When the Colors Fade:
Party Politics, Institutionalization, and Democratization in Ukraine and Georgia

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THESIS
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To my loving husband, Vitaliy Voznyak, whose passion and own success inspire me to never give up on my dreams, and whose optimism makes me hopeful that our children will grow up knowing a democratic Ukraine.
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SUMMARY

This study analyzes the process of democratization through an institutional lens, focusing on levels of political party and party system institutionalization following the color revolutions. Various approaches were used to analyze the political impact of the color revolutions. For the purposes of my work, I look at the color revolutions as a potential moment of change for party politics. Political parties and party systems control levels of political stability, impact effective policymaking, and shape the political landscape. The institutionalization of political parties and party systems is considered vital to democratic consolidation and the literature has reflected this with an increasing amount of efforts to bring these two debates together. In this study I argue that how the color revolutions impacted democratization is a rather complex process, mitigated by ethno-regional, economic, and institutional problems afflicting both political parties and the party systems.

Using the cases of Ukraine and Georgia, I find that the development and institutionalization of the party system has greater democratizing effects than having strong, institutionalized political parties. Furthermore, while it is conceptually important to treat political parties and party systems as distinctly important areas of analysis, the interaction between these two levels of party politics is crucial for understanding democratization. Following the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, political parties emerged as strong political actors, while the party system proved unable to provide the necessary constraint needed for democratic development. After the Rose Revolution in Georgia, all parties were systematically weak, which allowed for full government changeover. With this came long overdue lessons about the dangers of a dominant party regime, which aided in the emergence of a more competitive party system, by 2012, capable of pursuing deeper democratization. The value of the color revolution cases is not their uniqueness, but the conceptual generalizability that flows from them. They highlight the importance of analyzing institutions, not just the actors, which are responsible for democratic change.
I. Introduction

A. Background

On December 8, 2013, throngs of protestors near Kyiv’s Independence Square – *Maidan* – toppled a Lenin statue that stood in Ukraine’s capital since 1946. Despite gaining independence in 1991, Lenin – and what he represents – continues to occupy a controversial place in Ukraine’s history. He is both resented and revered. Protestors cheered the demolition of a symbol to the man responsible for creating the Soviet regime and who murdered millions of its own citizens. Yet, many current and former communist members continue to fondly remember Lenin absolving him of all his flaws. Leading Party of Regions member, and Kharkiv Oblast Governor – Mykhaylo Dobkin – even attempted to start a campaign for the statue’s restoration to which he himself pledged money. The contradictory emotions toward the statue’s destruction capture a deeper division, and are symbolic of a greater political paradox common in former Soviet republics. How can these countries become part of the democratic West when politically, and culturally, there still exists “a little bit of Leninism” – that is the desire for ultimate authority and an intolerance for political opposition.¹ The color revolutions that occurred at the start of the 21st century were a major step in the democratic advancement of the Ukrainian and Georgian political systems, but the color revolutions did not deliver lasting political change only an opportunity to achieve it.

Over the past few decades, scholars worked to define democracy, analyze regime change, and identify mechanisms that trigger transition. However, the current discourse on democratization needs to go beyond analysis of “democratic transition,” which centers on regime alteration, and focus on democratic consolidation – specifically why democratic politics are failing to take root. A consolidated democracy is stable, accorded legitimacy, and functions by means of democratic procedure. In an effort to understand why democratization stalled in post-color revolution Ukraine

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² Parts of the discussion on color revolutions in this dissertation were previously published in Mierzejewski, M.
and Georgia, this research investigates a critical aspect of consolidation – institutionalization. The concept of institutions is broad, ranging from the judiciary and legislative assembly to public administration. However, it is the party system that is most debated when it comes to consolidation. Many scholars (e.g., Downs, 1957; Aldrich, 1995; Schedler, 1995; Schattschneider, 1942) contend that as political parties are the main democratic actors, any analysis of democracy must account for them.

This dissertation tackles two broad questions (which will further be broken down in Chapter 3: Methodology): (1) At the empirical level, how did the color revolutions impact party politics and to what degree are political parties and party systems in Ukraine and Georgia institutionalized? (2) At the theoretical level, if and how can these case based studies advance our understanding of political party/party system institutionalization and the interaction between institutionalization at the two levels?

These questions are interrelated and invite us to rethink why democratic consolidation did not occur following the Orange and Rose Revolutions. I use the color revolutions as a starting point because they were critical junctures in Ukraine and Georgia’s modern political history. Ukraine and Georgia are selected for comparison to highlight that even following successful mass movements, democratic development is dependent on other actors – political elites and the parties they lead. Ukraine and Georgia have increasingly come under criticism for their failure to capitalize off the revolutions and achieve democratic consolidation. While the dissertation is not devoted specifically to social movements, these events are seen as critical moments of change that pushed for institutional reforms, which are crucial to democratic processes.

I trace the process of democratization by focusing on levels of political party and party system institutionalization in the two countries following the color revolutions. In this study I argue

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3 The term “color revolutions” is used here to refer to the largely, peaceful protest movements that occurred between 2003 and 2005 in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, that targeted government orchestrated electoral fraud.
that how the color revolutions impacted democratization is a rather complex process, mitigated by ethno-regional, economic, and institutional problems afflicting party politics and institutionalization in Ukraine and Georgia. I conclude my research by analyzing the political preconditions in Ukraine and Georgia as well as tangible reforms following the color revolutions in order to provide a context in which to understand the major problems hindering institutionalization and thus democratic consolidation.

