. First, participants completed the Moral Motives Scale (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008) to assess their endorsement of the group level moral motives of social justice and social order, as well as the self-relevant moral motives of self-restraint and self-reliance. Beyond the items in the moral motives scale, several alternative measures of societal level moral motives were also included. Specifically, additional social order and social justice items were included in order to have measures for each that were framed in both promotion and prevention terms. That is, a promotion worded social order and a prevention worded social justice item were each included. Furthermore, additional items were also included to measure a possible liberal moral motive related to protecting society as well as a possible conservative moral motive related to providing

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\(^3\) Due to a programming error, demographic variables for approximately 100 participants in each of Studies 1 (N = 108) and 2 (N = 107) were not collected. Thus, the demographics reported here and in Study 2 reflect the characteristics of the samples without these participants.
for society. Second, participants completed the Moral Foundations scale (Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2010) to assess their endorsement of each of the five “moral foundations” (i.e., Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Loyalty/Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, and Sanctity/Degradation). Third, participants also reported their feelings of moral conviction (Skitka, in press; Skitka et al., 2005) as well as attitude importance for seven political issues of the day (see Appendix A for a list of the seven issues used). Finally, participants reported their political orientation along with a page of demographic variables before being thanked for their time and debriefed. I provide additional information about these measures below.

4. Measures

Moral motives scale. To assess their endorsement of the moral motives of self-reliance, self-restraint, social justice, and social order, participants completed a shortened version of the Moral Motives Scale (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008). Participants indicated their agreement or disagreement with 10 statements. Two items each were used to assess participants’ endorsement of motives related to self-reliance and self-restraint. Example statements for these included: “I value hard work and personal commitment when it comes to making decisions in my life” (i.e., self-reliance), and “It’s particularly important to me to demonstrate self-control in the face of temptation” (i.e., self-restraint). Participants also completed three items for each of the two societal level moral motives. For both social order and social justice, participants completed two items for each taken from the Moral Motives Scale. Examples of these items include “We should all be responsible for improving the welfare of others beyond our immediate circle of friends and family” (i.e., social justice), and “Giving people the freedom to choose the way they live threatens the societal bonds that hold us together” (i.e., social order). Furthermore, participants also completed an additional item for each of the two societal motives. For social order, the new
item was framed in promotion rather than prevention terms, whereas for social justice, the new item was framed in prevention rather than promotion terms. Specifically, participants reported their agreement or disagreement with the statements: “Our society would be safer and more secure if we promoted traditional values” (social order), and “One of the most important goals of our society should be to prevent anyone from going without basic necessities” (social justice). Responses were given on 7-point scales with scale points: strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, neither agree nor disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, and strongly agree. Each of the four measures was found to be moderately reliable: self-reliance: $\alpha = .60$, self-restraint: $\alpha = .73$, social justice: $\alpha = .72$, social order: $\alpha = .68$.

**Possible additional moral motives.** In addition to these measures of the moral motives described in the MMM, two additional measures were included to assess whether there are (1) conservative moral motives about providing for society and (2) liberal motives about protecting society. Specifically, the conservative version of the social justice motive asked about allocating societal resources based on merit by asking people the extent to which they agree with the statement “The fairest way to allocate our society's resources is to do so based on merit.” The liberal version of the social order motive focused on protecting society by ensuring that everyone has an equal voice in the democratic process and that no one is allowed to have a disproportionate impact on the government. Thus, this “egalitarianism of voice” item asked participants’ about how much they agreed with the statement “The best way to protect our society's values and way of life is to keep businesses and corporations out of the democratic process.” Responses were given on 7-point scales with scale points: strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, neither agree nor disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, and strongly agree.
**Moral foundations scale.** Participants completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ, Graham et al., 2011) to assess their endorsement of each of the five moral foundations. The MFQ consists of two subscales and a total of 20 items. For the first subscale, participants reported how relevant each of 10 considerations was to them when they decide whether something is right or wrong. Each statement represented one of the five moral foundations such as “whether or not someone suffered emotionally” (harm/care), “whether or not some people were treated differently than others” (fairness/reciprocity), “whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country” (in-group/loyalty), “whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority” (authority/respect), and “whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency” (purity/divinity). Participants responded on a six-point scale with point labels *not at all relevant, not very relevant, slightly relevant, somewhat relevant, very relevant,* and *extremely relevant.*

The second subscale also consisted of 10 items and involved having participants indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with ten statements each related to the one five foundations. Examples of the statements include “compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue” (harm/care), “when the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly” (fairness/reciprocity), “I am proud of my country’s history” (in-group/loyalty), “respect for authority is something all children need to learn” (authority/respect), and “people should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed” (purity/divinity). Participants responded on seven-point scales with the point labels of *strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, neither agree nor disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree,* and *strongly agree.*
Taken together, each foundation was measured with 4 items. To combine the items for each subscale, I standardized participants’ responses prior to averaging them to create composite measures. The reliability for each of the measures of the five foundations was similar to levels observed in previous research using the scale, harm/care: .67, fairness/reciprocity: .62, in-group/loyalty: .65, authority/respect: .72, and purity/divinity: .80. Finally, I ran a principal components analysis with an oblique rotation including the five moral foundations subscales to test the factor structure of the measure. It has been argued previously that the five foundations can be organized into two overarching groups with harm and fairness making up the “individuating” foundations, and loyalty, authority, and purity making up the “binding” foundations (Graham et al., 2011). The results of the principal components analysis were consistent with a two, rather than five, component solution. The first component accounted for 46.1% of the variance and included the loyalty, authority, and purity scales; the second component accounted for an additional 29% of the variance and included harm and fairness scales. In light of these results, I collapsed the foundations into these two broader categories to simplify analyses.

**Moral conviction.** After reporting their support or opposition, participants answered four questions for each of the seven issues to assess their level of moral conviction for each. Specifically, participants reported the extent to which their position on each issue is “a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions,” “connected to your fundamental beliefs about right and wrong,” “a moral stance,” and “based on moral principle.” Reponses were given using five-point scale with point labels *not at all, slightly, moderate, much,* and *very much.* The reliability for each issue was high (all $\alpha > .90$) so the four items for each were averaged together within each issue.
Attitude importance. Participants answered three questions meant to assess their level of attitude importance for each of the seven issues. For each issue, participants reported the extent to which each issues is “personally important to you,” “something you care a lot about,” and “important to you relative to other issues of the day.” For each of the seven issues, participants’ responses to these three questions were averaged to create indices of how important their attitude is to them, all \( \alpha > .88 \).

Political orientation. Participants’ political orientation was measured using two items. Participants first indicated whether they “consider themselves to be liberal, conservative, moderate, or something else?” Participants who indicated that they were liberal or conservative were asked a follow up question where they indicated the degree to which they consider themselves to be liberal/conservative on a 3-point scale with the labels slightly liberal/conservative, moderately liberal/conservative, and strongly liberal/conservative. Participants who responded that they were moderate, uncertain, or other were branched to a second question asking if they “had to choose, would you consider yourself a liberal, conservative, or neither?” These two items were then combined into a single bipolar measure of political orientation ranging from -4 (strongly liberal) to 4 (strongly conservative). Participants who indicated that they are “moderate, uncertain, or other” in the initial question and indicated on the follow-up question that they would not consider themselves liberal or conservative “if they had to choose” were re-coded into a single group at the mid-point (zero) of our scale. Those who indicated on the follow-up question that they would consider themselves liberal or conservative “if they had to choose” were recoded into their own category on either side of the mid-point indicting that they “lean liberal/conservative.”
Initial inspection of the distribution of political orientation revealed that the current sample overrepresented liberals compared to conservatives (see Figure 1). Furthermore, political orientation strongly correlated with political extremity, \( r(501) = -0.51 \) (see Appendix B for the means and standard deviations as well as bivariate correlations for all variables for all 3 studies), such that the liberal participants in this sample were more politically extreme than conservative participants. Thus, to mitigate the possibility of confounding political orientation with political extremity in my analyses, political orientation was recoded into a trichotomous variable with liberals coded as -1, moderates coded as 0, and conservatives coded as 1.\(^4\) Recoding political orientation in this way reduced its correlation with political extremity considerably, \( r(501) = -0.29 \). Thus, this trichotomous political orientation variable was used in all analyses reported below as well as in Studies 2 and 3.

B. Results

1. Testing the Moral Relevance of the MMM

The goal of the current study was to test the moral relevance and moral differences hypotheses (see Table II for a complete summary of the support for each hypothesis across all 3 studies). According to the moral relevance hypothesis, stronger (versus weaker) endorsement of social order and social justice should predict stronger moral conviction about political issues of the day. Furthermore, according to the moral differences hypothesis, liberals and conservatives should base their sense of moral conviction about societal level issues on different moral motives. Specifically, the relationship between social justice and moral conviction should be

\(^4\) It should also be noted that the pattern of results reported here did not differ if the original bipolar political orientation variable was used rather than the trichotomous version.
stronger for liberals than conservatives, whereas the relationship between social order and moral conviction should be stronger for conservatives than liberals.

Figure 1. Frequency distribution of political orientation in Study 1
As will be shown below, the results of Study 1 found qualified support for the moral relevance hypothesis, and unqualified support for the moral differences hypotheses.

Specifically, I tested the moral relevance and moral differences hypotheses using hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) with moral conviction about each of the seven political issues nested within participants. This analysis allowed for a powerful test of the relationship between moral conviction and the two societal level moral motives within a single model, as well as whether these relationships were moderated by political orientation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Moral relevance</th>
<th>Moral differences</th>
<th>Moral motivation</th>
<th>Regulatory focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Supported, (Main effect of SJ and two-way SO by PO interaction predicting MC)</td>
<td>Supported, (SO by PO and SJ by PO interaction predicting MC)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Unsupported, (Factor analytic results showing that the promotion and prevention forms of the SO and SJ loaded with the measures described in the MMM)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Supported, (Main effects of SO and SJ predicting MC)</td>
<td>Mixed Support, (SO by PO interaction predicting MC was significant, but the SJ by PO interaction was not)</td>
<td>Supported, (Main effects of SO and SJ predicting activism intentions as well as the results of the meditational analysis)</td>
<td>Unsupported, (Factor analytic results showing that the promotion and prevention forms of the SO and SJ loaded with the measures described in the MMM)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Supported, (Main effects of SO and SJ predicting MC)</td>
<td>Supported, (SO by PO interaction and SJ by PO interaction predicting MC)</td>
<td>Mixed Support, (Main effects of SO and SJ predicting activism intentions, however, the meditational results for SO failed to replicate Study 2)</td>
<td>Unsupported, (The regulatory focus manipulation failed to affect endorsement of either SO or SJ)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Prior to testing the specific study hypotheses, however, I ran two initial models to determine whether using multi-level modeling to account for the nested structure of the data was warranted. The first model predicted participant moral conviction with only the intercept included as a fixed effect (i.e., it was an “empty” model), and the second model included both the intercept fixed effect along with a random intercept capturing the variation in moral conviction across participants. Comparison of these two models via a likelihood ratio test revealed that model fit was significantly improved by including the random intercept, $\chi^2(1) = 907.69$, $p < .001$.\(^5\) Thus, the use of HLM was warranted in this case.\(^6\)

Next, I entered the predictor variables in two steps into the model that included the random intercept. In the first step, I entered the direct effects of social order, social justice, and political orientation. In the second step, I entered the two-way interactions between social order and social justice and political orientation (see Table III for the results). Looking first at the results of the direct effects, and partially consistent with the moral relevance hypothesis, greater endorsement of social justice moral motives was related to higher moral conviction (see Table III). The direct effect of social order was also significant but, contrary to what the moral

\(^5\) Two additional tests were also run to determine whether the model fit was improved by including random slope effects for each of the two moral motives. Model fit was not significantly improved by including a random slope for social order, $\chi^2(1) = 2.79$, $p = .24$, and was only marginally significantly improved by including a random slope for social justice, $\chi^2(1) = 5.17$, $p = .08$. Rerunning the analyses including the social justice random slope, however, did not change the pattern of results for the fixed effects presented here.\(^6\) See Table A.2 in Appendix B for regression models predicting the moral conviction for each issue individually. Looking across the seven issues, the pattern of results in support of the moral relevance hypothesis for social justice found in the HLM analysis is consistent across five of the seven issues. Similarly, the support for the moral differences hypothesis found in the HLM results is consistent across all seven issues for social order and three of the seven issues for social justice.
relevance hypothesis predicts, was negatively related to moral conviction. The direct effect of political orientation was non-significant.

### TABLE III
**STUDY 1 HLM RESULTS PREDICTING MORAL CONVICTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model without controls</th>
<th>Model with controls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude Importance</td>
<td>--</td>
<td><strong>0.57</strong>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuating Moral Foundations</td>
<td>--</td>
<td><strong>0.23</strong>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Reliance</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Restraint</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Justice</td>
<td><strong>0.21</strong>**</td>
<td><strong>0.08</strong>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Order</td>
<td>-<strong>0.06</strong></td>
<td>-<strong>0.06</strong>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuating by PO interaction</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.11^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO by PO interaction</td>
<td><strong>0.19</strong>**</td>
<td><strong>0.10</strong>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJ by PO interaction</td>
<td>-0.08*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10**
Turning next to the two-way interactions, consistent with the moral differences hypothesis, there were significant political orientation by social order, \( b = .19, SE = .04, p < .001 \), and political orientation by social justice interactions, \( b = -.08, SE = .04, p = .02 \). First, as predicted by the moral differences hypothesis, social order motives positively predicted moral conviction among conservatives, \( b = .23, SE = .06, p < .001 \), negatively predicted moral conviction among liberals, \( b = -.15, SE = .03, p < .001 \), and showed no relationship with moral conviction among moderates, \( b = .04, SE = .03, p = .20 \) (See Figure 2). Second, also consistent with the moral differences hypothesis, social justice motives were positively associated with moral conviction among liberals, \( b = .24, SE = .04, p < .001 \), and moderates, \( b = .16, SE = .03, p = .002 \), but had no relationship with moral conviction for conservatives, \( b = .08, SE = .06, p = .16 \) (see Figure 3).

In sum, these results provide initial support for the predictions of the MMM. First, greater endorsement of social justice predicted stronger moral conviction. Social order was negatively related to moral conviction, but this main effect was qualified by the predicted social order by political orientation interaction. Specifically, consistent with the moral differences hypothesis, the relationships between the moral motives and moral conviction differed for liberals and conservatives. Social order positively predicted moral conviction for conservatives and negatively predicted moral conviction among liberals. Similarly, social justice positively predicted moral conviction for liberals, but was unrelated to moral conviction for conservatives.

Despite this support for the MMM, it is still possible that additional motives exist outside what the theory describes. Next, I explore the possibility that additional societal moral motives exist that can differentiate between the morality of liberals and conservatives.
Figure 2. Simple effect of social order at each level of political orientation on moral conviction (Study 1)
Figure 3. Simple effect of social justice at each level of political orientation on moral conviction

(Study 1)
2. **Testing Alternative Forms of the Societal Moral Motives**

Although the above results provide initial tests of the MMM, one question that remains is whether there are forms of the proscriptive and prescriptive motives that appeal to liberals and conservatives, respectively. In other words, are there moral motives related to protecting society that liberals endorse and are there moral motives related to providing for society that conservatives will endorse? If conservative morality is based primarily on protecting society, and preventing harm via maintaining social order, then their endorsement of moral motives related to providing for society should not predict their feelings of moral conviction (i.e., should not be morally relevant), even if they are framed in more stereotypically “conservative” terms. Similarly, if liberal morality is based primarily on providing for societal wellbeing via social justice, then their endorsement of moral motives related to protecting society should not predict their sense of moral conviction, even when the items are framed in a stereotypically “liberal” way. Alternatively, liberals’ and conservatives’ moral motivations may include both protecting and providing for society. One possibility is that liberals value protecting society based on ensuring that everyone has an equal say in the democratic process (what I call “equality of voice”) and that conservatives value providing for society by ensuring that resources are distributed based on merit, rather than equality.

To test whether liberal morality about protecting society is based on equality of voice in the democratic process and conservative morality about providing for society is based on merit, I reran the initial HLM analyses described earlier substituting these two variables for the original social order and social justice items from the MMM. The results were partially consistent with the hypothesis that liberals and conservatives possess moral motives about protecting and providing for society. Specifically, I found a significant direct effect for merit concerns, such that
stronger endorsement of distributing societal resources based on merit was associated with lower moral conviction, \( b = -0.05, \ SE = .02, \ p = .03 \). This effect, however, was qualified by a two-way political orientation by merit interaction, \( b = .07, \ SE = .03, \ p = .01 \). For liberals, stronger endorsement of societal level merit concerns predicted lower moral conviction, \( b = -0.07, \ SE = .02, \ p = .002 \). This relationship became non-significant for moderates, \( b = .00, \ SE = .03, \ p = .93 \), and was positive, though still non-significant, for conservatives, \( b = .07, \ SE = .05, \ p = .17 \). Thus, these results provide tentative support for the prediction that merit represents a conservative moral motive related to providing for societal wellbeing.