B. Political Party and Party System Institutionalization

As Mitchell (2012, p. 2) posits, the color revolutions were not paradigm shifting but neither should they be relegated to footnote status, as they were important breakthroughs in Ukrainian and Georgian politics. Parties constitute critical agents particularly in newer democracies, as their role as mediators between state and society tasks them with responsibility for both the legitimacy and efficiency of the new government (Tomsa, 2008, p. 16). A stable political system consists of both institutionalized political parties and an institutionalized party system. A party is institutionalized once it has a durable party organization, clear ideological values, ability to make decisions autonomously from external actors, and its existence is established in the public’s mind (Huntington, 1968; Panebianco, 1988; Randall and Svasand, 2002). Literature on party institutionalization often conflates the concepts of political party institutionalization and party system institutionalization. While political party institutionalization can contribute to party system institutionalization, systemic institutionalization is also concerned with party system dynamics and external actors such as voters. Arguably the most important attribute of an institutionalized party system is stability – in electoral results, rules, and inter-party competition (Lindberg, 2007; Przeworski, 1975; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mair, 1996). Beyond being stable, an institutionalized party system is one where legitimacy is accorded to the electoral process and political parties, and there is a mutual acceptance between parties who compete (Mainwaring, 1999; Randall and Svasand, 2002). The relationship between political party and party system institutionalization is not deterministic (Markowski, 2001,

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4 For example, see Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006; Mainwaring, 1998,1999; Meleshevich, 2007; Rose and Munro, 2003.
p. 56), thus an institutionalized party system might have weakly institutionalized parties, or institutionalized parties might exist in a weakly institutionalized party system. Institutionalization is also not a zero-sum measure. Parties and party systems can institutionalize to varying degrees, therefore in transitioning democracies it is not uncommon for political parties to exhibit uneven levels of institutionalization and a party system to be only moderately institutionalized.

Together, political parties and party systems control levels of political stability, impact effective policymaking, and shape the political landscape (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, p. 1-3). The relationship between parties and democratization is strong (Taylor-Robinson, 2001). In countries where party institutionalization is weak, shallow party organizations fill the political space, but fail to resonate with voters and to operate independently of external actors (Panebianco, 1988; Randall and Svasand, 2002). Where party system institutionalization is weakly developed, those countries face instability, a lack of predictability, and parties lack legitimacy (Rokkan, 1970; Mair, 1996). This research, therefore, considers levels of political party institutionalization and party system institutionalization separately, but equally.

The subsequent analysis includes a detailed account of where Ukraine and Georgia are in the process of democratization through description and examination of the dominant political parties and party systems in both countries as understood on three levels: the electorate, political leadership, and party organization. I go beyond asking whether democracy has become the “only game in town,” and investigate whether or not the political elites in these countries are willing to play the game. This allows for evidenced conclusions about the actual democratizing effects of the Orange and Rose Revolutions as understood through party politics.

C. Authoritarian Failure and Democratic Uprisings: 2003-2005 Color Revolutions

In the early 2000s when the color revolutions began taking place in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, many observers interpreted them as catalysts that were inevitably going to restart democracy in a region where it had long been stalled. However, these revolutions came largely without bloodshed and forcible overthrow of governments, which led to questions surrounding the revolutionary nature of these movements. Color revolution as a term needs clarification. Specifically,
the color revolutions refer to mass protest movements that occurred in the early 2000s in the former Soviet republics and Balkans. The name “color revolutions” was assigned to the movements by the media, and originally referred to the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan – though the term has since been expanded to include other protest movements, most notably the 2000 Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia. Many scholars have argued that the color revolutions were a form of electoral revolutions (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006b; Samokhvalov, 2006; Silitski, 2009; Way, 2008). I argue though, that while the term revolution is being applied, the color revolutions must be understood differently from the traditional notion of a revolution – such as the Russian Revolution of 1917 or the Romanian Revolution in 1989 following the collapse of the Soviet Union. McFaul (2005) identifies the four features of an electoral revolution as follows: “first, election fraud leads to electoral protests; second, the democratic cause is defended through extra-constitutional activities, such as mass protests; third, there is a dual claim to authority by both the incumbent and the opposition as a result of the election fraud; fourth, [mass scale] violence is avoided by all parties” (Mierzejewski, 2010, p. 5). It is the timing of the revolution with scheduled elections and the absence of violence that set the color revolutions apart from other types of revolution.

Each color revolution began after a series of crises that saw political elites manipulating electoral results, which in turn spurred popular protest. The first of these events occurred in early November 2003, on Rustaveli Avenue in Tbilisi with a swarm of protestors who in the coming weeks would number in the thousands and offer up peaceful roses to armed soldiers who looked to put down the anti-government masses. This revolt targeted the governing party, Citizens’ Union of Georgia (CUG) led by then President Eduard Shevardnadze, as a result of the massive fraud committed during the November 2, 2003 parliamentary elections. Demonstrators surrounded the parliament building and demanded Shevardnadze’s resignation. They were led by a united opposition of two parties, National Movement and Burjanadze Democrats, and relied heavily upon the organization and charisma of three politicians in particular – Zurab Zhvania, speaker of the house Nino Burjanadze, and future President Mikheil Saakashvili (Nodia and Scholtbach, 2006). The
protest lasted a few weeks and drew near a hundred thousand people at its height. The resignation of President Shevardnadze on November 23rd was considered the main marker of the Rose Revolution’s success. Over a month later, Georgians elected opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili as president and the world waited to see if Georgia would become the next democratic success story.

The accomplishments of Georgia’s peaceful revolution against electoral fraud, commonly known as the Rose Revolution, was best exported to Ukraine in a different color – Orange. One year after Tbilisi saw people stand up to political corruption, Kyiv found itself the center of civil resistance when the run-off vote to the 2004 presidential election was marred by corruption and fraud. The November 21 run-off election between the pro-Western candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, and then Prime Minister, and Eastern-Ukrainian oligarch, Viktor Yanukovych, was widely perceived as rigged with Yanukovych’s mentor President Leonid Kuchma at the helm. Two individual party coalitions allied to form the Orange Coalition that challenged the outgoing President Leonid Kuchma administration, which was using its control over state resources to intimidate the opposition – Our Ukraine led by Viktor Yushchenko and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc led by Yulia Tymoshenko. This election was more heated than that in Tbilisi a year before as one of the leading candidates, Yushchenko, suffered dioxin poisoning under mysterious circumstances just months prior to the election, affecting both his health and appearance. Orange clad protestors who supported Yushchenko occupied Maidan Nezalezhnosti in the center of Kyiv in November, calling for free and fair elections void of government influence. “Orange” protestors saw their demands met with the voiding of the original results and a Supreme Court ordered revote set for December 26, 2004. Yushchenko emerged the victor with 52% of the vote in what international observers declared fair and legitimate elections. The nullification of the original fraudulent results was not without consequences though, as constitutional changes accompanied the re-election and shifted power from the presidency to the parliament. For the first time since Kuchma took office in 1994, Ukraine was on the path toward democracy.

The 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia had protracted, modernizing effects that have slowly contributed to democratic development. President Saakashvili’s firm grasp on power for nearly a
decade after the revolution left many wondering whether democracy in Georgia was headed for an authoritarian reversal. However, the elimination of corruption from state agencies, eventual constitutional amendments that introduced a parliamentary system, as well as largely free and fair elections in 2012 and 2013 that saw a peaceful transfer of power signal that Georgia is now, 10 years after the Rose Revolution and five years after the war with Russia, slowly starting to create more sustainable democratic change. The case of Ukraine is different. Despite immense democratic strides made immediately after the 2004 Orange Revolution – moving to a presidential-parliamentary system, lowering the representational threshold in parliament, and avoiding of state interference in the electoral process – democratic backsliding occurred with the 2010 election of President Viktor Yanukovych and is only starting to subside in mid-2014. These divergent democratic paths, which saw Georgia take a gradual but aggressive approach to democratization versus Ukraine’s dramatic roller coaster experience, require explanation. Why has democratic progress in Ukraine and Georgia not been more impressive or developed in parallel, and what role have party politics played in political development?

D. **Institutionalization and Democratization After the Color Revolutions**

It is not enough to state that Ukraine and Georgia have failed to achieve democratic consolidation due to their limited success in liberalizing, and implementing successful reforms, or emulating successful democracies such as Poland or Lithuania. Such blanket statements lack empirical evidence and may obfuscate many complex processes. However, most of the scholarly literature discussing the state of democracy in Ukraine and Georgia make such general claims (Carothers, 2002; Fairbanks, 2007; McFaul, 2007; Riabchuk, 2008). Even more modest assertions of the countries’ inability to achieve large-scale democratic progress often fail to include nuanced accounts of specific causal analysis. There are a couple of reasons for this: first, these claims are often made in scholarship that is aimed at theory building rather than empirical analysis. This casual treatment of consolidation leads to assertions without evidence and investigation. Second, these

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5 Both a change to presidential-parliamentary system and increased parliamentary representation were considered to be institutional changes consistent with increased democratization and a move away from authoritarian-type rule.
general claims are also made when research is conducted at the macro-level. Too often, we see a general analysis of a country as a whole without investigation into the individual institutions that contribute to consolidation. This inhibits our ability to ascertain the actual state of democratization and to obtain a clear assessment of where countries stand in relation to consolidation.

Mid-level research, also *meso* level, which uses micro-analysis is needed to unravel the empirical puzzle of democratization in these former Soviet Union republics. Findings from this type of research can surpass high levels of abstraction and instead develop solid mid-level analyses that produce widely applicable generalizations for the post-Soviet space. The focus of this study is institutions and actors, how these two groups interact and what is their impact on the democratization process in Ukraine and Georgia. Conducting analysis at the meso-level accounts for the nuances that explain the different democratic trajectories taken by the two cases. This research rests upon the premise that democratization is concerned not just with institutional design and constitutional arrangements, but also with political actors and parties that are the focus of mid-range analysis. It is both the behavior of the political actors as well as the development and beliefs of political parties that impact the possibility for consolidation.

I break down the broad concept of democratic consolidation instead of just treating it as the ever-elusive end-goal in the linear model that is the democratic paradigm. What becomes apparent through this conceptual deconstruction is that both institutions and the public play key roles in democratization: institutions create the boundaries that structure political behavior all while the public has its own beliefs and sets its own expectations for the new regime and system. Similar to democratization, party system institutionalization is not teleological. Therefore, understanding the various components that impact democratic consolidation requires investigation of the power-relations between the party system and the people. Research on the impact of political party and party system institutionalization in democratization will contribute to more comprehensive theories of democratic consolidation. This dissertation approaches democratic progress in Ukraine and Georgia following the color revolutions by employing a party politics approach, analyzing how the Orange and Rose Revolutions affected the process of institutionalization and thus democratization.
The findings of this study seek to advance theoretical and political debates on political party and party system institutionalization and democracy. Extensive work has been done on how to conceptualize and measure political party and party system institutionalization (Casal Bertoa and Mair, 2010; Casal Bertoa and Enyedi, 2010; Huntington, 1968; Lindberg, 2007; Mainwaring, 1998, 1999; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mair, 1996; Panebianco, 1988; Randall and Svasand, 2002; Sartori, 1976). While some work (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; Randall and Svasand, 2002; Taylor-Robinson, 2001) successfully links the results of institutionalization studies with actual democratic development, more efforts are needed to better capture how these processes impact one another. It is assumed that institutionalization increases the likelihood of democratic consolidation, but most studies are limited to either measuring institutionalization or analyzing the state of democracy. To help fill this existing gap, this study presents a detailed account of the Ukrainian and Georgian political systems following the color revolutions with a special focus on the role of party politics and institutionalization in democratization.