Turning next to whether liberals possess moral motives related to protecting society, I found a significant direct effect of equality of voice on moral conviction, \( b = .08, \ SE = .02, \ p < .001 \). Greater endorsement of the statement that the best way to protect our society is to keep businesses and corporations out of the democratic process was related to stronger moral conviction. Furthermore, there was also a political orientation by equality of voice interaction, \( b = -.07, \ SE = .03, \ p = .007 \). For liberals, greater endorsement of the equality of voice measure predicted stronger moral conviction, \( b = .12, \ SE = .03, \ p < .001 \). This effect became smaller though still significant for moderates, \( b = .05, \ SE = .02, \ p = .05 \), and non-significant for conservatives, \( b = -.02, \ SE = .04, \ p = .59 \).

In sum, these results provide initial evidence that there may be additional moral motives not described in the MMM. At the very least, it appears that liberals may apply principles related to equality and social justice beyond how best to allocate tangible, societal resources to also include equal influence and voice in the democratic process. These results also point to the possibility that, when determining how resources should be distributed in society, conservatives may emphasize merit rather than equality, although this relationship failed to achieve statistical
significance. Furthermore, assuming that social order and social justice also reflect prevention and promotion concerns, respectively, these results also open the door to the possibility that liberals also have prevention oriented moral motives and conservatives also have promotion oriented moral motives.

3. **Ruling Out Alternative Explanations for the MMM**

Beyond testing whether there are additional moral motives that aren’t described in the MMM, it is also important to test whether social order and social justice boil down to other related constructs already described elsewhere in the literature. It remains unclear, for example, whether the results are independent of other moral motives discussed in the MMM itself as well as the moral foundations described in moral foundations theory. It is possible that the social order and social justice motives fail to explain any unique variance in moral conviction when controlling for other moral motives such as self-reliance and self-restraint, or for the individuating moral foundations. Similarly, the above results also do not rule out the possibility that endorsement of social order and social justice motives simply predicts stronger attitudes in general, rather than moral conviction, in particular. That is, one could argue that social order and social justice are, in fact, not morally relevant at all and instead simply make people feel more strongly about their attitudes.

To address these alternative explanations, I reran the original HLM analyses including social order and social justice controlling for participants’ attitude importance (a measure of attitude strength, Petty & Krosnick, 1995) about each of the seven issues, as well as their endorsement of the individuating moral foundations, self-reliance motives, and self-restraint motives. Furthermore, because moral foundations theory also predicts that the effect of the individuating foundations on moral conviction should be stronger for liberals than conservatives
(Graham et al., 2009), I also including the two-way individuating foundations by political orientation interaction. As can be seen in the right column of Table III, including these alternative explanations failed to reduce the effects described above to non-significance in every case with the exception of one. When controlling for the individuating foundations, only the two-way social justice by political orientation interaction became non-significant, although the direct effect of social justice remained significant. Also of note, consistent with moral foundations theory, greater endorsement of the individuating foundations also independently predicted greater moral conviction above and beyond both the societal and individual level moral motives. Furthermore, there was also a marginally significant individuating foundations by political orientation interaction on moral conviction. Consistent with moral foundations theory, greater endorsement of the individuating foundations predicted stronger moral conviction for liberals, $b = .28$, $SE = .06$, $p < .001$, and moderates, $b = .17$, $SE = .05$, $p = .001$, but not for conservatives, $b = .06$, $SE = .09$, $p = .49$ (Graham et al., 2009).

In sum, these results provide some evidence that the societal level moral motives described in the MMM are distinct from other types of moral motives. Social order and social justice continued to predict moral conviction even when controlling for a measure of attitude strength closely related to moral conviction as well as constructs related to the social order and social justice motives such as the individuating moral foundations and the self-level moral motives. It should be noted, however, that, although the direct effects of social order and social justice remained significant even when controlling for the individuating foundations, the social

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7 Because the binding moral foundations are theoretically the same as the social order moral motives, they were not included in this analysis. Interestingly, controlling for the binding foundations and the political orientation by binding foundations interaction does not reduce the effects of the social order motives found in the primary analyses to non-significance.
justice by political orientation interaction became non-significant. This finding points to the possibility of at least some overlap between the social justice motive and the individuating moral foundations – a point I will return to in the discussion for Study 1.

4. **Preliminary Tests of the Regulatory Focus Hypothesis**

Finally, one could also argue that the social order and social justice moral motives are not, as the MMM predicts, grounded in promotion and prevention concerns. The current study included additional items that measured social order, but framed it in terms of promotion, and social justice, but framed it in terms of prevention. Thus, I conducted exploratory analyses to see whether these additional items differed from the items taken from the original moral motives scale (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008). This analysis can be thought of as a very basic test of the regulatory focus hypothesis. If social justice reflects promotion concerns and social order reflects prevention concerns, then we would expect the alternatively framed items for each motive (i.e., social justice prevention and social order promotion) to be either weakly correlated or uncorrelated with the original measures of social justice framed in promotion terms, and social order framed in prevention terms, respectively. If however, social justice and social order can be seen in either promotion or prevention terms, then the alternatively framed items should correlate highly with the original measures of the motives.

Contrary to the regulatory focus hypothesis, the results of this analysis supported the notion that social order and social justice can reflect either promotion or prevention. First, the prevention framed social justice item was strongly correlated with the original social justice measure, \( r(501) = .77, p < .001 \). Second, the promotion framed social order item was also strongly correlated with the original social order measure, \( r(501) = .79, p < .001 \). In sum, these
results provide preliminary evidence that the social order and social justice motives can come in either promotion or prevention forms – a question I will return to in Study 3.
C. **Study 1 Discussion**

The results of Study 1 partially supported the moral relevance of the motives described in the MMM. As predicted by the moral relevance hypothesis, greater endorsement of social justice motives predicted people’s feeling of moral conviction about their political attitudes. Stronger endorsement of social order motives, however, was negatively related to moral conviction without taking into account the political orientation of the perceiver. This overall negative relationship between social order and moral conviction was likely the result of the over representation of liberals in the current sample (see Figure 1). Only when political orientation was taken into account as a moderator was the predicted positive relationship between social order and moral conviction found: social order positively predicted moral conviction among conservative participants. I also found support for the moral differences hypothesis that liberals would moralize based on social justice more than conservatives, whereas conservatives would moralize based on social order more than liberals. Greater endorsement of social order motives predicted stronger morally convicted attitudes for conservatives, but not for moderates or liberals, whereas greater endorsement of social justice motives predicted stronger moral conviction for liberals, but not conservatives. Unexpectedly, greater endorsement of social order motives for liberals predicted lower moral conviction. This negative relationship between social order and moral conviction points to an interesting possible avenue for future research. One possible explanation is that liberals can endorse social order, but when they do it is for non-moral reasons perhaps related to concerns about norms and conventionality rather than morality.

Furthermore, these results are also consistent with similar results found in previous research showing that greater endorsement of the binding moral foundations among liberals predicts lower moralization outside the domain of politics (Wisneski, Conway, & Skitka, 2014).
Furthermore, the results of Study 1 also showed some support for the social order and social justice moral motives being distinct from other moral motives (i.e., moral motives at the self rather than collective level), the individuating moral foundations, and are not only associated with the strength of people’s political attitudes, but instead, uniquely predict the degree to which people feel morally convicted about their political attitudes. That said, the interaction between social justice and political orientation dropped to non-significance when the individuating foundations were included in the model. Even if social justice explains additional variation in people’s sense of morality beyond the individuating foundations, there is clearly considerable overlap between the two constructs. There are at least two explanations for these findings – one methodological and one theoretical. First, although the MMM defines the interpersonal level motives as theoretically equivalent to the individuating foundations and pertinent only to interpersonal fairness and reciprocity, the individuating foundations measure (Graham et al., 2011) does not distinguish between different justice concerns (e.g., equity versus equality) or different levels of analysis (e.g., individual others versus society). Thus, from the perspective of the MMM, the measure of individuating foundations may confound concerns about equality/social justice at the societal level (e.g., “Justice is the most important requirement for society”) with concerns about reciprocity/interpersonal fairness at the individual level (e.g., “Whether some people were treated differently than others”). Although the use of the individuating foundations subscale in the current research allowed me to use a validated measure from the moral psychology literature, it may not have captured the “interpersonal level” moral motives described in the MMM as cleanly as it could have.

Regardless of the possible measurement issues, another possible alternative explanation for the overlap between social justice and individuating foundations is that the two constructs are
less distinct than is proposed in the MMM. Considered along side previous work that shows that concerns about “macro level” equality are distinct from those about “micro level” reciprocity and merit (Brickman, Folger, Goode, & Schul, 1981), one possible explanation for these seemingly disparate findings is that the distinction between macro and micro justice holds for some people (e.g., liberals), but less so for others (e.g., conservatives). The MMM does not, for example, allow for a moral motive at the societal level that reflects concerns for more “conservative” notions of fairness, such as equity, reciprocity, and merit. That is, rather than assuming that different moral motives are only relevant at specific levels of analysis (as the MMM does), it may be that people differ in both their overall endorsement of any given motive as well as the contexts in which the motive applies. In the case of interpersonal versus societal level fairness, whereas liberals may base their morality on social justice at the societal level and their morality on reciprocity/equity at the individual level, conservatives may base their morality on reciprocity/equity at both levels of analysis. In sum, the overlap between social justice and the individuating foundations found in the current data may be the result of liberals applying different moral motives at the individual versus group level, but conservatives applying the individual level motives at both levels. This interpretation of the results is further bolstered by the finding in Study 1 that conservatives moralize at the societal level based on merit – a point I turn to next.

Also in Study 1, I found initial evidence that there may be important societal level moral motives other than social order and social justice. Specifically, I found evidence that liberals’ apply their emphasis on social justice and equality beyond the domain of providing for society and resource distribution to also include concerns for protecting society. Among liberals, stronger moral conviction was associated with greater endorsement of the belief that the best way
to protect our society is to ensure that everyone has an equal say and that no one has undue influence over the government compared to everyone else (i.e., that businesses should be kept out of the democratic process). Some evidence was also found that when determining how best to provide (rather than protect) society, conservatives might base their moral convictions on concerns about merit and people getting what they deserve, although this result was only a trend. This finding is consistent with the above discussion that conservatives apply moral concerns about equity, merit, and reciprocity beyond the domain of individual others (i.e., micro justice) to also determine how resources should be distributed within society writ large (i.e., macro justice, Brickman et al., 1981).

Beyond testing the moral relevance and moral differences hypotheses, Study 1 also provided a preliminary test of the prediction that the social order and social justice motives are based in underlying prevention and promotion concerns, respectively. Study 1 included a measure of each moral motive worded in both promotion and prevention terms. If social order is based in prevention and social justice is based in promotion, then we would expect measures of each motive emphasizing its hypothesized regulatory goal (i.e., prevention oriented social order and promotion oriented social justice) to be unrelated (or weakly related) to measures emphasizing the opposing regulatory goal (i.e., promotion oriented social order and prevention oriented social justice). Inspection of the bivariate correlations, however, found these measures to be highly correlated. Although a more direct test of the regulatory focus hypothesis—that is, the prediction that the social justice motives are more promotion than prevention oriented, and the social order motives are more prevention than promotion oriented – will be conducted in Study 3, these initial results appear to indicate that the promotion/prevention distinction may not be central to what differentiates social order from social justice motives.
In sum, even though the results of Study 1 found support for several of the predictions of the MMM, they also pointed to several interesting extensions as well as areas that may need of further clarification (see Table II for a summary of the support for each hypothesis across studies). Societal level moral motives predicted participants’ moral conviction across a wide range of social and political issues (consistent with the moral relevance hypothesis). Moreover, the relationships between social order, social justice, and moral conviction also differed between liberals and conservatives in ways that the MMM predicts (i.e., support for the moral differences hypothesis). Stronger moral conviction among liberals was predicted better by social justice than social order, whereas stronger moral conviction among conservatives’ was predicted better by social order than social justice. I only found partial support, however, for the possibility that the moral motives are distinct from the individuating moral foundations. Furthermore, the results of Study 1 were inconsistent with one key aspect of the MMM, that is, the prediction that social justice motives are exclusively promotion oriented and that social order motives are exclusively prevention oriented. Rather, tentative evidence was found that people can construe social order and social justice related goals in either promotion or prevention terms. This hypothesis will be examined in greater detail in Study 3.
III. STUDY 2

Although I found initial support in Study 1 for the idea that social order and social justice predict people’s moral convictions about specific classes of issues, it remains unclear whether these moral motives are also really *motivational*. One of the central contributions of the MMM is that it goes beyond simply making predictions about the content of people’s moral beliefs by also making predictions about how people’s sense of morality might motivate behavior. If the moral motives are, in fact, motivational, then those who endorse them more strongly should be more willing to take action in the name of those beliefs.\(^8\) Thus, in addition to replicating Study 1, the goal of Study 2 was to test the motivational component of the MMM, that is, whether the societal level ”motives,” in fact, underlie people’s motivation to take action in the name of their moral beliefs (the moral motivation hypothesis). Specifically, my goals for Study 2 were to test (1) whether greater endorsement of social order and social justice motives predict greater willingness to engage in activism, and (2) whether this motivation is due to the moral relevance of the motives by testing whether the relationship between endorsement of social order and social justice motives and activism are mediated by moral conviction. Furthermore, beyond testing these mediational effects, I also tested whether the mediation was moderated by political

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\(^8\) One could argue that an alternative test of the motivational aspect of the MMM would be through the regulatory focus hypothesis. That is, whether social order and social justice motivate behavior via prevention or promotion concerns could also be considered a test of the motivational aspect of the MMM. I would argue, however, that such a test is one step beyond where the current state of the literature is. Testing whether the motivation provided by social order and social justice is the result of prevention or promotion concerns assumes that the two motives actually motivate behavior to begin with. Such a test would address the mechanism for an effect (i.e., that the motivation in the MMM is the result of promotion/prevention) before showing that the effect exists in the first place (i.e., that the moral motives are related to behavior). Thus, for the current study I chose to directly test whether the moral motives are related to behavioral intentions under the assumption that, if they are motivational, then this motivation would manifest itself in a greater willingness to engage in behaviors in support of these beliefs.
orientation. The MMM is not explicit about whether moral conviction should mediate the relationship between social order and activism intentions only for conservatives and mediate the relationship between social justice and activism only for liberals. On the one hand, a moderated-mediation hypothesis would seem to follow easily from the moral differences hypothesis that conservatives focus only on social order and liberals only on social justice. On the other hand, to the extent that some liberals endorse social order and some conservatives endorse social justice, then there is no reason to think that moral conviction should not mediate the relationship between these motives and activism intentions for these groups. Put simply, the prediction that liberals and conservatives differentially endorse social justice and social order motives (i.e., the moral differences hypothesis) is independent of the prediction that endorsement of these motives will predict activism and that this relationship will be mediated by moral conviction. That is, even if the MMM predicts political orientation differences in endorsement of the moral motives, there is no strong theoretical reason to think that the moral motives should be differentially motivating among people on the political left versus the right.

A. Method

1. Participants

Similar to Study 1, participants for Study 2 consisted of 504 people recruited both from an email sent to the UIC MassMail system ($N = 241$) and from MTurk ($N = 263$). Again, participants who completed the survey through the UIC MassMail system had the option of entering a lottery to win one of four $50 gift cards to Amazon.com. Participants who completed the survey though MTurk were each paid 60 cents for their time. Finally, data from nine participants were dropped for missing more than one of two instructional manipulation checks, leaving a final sample of 495.
2. **Sample Demographics**

The sample demographics were very similar to those for Study 1. The sample was 58% male and ranged in age from 18 to 76 \( (M = 31.34, SD = 11.63) \). Furthermore, the sample was also highly educated with 30% reporting that they had completed some college but had not finished a degree, 36% reporting that they had completed a bachelor’s degree, and 16% reporting that they had completed a degree beyond a bachelor’s.

3. **Procedure**

After arriving at the survey website, consenting to participate in the study, and verifying that they were at least 18 years of age, participants were presented with a list of nine political issues (a complete list of the issues used can be found in Appendix A) and asked to select either the one that, in their opinion, is most related to concerns about “the lifestyles and behavior of people in the United States” or “economics and the distribution of societal resources in our society.”\(^9\) Next, participants reported their attitude importance (i.e., a measure of attitude strength), and moral conviction about the issue they chose.