The existing literature on color revolutions also lacks an adequate analysis of the impact these events had on party politics and institutionalization. Bunce and Wolchik (2009), Way (2008) as well as others have written extensively on the causes of the color revolutions; likewise, Pop-Eleches and Robertson (2013) and Silitski (2009) wrote about the long-term results of the revolutions. By making political parties and party systems the main explanatory factors of democratic development following the color revolutions, this dissertation develops an unconventional perspective on why democratic consolidation has faltered and might still be years if not decades away in Ukraine and Georgia. This work acknowledges its limitations, primarily its small scope, as it is limited to only two cases. However, this research is conducted in hope that similar analyses may be extended to other color revolution cases – such as Serbia and Kyrgyzstan – or even non-revolutionary, electoral regime change cases – such as Slovakia or Croatia. I present conclusions grounded in close analysis of the micro-mechanisms at work in the Ukrainian and Georgian political systems, so that politicians as well as the organizations and agencies that advise them understand the perpetuating obstacles to democratic consolidation.
E. **Dissertation Outline**

Chapter One explained the importance of analyzing if and how the color revolutions impacted party politics and institutionalization in order to understand democratic development in Ukraine and Georgia. Chapter Two provides a more extensive discussion of the relevance of institutions for political science and the democratization literature. It explains the role of political parties and the institutionalization process in democratic consolidation and why analysis of democratization should better capture their impact and transformation – both political party institutionalization and party system institutionalization. Chapter Three presents the methodology and outlines the research design. Chapters four through six address the main empirical questions listed above, examining the levels of institutionalization in Ukraine and Georgia as well as the impact of the color revolutions on party politics. Given that three main questions guide the empirical part of the research, chapters four through six are each devoted to addressing a specific area of analysis.

Chapter Four asks to what degree did political parties in Ukraine and Georgia institutionalize following the color revolutions? The focus of this chapter is on political party institutionalization and includes in-depth analyses of the major parties that have been key actors since the color revolutions. The analysis of political party institutionalization in Ukraine focuses on Batkivshchyna/Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, Party of Regions, UDAR, and Svoboda. The analysis for Georgia includes United National Movement along with the Republican Party of Georgia and the newer Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia party. The parties undergo in-depth analysis according to Randall and Svasand’s (2002) four dimensions of party institutionalization - systemness, value infusion, decisional autonomy, and reification - allowing the parties to be understood on three levels: party organization, political leadership, and the electorate.

Chapter Five shifts analysis from individual parties to the larger system and asks what is the state of party system institutionalization in Ukraine and Georgia after the Orange and Rose Revolutions? This chapter examines systemic institutionalization, building on Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) model of party system institutionalization. However, in order to offer a thorough measure of party system institutionalization that is not muddled by dimensions of political party
institutionalization, I utilize only of two of Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) measures adding an additional indicator introduced by Randall and Svasand (2002). My measurements include electoral volatility, legitimacy, and mutual acceptance of parties.

Chapter Six then offers a context to understand the development of party politics, asking why did (not) the color revolutions create institutional changes that would impart stability and legitimacy on the party system? More specifically, if and how did the color revolutions serve as catalysts for the parties to better address destabilizing socio-economic conditions and undertake important reforms? This chapter examines if and how the revolution victors addressed issues of regional/ethnic divide, corruption, and institutional distribution of power to assess the impact on the development of party politics and the larger process of democratization.

Chapter Seven revisits the primary conceptual questions at the center of the dissertation; it begins by asking how we can understand the effects of uneven political party institutionalization on the party system? The conclusion also seeks to develop arguments regarding the interaction of political party and party system institutionalization and its combined impact on democratization? This chapter additionally tackles broad theoretical questions such as how we can distinguish between the importance of political party versus party system institutionalization for democratic development? I evaluate the discussion of why an institutional approach to democratization has explanatory power in the cases of the color revolutions as well as how the events of Euromaidan confirm my findings on party politics, institutionalization, and subsequent democratic development (or lack of) in Ukraine and Georgia.
II. Tackling the Theory: Institutions and Democracy

A. Introduction

The focus of this dissertation is political parties, but they have been theoretically neglected under both the democracy and institutional debates. The democracy literature acknowledges parties as a central component of the political system, but often discounts the role of parties in consolidation. Additionally, institutional approaches have tended to focus on elections rather than parties. However, generally speaking, political science tends to award more attention to elections than parties. For example, between 2008 and 2014, the annual American Political Science Association conferences devoted nearly twice as many panels to elections than political parties – 158 to 87. My work stands at the intersection of where these two bodies of literature meet, as I am interested in the process of democratization as understood through the institutional lens of political parties. Specifically, if and how the “right” or “ideal type” of institutions – in this case institutionalized political parties and party systems – can secure democracy.

Schedler (1995, p. 3) posits that institutions are “defined by their relations to actors,” as institutions provide parameters that shape actors’ behavior. Huntington (1996) notes that it is not anti-democratic generals or revolutionaries that threaten third-wave democracies, but most likely those that are part of the democratic process: politicians that compete for power through elections. These individuals have the potential to legitimately assume power and then manipulate “the mechanisms of democracy” or destroy them from the inside. Analyses of democratization thus need to find a balance between formal structures and individuals as purposive agents. Political parties are an effective political intermediary between state and society in liberal democracies, acting as agents of regime consolidation. Parties are, therefore, a key institution for democratic consolidation.