After completing the attitude measures, participants completed modified versions of the Moral Motives Scale (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008) and Moral Foundations scale (Graham et al., 2011) to assess their moral concerns about individual others (i.e., Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity) related to the issue they chose. Next, participants completed a measure of

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\(^9\) Manipulation checks that assessed the extent to which participants viewed the issues they chose as “economics” and “lifestyle” relevant indicated considerable overlap between the two issue types. That is, the results of these analyses indicated that people often see political issues as relevant to both sets of concerns, limiting the interpretability of the results including issue-relevance as a variable. That said, analyses including which type of issue the participants chose found that it did qualify some of the predictions from the MMM. These results, however, did not change any of the conclusions presented here, nor was issue relevance a key component of the MMM. The results of additional analyses of the “issue type” manipulation check as well as those including it as a moderator are in Tables A.5 of Appendix B.
their willingness to engage in political activism in the name of their attitude on the issue. Finally, participants reported their political orientation along with a page of other demographic variables.

4. Measures

Moral conviction. Participants’ moral conviction about the issue they chose was assessed with four items. Specifically, participants reported the extent to which their position on the issue is “connected to your beliefs about fundamental right and wrong,” “a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions,” “based on moral principle,” and “a moral stance.” For each item, participants responded on a 5-point scale with point labels not at all, slightly, moderately, much and very much. This four item measure was highly reliable, $\alpha = .93$, and so the items were averaged to create a single measure of people’s moral conviction related to their chosen issue.

Attitude importance. Participants’ level of attitude importance related to the issues they chose were measured using three items asking them to report the extent to which their attitude is “personally important to you,” “something that you care a lot about,” and “important to you compared to other political issues of the day.” Participants responded to each item using a 5-point scale with point labels not at all, slightly, moderately, much and very much. These items were averaged to create a single index of people’s attitude importance for the issue they selected, $\alpha = .86$.

Attitude specific moral motives and moral foundation. Following the measures of moral conviction and attitude importance, participants answered a series of questions assessing how relevant several different types of moral concerns are to their thinking on the issue they selected. The statements were created to be relevant either to one of the two societal level moral motives (social order and social justice) or to the individual level moral foundations of harm/care and fairness/reciprocity. Specifically, three items were created to measure concerns about social
order included: “maintaining order in our society,” “protecting our society from threats,” and “promoting traditional values in our society.” The three social justice items included: “providing for the wellbeing of our society,” “ensuring that societal resources are distributed equally,” and “preventing anyone in our society from going without basic necessities.” I also assessed participants’ endorsement of merit concerns at the group level with the item “allocating societal resources based on merit.” Furthermore, the additional items meant to measure more “individual level” (rather than societal level) moral concerns were based on the “individuating” moral foundations of harm and fairness and included: “whether or not people suffered emotionally,” “whether or not people cared for someone weak or vulnerable,” “whether or not some people were treated differently than others,” and “whether or not people acted unfairly.” Participants reported how relevant each concern is to their thinking on the issue they selected using a six-point scale with point labels not at all relevant, not very relevant, slightly relevant, somewhat relevant, very relevant, and extremely relevant. The reliability of the scales were similar to those from Study 1, social order: $\alpha = .67$, social justice: $\alpha = .78$, 10 individuating foundations: $\alpha = .80$.

**Activism intentions.** Participants’ willingness to engage in political activism related to the issue they selected was measured with 6 items (Skitka & Wisneski, 2011). Participants reported their willingness to do a number of activist behaviors in support of their position on the issue, including signing a petition, contacting a state representative, working at a phone bank, volunteering to go door-to-door to collect signatures, voting in the next election, and holding group meetings at their home. Participants responded using a 4-point scale with the point labels

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10 Given that the reliabilities for the measures of the two moral motives were only moderate in size (Kline, 2000), I ran a second Principle Components Analysis similar to the one run in Study 1. The results of this test confirmed the two factor structure of the scale with the three items for each of the two motives loaded onto their own factors.
of not at all willing, slightly willing, moderately willing, and very willing. These items were averaged to create a single measure of people’s intentions to engage in activism, $\alpha = .80$.

**Political orientation.** Participants’ political orientation in Study 2 was measured in the same way as in Study 1. Just as in Study 1, the bipolar measure of political orientation ranging from -4 (strongly liberal) to 4 (strongly conservative) showed a surprisingly high correlation with political extremity such that the greater extremity was associated with greater liberalism, $r(495) = -.47$. Thus, just as in Study 1, the analyses were run using a trichotomous political orientation variable that did not also include political extremity with liberal participants coded -1, moderates coded 0, and conservatives coded 1.

**B. Results**

1. **Testing the Moral Relevance of the MMM**

   I tested whether the support for the moral relevance and moral differences hypotheses\textsuperscript{11} found in Study 1 replicated in Study 2 using hierarchical multiple regression.\textsuperscript{12} Similar to Study 1, I entered the predictor variables into the regression model in two steps (see Table IV for results). In the first step, I entered the direct effects of social order, social justice, and political orientation. Consistent with the moral relevance hypothesis, the direct effects of both moral motives were significant. Greater endorsement of both social order and social justice motives predicted stronger moral conviction. There was also a marginal effect for political orientation such that greater moral conviction was associated with being liberal.

   Next, in step two I entered the two-way interactions between social order and social justice, and political orientation.

\textsuperscript{11}See Table II for a complete summary of the support for each hypothesis across all 3 studies

\textsuperscript{12}Unlike in Study 1, HLM was not used to analyze the data from Study 2 because participants only answered questions regarding one political issue.
### TABLE IV
STUDY 2 REGRESSION RESULTS PREDICTING MORAL CONVICTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Model without controls</th>
<th>Model with controls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td>Attitude Importance</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.50**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individuating Moral Foundations</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Justice</td>
<td>0.24**</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Order</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td>-0.12^</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td>Individuating by PO interaction</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SO by PO interaction</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>0.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SJ by PO interaction</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < .01, *p < .05, ^p < .10
Partially consistent with the moral differences hypothesis, results revealed a significant social order by political orientation interaction, but not a significant social justice by political orientation interaction. Follow up analyses looking at the simple effect of social order at different levels of political orientation found that social order positively predicted moral conviction for all levels of political orientation, but the relationship was strongest for conservatives, $b = 0.49$, $t(489) = 5.13, p < .001$, compared to liberals, $b = 0.15$, $t(489) = 3.00, p = .003$, and moderates, $b = 0.29$, $t(489) = 6.25, p < .001$ (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Simple effect of social order at each level of political orientation on moral conviction (Study 2)
In sum, these results provide further support for the hypothesis that social justice and social order are, in fact, morally relevant (the moral relevance hypothesis) and qualified support for the idea that they can be used to differentiate between the moral beliefs of liberals and conservatives (the moral difference hypothesis, see Table IV). Social order differentiated between the moral conviction of liberals and conservatives, but social justice predicted moral conviction regardless of political orientation (a point I will address further in the Study 2 discussion). In the next section, I test the boundary conditions of the MMM by statistically controlling for a variable conceptually related the social order and social justice (i.e., the individuating moral foundations) as well as attitude importance.

2. **Testing the Boundary Conditions of the MMM**

Just as with Study 1, it is necessary to test whether the societal level moral motives are distinct from other aspects of people’s morality as well as whether they predict moral conviction beyond non-morally relevant attitude strength variables. To test these possibilities, I reran the above regression model including attitude importance and participants’ endorsement of the individuating foundations as control variables. Consistent with Study 1, most of the results in support of the MMM remained significant even including these alternative explanations. One notable exception, however, is that the direct effect of social justice became non-significant when controlling for the individuating foundations. This result replicates the similar finding in Study 1 and points again to the considerable overlap between social justice and the individuating moral foundations discussed in the moral psychology literature (Graham, 2013) – a point also bolstered by the moderate correlation between the two variables in this dataset, $r(495) = .57$, $p < .001$. Thus, future work should attempt to determine exactly how and for whom social justice and the individuating foundations might differ. One possibility is that the distinction between social
justice and the fairness aspect of the individuating foundations is made more among liberals than conservatives. This possibility is supported by the results from Study 1 showing that, among liberals, merit concerns applied at the societal level negatively predict moral conviction whereas the relationship may be positive for conservatives.

3. **Testing the Moral Motivation Hypothesis**

   According to the moral motivation hypothesis, greater endorsement of social order and social justice motives should motivate people to engage in activism related to their political attitudes. To test this hypothesis, I ran a two-step hierarchical regression analysis predicting participants’ willingness to engage in political activism related to the issue they chose. Specifically, I entered the direct effects of social order, social justice, and political orientation in step one, and the two-way social order and social justice by political orientation interactions in step two. The results of this analysis supported the moral motivation hypothesis. Greater endorsement of both social order, \( b = 0.08, t(489) = 3.36, p < .001 \), and social justice, \( b = 0.13, t(489) = 4.87, p < .001 \), independently predicted greater willingness to engage in activism. Furthermore, greater willingness to engage in activism was also marginally associated with greater liberalism, \( b = -0.07, t(487) = -1.85, p = .07 \). Interestingly, neither of the two interaction terms was significant. These results seem to indicate that the political orientation differences in the moral motives only predict liberals’ and conservatives’ feelings of moral conviction, and do not differentially predict liberals’ and conservatives’ willingness to engage in activism. It is not entirely clear where the MMM predicts the differences between liberals and conservatives to “play out” – only in how they impact moral conviction or also in the motivation provided by social order and social justice.
4. Does Moral Conviction Mediate the Relationship Between Moral Motives and Activism?

Finally, as an additional test of the moral motivation and moral relevance hypotheses I tested whether people’s sense of moral conviction mediates the effect of social order and social justice motives on activism. That is, I tested whether the motivational force provided by the two societal level moral motives is, in fact, moral in nature. I ran two sets of moderated mediation analyses, first using social order and then social justice as the independent variable predicting moral conviction that, in turn, predicted activism intentions. I also included political orientation as a moderator on the relationship between the societal level motives and moral conviction. Furthermore, each analysis was run controlling for the other moral motive. Analyses were run using 1000 bootstrap samples to test the conditional indirect effect of each of the two moral motives on activism through moral conviction for both liberals and conservatives (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007).

Results across both models supported the hypothesis that the relationship between social order and social justice motives and intentions to engage in activism is mediated by moral conviction. Interestingly, the mediational effects of the two moral motives did not differ between liberals and conservatives. Although these results are inconsistent with what may have been predicted based on the results supporting the moral differences hypothesis, these results are

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13 One could argue that an equally plausible model could include moral conviction as the independent variable and social order and social justice as mediators. To test this, a path model including social order and social justice both as independent variables and including moral conviction as the mediator was tested against a model that included moral conviction as the independent variable and social order and social justice as mediators. The results showed that, although the overall fit of the two models was similar, the model including social order and social justice as the independent variables fit the data slightly better. Specific fit statistics for each of the two models can be found in Table A.4 of Appendix B.
consistent with the hypothesis that the motives are equally motivational among those who do endorse them regardless of political orientation.

First, the indirect effect of social order on activism through moral conviction was significant for both conservatives, (indirect effect = .08, 95% CI: .04 to .12), and liberals (indirect effect = .03, 95% CI: .01 to .05). Second, social justice also indirectly predicted activism through moral conviction both for liberals (indirect effect = .04, 95% CI: .01 to .07) and conservatives (indirect effect = .05, 95% CI: .02 to .09).

In sum, these results provide evidence that the societal level moral motives motivate activism and that this motivation is moral in nature. Contrary to what the moral differences hypothesis predicts, however, the mediational effect of moral conviction did not differ for liberals versus conservatives.

C. Study 2 Discussion

The results of Study 2 provided qualified support for the predictions of the MMM. Specifically, I partially replicated the results from Study 1 that social order predicts the moral convictions of conservatives, but not liberals. What is not clear, however, is whether these moral motives boil down to other constructs described elsewhere in the morality literature (e.g., moral foundations theory). Just as in Study 1, controlling for the individuating moral foundations resulted in the relationship between social justice and moral conviction dropping to non-significance. This result again points to the possibility that the relationship between social justice and the individuating foundations is more complicated than is described in the MMM. Furthermore, unlike in Study 1, social justice failed to differentiate between the morality of liberals versus conservatives (i.e., the social justice by political orientation interaction predicting moral conviction was non-significant). Rather, greater endorsement of social justice equally
predicted stronger moral conviction for the political left and the right. One possible explanation for why these findings differ from those found in Study 1 could be the differences in how the social justice motives were measured in the two studies. Study 1 used the original moral motives scale from past literature (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008) that measures participants’ overall endorsement of social order and social justice based on how the constructs are described in the MMM. Study 2, however, changed how social order and social justice were measured so that they (1) were specific to the attitude participants chose and (2) used more face valid wording meant to capture participants’ concerns about protecting and providing for society while trying to explicitly mention social order and social justice. One possible effect of using more face valid social order and social justice measures in Study 2 may have been that participants answered them based on whatever moral concern they saw as relevant to protecting or providing for society. This could explain both why social justice positively predicted moral conviction for both liberals and conservatives and why social order and social justice were positively correlated in Study 2, \( r(495) = .24, p < .01 \), but negatively correlated in past research (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008) and Study 1, \( r(501) = -.20, p < .01 \), that used the regular moral motives measure. At the very least, these results again point to the possibility that conservatives also care about providing for society, but in a different way than liberals.

Beyond replicating what was tested in Study 1, the Study 2 results also provided evidence that the MMM is a model of moral motivation. Greater endorsement of social order and social justice predicted greater willingness to become politically engaged, and this relationship was mediated by participants’ feelings of moral conviction. Interestingly, these mediational results were not qualified by political orientation. Thus, greater endorsement of the moral motives provides motivation to engage in activism in the name of one’s moral beliefs across the political
spectrum, even if the motives underlie the morality of liberals and conservatives to different degrees.

One aspect of the MMM that has not been adequately tested, however, is whether the social order and social justice motives are, by definition, uniquely grounded in promotion and prevention concerns (i.e., the regulatory focus hypothesis). Although tentative evidence against the regulatory focus hypothesis was found in Study 1, one could argue that the differences in the wording of the promotion and prevention framed social order and social justice items, compared to the items taken directly from the moral motives scale, was too subtle to find any difference between them (i.e., a problem of common method variance). Thus, Study 3 attempted to directly test the regulatory focus hypothesis by manipulating participants’ momentary regulatory focus goals.
IV. STUDY 3

Beyond replicating the results of Study 2, the goal of Study 3 was to test whether the social order and social justice motives reflect more general promotion and prevention goals. According to the MMM, the social justice and social order motives represent differences in people’s motivation to provide for group wellbeing or protect the group from threat, respectively (the regulatory focus hypothesis). Building on these theoretical differences, one goal of Study 3 was to manipulate the endorsement of social justice and social order motives for liberals and conservatives by situationally inducing a promotion or prevention focus among participants. If social order is by definition prevention oriented and social justice is promotion oriented, then inducing an opposing regulatory mindset should undermine endorsement for each, and inducing a consistent regulatory state should heighten the endorsement for each. Furthermore, if the regulatory focus manipulation is effective, a secondary consequence should be that shifts in regulatory focus should also affect the relationship between the two motives and moral conviction or activism. Placing participants in a prevention mindset should enhance the relationship between social order and activism, whereas placing participants in a promotion mindset should enhance the relationship between social justice and activism.

A. Method

1. Participants

Participants for Study 3 consisted of 505 people recruited from MTurk, paid 60 cents each for their time. Only participants who were at least 18 years of age and U.S. residents were recruited to participate. Seven participants were dropped for failing to answer at least one of two instructional manipulation checks correctly, leaving a final sample of 498 participants.
2. **Sample Demographics**

The average age of the participants for Study 3 was 29.8 (SD = 10.05). The sample was also more male (68.9%) than female (31.1%). Finally, 11% had earned a high school diploma; 34% had completed some college, but had not completed a degree; 10% had earned a technical/associate’s degree; 37% had earned a bachelor’s degree; and 7% had earned a degree beyond a bachelor’s.

3. **Procedure**

After consenting to participate in the study and indicating that they were at least 18 years of age, participants reported their attitude stance, moral conviction, and attitude importance about one of four randomly selected issues (nationalized healthcare, welfare for poor Americans, abortion, or same-sex marriage).\(^{14}\) Immediately after completing the attitude measures, participants were randomly assigned to a promotion prime condition, a prevention prime condition, or to a control condition (additional details about this manipulation are provided below). Participants then completed the same measures from Study 2 of attitude specific social order and social justice motives as well as attitude specific measures of the individuating moral foundations. Finally, participants completed the same measure from Study 2 of their willingness to engage in political activism related to the issue to which they were randomly assigned.

\(^{14}\) It is possible that randomly assigning participants to an issue (as in Study 3) resulted in lower moral conviction scores compared to when participants select an issue themselves (as in Study 2). This, however, did not appear to be the case. The mean moral conviction reported for Study 3 (\(M = 3.51, SD = 1.17\)) was nearly identical to the mean from Study 2 (\(M = 3.51, SD = 1.14\)).
4. **Measures and Manipulation**

Moral conviction, attitude importance, the moral motives, activism, and political orientation were measured and operationalized in the same way as in Study 2. Study 3, however, included a manipulation of participants’ current regulatory focus, described below.

**Regulatory focus manipulation.** The regulatory focus manipulation involved a brief writing task modified from previous research (e.g., Cornwell & Higgins, 2013; Freitas & Higgins, 2002), designed to prime self-level promotion or prevention orientation. Because the MMM includes different moral motives at different levels of analysis (i.e., the self, individual others, the group/society), I modified the regulatory focus primes used in past research to induce promotion/prevention concerns relevant to the group/society level rather than at the level of the participants themselves (i.e., the self-level). Specifically, participants were given a writing prompt that asked them to list up to two “hopes and aspirations” (promotion condition) or two “duties and obligations” (prevention condition) for America, or a control prompt. Group level promotion participants received the prompt:

> For this task, we would like you to think about what you see as the current hopes and aspirations of the United States. In other words, what are some things you think should be promoted in American society? What things would you ideally like for American society to achieve? In the boxes below, please list out up to two things that you think America should aspire to accomplish.

Alternatively, a group level prevention focus was induced with the following prompt:

> For this task, we would like you to think about what you see as the current duties and obligations of the United States. In other words, what are some things that you think should be prevented in American society? What are some things that you think American
society has an obligation to avoid? In the boxes below, please list out up to two things that you see as being America’s current duties and obligations.

Finally, control participants were given the following prompt:

For this task, we would like you to think about the day-to-day behaviors and activities of the average American. In other words, what sorts of things do you think the average American does on a day-to-day basis? In the boxes below, please list out up to two daily behaviors or activities of the average American.

Participants in each condition were provided with two text boxes for their answers. In an effort to strengthen the manipulation, participants also rated how “harmful versus beneficial” and “good versus bad” they saw each thing they listed. Participants responded to each using seven-point scales with point labels ranging from very harmful/bad to very beneficial/good.

B. Results

1. Assessing the Effectiveness of the Regulatory Focus Manipulation.

Prior to testing the regulatory focus hypothesis, I assessed whether the regulatory focus manipulation effectively induced the intended promotion and prevention mindset in the study participants. Participants’ open-ended responses to the prompts provided as part of the regulatory focus manipulation were coded using the Recursive Inspection of Text (RIOT) software program. Specifically, the responses were coded using a dictionary developed by Mergenthaler (1996) based on a coding system originally developed by Gillie (1957) meant to capture the proportion of abstract language used in a sample of written text. Previous research has found that promotion goals tend to be framed in more abstract language whereas prevention goals tend to be framed in more concrete terms (Semin, Higgins, de Montes, Estourget, & Valencia, 2005). Coding participants’ responses for abstraction therefore provided a proxy measure of the
effectiveness of the regulatory focus manipulation. If the regulatory focus manipulation was effective, then participants in the promotion condition should use more abstract language, relative to control participants, and prevention condition participants should use less abstract language relative to control.

I tested the effectiveness of the regulatory focus manipulation using a 2(Political orientation: liberals, conservatives) x 3(Regulatory focus condition: Promotion, prevention, control) between-subjects ANOVA with the percentage of abstract words participants used in their response to the regulatory focus prompt as the dependent variable. The results provided partial support for the effectiveness of the manipulation. Results revealed that there was a main effect of condition, $F(2, 404) = 3.39, p = .04$. Two planned comparisons revealed that participants used less abstract language in the prevention condition ($M = 10.71\%, SD = 22.39$) compared to those in the control condition ($M = 17.69\%, SD = 21.48$), $F(1, 404) = 6.75, p = .01$. This effect is consistent with the prediction that the prevention condition effectively induced the intended mindset. Contrary to this prediction that the prompt was effective, however, the language of the participants in the promotion condition ($M = 14.03\%, SD = 20.99$) was no more abstract than the language of control participants, $F(1, 404) = 2.09, p = .15$, nor was the mean in

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Studies 1 and 2 that found participants’ political orientation to be partially confounded with political extremity, $r(501) = -.51$ and $r(495) = -.47$, respectively. The relationship between political orientation and political extremity, however, was smaller in Study 3, $r(498) = -.28, p < .001$. That said, I decided to use the same trichotomous measure of political orientation used in Studies 1 and 2 in Study 3 to test the moral relevance, moral differences, and moral motivation hypotheses. This decision was made to facilitate comparison of the results across studies. Moreover, because of the small number of political moderates ($N = 85$) in the current sample and because the MMM is unclear what predictions would be made for them, they have been removed from the ANOVA analyses assessing the effectiveness of the regulatory focus manipulation as well as the ANOVA analysis in the following section testing the regulatory focus hypothesis. Identical analyses including moderates, however, yields the same patterns of results as those reported here.
the anticipated direction. A main effect of political orientation was also found. Consistent with past research showing that liberals tend to be more promotion and conservatives more prevention oriented (Cornwell & Higgins, 2013; Janoff-Bulman, 2009; Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2010), liberals used more abstract language ($M = 16.29\%, SD = 18.70$) than conservatives ($M = 12.00\%, SD = 18.83$), $F(1, 404) = 4.01, p = .05$. Finally, the political orientation by regulatory focus condition interaction was non-significant, $F(2, 404) = 0.75, p = .47$.

The results of these analyses provide limited support for the effectiveness of the regulatory focus manipulation. Based on the results from the text analysis, there is evidence that the prevention condition effectively induced the intended mindset. The effectiveness of the promotion mindset induction, however, was not supported by the analyses. Because of the evidence that the regulatory focus manipulation was at least partially effective, analyses were run to test the regulatory focus hypothesis and determine whether it affected participants’ endorsement of the social order and social justice motives.

### 2. Testing the Regulatory Focus Hypothesis

According to the regulatory focus hypothesis, social order motives are rooted in people’s prevention orientated goals to protect society whereas social justice motives are rooted in people’s promotion oriented goals to provide for societal wellbeing. If the regulatory focus hypothesis is correct, (1) priming a promotion frame of mind should enhance the salience of social justice and, similarly, (2) putting people into a prevention frame of mind should enhance social order motives.

I tested the regulatory focus hypothesis with a 2(Political orientation: liberals, conservatives) by 3(Regulatory focus condition: promotion, prevention, control) by 2(Moral...
motive: social justice, social order)\textsuperscript{16} mixed model ANOVA with political orientation and regulatory focus condition varying between subjects and moral motives varying within subjects. Political orientation was included as a dichotomous rather than continuous variable in these analyses to allow for a mixed-model ANOVA, rather than regression, to be used to test the regulatory hypothesis. Specifically, using the mixed-model ANOVA allowed me to compare, in a single test, whether the effects of the regulatory focus manipulation differed between the two moral motives as well as for liberals and conservatives.

Results did not support the regulatory focus hypothesis. Critically, contrary to the regulatory focus hypothesis, neither the moral motive by regulatory focus condition interaction, $F(2, 406) = 1.75, p = .18$, nor the moral motive by regulatory focus by political orientation interaction, $F(2, 406) = .92, p = .63$, were significant. Moreover, neither the main effect of regulatory focus condition, $F(2, 406) = .56, p = .57$, nor the political orientation by regulatory focus condition interaction, $F(2, 406) = .1.96, p = .14$, were significant. Thus, these results show that the regulatory focus manipulation had no effect on the endorsement of social order or social justice motives. There was, however, a significant moral motive by political orientation interaction, $F(1, 406) = 56.77, p < .001$. Liberals endorsed the social justice motives ($M = 4.49, SD = 1.22$) to a greater extent than conservatives ($M = 3.33, SD = 1.18$), $F(1, 406) = 71.14, p < .001$. Furthermore, and somewhat contrary to the moral differences hypothesis, liberals endorsed

\textsuperscript{16} In order to provide the most direct test of the regulatory focus hypothesis as predicted by the MMM, the measures of social order and social justice used in this analysis did not include the items framed in terms of the opposing regulatory goals. In the remainder of the analyses for Study 3, however, I did include the additional items in order to make the results as comparable across studies as possible. That said, none of the Study 3 results changed if the different versions of the social order and social justice items were used instead.
the social order motives \((M = 3.28, SD = 1.35)\) to the same degree as conservatives \((M = 3.35, SD = 1.37)\), \(F(1, 406) = .13, p = .73\).

In summary, I did not find support for the regulatory focus hypothesis in Study 3. Neither of the societal level moral motives were affected by the regulatory focus manipulation. These findings, along with those of Study 1, provide little to no support for the prediction that social order and social justice motives, by definition, are respectively about prevention and promotion motivations. Overall, however, it is unclear whether the lack of support for the regulatory focus hypothesis is due to a failure of experimental manipulation or because the MMM ought to be revised to include both promotion and prevention moral motives about both providing for and protecting society. Moving forward, because I found only mixed support for the effectiveness of the regulatory focus manipulation and because it had no effect on the moral motives, I chose to not include it in any of the subsequent tests of the MMM hypotheses for the sake of simplicity.\(^{17}\)

3. **Testing the Moral Relevance of the MMM**

Beyond testing the regulatory focus hypothesis, I also sought in Study 3 to replicate the results of Studies 1 and 2. To test the moral relevance and moral difference hypotheses, I ran a two-step hierarchical regression analysis predicting participants’ feelings of moral conviction about the attitude to which they were assigned (see Table V for complete results). In step 1, I entered the direct effects of social order, social justice, and political orientation.

\(^{17}\) Regression analyses testing whether the regulatory focus manipulation moderated the relationships between the two moral motives and activism can be found in Table A.7 in Appendix B.
### TABLE V
STUDY 3 REGRESSION RESULTS PREDICTING MORAL CONVICTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Model without controls</th>
<th>Model with controls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attitude Importance</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.52**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuating Moral Foundations</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Justice</td>
<td>0.28**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Order</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
<td>0.06^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuating by PO interaction</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO by PO interaction</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>0.08^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJ by PO interaction</td>
<td>-0.31**</td>
<td>-0.13*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10
Consistent with the moral relevance hypothesis, greater endorsement of social order and social justice motives each independently predicted stronger moral conviction (see Table V).

Next in step 2, I entered the two-way interactions between political orientation and social order and social justice. Support was found for the moral differences hypothesis in that the relationship between social order, social justice, and moral conviction differed for liberals versus conservatives. Specifically, results revealed significant two-way political orientation by social order, $b = .16, t(492) = 3.11, p = .002$, and political orientation by social justice, $b = -.31, t(492) = -6.01, p < .001$, interactions. Follow-up analyses for each interaction revealed that the patterns of results were consistent with what the moral differences hypothesis predicts. Social order positively predicted moral conviction for conservatives, $b = .32, t(492) = 3.97, p < .001$, and moderates, $b = .16, t(492) = 3.55, p < .001$, but not for liberals, $b = .01, t(492) = 0.13, p = .90$ (see Figure 5 for a graph of the simple slopes). Social justice, in contrast, positively predicted moral conviction for liberals, $b = .47, t(492) = 8.71, p < .001$ and moderates, $b = .16, t(492) = 3.38, p < .001$. For conservatives, however, the relationship became marginally significant and negative, $b = -.15, t(492) = -1.76, p = .08$ (see Figure 6 for a graph of the simple slopes).

Study 3 replicated the support for the MMM found in Studies 1 and 2 for the moral relevance and moral differences hypotheses. Social order and social justice motives both positively predicted moral conviction (the moral relevance hypothesis) and these relationships differed for liberals versus conservatives in the predicted ways (the moral differences hypothesis).
Figure 5. Simple effect of social order at each level of political orientation on moral conviction (Study 3)
Figure 6. Simple effect of social justice at each level of political orientation on moral conviction (Study 3)
Ruling out alternative explanations for the MMM. As in Study 2, I again found mixed evidence that the social order and social justice motives are independent of the individuating foundations and that they predict moral conviction over and above attitude importance. Specifically, to test whether social order and social justice predict unique variance in moral conviction beyond these alternative variables in the psychology literature, I reran the regression model described above controlling for the direct effects of the individuating moral foundations and attitude importance as well as the individuating foundations by political orientation interaction. As can be seen in the right column of Table V, although the effects of social order and social justice were reduced, most of the effects remained significant or only dropped to marginal significance. Similar to what was found in Studies 1 and 2, however, social justice was the most affected by the inclusion of the individuating foundations in the model. Specifically, although the social justice by political orientation interaction remained statistically significant, the direct effect of social justice dropped to non-significance. Furthermore, there was also a significant individuating foundations by political orientation interaction, $b = -.12, t(489) = -2.21, p = .03$. Consistent with moral foundations theory, there was a significant positive relationship between the individuating foundations and moral conviction for liberals, $b = .23, t(489) = 4.41, p < .001$, and moderates, $b = .12, t(489) = 2.39, p = .02$, but not for conservatives, $b = .00, t(489) = 0.02, p = .98$ (see Figure 7 for a graph of the simple slopes). In sum, these results provide some evidence that the societal level moral motives are independent of the individuating moral foundations while also pointing to considerable overlap between the two sets of moral concerns, particularly in the case of social justice.
Figure 7. Simple effect of the individuating foundations at each level of political orientation on moral conviction (Study 3)
4. **Testing the Moral Motivation Hypothesis**

Another goal of Study 3 was to replicate the support for the moral motivation hypothesis found in Study 2. That is, even if the social order and social justice motives are morally relevant, they may or may not be motivational, as is proposed in the MMM. Specifically, to test the moral motivation hypothesis I ran the same two-step hierarchical regression analysis from above to test the moral relevance of the MMM, this time predicting participants’ activism intentions.

The results supported the moral motivation hypothesis. Greater endorsement of both social order, \( b = .07, t(494) = 2.68, p = .008 \), and social justice, \( b = .14, t(494) = 5.28, p < .001 \), positively predicted greater willingness to engage in political activism. There was also a significant direct effect of political orientation such that greater willingness to engage in activism was associated with being liberal, \( b = -.12, t(494) = -2.92, p = .004 \). Unlike what was found in Study 2, however, the social order effect was qualified by a significant two-way social order by political orientation interaction, \( b = .07, t(492) = 2.17, p = .03 \). Follow up analyses revealed a pattern of results consistent with the moral differences hypothesis. Greater endorsement of social order predicted greater willingness to engage in activism for conservatives, \( b = .16, t(492) = 3.26, p = .001 \), and moderates, \( b = .09, t(492) = 3.35, p < .001 \), but not for liberals, \( b = .03, t(492) = 0.85, p = .40 \). The political orientation by social justice interaction was not significant, \( b = -.05, t(492) = -1.61, p = .11 \).

In sum, Study 3 replicated the support for the moral motivation hypothesis found in Study 2. Both social order and social justice were associated with willingness to engage in activism; a finding consistent with them being motivational. Unlike in Study 2, however, I found in Study 3 that political orientation moderated the relationship between social order and activism intentions. Whereas social order predicted the activism intentions of conservatives and
moderates, it did not predict the activism intentions of liberals. This result stands in contrast to the finding from Study 2 that, even though social order differentially underlies the morality of liberals and conservatives, greater endorsement of the social order motive predicts greater activism intentions for both groups. One question that remains, however, is whether the motivation provided by social order and social justice is mediated by their moral relevance.

5. **Does Moral Conviction Mediate the Relationship Between Moral Motives and Activism?**

The prior two sets of analyses independently showed evidence consistent with the prediction that social order and social justice motives are, in fact, morally relevant and that they motivate behavior. What is not clear from these results is whether the relationship between the societal level moral motives and activism is mediated by the motives’ moral relevance. To test this prediction, I ran two moderated mediation models to test the significance of the indirect effect of social order and social justice on activism through moral conviction. Furthermore, I also tested whether these indirect effects differed as a function of political orientation.

Just as in Study 2, the analyses used 1000 bootstrap samples to test the conditional indirect effect of social order and social justice on activism through moral conviction for both liberals and conservatives (Preacher et al., 2007). First, consistent with the moral differences hypothesis, the indirect effect of social justice on activism was significant for liberals (indirect effect = .08, 95% CI: .05 to .11), but was non-significant for conservatives (indirect effect = -.01, 95% CI: -.03 to .02). Contrary to the prediction that the motivation that social order provides results from its moral relevance, moral conviction did not mediate the relationship between
social order and activism for either conservatives (indirect effect = .02, 95% CI: -.01 to .06) or liberals (indirect effect = .01, 95% CI: -.004 to .03).\textsuperscript{18}

In sum, although the regression results provide support for the moral motivation hypothesis that greater endorsement of the social order and social justice motives would predict greater activism intentions, I found only mixed support in the results of the mediation analysis. Specifically, consistent with the moral motivation and moral differences hypotheses, the mediational results showed that moral conviction mediated the relationship between social justice and activism for liberals, but not conservatives. This result is different from Study 2 that found that moral conviction mediated the relationship between social justice and activism for both liberals and conservatives. Furthermore, the mediational results for social order were different both from what the MMM would predict and from what was found in Study 2. Whereas Study 2 found that moral conviction mediated the relationship between social order and activism, the mediational effect in Study 3 was non-significant.