Alternative explanations of democratic development exist, such as culture, path dependency, and

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6 Author’s own calculations according to online programs posted to the apsa.org website. In an attempt to create a more reliable comparison, panels were counted only once even if they were cross-listed under multiple divisions.
economic development. However, this work makes parties and party systems the leading explanatory factors in its analysis of democratization. I unpack the processes that contribute to democratic consolidation, with an emphasis on institutionalization, looking at the different layers – political parties and party systems – that contribute to political development.

B. Understanding Institutions in Political Science

During the process of democratic consolidation, institution building is key to political sustainability. Institutions represent durability and repetition of democratic rules and procedures, as they are predictable and structured. Institutions give order to society and modern democracies are “organized democracies,” where institutions are markers of a polity’s political character, history, visions and identity (Olsen, 2008). Political development, thus, can be understood through how government institutions operate, stabilize, and adapt.

Observations of institutions, their effectiveness and how they constrain human behavior date back to early political philosophers and can be seen in the writings of Aristotle (See Politics). In political science, studies of institutions began with a focus on constitutions and law – what is now commonly referred to as “old institutionalism” (Peters, 2011). The behavioralist theories that developed in the 1950s and 1960s fueled a new theoretical movement - “new institutionalism.” New institutionalist approaches claim that preferences are expressed in politics where there is institutional context or constraint, though individual preferences are not always reflected in policymaking. What new institutionalist theories are interested in is illuminating the “role that institutions play in the determination of social and political outcomes” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 936). Political parties are key political actors and as organizations they constitute institutions. However, institutional approaches fail to capture the larger political role parties play in political development.

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An institutional approach views political life as neither deterministic nor random; institutions organize actors and structure patterns of behavior. However, different approaches favor distinct actors or conditions. Rational choice institutionalism focuses on strategic interactions where choices are “made by rational actors under conditions of interdependence” (Immergut, 1998, p. 12). However, while rational choice models have attempted to explain competitive party behavior (Strom, 1990), they are more applicable to individual politicians’ behavior than overall parties and they fail to account for party formation. Historical institutionalism views institutions as both formal procedures and informal norms and conventions that are embedded in society, the logic of which will vary in different contexts at different times (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 938). While this can explain how parties organize, it does not explain why some are more developed than others and the consequences of uneven party development for a party system.

The study of institutions continues to be significant in political science as scholars seek to answer questions about political development and social choices through institutional arrangements. A problem with new institutionalist approaches is that they take institutions for granted, often treating their emergence as beyond the scope of analysis. We need to ask how institutions are formed as such inquiries help us to explain the processes of political development. An additional challenge facing new institutionalist approaches is in their ability to explain institutional change and political agency (Peters, 2011). Theories of institutions are concerned with how political decision-making and structures shape political outcomes (Shepsle, 1986), however, change is a normal part of political life and can provide insight into political dynamics. Olsen (2008, p. 2) posits,

Focus is on the relations between institutional characteristics and change in governmental institutions in modern democracies. Accounting for how and why institutions emerge and change, however, requires a rephrasing of the questions an institutional approach should aspire to answer. The task of democratic government is not to maximize change. It is to balance order and change, and the scholarly challenge is to account for how and why institutions remain stable as well as how and why they change.

Institutionalist approaches have viewed institutions as an enduring collection of rules and practices that are not altered by change in individuals or external circumstances (March and Olsen, 2005).
However, the color revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus require us to rethink institutional stability and alteration as well as the reinvention of some institutions.

If building democracies is about building institutions, as Mainwaring and Scully (1995) posited, then from it flows the assumption that the consolidation of democracy is about the institutionalization of key democratic institutions. Institutionalization here is understood as the process by which political parties and party systems become established, predictable, resilient, and accepted. Standardization and routinization shape organizational arrangements and guide the process of institutionalization. However, stability is not given and institutions have to successfully cope with change in the political environment if they are to survive and institutionalize. Following the color revolutions, many scholars and international observers expected democratic development in Ukraine and Georgia. What failed to be considered though, was whether or not these mass protests would have a lasting institutional effect. Specifically, how would the color revolutions impact the development and functioning of party politics and what would be the subsequent result on democratization?

C. From Institutional Approaches to Institutionalization

Western centered literature often overlooks the historical processes and gradual development of now consolidated institutions. Understanding the state of democratization in newly transitioned countries requires an evaluation of the party system, which to a great extent structures the political process. Additionally, the variation in political party and party system institutionalization among newly transitioned countries is comparatively important as this variance, arguably, has explanatory power across cases. Political parties and party systems affect legitimacy, shape policy-making, and are the primary actors that compose the political landscape (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, p. 1-3). Schedler (1998) posits that in uninstitutionalized systems parties are not political communities but instruments of the politicians that lead them, for example Russia under Putin. As Tomsa (2008, p. 16) notes, the performance and structure of parties has direct impact on the prospects for democratic consolidation. The consolidation of democracy entails various processes that contribute to political stability and enable the functioning of democratic procedure. In an effort to understand why
democracy has not developed in tandem in Ukraine and Georgia following the color revolutions, this research investigates an intrinsic part of consolidation – the process of institutionalization.