C. Study 3 Discussion

The major contribution of Study 3 was that it attempted to provide a more definitive test of the regulatory focus hypothesis by directly manipulating participants’ current regulatory states. According to the MMM, the societal level moral motives reflect broader concerns about preventing societal harm (social order) and promoting societal welfare (social justice). If this

\textsuperscript{18} It is possible that the reason why this pattern of results differed from what was found in Study 2 is that the regulatory focus manipulation did have some downstream effects even if it did not directly alter participants’ endorsement of the moral motives. To test this possibility, I reran the two moderated mediation models looking only at participants in the control group. If the moderated mediation results for Study 3 are due to the regulatory focus manipulation, then I would expect that the results for the participants in the control group would replicate what was found in Study 2. These additional analyses, however, did not support this hypothesis. The pattern of results for the control participants was similar to what was found for the sample as a whole.
hypothesis is true, then we would expect participants in the promotion condition to show greater endorsement of social justice motives and those in the prevention condition to show greater endorsement of social order motives, relative to participants in the control condition. The manipulation check of the regulatory focus manipulation, however, only found evidence for effectiveness of the prevention mindset condition and did not find evidence that the prevention manipulation was successful. Based on this, one could still test whether the participants’ in the prevention condition increased their social order endorsement relative to control, as predicted. I found little support in Study 3 for the regulatory focus hypothesis; attempting to place people into a promotion (or prevention) mindset had no influence on their endorsement of either social order or social justice motives.

The results of Study 3 replicated some results of Studies 1 and 2, and provided further support for some of the central components of the MMM. Both social order and social justice predicted people’s sense of moral conviction about their social and political attitudes, and these relationships differed as a function of political orientation – findings consistent with both the moral relevance and moral differences hypotheses. Greater endorsement of social justice predicted stronger moral conviction for liberals, but not conservatives. Greater endorsement of social order, in contrast, predicted stronger moral conviction for conservatives, but not liberals. Again, however, the significance of these results was reduced when the individuating moral foundations were included in the model. Across all three studies, there is now a fairly consistent pattern that, although the moral motives are distinct from the individuating foundations to some extent, there nonetheless is considerable overlap between the constructs. Future empirical and theoretical work should attempt to specify where the areas of overlap lie and for whom.
Finally, I only partially replicated the mediational results from Study 2 in Study 3. Moral conviction mediated the relationship between social justice and activism (consistent with the moral motivation hypothesis) for liberals, but not conservatives (consistent with the moral differences hypothesis, but inconsistent with Study 2). Moral conviction did not mediate the relationship between social order and activism, a null finding that was inconsistent both with the results of Study 2 and the moral motivation hypothesis. Given these mixed results from the mediation tests, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about whether the motivation provided by the moral motives is, in fact, the result of the relationship of these motives with moral conviction under all conditions and for all people.

In sum, the results of Study 3 are largely consistent with in the results of Studies 1 and 2. Support was found for the moral relevance and moral differences hypotheses that greater endorsement social order and social justice would be related to stronger moral conviction and that these relationships would differ for liberals versus conservatives. Furthermore, as in Study 2, I found that greater endorsement of social order and social justice both predicted a greater willingness to engage in political activism and, in the case of social justice, that this relationship was mediated by moral conviction. Taken together, these findings are, to a large extent, consistent with the hypothesis that social order and social justice are morally relevant, and underlie the morality and moral motivation of liberals versus conservatives. Finally, the results of Study 3 were inconsistent with the regulatory focus hypothesis that social order and social justice are by definition grounded in prevention and promotion concerns, respectively. Study 1 found initial correlational evidence that social order and social justice can come in either promotion or prevention forms. Study 3 found that manipulating participants’ current regulatory
focus had no influence on their endorsement of the two societal level moral motives (at least in terms of the prevention condition).
V. GENERAL DISCUSSION

Overall, the results of the three studies described here provide support for several of the central components of the MMM. Across all three studies, social order and social justice predicted people’s feelings of moral conviction as well as behavioral intentions related to their social and political attitudes – findings consistent with the prediction that the moral motives described in the MMM underlie people’s sense of morality and provide motivation for them to take action in the name of their moral beliefs. Furthermore, social order and social justice also effectively differentiated the morality of liberals and conservatives. Social justice predicted moral conviction for liberals and social order predicted moral conviction for conservatives. That said, I found only mixed support for the prediction that the motivation provided by the social order and social justice motives is due to their relationship with moral conviction. Finally, social order and social justice do not appear (respectively) to be prevention and promotion-oriented motivational systems. Next, I will describe how the results across the three studies speak to each of the hypotheses derived from the MMM as well as what the possible implications are for each set of findings.

A. Moral Relevance and Moral Differences Hypotheses.

All three studies tested and found consistent support for the moral relevance hypothesis and, relatedly, the moral differences hypothesis: endorsement of the social order and social justice motives predicted people’s sense of moral conviction and these relationships differed for liberal versus conservatives. First, consistent with the moral relevance hypothesis that the two societal level moral motives would predict people’s moral conviction about specific policies, I found that greater endorsement of social justice was associated with stronger moral conviction in all three studies. Similarly, Studies 2 and 3 both found a similar positive relationship between
social order and moral conviction. Second, consistent with the moral differences hypothesis that social order and social justice provide the basis for moral differences between the political left and right, I found that the relationships between social order and social justice and moral conviction were qualified by political orientation in all three studies. Social order predicted stronger moral conviction for conservatives, but not liberals across all three studies. Conversely, social justice predicted stronger moral conviction for liberals, but not conservatives, in Studies 1 and 3, but not in Study 2. In summary, social order and social justice are morally relevant and they differentially predict the moral conviction of liberals and conservatives.

1. **Implications of the moral relevance and moral differences hypotheses.**

The strongest support provided for the MMM found in the current studies was for the moral relevance and moral differences hypotheses. These results support one of the central assumptions of the MMM – that it is a theory about people’s moral beliefs. Often in the field of moral psychology, the phenomena being studied – be those moral judgments, moral dilemmas, or political attitudes – are classified *a priori* as morally relevant by the researcher rather than the participant. One of the major findings, however, of research on the theory of moral conviction is that considerable variation exits in what people classify as relevant to their subjective moral beliefs (see Skitka, 2010, 2013 for reviews). Thus, for any theory that presumes to describe people’s sense of morality, it is important to test whether the phenomena described in the theory, in fact, are associated with people’s perceptions of moral relevance. In this case, the results showed that the MMM is, indeed, not only a moral theory, but a theory that can differentiate between the morality of liberals and conservatives.

Future research, however, is needed to tease apart whether social order and social justice are a cause or a consequence of moral conviction. On the one hand, the moral motives could
make up people’s broad sense of morality that then gives rise to moral conviction about specific attitudes. On the other hand, people’s moral convictions may be caused by brief flashes of affect laden “moral intuition” that are then justified, post hoc, by their relevance to social order and social justice (cf. Haidt, 2001). Each of these hypotheses could explain the correlational results presented here. Future work using experimental techniques is needed that directly manipulates social order and social justice to determine whether they are the cause or consequence of moral conviction.

    Beyond the importance of showing that the MMM is related to actual perceptions of moral relevance and that what predicts moral relevance varies as a function of political orientation, the current studies also tested whether the MMM differs from moral foundations theory. The results from these tests provided only mixed support for the moral motives being different from the moral foundations. Statistically controlling for the individuating moral foundations seemed to reduce the strength of the relationships between the moral motives and moral conviction and, in some case, to wipe the effects out completely. Specifically, across all three studies, social justice shared the most overlap with the individuating foundations.

    Similar to the MMM, moral foundations theory also attempts to “map” the possible psychological bases of people’s morality. Although the two theories share several potentially overlapping constructs, the biggest difference between the two has to do with how they treat people’s justice related moral concerns. Specifically, the MMM and moral foundations theory make competing predictions about the distinction between moral concerns related to interpersonal fairness and reciprocity, on the one hand, and concerns related to social justice and equality, on the other. The MMM distinguishes between people’s moral motives related to interpersonal fairness (micro justice) versus motives related to social justice (macro justice;
Brickman et al., 1981; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013). According to the MMM, the fairness moral foundation is related to micro justice concerns about reciprocity and not cheating or taking advantage of others and is therefore at the “individual other” or micro level, whereas social justice is related to how resources ought to be distributed within society, and is therefore at the social or macro level. That is, unlike concerns related to interpersonal fairness, people base their social justice motives on a sense of communal responsibility and what their ideal distribution of societal resources ought to look like. In contrast, moral foundations theory makes no distinction between fairness and social justice, and instead argues very clearly that these are one and the same construct, simply applied at different levels of analysis (Graham, 2013). Although the results of the current studies provided some support for the distinct constructs view proposed by the MMM, it would be incorrect to claim that social justice and interpersonal fairness are entirely independent for all people, in all contexts (at least with respect to the measures used in the current study).

The question remains where to go next in light of these mixed results for the independence of the macro justice construct of social justice and the micro justice construct of reciprocity and merit. Theoretically, the two appear distinct, and this distinction has been supported by past research (e.g., Brickman et al., 1981; Lillie & Janoff-Bulman, 2007). In light of this apparent contradiction, one possibility moving forward could be to step back from theories that make strong claims about stable individual differences in morality and ignoring the possibility that how people think about morality may be contextually variable. For example, although moral foundations theory has previously made strong claims about the differences in the morality of liberals and conservatives, recent research has found that these differences do not hold outside the political domain (Wisneski et al., 2014). Similarly, outside of the field of moral
psychology, considerable research has found that many assumed “differences” between liberals and conservatives, such as differences in intolerance (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014), respect for authority (Frimer, Gaucher, & Schaefer, in press), and attributions (Morgan, Mullen, & Skitka, 2010) are actually the result of similar underlying psychological processes. It was previously thought, for example, that conservatives prefer to make dispositional attributions whereas liberals prefer to look to the situation when attempting to explain the behavior of others (i.e., the “ideo-attribution effect”). More recently, however, research has shown that these two attributional styles are not “hard wired” into the psychology of liberals and conservatives. Instead, both liberals and conservatives are motivated to make attributions for social problems that are in line with their values (Morgan et al., 2010). Future work on the MMM could take a similar path by exploring the contexts where liberal and conservative morality overlap and diverge, and explore the common underlying psychological mechanisms that might explain this variation.

The MMM already reflects, to some extent, the notion that differences between the political left versus the right are contextually variable. The MMM makes predictions about the contexts where one should expect to find differences between the morality of liberals and conservatives (i.e., when determining how best to protect and provide for society) and the contexts where one should not (i.e., how best to protect and provide for the self and individual others). The results of the current studies, however, indicate that we can go further. One of the strongest aspects of the MMM is that it provides a clear set of six possible contexts in which people’s sense of morality might “play out.” Beyond that, it may not be necessary to make strong claims about what moral content will be most salient in each context. For example, by placing social order and social justice in the protect and provide cells at the societal level, the MMM
implies that (1) these motives should not impact people’s morality at other levels of analysis, and (2) other motives should not impact people’s morality at the level of the group. Furthermore, by labeling social order as a conservative moral motive and social justice as a liberal moral motive, the MMM also implicitly makes the prediction that liberal morality ignores concerns about protecting society and conservative morality ignores providing for society. Each of these predictions proved to be too strong: Liberals and conservatives are both concerned about protection and prevention.

One possible remedy to the problem of assuming that different moral motives can only apply in certain contexts or for certain groups of people could be to abandon such claims all together and take a more bottom up approach. The MMM could be revised as a two part theory that proposes six possible contexts where morality is potentially relevant, on the one hand, and a set of possible moral motives, on the other. From there, different people can vary both in their endorsement of each moral motive as well as where they see that motive applying, with some motives even falling into multiple cells and others not appearing at all. For example, a conservative may strongly endorse moral motives related to the importance of merit and reciprocity, while also reporting low endorsement of the moral motive of equality and social justice. From there, this person may also see the reciprocity/merit motive as the foundation for both how people ought to treat each other on an interpersonal level as well as how resources ought to be distributed in society. Similarly, a liberal may view social order as unimportant to morality, report strong endorsement of equality, and then use that equality motive as the foundation for both how best to provide for societal wellbeing and for how our society and way of life can best be protected. One of the major benefits of this alternative approach would be that it would avoid any problems that arise from assuming that specific moral motives only apply at
specific levels of analysis. For example, according to this approach, “macro justice” would be
defined more broadly as any set of principles a person may use to determine what a fair
distribution of societal resources may be. These principles may, as the MMM current predicts, be
based on equality and social justice, but they do not need to be.

Furthermore, this revised MMM could also accommodate variability between how people
view any given motive – even those who report equally strong endorsement. For example, people
may support social justice and a more equal distribution of societal resources, but do so for
different reasons. For example, people of high socio-economic status (SES) may view their
endorsement of social justice in moral terms and see it as the fair thing to do given their personal
prosperity. Low SES people may also support a more equal distribution of resources in society,
but may do so only because it benefits them economically. The differences between these two
individuals may translate into different predictions about, for example, whether either of them
chooses to become politically engaged and how their endorsement of social justice may or may
not change over time.

In sum, future work should test hypotheses beyond those that make trait level predictions
about the morality of different groups of people, both inside and outside of politics. To do this,
we need a more flexible theoretical model that can accommodate the wide variety of human
moral experience. Currently, the MMM provides a very promising starting point upon which
future research can build. As stated at the beginning of this section, the moral motives described
in the MMM are morally relevant and can be used to describe differences in the morality of
liberals and conservatives. The MMM does not, however, fully describe the wide variety of
moral content that people possess, be they liberal, conservative, or otherwise. As much as the
current results found support for the moral relevance and moral differences hypotheses, the
results also demonstrated that the morality of liberals and conservatives is likely far more complex than what is described in the MMM. There is still plenty of unexplored territory that will likely uncover aspects of morality where liberals and conservatives both disagree and agree.

B. **Moral Motivation Hypothesis**

Beyond trying to specify the “content” of people’s moral beliefs, the MMM also tries to understand how people’s sense of morality motivates behavior. I found support for the moral motivation hypothesis that greater endorsement of social order and social justice motives predicted greater willingness to take action in both Studies 2 and 3. Moreover, the relationships between social order and activism intentions differed for liberals versus conservatives in Study 3 (but not Study 2), which provided partial support for the moral differences hypothesis. More specifically, social order predicted activism intentions for conservatives, but not liberals, but there was not a parallel ideological difference in the relationship between social justice and activism.

I also tested whether the motivation provided by social order and social justice is the result of their perceived moral relevance. If social order and social justice motivate behavior because they are morally relevant, then moral conviction should mediate their relationship with activism; moreover, the motivational pathways should vary as a function of political orientation. The results were generally consistent with the prediction that the motivation provided by the moral motives is due to their relationship with moral conviction (particularly for the social justice motives), but I found only mixed support for the MMM prediction that this motivation is different for liberals and conservatives. In support of the moral motivation hypothesis, moral conviction mediated the relationship between both social order and social justice and activism in Study 2. Additional support was also found for the moral motivation as well as moral differences
hypotheses in Study 3 for social justice: Moral conviction mediated the relationship between social justice and activism for liberals, but not conservatives. Contrary to the moral motivation hypothesis and the results from Study 2, however, moral conviction did not mediate the relationship between social order and activism in Study 3. Moreover, political orientation did not moderate these mediational effects.

In summary, the moral motivation hypothesis that social order and social justice not only describe different aspects of people’s moral beliefs, but also motivate behavioral intentions was supported, albeit with some qualifications. Moreover, the relationship between the moral motives and activism is mediated, at least in part, by moral conviction. Political orientation, however, did not consistently moderate the motivational connections between the social motives, moral conviction, and activist intentions.