The weak institutionalization among parties and party systems in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe differentiates the region from the industrialized democracies of Western Europe (Mainwaring, 1998). Additionally, various levels of party and party system institutionalization within the region can largely account for the divergent levels of democratization among the countries. As previously noted, party institutionalization and party system institutionalization often fail to be addressed distinctly and equally by the party literature. Party institutionalization is the process when parties solidify and establish routine patterns of behavior (Randall and Svasand, 2002, p. 12). In an institutionalized party system, “actors develop expectations and behavior based on the premise that the fundamental rules of party competition and behavior will prevail in the foreseeable future” (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006, p. 206).

This research approaches political party and party system institutionalization as distinct but interrelated areas of analysis. This allows for examination of party politics on two levels – individual political parties and the larger party system. What is often missing from the institutionalization literature is this type of integrated analysis, which enables both political party and party system institutionalization to be considered together. This type of analysis allows for a deeper understanding of the relationship between party politics and democratization. I analyze how the degree of institutionalization at the individual party level impacts institutionalization at the system level, and why democratic progress is dependent on the development and stabilization of both individual parties and the party system.

D. Political Party Institutionalization

The different dimensions of political party institutionalization overlap, and hence there have been various conceptualizations set forth by scholars, notably Huntington (1968) and Panebianco (1988). In Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), Huntington links party institutionalization with the stabilization of the larger party system, which he finds contributes to political development and social improvement. However, Huntington’s four variables of adaptability, complexity,
autonomy, and coherence of organizations and procedures of a political system include a multitude of subcategories and are difficult to measure. Still, many of his arguments and ideas continue to be applicable to party politics and have been incorporated into other models of political party institutionalization, such as Randall and Svasand’s (2002) framework. Panebianco’s *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (1988) picks up where the work of Duverger (1963) left off, focusing on types of parties and their organizational structure. He argues that a parties’ organization determines its’ institutionalization. His work makes the important link between party institutionalization and democracy, though how he conceptualizes institutionalization is rather broad. Panebianco measures party institutionalization according to two sweeping dimensions: (1) the degree of systemness (internal organization) and (2) autonomy from the external environment. Despite creating only two dimensions of institutionalization, he goes on to discuss and analyze various other issues, such as centralized decision making and stability, which creates problems for those wishing to apply his model, as it is unclear what exactly is being measured under the general concept of “institutionalization.”

Randall and Svasand (2002) deconstruct the dimensions set forth by Huntington, Panebianco, as well as Kenneth Janda (1980) arriving at four elements of party institutionalization: (a) systemness, (b) value infusion, (c) decisional autonomy, (d) reification. These four dimensions comprehensively assess political parties - accounting for party apparatus, ideology, autonomy from external actors, and ability to forge a lasting place in the public’s mind. It is their model that will be employed in this study on political party institutionalization. The strength of Randall and Svasand’s (2002) framework is its clear distinction between political party and party system institutionalization which allows for four independent dimensions that add up to one valid and reliable indicator of party institutionalization. The first variable – systemness – gages the level of party organization as defined by party apparatus, funding, and leader-party relationship. The second variable – value infusion – determines the extent that a party has created an identity that garners lasting support and develops a popular base. Autonomy is the third variable, specifically decisional autonomy, which is the party’s ability to create policy independent of its sponsors or supporting organization. The last variable –
reification – refers to the ability of a party to solidify itself in the public’s mind and become a permanent feature of the political party landscape.

E. **Party System Institutionalization**

According to Sartori (1976), a party system is defined as “the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition.” Implied in this definition is that (1) a party system consists of more than one party, (2) it is not just the parties that are important for analysis, but the relations between them, i.e. their interaction, and (3) the “notion of ‘system’ implies some degree of regularity, suggesting some continuity of inter-party interaction between elections” (Casal Bertoa, 2011). When analyzing party systems, Sartori noted two important dimensions, the number of parties and the degree of ideological polarization. However, what he neglected, and which has been the focus of research by party politics scholars (Bielasik, 2002; Casal Bertoa, 2011; Mair, 2007; Markowski, 1997; Randall and Svasand, 2002; Rose and Mishler, 2010), is party system institutionalization.

Scott Mainwaring (1998; 1999) has been one of the most diligent scholars in highlighting the role of institutionalization in democratization, specifically in Latin America. His work offers much needed insight on the importance of institutionalization though it falls victim to the same theoretical trap it warns against – conflation of political party and party system institutionalization. Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) model of institutionalization conceptualizes the four main dimensions of party system institutionalization as electoral volatility, party rootedness, party organization, and party system legitimacy. The inclusion of party organization shifts focus from the system to individual party building. Additionally, the inclusion of party rootedness is aimed at measuring specific political party linkages with society. Inclusion of these dimensions in the model presupposes that political party institutionalization is necessary for party system institutionalization, a fact contested by other scholars (Casal Bertoa, 2011; Wolinetz, 2006). Therefore, while I adopt two of Mainwaring and Scully’s dimensions, electoral volatility and legitimacy, I exclude party organization and party

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8 Mainwaring is not alone, as many scholars have conflated these two areas of study. See Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Meleshevich 2007; Morlino 1998; Rose and Munro 2003.
rootedness. In order to understand exactly how party politics impacts democratization, it is important that my research maintains separate analyses of political party and party system institutionalization.

Randall and Svasand’s (2002) model of party system institutionalization aims at creating separate, independent analytical categories. However, their work is predominantly focused on party institutionalization and fails to develop actual measures as concerns systemic institutionalization. In an effort to isolate party system institutionalization, I create my own set of dimensions largely drawing on the work of Mainwaring (1998) and including one dimension of Randall and Svasand’s (2002) model – mutual party acceptance. My three measures of party system institutionalization are electoral volatility, legitimacy, and mutual acceptance of parties.

F. **A Broader Understanding of Democratic Development**

What notion of democracy is employed in this study? What is democracy? Conceptual frameworks are many, with names such as Schumpeter, Dahl, and Diamond among the most often quoted. What studies on democratization often lack though, is an adequate account of intervening factors that contribute to democratic development. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, first published in 1942 by Joseph Schumpeter, laid the foundation for many future theories of democracy. Schumpeter notes that in the classical definition of democracy from 18th century philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Locke and Thomas Hobbs, democracy refers to the “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realize the common good by making people themselves decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out their will” (Schumpeter, 1962). This common will is not the same as common good. Common good is what is best for the people and common will is the willingness to realize this common good. Both of these things relate to what Rousseau termed “general will,” which is infallible and endowed with goodness and demands obedience by all of society.

The problem Schumpeter has with a definition of democracy that focuses on this notion of “general will” is that (1) there is no uniquely determined common good – it is different things to different people; (2) no one answer exists to the individual issues concerning the so-called “general will”; (3) even if there were an answer it would not persist as it would disappear as soon as it failed
us. To avoid these complications that arise when defining democracy in terms of the realization of
the “general will,” Schumpeter (1962, p. 9) forms a new conception of democracy where the
democratic method is the “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”

This Schumpeterian conception of democracy identifies a system in which rulers are selected
by competitive elections. This allows for a dichotomous measure of democracy where a society is
either democratic or not depending on whether it holds competitive elections. This provides the basis
for Adam Przeworski’s (1991; 1999) minimalist definition of democracy. Przeworski views
competitive elections as the litmus test of a democratic state. He specifically leaves out other features
that can be considered essential for a democracy such as extensive civil liberties – freedom of the
press, free speech, etc. – which garners criticism from some democracy scholars, notably Larry
Diamond. Przeworski (1999, p. 45) finds representation of public interest to be outside democratic
governance. What is central for democracy is the ability to change government and “being able to do
it by voting.” This turnover in government is where minimalists such as Schumpeter and Przeworski
find democracy’s value.

Robert A. Dahl’s (1971) concept of polyarchy, although not truly minimalist, does make
electoral competition its exclusive focus aligning it with the above mentioned scholars. Polyarchy
refers to political systems where people actively compete for public office, which prevents tyrannical
rule. Dahl views democracy as an ideal system that does not exist and therefore considers most
democratic countries to be instances of polyarchies. Central to polyarchy is competition for political
power, which implies certain individual freedoms – elevating it from other minimalist conceptions of
democracy (1971). Understanding how politicians compete, voter motivation, and commitment to
democratic rules and norms are key to analyses of democratization.

One of the strongest opponents of minimalist democracy is Larry Diamond. Diamond puts
forth the concept of liberal democracy. If Schumpeter sets the minimum standard, Diamond sets what
a minimalist state should strive to be. Liberal democracy is “a political system in which individual
and group liberties are well protected and in which there exist autonomous spheres of civil society
and private life, insulated from state control” (Diamond, 1999, p. 29). Diamond does not discount the importance of elections; he, like many democracy scholars (Bunce, 2003; Diamond, 1999; O’Donnell, 2002; Przeworski, 1999), acknowledges the importance of electoral competition. What his conceptualization of democracy addresses is the fact that while minimalist definitions of democracy often recognize minimal levels of freedom they do not include them in their definitions.

Electoral democracy denotes any regime that holds free, fair, competitive elections (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). Liberal democracy includes mass preference, self-governance and social mobilization (Dahl, 1971). What accounts for these competing conceptions of democracy? Essentially there are pseudo democracies arising where formal democratic institutions exist that are masking authoritarian domination. It is due to this, that there is a need to emphasize the non-electoral dimension of democracy – civil liberties. For Diamond, there has to be horizontal accountability, civic pluralism, and group freedoms that exist in between periodic elections. By emphasizing the non-electoral dimensions, Diamond is engaging in a fight against the loosening of the term democracy in public discourse and autocratic regimes’ purposeful misuse of the word. The most blatant examples are the Democratic Republic of China or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, neither of which hold competitive elections nor protect political liberties. I look to understand democratic developments beyond the free and fair elections that occurred following the color revolutions. The objective of analyzing party politics and its effect on democratization is to identify those substantive aspects inherent to a modern, liberal democratic state and why they are slow to develop in Ukraine and Georgia.

G. Consolidation and Party Politics: Who is Responsible for Democracy

Eastern European countries that experienced color revolutions have come under criticism from academia for failing to consolidate and reach democratization levels seen in their Central European neighbors. This places Ukraine and Georgia in a precarious position, having accomplished transition but not having approached consolidation. Thomas Carothers (2002) takes issue with what he calls the “transition paradigm,” noting its inability to account for the majority of third wave transitional democracies. These democracies completed the transition process; however, they are far
from achieving the status of well-functioning democracies. Carothers (2002, p. 9-10) argues most transitional democracies are in a political “gray zone.” Specifically, they “suffer from serious democratic deficits, often including poor representation of citizens’ interests, low levels of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse of the law by government officials, elections of uncertain legitimacy, very low levels of public confidence in state institutions, and persistently poor institutional performance by the state.” These countries are no longer authoritarian, but not yet fully democratic - they have become hybrid regimes. While some democratization scholars have taken issue with certain aspects of Carothers’ critique of the “transition paradigm” (Hyman, 2002; Nodia, 2002; O’Donnell, 2002; and Wollack, 2002), it can largely be agreed upon that there are countries that do fail to fit into either the transition or the consolidation stage of democratization. Some countries – such as Ukraine and Georgia – are in this “gray zone.” The next several paragraphs explain why this is the case.