1. **Implications of the moral motivation hypothesis.**

Unlike the moral relevance and moral difference hypotheses, support for the moral motivation hypothesis was less consistent across studies. Across Studies 2 and 3, both social order and social justice positively predicted activism, but whether this relationship differed for liberals and conservatives and whether it was mediated by moral conviction was less consistent. One possible interpretation of these mixed results is that, although the moral motives can at times be motivating, they may not be motivating in every situation or for every person (even those who base their morality on a motive). Put another way, the current results point to the possibility that there are likely to be important moderators of when the moral motives are motivational, and when they are not. One possible moderator, based on self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), could be whether people perceive a difference between how they think the world ought to be based on their moral beliefs, and how they perceive the world to be in reality. For example, for
people who base their morality on social justice and beliefs about the importance of ensuring that the basic needs of everyone in society are provided for, they might be more likely to engage in activism in the name of these moral beliefs if or when they see the world as somehow falling short of this ideal. Those same people, however, might be unlikely to be motivated to take action if and when they see society as already meeting their social justice related goals. In sum, the mixed support for the moral motivation hypothesis points to the possible presence of important boundary conditions for when the moral concerns described in the MMM are motivational and when they are not. Moreover, it supports the notion that the moral motives, although potentially providing a source of motivation, may not be motivational by definition.

C. The Regulatory Focus Hypothesis

Compared to the moral relevance, moral differences, and moral motivation hypotheses, I found the least support for the regulatory focus hypothesis. According to the regulatory focus hypothesis, the societal moral motives are grounded in people’s regulatory goals related to preventing societal harm (in the case of social order), and promoting societal wellbeing (in the case of social justice). In Study 1, I provided a tentative test of the regulatory focus hypothesis by including items meant to measure promotion and prevention forms of both social order and social justice. Inspection of the bivariate correlations between the measures of each of the two societal moral motives in either promotion or prevention terms revealed them to be statistically indistinguishable from one another. That is, participants’ endorsement of the two moral motives was independent of whether they were framed in promotion or prevention terms.

In Study 3, I more directly tested the regulatory focus hypothesis by attempting to manipulate participants’ current regulatory focus. If the regulatory focus hypothesis is correct, then priming a promotion orientation should increase endorsement of social justice (a promotion
oriented moral motive) and therefore reduce endorsement of social order (a prevention oriented moral motive). In contrast, priming a prevention orientation should increase endorsement of social order and therefore reduce endorsement of social justice. Contrary to the regulatory fit hypothesis, however, the regulatory focus manipulation had no effect on participants’ endorsement of either social order or social justice.

1. **Implications for the regulatory focus hypothesis.**

   One aspect of the MMM that was not supported by the current studies is that the social order and social justice motives represent more fundamental underlying regulatory concerns about promoting societal welfare and preventing societal harm. One possible explanation for not finding more convincing evidence in support of the regulatory fit hypothesis may be that, even though regulatory focus can influence how people go about pursuing morally relevant goals, neither social order nor social justice is, by definition, promotion or prevention oriented. Rather, perhaps each motive can come in either promotion or prevention forms. That is, the goals of providing and protecting society can be achieved through either promotion or prevention focused means. For example, people can construe goals related to social justice in either promotion terms related to maximizing societal gains or in prevention terms related to ensuring that no one in society goes without basic necessities. Similarly, other people might attempt to protect society via social order by either preventing what they see as threats to our way of life or by promoting traditional values.

   The notion that people often pursue morally relevant outcomes through both promotion and prevention is mirrored in recent research on moral conviction. Specifically, a series of recent studies tested whether people engage in activism in the name of their moral convictions to (1) promote morally good outcomes and feel a sense of pride, (2) prevent morally bad outcomes and
avoid feeling a sense of regret for failing to take action, or (3) some combination of both (Skitka et al., 2013). Results from these studies found that the relationship between moral conviction and activism is mediated by both promotion and prevention related variables.

Overall, considerable future research is needed to clearly determine what the relationship is between the moral motives and people’s regulatory goals. Although the results I present here are inconsistent with the prediction that social order is based on prevention concerns and social justice on promotion, they are still preliminary. Moreover, these results are inconsistent with previous work that does support of the regulatory focus hypothesis (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). Unlike the current studies, however, this previous work has focused on demonstrating that morality in general can exist in both promotion (i.e., prescriptive) and prevention (i.e., proscriptive) forms, and has not tested whether the specific moral motives discussed in the MMM are promotion or prevention based. Little previous work has attempted to manipulate the societal level moral motives by manipulating people’s current regulatory goals. One notable exception that used a regulatory focus manipulation similar to the one used here, however, found that inducing a prevention mindset increased, and a promotion mindset decreased, people’s endorsement of the “binding” moral foundations – a construct theoretically similar to the social order motives (Cornwell & Higgins, 2013). Future research should further explore the degree to which social order and social justice are respectively prevention and promotion orientations.

D. **Limitations and Future Directions**

As I noted in the previous sections, the current studies tested the validity of the MMM and, in many instances, the results supported the model’s central predictions. With that being said, it is necessary to qualify some of the conclusions of the present research. In this remaining
section, I discuss limitations of the current studies as well as how they ought to be addressed in future research.

One limitation of the current studies centers on the largely correlational nature of the methods used. Making strong causal claims about the relationship between moral motives and moral conviction, however, was not the primary goal of the current work, which was instead to take a first step toward establishing whether there were relationships between the moral motives, moral conviction, and political activism in the first place. Before testing which direction the causal arrow points in the relationships between the moral motives, moral conviction, and activism, it is useful to establish that these relationships exist in the first place.

Now that we know that there are the predicted relationships between these variables, future research should focus on manipulating the social order and social justice moral motives. Because of the questionable effectiveness of the regulatory focus manipulation used in Study 3, it remains an open question whether altering people’s current regulatory state can affect people’s endorsement of the moral motives. Furthermore, the failure to find support for the regulatory focus hypothesis is, to some extent, at odds with what has been found in previous research. Specifically, previous research found that priming threats versus rewards (a standard approach-avoidance manipulation, see Friedman & Forster, 2005) can elicit prescriptive versus proscriptive moral responses (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). In these studies, when asked to spontaneously list morally prohibited and morally permitted behaviors, participants primed with threat spontaneously generated more morally prohibited behaviors (and fewer morally permitted behaviors) than participants in the control condition. Participants in the reward condition, however, did not differ from control in either the number of spontaneously generated morally prohibited or permitted behaviors. Thus, previous research found threat manipulations effectively
primed prescriptive aspects of morality related to behavioral restraint and preventing harm. Based on this work, it is possible that threat inductions may be a more effective method for manipulating people’s promotion versus prevention mindset and their subsequent endorsement of social order motives, compared to the manipulation used in Study 3 of the current research.

Another possible limitation of the current work is that it focuses on only one set of the moral motives – the societal level moral motives. Thus, another possible avenue for future work would be to manipulate people’s endorsement of the moral motives by manipulating participants’ current level of construal (i.e., self, individual others, society). One aspect of the MMM that the current research did not address is that the different moral motives are, theoretically, only relevant at a specific level of analysis. That is, social order and social justice are thought to apply to the group or macro-level concerns, harm and fairness apply to individual others, and self-restraint and self-reliance apply to the self (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013). Consistent with the prediction that these construal levels matter in how people make morally relevant judgments, manipulating whether people take a macro/societal versus a micro/individual level focus impacts how people make judgments of fairness (Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2007). This past work can provide a foundation for research that manipulates whether people are focusing on their own behavior, the behavior of specific others, or on society as a whole, and see how it affects which of the moral motives forms the basis of their moral judgments.

The current work also likely missed important variables that may moderate when social order and social justice predict the moral conviction of liberals and conservatives. For example, previous research on the MMM has already attempted to explain why liberals and conservatives differ in the public policy domains where they think moral regulation is most needed. These different public policy domains may prove to be an important boundary condition of when the
societal level moral motives predict people’s sense of moral conviction about those issues and when they do not. Specifically, according to the MMM, liberals’ emphasis on social justice leads them to support social regulation policy that attempts to minimize inequality and ensure equal distribution of societal resources (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013). For example, according to the MMM, it is liberals’ focus on equality and social justice that underlies their support for social welfare programs and affirmative action. In contrast, according the MMM, conservatives’ emphasis on social order leads them to favor social regulation policy aimed at behavioral restraint and regulating what they see to be counter-normative and deviant behavior. It is these beliefs that underlie conservatives’ opposition to such things as legalized abortion and same-sex marriage. Thus, how people classify a specific political issue is a likely boundary condition for when social order and social justice will predict their feeling of moral conviction about that issue. That is, social justice will likely be more relevant to moral conviction related to “economics issues” whereas social order will likely be more relevant to “lifestyle and behavior issues” (although issues are often seen as relevant to both economics and lifestyle; see Appendix B for additional analyses relevant to the moderating role of issue type).

Beyond likely missing important moderating variables, another limitation of the current research is that it only partially addressed the possibility that there are additional moral motives not included in the MMM. Although the results of Study 1 found preliminary evidence for additional motives related to protecting and providing for society exist beyond social order and social justice, these findings were quite preliminary. Specifically, I found that a moral motive about protecting society framed in a way that was more stereotypically liberal (i.e., in terms of everyone having an equal voice in our democracy) positively predicted moral conviction for liberals, but not conservatives. Furthermore, I also found that a moral motive about providing for
societal wellbeing but framed in more a stereotypically conservative way (i.e., emphasizing merit rather than equality) had a positive, though non-significant, relationship with moral conviction for conservatives. Future research should explore the possibility that the moral motives described in the MMM may need to be expanded. The MMM does not specify what underlies people’s sense of moral conviction about societal level issues if not social order or social justice. Currently, the MMM would lead one to predict that liberals do not moralize issues related to protecting society and conservatives do not moralize issues related to providing for society. It is entirely possible, however, that both liberals and conservatives value both protecting and providing for society, but in ways that the MMM does not address.

Finally, the conclusions that one can draw from the current studies are limited by the samples used. Each of the three studies used opt-in samples that overrepresented liberals and underrepresented conservatives, particularly at the extreme end of the conservative spectrum. Scholars in the field of political psychology have argued numerous times for caution when interpreting results from samples that contain such an imbalance across the political spectrum (e.g., Kahan, 2013). It is possible that such samples might not only contain small numbers of conservatives, but might also be unrepresentative of conservatives more generally (i.e., the conservatives in the sample are “atypical” and differ in fundamental ways from most conservatives). Thus, future studies should make a concerted effort to replicate the current results with samples that are more balanced in the number of participants from different political points of view.

E. Conclusion

In summary, the three studies presented here tested key predictions of the MMM (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013) and provided evidence for how the morality of liberals and
conservatives differs. Liberals tend to base their moral conviction on social justice rather than social order, whereas conservatives base their moral conviction on social order rather than social justice. These findings help reconcile the discrepancy between (1) research on moral conviction that finds little difference between liberals and conservatives in their overall level of moral conviction or its consequences (Skitka et al. in press), and (2) theory and research that finds considerable differences in the moral worldviews of the political left and right (Graham et al., 2009; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013). In tying these two lines of work together, the current studies not only point to fruitful areas that can be explored by future research, but also provide insight into what underlies the “culture war” that is currently raging in American culture. It is not that liberals and conservatives desire different moral ends – both want to foster societal good and to protect society from harm. Rather, the two groups simply emphasize different concerns when attempting to bring these two goals into being – liberals emphasize social justice, equality, communal responsibility, whereas conservatives emphasize social order, traditional values, and group loyalty.
REFERENCES


### APPENDIX A: MATERIALS

#### Study 1 Materials

**Moral Motives Scale**

Please indicate the extent of your support or opposition each of the statements below. There are no correct or incorrect reactions, so please be as honest as possible in responding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Moderately Disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Moderately Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It’s particularly important to me to demonstrate self-control in the face of temptation. <em>(Self-Restraint)</em></td>
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<td>Life is full of unhealthy attractions, so it’s important for me to develop a strong sense of self-discipline and control. <em>(Self-Restraint)</em></td>
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<td>I’m willing to put the necessary time and effort into providing for my own well-being and success. <em>(Self-Reliance)</em></td>
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<td>I think it’s important to take responsibility for my failures and setbacks rather than blame other people. <em>(Self-Reliance)</em></td>
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<td>We should all be responsible for improving the welfare of others beyond our immediate circle of friends and family. <em>(SJ)</em></td>
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<td>Statement</td>
<td>SJ</td>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Promotion</td>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>Equality of Voice</td>
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<td>In the healthiest societies those at the top feel responsible for providing better lives for those at the bottom. (SJ)</td>
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<td>One of the most important goals of our society should be to prevent anyone from going without basic necessities. (SJ Prevention)</td>
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<td>Giving people the freedom to choose the way they live threatens the societal bonds that hold us together. (SO)</td>
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<td>In a decent society, people should not be free to make their own choices about how to live their lives, but should attend to community standards. (SO)</td>
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<td>Our society would be safer and more secure if we promoted traditional values. (SO Promotion)</td>
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<td>The fairest way to allocate our society's resources is to do so based on merit. (Merit)</td>
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<td>The best way to protect our society's values and way of life is to keep businesses and corporations out of the democratic process. (Equality of Voice)</td>
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### Moral Foundations Scale (Part 1)

When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all relevant</th>
<th>Not very relevant</th>
<th>Slightly relevant</th>
<th>Somewhat relevant</th>
<th>Very relevant</th>
<th>Extremely relevant</th>
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<tr>
<td>Whether or not someone suffered emotionally.</td>
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<td>(Harm)</td>
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<td>Whether or not some people were treated differently than others.</td>
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<td>(Fairness)</td>
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<td>Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country.</td>
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<td>Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority.</td>
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<td>Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency.</td>
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<td>(Purity)</td>
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<td>Whether or not someone acted unfairly.</td>
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<td>(Fairness)</td>
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<td>Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable. <strong>(Harm)</strong></td>
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<td>Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group. <strong>(Loyalty)</strong></td>
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<td>Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society. <strong>(Authority)</strong></td>
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<td>Whether or not someone did something disgusting. <strong>(Purity)</strong></td>
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<td>Whether someone benefited who did not earn it. <strong>(Fairness)</strong></td>
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**Moral Foundations Scale (Part 2)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial</th>
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</table>

- Strongly Disagree
- Moderately Disagree
- Slightly Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Slightly Agree
- Moderately Agree
- Strongly Agree
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>virtue. (Harm)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal. (Harm)</td>
<td>$\bigcirc$</td>
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<tr>
<td>When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly. (Fairness)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justice is the most important requirement for a society. (Fairness)</td>
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<tr>
<td>I am proud of my country’s history. (Loyalty)</td>
<td>$\bigcirc$</td>
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<tr>
<td>People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something</td>
<td>$\bigcirc$</td>
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<tr>
<td>wrong. (Loyalty)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Respect for authority is something all children need to learn. (Authority)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Men and women each have different roles to play in society. (Authority)</td>
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<tr>
<td>People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed. (Purity)</td>
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<tr>
<td>I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural. (Purity)</td>
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Attitude Stance, Moral Conviction, and Attitude Importance

The following questions were asked for each of the following issues:
- Same-sex marriage
- Nationalized healthcare (i.e., healthcare provided by the government)
- Legalized abortion
- Welfare for poor Americans
- The death penalty
- Additional laws meant to curb illegal immigration
- Reducing government spending on entitlement programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid

To what extent do you Support or Oppose *<the issue>*?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly oppose</th>
<th>Moderately oppose</th>
<th>Slightly oppose</th>
<th>Neither support nor oppose</th>
<th>Slightly support</th>
<th>Moderately support</th>
<th>Strongly support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐</td>
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<td>☐</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

To what extent is your position on *<the issue>*…

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>…deeply connected to your beliefs about fundamental questions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’?</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>☐</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>…a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions?</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>☐</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>…based on moral principle?</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>☐</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>…a moral stance?</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
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<td>☐</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>…personally important to you?</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐</td>
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<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>…something that you care a lot about?</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐</td>
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<td>☐</td>
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<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>…important to you compared to other political issues of the day?</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Political Orientation**
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a liberal, conservative, moderate, or something else?

- Liberal
- Conservative
- Moderate
- Uncertain/ Don't know
- Other: ____________________

**[IF “Liberal” is selected]**
To what degree do you consider yourself a Liberal?
- Slightly liberal
- Moderately liberal
- Strongly liberal

**[IF “Conservative” is selected]**
To what degree do you consider yourself a Conservative?
- Slightly conservative
- Moderately conservative
- Strongly conservative

**[IF “Moderate”, “Uncertain/ Don't know” or “Other” is selected]**
If you had to choose, would you say that you lean more toward considering yourself liberal, conservative, or neither?
- Liberal
- Neither
- Conservative
Study 2 Materials

Issue Type Manipulation
Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of the two following prompts:

Regardless of your support or opposition toward the issues below, please select the one that, in your opinion, is most closely related to concerns about “economics and the distribution of resources in our society”

Regardless of your support or opposition toward the issues below, please select the one that, in your opinion, is most closely related to concerns about “the lifestyles and behavior of people in the United States.”

- Nationalized healthcare (i.e., healthcare provided by the government)
- Legalized abortion
- Legalizing same-sex marriage
- Welfare for poor Americans
- Capital punishment (i.e., the death penalty)
- Additional laws to curb illegal immigration
- Cuts to government spending for entitlement programs (social security, medicare, etc.)
- Laws that make recycling mandatory
- A "carbon tax" on businesses to curb greenhouse gas emissions

Attitude Stance
Do you support or oppose <the issue>?
- Support
- Oppose
- Neither support nor Oppose

[Participants who select “Support” or “Oppose”]
How strongly do you support/oppose <the issue>?
- Slightly
- Moderately
- Much
- Very much

[Participants who select “Neither support nor Oppose”]
If you had to choose, would you say that you lean more toward support, more toward oppose, or would you still say neither?
- Lean toward support
- Lean toward oppose
- Neither support nor oppose

**Moral Conviction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent is your position on <em>the issue selected</em>...</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...deeply connected to your beliefs about fundamental questions of 'right' and 'wrong'?</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions?</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...based on moral principle?</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...a moral stance?</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Attitude Importance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent is your position on <em>the issue selected</em>...</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...personally important to you?</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...something that you care a lot about?</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...important to you compared to other political issues of the day?</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Economic and lifestyle concerns**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent is your position on this issue based on concerns about...</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...economics and the distribution of resources in the United States?</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>...the lifestyles and behavior of people in the United States?</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Attitude Specific Moral Motives and Moral Foundations

To what extent are each of the following considerations relevant to your thinking on this issue?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consideration</th>
<th>Not at all relevant</th>
<th>Slightly relevant</th>
<th>Moderately relevant</th>
<th>Very relevant</th>
<th>Extremely relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whether or not people suffered emotionally. (MF Harm)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whether or not people cared for someone weak or vulnerable. (MF Harm)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whether or not some people were treated differently than others. (MF Fair)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whether or not people acted unfairly. (MF Fair)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining order in our society. (SO)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting our society from threats. (SO)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
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<tr>
<td>Providing for the wellbeing of our society. (SJ)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
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<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring that societal resources are distributed equally. (SJ)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
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<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocating societal resources based on merit. (Merit)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promoting traditional values in our society. (SO Promotion)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
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<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing anyone in our society from going without basic necessities. (SJ Prevention)</td>
<td>●</td>
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</table>
**Activism Intentions**
To what extent would you be willing to do each of the following in the name of your beliefs of the issue of *<the issue>*?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Not at all willing</th>
<th>Slightly willing</th>
<th>Moderately willing</th>
<th>Very willing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sign a petition.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contact your state representative.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Work at a phone bank.</td>
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<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer to go door-to-door to collect signatures on a petition.</td>
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<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote in the next election.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hold group meetings at your house.</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</table>

**Political Orientation**
Political orientation was measured in the same way in Studies 2 and 3 as in Study 1.
Study 3 Materials

Attitude stance, moral conviction, attitude importance, the moral motives, the moral foundations, activism, and political orientation were measured in the same way in Study 3 as in Study 2.

Regulatory Focus Manipulation

Promotion prompt:

For this task, we would like you to think about what you see as the current hopes and aspirations of the United States. In other words, what are some things you think should be promoted in American society? What things would you ideally like for American society to achieve? In the boxes below, please list out up to two things that you think America should aspire to accomplish.

Prevention prompt:

For this task, we would like you to think about what you see as the current duties and obligations of the United States. In other words, what are some things that you think should be prevented in American society? What are some things that you think American society has an obligation to avoid? In the boxes below, please list out up to two things that you see as being America’s current duties and obligations.

Control prompt:

For this task, we would like you to think about the day-to-day behaviors and activities of the average American. In other words, what sorts of things do you think the average American does on a day-to-day basis? In the boxes below, please list out up to two daily behaviors or activities of the average American.

Each participant was also provided with two text boxes along with the following questions for each response:
How harmful or beneficial do you think this is for the United States?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very harmful</th>
<th>Moderately harmful</th>
<th>Slightly harmful</th>
<th>Neither harmful nor beneficial</th>
<th>Slightly beneficial</th>
<th>Moderately beneficial</th>
<th>Very beneficial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</table>

How good or bad do you think this is for the United States?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very bad</th>
<th>Moderately bad</th>
<th>Slightly bad</th>
<th>Neither harmful nor beneficial</th>
<th>Slightly good</th>
<th>Moderately good</th>
<th>Very good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</table>
## APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
### TABLE A.1
STUDY 1 MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS

|                          | M    | SD  | 1          | 2          | 3          | 4          | 5          | 6          | 7          | 8          | 9          | 10         | 11         | 12         | 13         | 14         | 15         |
|--------------------------|------|-----|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Political Orientation   | -1.38| 2.15| 1          |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| Political Extremity      | 2.13 | 1.41| -0.51**    | 1          |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| Self-Reliance (3)       | 6.29 | 0.84| 0.09*      | 0.01       | 1          |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| Self-Restraint (4)      | 5.54 | 1.21| 0.17**     | -0.13**    | 0.35**     | 1          |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| Social Justice (5)      | 5.27 | 1.40| -0.38**    | 0.19**     | 0.04       | 0.00       | 1          |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| Social Order (6)        | 2.92 | 1.57| 0.43**     | -0.26**    | -0.02      | 0.28**     | -0.20**    | 1          |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| Individuating MF (7)    | 0.00 | 0.60| -0.26**    | 0.18**     | 0.24**     | 0.20**     | 0.29**     | -0.06      | 1          |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| Binding MF (8)          | 0.00 | 0.64| 0.36**     | -0.16**    | 0.16**     | 0.30**     | -0.20**    | 0.63**     | 0.12**     | 1          |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| Abortion MC (9)         | 3.45 | 1.20| -0.05      | 0.19**     | 0.07       | 0.06       | 0.09*      | -0.10*     | 0.14**     | -0.03      | 1          |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| Same-sex Marriage MC (10)| 3.64 | 1.28| -0.31**    | 0.25**     | 0.01       | -0.04      | 0.23**     | -0.25**    | 0.26**     | -0.18**    | 0.47**     | 1          |            |            |            |            |            |            |
| Healthcare MC (11)      | 3.38 | 1.23| -0.32**    | 0.27**     | 0.03       | -0.05      | 0.31**     | -0.18**    | 0.26**     | -0.14**    | 0.38**     | 0.46**     | 1          |            |            |            |            |            |
| Welfare MC (12)         | 3.47 | 1.10| -0.29**    | 0.29**     | 0.07       | -0.05      | 0.34**     | -0.27**    | 0.35**     | -0.15**    | 0.38**     | 0.43**     | 0.64**     | 1          |            |            |            |            |
| Death penalty MC (13)   | 3.34 | 1.14| -0.11*     | 0.14**     | 0.03       | -0.02      | 0.09*      | -0.12**    | 0.23**     | -0.04      | 0.39**     | 0.35**     | 0.31**     | 0.42**     | 1          |            |            |            |
| Illegal Immigration MC (14)| 2.87 | 1.16| -0.05      | 0.13**     | 0.00       | -0.08^     | 0.06       | 0.02       | 0.21**     | 0.03       | 0.34**     | 0.29**     | 0.39**     | 0.40**     | 0.39**     | 1          |            |            |
| Entitlement programs MC (15)| 3.11 | 1.21| -0.23**    | 0.27**     | 0.02       | -0.07      | 0.22**     | -0.19**    | 0.29**     | -0.11*     | 0.37**     | 0.40**     | 0.60**     | 0.67**     | 0.33**     | 0.42**     | 1          |            |
| MC total (16)           | 3.32 | 0.84| -0.28**    | 0.31**     | 0.05       | -0.05      | 0.27**     | -0.22**    | 0.35**     | -0.13**    | 0.67**     | 0.70**     | 0.76**     | 0.79**     | 0.64**     | 0.65**     | 0.76**     |

^ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
### TABLE A.2

**STUDY 1 REGRESSION RESULTS PREDICTING MORAL CONVICTION FOR EACH ISSUE INDIVIDUALLY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Abortion MC</th>
<th>Same-sex marriage MC</th>
<th>Healthcare MC</th>
<th>Welfare MC</th>
<th>The death penalty MC</th>
<th>Illegal Immigration MC</th>
<th>Entitlement programs MC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>0.19*</td>
<td>-0.24**</td>
<td>-0.22**</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Justice</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>0.13**</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Order</td>
<td>-0.10**</td>
<td>-0.14**</td>
<td>-0.06^</td>
<td>-0.14**</td>
<td>-0.08*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO by SJ</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.11*</td>
<td>-0.09*</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.09^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO by SO</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td>0.20**</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td>0.22**</td>
<td>0.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
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<td>.13</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

### TABLE A.3

**STUDY 2 MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS**

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<th>3</th>
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<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
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</thead>
</table>


<table>
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<td>MO</td>
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<td>-0.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.33**</td>
</tr>
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<td>MO</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.29**</td>
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<td>MO</td>
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<td>0.51**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.39**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01
### TABLE A.4
STUDY 2 FIT STATISTICS FOR PATH MODELS PREDICTING ACTIVISM INTENTIONS INCLUDING EITHER MORAL CONVICTION OR THE MORAL MOTIVES AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

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<th>Fit Indices</th>
<th>Lower Values = Better Fit</th>
<th>Higher Values = Better Fit</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>BIC</td>
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<td>Model with Moral Motives as the Independent variables</td>
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<td>5488.13</td>
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TABLE A.5
STUDY 2 REGRESSION RESULTS PREDICTING MORAL CONVICTION INCLUDING ISSUE TYPE AS A MODERATOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Model without controls</th>
<th>Model with controls</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td><strong>0.51</strong></td>
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<td>Individuating Moral Foundations</td>
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<td>“Lifestyle concerns” relevant</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Economic concerns” relevant</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Justice</td>
<td><strong>0.23</strong></td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Order</td>
<td><strong>0.19</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.07</strong>^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td><strong>-0.11</strong>^</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td>Individuating by PO interaction</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lifestyle by SJ interaction</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lifestyle by SO interaction</td>
<td><strong>0.06</strong>^</td>
<td><strong>0.06</strong>^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic by SJ interaction</td>
<td><strong>0.17</strong>^</td>
<td><strong>0.06</strong>^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic by SO interaction</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SO by PO interaction</td>
<td><strong>0.11</strong>^</td>
<td><strong>0.12</strong>^</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SJ by PO interaction</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic by PO interaction</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lifestyle by PO interaction</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3</td>
<td>Lifestyle by SJ by PO</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lifestyle by SO by PO</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic by SJ by PO</td>
<td><strong>-0.19</strong>^</td>
<td><strong>-0.10</strong>^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic by SO by PO</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
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</table>

**p < .01, *p < .05, ^p < .10**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 3 Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations</th>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>M</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Moral Conviction (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attitude Importance (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political extremity (4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Justice (5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Order (6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individuating MF (7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activism (8)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01
### TABLE A.7
STUDY 3 REGRESSION RESULTS PREDICTING ACTIVISM INTENTIONS, INCLUDING THE REGULATORY FOCUS MANIPULATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>ΔR²</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Political Orientation</strong></td>
<td>-0.12**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Social Order</strong></td>
<td>0.07**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Social Justice</strong></td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
<td>Prevention DC</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Promotion DC</strong></td>
<td>0.15*</td>
<td>.01^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 3</strong></td>
<td>PO x SO</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PO x SJ</td>
<td>-0.05^</td>
<td>.01^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 4</strong></td>
<td>Prevention DC x PO</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promotion DC x PO</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 5</strong></td>
<td>Prevention DC x SJ</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promotion DC x SJ</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 6</strong></td>
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<td>-0.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Promotion DC x SO</strong></td>
<td>-0.14*</td>
<td>.01^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 7</strong></td>
<td>Prevention x PO x SJ</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promotion x PO x SJ</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 8</strong></td>
<td>Prevention x PO x SO</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promotion x PO x SO</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Final R²** | .18 |
IRB DOCUMENTATION

Exemption Granted

November 5, 2013

Daniel Wisneski, MA
Psychology
1007 W Harrison St., 1009 BSB
M/C 285
Chicago, IL 60612
Phone: (773) 682-5912 / Fax: (312) 413-4122

RE: Research Protocol # 2013-1062
“Exploring Possible Differences in Liberal and Conservative Moral Conviction”
Sponsors: None

Dear Mr. Wisneski:

Your Claim of Exemption was reviewed on November 5, 2013 and it was determined that your research protocol meets the criteria for exemption as defined in the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects [(45 CFR 46.101(b)]. You may now begin your research.

Performance Site: UIC
Subject Population: Adult (18+ years) subjects only
Number of Subjects: 1500

The specific exemption category under 45 CFR 46.101(b) is:
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.

You are reminded that investigators whose research involving human subjects is determined to be exempt from the federal regulations for the protection of human subjects still have responsibilities for the ethical conduct of the research under state law and UIC policy. Please be aware of the following UIC policies and responsibilities for investigators:

1. Amendments You are responsible for reporting any amendments to your research protocol that may affect the determination of the exemption and may result in your research no longer being eligible for the exemption that has been granted.

2. Record Keeping You are responsible for maintaining a copy all research related records in a secure location in the event future verification is necessary, at a minimum these documents include: the research protocol, the claim of exemption application, all questionnaires, survey instruments, interview questions and/or data collection instruments associated with this research.
3. protocol, recruiting or advertising materials, any consent forms or information sheets given to subjects, or any other pertinent documents.

4. Final Report When you have completed work on your research protocol, you should submit a final report to the Office for Protection of Research Subjects (OPRS).

5. Information for Human Subjects UIC Policy requires investigators to provide information about the research protocol to subjects and to obtain their permission prior to their participating in the research. The information about the research protocol should be presented to subjects in writing or orally from a written script. When appropriate, the following information must be provided to all research subjects participating in exempt studies:
   a. The researchers affiliation; UIC, JBVMAC or other institutions,
   b. The purpose of the research,
   c. The extent of the subject’s involvement and an explanation of the procedures to be followed,
   d. Whether the information being collected will be used for any purposes other than the proposed research,
   e. A description of the procedures to protect the privacy of subjects and the confidentiality of the research information and data,
   f. Description of any reasonable foreseeable risks,
   g. Description of anticipated benefit,
   h. A statement that participation is voluntary and subjects can refuse to participate or can stop at any time,
   i. A statement that the researcher is available to answer any questions that the subject may have and which includes the name and phone number of the investigator(s).
   j. A statement that the UIC IRB/OPRS or JBVMAC Patient Advocate Office is available if there are questions about subject’s rights, which includes the appropriate phone numbers.

Please be sure to:
   → Use your research protocol number (listed above) on any documents or correspondence with the IRB concerning your research protocol.

We wish you the best as you conduct your research. If you have any questions or need further help, please contact me at (312) 355-2908 or the OPRS office at (312) 996-1711. Please send any correspondence about this protocol to OPRS at 203 AOB, M/C 672.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Hoehne, B.S., C.I.P.
Assistant Director, IRB # 2
Office for the Protection of Research Subjects

cc: Michael E. Ragozzino, Psychology, M/C 285
    Linda J. Skitka, Psychology, M/C 285
Exempt Research
UIC Amendment #1
Request for Modifications and/or Additional Information

January 24, 2014

Daniel Wisneski, MA
Psychology
1007 W Harrison St., 1009 BSB
M/C 285
Chicago, IL 60612
Phone: (773) 682-5912 / Fax: (312) 413-4122

RE: Protocol # 2013-1062
“Exploring Possible Differences in Liberal and Conservative Moral Conviction”

Dear Mr. Wisneski,

Staff/Members of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) #2 reviewed the UIC Amendment #1 to your research protocol and/or the informed consent document(s). The amendment was reviewed on January 24, 2014. It was determined that the following is required:

1. An “Example Recruitment Message” was included with this submission. Please submit copies of the final recruitment message(s).
2. The recruitment message currently indicates, “All responses are entirely anonymous and there is absolutely no way that any respondent can be identified.” Anonymity, however, cannot be guaranteed for on-line surveys, and since contact information will be requested, respondents can be identified. Therefore, please revise the recruitment message to eliminate suggestions of anonymity and to explain that participants will have the option of providing their email address on a separate website so their contact information cannot be linked back to their completed survey.

When submitting your response provide 1 original and 1 collated copy (2 total) of the following:

1. A cover letter that references this letter (date) and that responds to each specific item by listing the IRB’s requirements from that letter. Please use the same numbering system as in the IRB’s letter and list your responses after each item.
2. A copy of this letter so that the bar code on the letter can be scanned.
3. For modifications that involve the research protocol, amendment application, and/or research protocol application:
   a. Provide the revised research protocol, amendment application, and/or research protocol application with the modifications and information incorporated.
   b. Please highlight or shade the additions and strike through the deletions on the copy.
   c. Include the next sequential version number and date on each page.
4. For modifications that involve the informed consent document(s)/process:
   a. Provide **one original and two copies** of each revised informed consent document and/or recruitment materials.
   b. On **two (2) copies**, please **highlight** or shade the additions and **strike through** the deletions.
   c. Include a **short descriptor** (to describe each document and differentiate among various documents in the same research protocol) in the footer of each page.
   d. Include the next sequential **version number and date** in the footer of each page.
   e. Be sure the pages are numbered: Page 1 of #, Page 2 of #.

The reviewers have determined that your response to these required modifications may be reviewed without being scheduled for review at a convened IRB meeting. Based on your response the reviewers have the authority to ask further questions, seek additional information, require further modification, or refer the response to the convened IRB.

Please note that you **may not** implement the amendment to your research until you receive a **written notice of approval**.

If you do not respond to the reviewer’s requests within 90 days of this letter, your research protocol submission may be withdrawn from the review process and the reviewers will not take any further action.

If you have any questions or need further help, please contact the OPRS office at (312) 996-1711 or me at (312) 355-2908. Please send any correspondence about this protocol to OPRS at 203 AOB, M/C 672.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Hoehne, B.S., C.I.P.
Assistant Director
Office for the Protection of Research Subjects

Enclosure(s): None

cc: Michael E. Ragozzino, Psychology, M/C 285
    Linda J. Skitka, Psychology, M/C 285
Exemption Granted
UIC Amendment #1

February 6, 2014

Daniel Wisneski, MA
Psychology
1007 W Harrison St., 1009 BSB
M/C 285
Chicago, IL 60612
Phone: (773) 682-5912 / Fax: (312) 413-4122

RE: Research Protocol # 2013-1062
“Exploring Possible Differences in Liberal and Conservative Moral Conviction”

Dear Mr. Wisneski:

Your amendment was reviewed on February 3, 2014 and it was determined that your amended research continues to meet the criteria for exemption. You may now implement the amendment.

Amendment Summary:
UIC Amendment #1 initially dated and submitted on January 13, 2014 is an investigator-initiated amendment and involves a change in the way participants for Studies 1 and 2 will be recruited. Repeated attempts to recruit subjects through CraigsList have failed. Thus, participants will now be recruited by sending out an email through the UIC Massmail system. Additionally, as an incentive to help recruitment for Studies 1 and 2, participants will be given the option to enter a lottery for a chance to win one of four $50 Amazon.com gift cards.

Amendment Approval Date: February 3, 2014
Exemption Period: February 3, 2014 – February 3, 2017

The specific exemption category under 45 CFR 46.101(b) is:
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human subjects’ responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects’ financial standing, employability, or reputation.

Please note the Review History of this submission:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Receipt Date</th>
<th>Submission Type</th>
<th>Review Process</th>
<th>Review Date</th>
<th>Review Action</th>
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<td>Exempt</td>
<td>01/24/2014</td>
<td>Modifications Required</td>
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<td>01/29/2014</td>
<td>Response To Modifications</td>
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</table>

You are reminded that investigators whose research involving human subjects is determined to be exempt from the federal regulations for the protection of human subjects still have responsibilities for
the ethical conduct of the research under state law and UIC policy. Please be aware of the following UIC policies and responsibilities for investigators:

6. **Amendments** You are responsible for reporting any amendments to your research protocol that may affect the determination of the exemption and may result in your research no longer being eligible for the exemption that has been granted.

7. **Record Keeping** You are responsible for maintaining a copy all research related records in a secure location in the event future verification is necessary, at a minimum these documents include: the research protocol, the claim of exemption application, all questionnaires, survey instruments, interview questions and/or data collection instruments associated with this research protocol, recruiting or advertising materials, any consent forms or information sheets given to subjects, or any other pertinent documents.

8. **Final Report** When you have completed work on your research protocol, you should submit a final report to the Office for Protection of Research Subjects (OPRS).

9. **Information for Human Subjects** UIC Policy requires investigators to provide information about the research protocol to subjects and to obtain their permission prior to their participating in the research. The information about the research protocol should be presented to subjects in writing or orally from a written script. When appropriate, the following information must be provided to all research subjects participating in exempt studies:
   
f. The researchers affiliation; UIC, JBVMAC or other institutions,
g. The purpose of the research,
h. The extent of the subject’s involvement and an explanation of the procedures to be followed,
i. Whether the information being collected will be used for any purposes other than the proposed research,
j. A description of the procedures to protect the privacy of subjects and the confidentiality of the research information and data,
f. Description of any reasonable foreseeable risks,
k. Description of anticipated benefit,
l. A statement that participation is voluntary and subjects can refuse to participate or can stop at any time,
m. A statement that the researcher is available to answer any questions that the subject may have and which includes the name and phone number of the investigator(s).
n. A statement that the UIC IRB/OPRS or JBVMAC Patient Advocate Office is available if there are questions about subject’s rights, which includes the appropriate phone numbers.

Please be sure to:

➤ Use your research protocol number (2013-1062) on any documents or correspondence with the IRB concerning your research protocol.

We wish you the best as you conduct your research. If you have any questions or need further help, please contact the OPRS office at (312) 996-1711 or me at (312) 355-2908. Please send any correspondence about this protocol to OPRS at 203 AOB, M/C 672.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Hoehne, B.S., C.I.P.
Assistant Director
Office for the Protection of Research Subjects
cc: Michael E. Ragozzino, Psychology, M/C 285
     Linda J. Skitka, Psychology, M/C 285

Exempt Research
UIC Amendment #2
Request for Modifications and/or Additional Information

March 27, 2014

Daniel Wisneski, MA
Psychology
1007 W Harrison St., 1009 BSB
M/C 285
Chicago, IL 60612
Phone: (773) 682-5912 / Fax: (312) 413-4122

RE: Protocol # 2013-1062
“Exploring Possible Differences in Liberal and Conservative Moral Conviction”

Dear Mr. Wisnewski,

Staff/Members of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) #2 reviewed the UIC Amendment #2 to your research protocol and/or the informed consent document(s). The amendment was reviewed on March 24, 2014. It was determined that the following is required:

1. Please clarify whether or not subjects recruited through Mechanical Turk will also be offered the chance to participate in the raffle. If they are eligible for the raffle, is this allowed by Amazon Mechanical Turk? If they are not eligible for the raffle, please explain how the raffle incentive equitable for all participants.

When submitting your response provide 1 original and 1 collated copy (2 total) of the following:

2. A cover letter that references this letter (date) and that responds to each specific item by listing the IRB's requirements from that letter. Please use the same numbering system as in the IRB's letter and list your responses after each item.

2. A copy of this letter so that the bar code on the letter can be scanned.

3. For modifications that involve the research protocol, amendment application, and/or research protocol application:
   d. Provide the revised research protocol, amendment application, and/or research protocol application with the modifications and information incorporated.
   e. Please highlight or shade the additions and strike through the deletions on the copy.
   f. Include the next sequential version number and date on each page.

4. For modifications that involve the informed consent document(s)/process:
   f. Provide one original and two copies of each revised informed consent document and/or
recruitment materials.
g. On two (2) copies, please highlight or shade the additions and strike through the deletions.
h. Include a short descriptor (to describe each document and differentiate among various documents in the same research protocol) in the footer of each page.
i. Include the next sequential version number and date in the footer of each page.
j. Be sure the pages are numbered: Page 1 of #, Page 2 of #.

The reviewers have determined that your response to these required modifications may be reviewed without being scheduled for review at a convened IRB meeting. Based on your response the reviewers have the authority to ask further questions, seek additional information, require further modification, or refer the response to the convened IRB.

Please note that you may not implement the amendment to your research until you receive a written notice of approval.

If you do not respond to the reviewer’s requests within 90 days of this letter, your research protocol submission may be withdrawn from the review process and the reviewers will not take any further action.

If you have any questions or need further help, please contact the OPRS office at (312) 996-1711 or me at (312) 355-2908. Please send any correspondence about this protocol to OPRS at 203 AOB, M/C 672.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Hoehne, B.S., C.I.P.
Assistant Director
Office for the Protection of Research Subjects

Enclosure(s): None

cc: Michael E. Ragozzino, Psychology, M/C 285
    Linda J. Skitka, Psychology, M/C 285
Exemption Granted
UIC Amendment #2

April 3, 2014

Daniel Wisneski, MA
Psychology
1007 W Harrison St., 1009 BSB
M/C 285
Chicago, IL 60612
Phone: (773) 682-5912 / Fax: (312) 413-4122

RE: Research Protocol # 2013-1062
“Exploring Possible Differences in Liberal and Conservative Moral Conviction”
Sponsors: None

Dear Mr. Wisneski:
The amendment to your Claim of Exemption was reviewed on April 3, 2014 and it was determined that your amended research meets the criteria for exemption.

Amendment Summary: UIC Amendment #2 dated March 2, 2014 and initially submitted to OPRS on March 5, 2014 is an investigator-initiated amendment and includes the following: Due to low number of 492 enrolled participants reporting to be politically conservative, an additional 200 Study 1 and 2 participants will be recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk increasing the anticipated number of Study 1 and 2 subjects from 450 to 650. The amendment includes the following:
1. Mechanical Turk Recruitment Message (Version 3, dated 3/4/2012); and

Amendment Approval Date: April 3, 2014

Exemption Period: April 3, 2014 – April 3, 2017
Performance Site: UIC
Subject Population: Adult (18+ years) subjects only
Number of Subjects: 1700

The specific exemption category under 45 CFR 46.101(b) is:
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.

You are reminded that investigators whose research involving human subjects is determined to be exempt from the federal regulations for the protection of human subjects still have responsibilities for the ethical conduct of the research under state law and UIC policy. Please be aware of the following UIC policies and responsibilities for investigators:
10. Amendments You are responsible for reporting any amendments to your research protocol that may affect the determination of the exemption and may result in your research no longer being eligible for the exemption that has been granted.

11. Record Keeping You are responsible for maintaining a copy all research related records in a secure location in the event future verification is necessary, at a minimum these documents include: the research protocol, the claim of exemption application, all questionnaires, survey instruments, interview questions and/or data collection instruments associated with this research protocol, recruiting or advertising materials, any consent forms or information sheets given to subjects, or any other pertinent documents.

12. Final Report When you have completed work on your research protocol, you should submit a final report to the Office for Protection of Research Subjects (OPRS).

13. Information for Human Subjects UIC Policy requires investigators to provide information about the research protocol to subjects and to obtain their permission prior to their participating in the research. The information about the research protocol should be presented to subjects in writing or orally from a written script. When appropriate, the following information must be provided to all research subjects participating in exempt studies:

k. The researchers affiliation; UIC, JBVMAC or other institutions,

l. The purpose of the research,

m. The extent of the subject’s involvement and an explanation of the procedures to be followed,

n. Whether the information being collected will be used for any purposes other than the proposed research,

o. A description of the procedures to protect the privacy of subjects and the confidentiality of the research information and data,

f. Description of any reasonable foreseeable risks,

o. Description of anticipated benefit,

p. A statement that participation is voluntary and subjects can refuse to participate or can stop at any time,

q. A statement that the researcher is available to answer any questions that the subject may have and which includes the name and phone number of the investigator(s).

r. A statement that the UIC IRB/OPRS or JBVMAC Patient Advocate Office is available if there are questions about subject’s rights, which includes the appropriate phone numbers.

Please be sure to:

➔ Use your research protocol number (2013-1062) on any documents or correspondence with the IRB concerning your research protocol.

We wish you the best as you conduct your research. If you have any questions or need further help, please contact the OPRS office at (312) 996-1711 or me at (312) 355-2908. Please send any correspondence about this protocol to OPRS at 203 AOB, M/C 672.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Hoehne, B.S., C.I.P.
Assistant Director
Office for the Protection of Research Subjects

cc: Michael E. Ragozzino, Psychology, M/C 285
    Linda J. Skitka, Psychology, M/C 285
VITA

Daniel C. Wisneski - Curriculum Vita

University of Illinois at Chicago
Department of Psychology (M/C 285)
1009 Behavioral Sciences Building
1007 W. Harrison Street
Chicago, Illinois 60607-7137
773-682-5912
dwisne2@uic.edu

Education:

University of Illinois at Chicago (2007 – Present)
Ph.D, anticipated May 2014
M.A., 2010
   Social and Personality Psychology
   Minor: Statistics, Methods, and Measurement
   Thesis and Dissertation Advisor: Linda J. Skitka

Ohio State University (2000 – 2005)
B.A., Summa Cum Laude
   Major: Psychology

Employment:

Assistant Professor of Psychology (2014-Present)
Saint Peter’s University

Honors and Awards:

Society for Personality and Social Psychology Travel Award ($500), 2013
UIC Dean’s Scholar Award, stipend plus tuition waiver (valued at over $40,000), 2011
Provost Award for Graduate Research ($1218), Fall 2010
Member of Phi Kappa Phi National Honors Society (2004)
Ohio State Arts and Sciences Award for Excellence in Scholarship (Spring 2004)

Research Interests:

How moral beliefs influence political thought and behavior.  How attitudes come to be held with strong moral conviction. The cognitive structure of moral attitudes and how they differ from otherwise strong, but non-moral attitudes.
Publications:


Morgan, G. S., Wisneski, D. C.*, & Skitka, L. J. (2011). The expulsion from Disneyland: Understanding the social psychological impact of 9/11. The American Psychologist, 66, 447-454. [*first and second authors contributed equally to this paper and are listed alphabetically.]


Work under review and in preparation:


Skitka, L. J., Wisneski, D. C., Hanson, B., & Morgan, G. S. (in preparation). The affective and cognitive mediators of the link between moral conviction and political action on the issue of same-sex marriage.


Wisneski, D. C., Skitka, L. J., Hanson, B. E., & Morgan, G. S. (in preparation). Examining moralized politics: Who are the chronic political moralizers?

**Invited Talks for External Audiences:**


**Conference Papers and Presentations:**


Wisneski, D.C., Lytle, B.L., & Skitka, L. J. (2010). The independent effect of moral conviction on attitude accessibility and attitude knowledge. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology. Las Vegas, NV.


Professional and Departmental Service:

- Graduate student mentor - Summer Research Opportunity Program (SROP) for minority undergraduates interested in research
- Organizer of the 2013 Chicago Psychology Graduate Student Research Symposium (CPGSRS) at the University of Illinois at Chicago
- Graduate student volunteer - International Society for Political Psychology (ISPP) annual conference in Chicago IL, 2012
- Co-founding member of the Chicago Morality Research group (C-MORE)
- Co-organizer of the 2009 Social Psychologists of Chicago (SPOC) annual conference
**Professional Affiliations:**

Association for Psychological Science  
Society for Personality and Social Psychology  
Midwestern Psychological Association  
International Society for Political Psychology  

**Media Mentions:**

“On September 11th, the American People were expelled from Disneyland”  
Published online between August 26 and September 8, 2011 by:  
20 minutes online (Switzerland)  
A Critica (Brazil)  
Diario Popular (Argentina)  
Freie Press (Germany)  
La Gaceta (Argentina)  
Le Matin (Switzerland)  
La Nacion (Paraguay)  
Le Point (France)  
Otz (Germany)  
Romandie News (France)  
Tiroler Tageszeitung (Germany)  
Univision (United States)

“9/11 Left Permanent Scars on the American Psyche”  
Published online on September 11 and 12, 2011 by:  
Le Figaro (France)  
MSN Healthday (United States)  
Univision (United States)

“Trust your gut? Study explores religion, morality and trust in authority.”  


Religious people have more trust in authority.  
September 15, 2009. The Times of India.  
Teaching Experience:

Instructor
Introduction to Statistics in Psychology (Spring, 2012)
Introduction to Computing in Psychology (Fall 2010, 2011, 2013)

Teaching Assistant (Graduate level)
Research Design and Analysis I (Univariate Statistics) (Fall 2010, 2011, 2013)
Research Design and Analysis II (Multivariate Statistics) (Spring 2010, 2011)

Teaching Assistant (Undergraduate level)
Introduction to Statistics in Psychology (Summer 2010, 2011)

Guest Lectures
Research Design and Analysis I (Graduate level)
  Conducting Planned Comparisons in ANOVA (September 9, 2010)
  Reporting Results in Psychology (September 21, 2010)
  Factorial Designs in ANOVA (September 23, 2010)

Introduction to Research Methods in Psychology (Undergraduate level)
  Visual and Quantitative Descriptions of Data (November 7, 2011)

Teaching Interests:

Undergraduate
Introduction to Statistics in Psychology
Research Methods in Psychology
Introduction to Social Psychology
Political Psychology
The Psychology of Morality and Justice

Graduate
Advanced Statistical Methods in Psychology
Advanced Research methods in Social Psychology
Attitudes and Social Cognition
Political Psychology
The Psychology of Morality and Justice

Research Experience Outside of Academia:
Survey Research Associate, Strategic Research Group (April 2005-August 2007)