Free and fair elections are a key element of democracy. This is why many observers justifiably expected the color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia to lead to democratization. Competitive elections may mark an end to the transition process, but they do not signal consolidation (Bunce, 2003, p. 179). It is commonly accepted in democratization studies that a democracy is consolidated when it is agreed upon that it is “the only game in town” and no one would imagine acting outside established democratic institutions and norms.

Linz and Stepan (1996) offer three minimal conditions that must be met in order for a country to be considered a consolidated democracy. There must be (1) a defined state, (2) a complete transition through free and fair elections, and (3) a ruler who governs democratically. However, O’Donnell (1996, p. 5) offers the following caveat: just because a democracy is institutionalized according to the three requirements outlined above, that does not guarantee that those following formal democratic rules will not try to subvert the transition process from the inside. A weak point in the democratization literature is its failure to address the gap between “formal rules and actual behavior” (O’Donnell, 1996, p. 41). Just because democracy is institutionalized does not mean that it will inevitably reach consolidation. Actors – both political parties and the public – play a key role in
democratic progress. If consolidation is defined as the achievement of broad and deep legitimization of democracy, then scholars of democratization need to look beyond elections and focus on parties and institutionalization.

Huntington (1991) notes that a problem for third wave democracies, and similarly the color revolutions, is that the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one was rapid and not evolutionary. In the case of the color revolutions, people took to the streets over a period of months, not years, demanding the overturning of fraudulent election results. Once the democratic forces assumed office they did not have time to allow democratic norms and procedures to slowly develop; the people expected change overnight. Furthermore, the new regimes that arose post-transition exhibited both authoritarian and democratic elements.

Issues of measurement have complicated understandings of democratic consolidation. Failure to accurately gauge where Ukraine and Georgia are in the democratization process is largely a result of how the literature approaches consolidation. Analyses of democratization in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, and third-wave countries in general, have tended to be actor centric. Often scholars have privileged elite choice, focusing on the outcomes and consequences of policy and reform decisions (Bunce, 2003). Differences in democratic progress are then seen as a result of different available political and economic choices for the leaders. However, elite choice overestimates the power of elites and ignores the fluidity of institutional constraints in democratizing countries (Bunce, 2003, p. 187). It is important to focus on how and if elite choice has impacted institutional development as well as its resulting impact on political stability. Thus, while analyses of elite-choice and reform decisions offer a general context for understanding political development, research that employs analysis of the intermediary role of institutions is aptly positioned to offer a more robust explanation of democratization.

Diamond (1999) creates indicators of democratic consolidation, which can be separated into two dimensions: norms and behavior, on three levels. At the top level are the political elites whose behavior and beliefs shape the governmental system due to their disproportionate amount of power. The intermediate level consists of parties and organizations, which have their own beliefs and pattern
of behavior (Diamond, 1999, p. 66). This group is not uniform, as parties are founded on different ideological orientations. These two levels affect prospects of consolidation based on their stability and the willingness of these collective actors to support democratic institutions (Diamond, 1999, p. 68). The third level is made up of the mass public. For consolidation to occur the majority of the public must consistently believe over time that democracy is the most preferable form of government. Additionally, mass behavior has to reject violence as a form of protest and not resort to anti-constitutional measures to pursue political preferences and interests (Diamond, 1999, p. 68).

While ample attention is often paid to the collective actors that comprise the first two levels, particularly political elites occupying the first level, democratization studies need to more vigorously account for the actors in the second and third levels – party politics and public opinion. By focusing on the micro-mechanisms that contribute to democratic consolidation, this research analyzes political party and party system institutionalization, taking into account the actors and institutions that contribute to well-functioning democracy.

Democratic achievement is dependent upon political parties – the intermediaries between the state and society. Numerous scholars (Levitsky, 2003; Mainwaring, 1999; Randall and Svasand, 2002; Tomsa, 2008) have noted how the institutionalization of parties and party systems are key to democratic consolidation.

[I]deology, structure and behavior of the parties are not only of utmost importance for the survival or breakdown of young democracies but they also constitute critical factors determining whether democracies consolidate or instead remain in a gray zone. (Merkel, 1998, p. 50)

Weak parties often fail to represent voters’ interests and occupy an important place in the political landscape, and weak party systems lack stability and legitimacy. The result is low levels of institutionalization within party politics, which often allows political institutions to fall victim to “old predatory interest” (Hadiz, 2003) that lack democratic ambitions. The puzzle this research confronts is to identify what effects the color revolutions had on the institutional foundations of democracy in Ukraine and Georgia by analyzing the ways in which party institutionalization and larger systemic institutionalization have aided or hindered the democratization process following these movements.
III: Methodology

A. \textbf{Introduction and Cases}

This research is guided by an interest in institutionalization in transitioning countries particularly after moments of political openings such as the color revolutions. I select Ukraine and Georgia for analysis because most similar case selection methodology offers optimal clarity to understand these post-Soviet states. In both cases, party-led mass movements overturned semi-authoritarian regimes and elected pro-democracy politicians and their political parties. At the time of this analysis, the color revolutions occurred over a decade ago, which has allowed for multiple election cycles to pass. While institutionalization is a gradual process, we can draw some specific conclusions about the impact the color revolutions had on party politics during this ten-year time period.\footnote{Despite past similarities, the value in studying post-communist cases is their current variability, 25 years after communism’s demise. I compare Ukraine and Georgia, because both emerged as independent states in the early 1990s following over 70 years of communism; yet, they soon succumbed to political systems characterized at best as semi-authoritarian. Furthermore, in both cases the major political parties that championed the color revolutions – United National Movement in Georgia, and Our Ukraine and Batkivshchyna in Ukraine – were headed by politicians who formally held high positions in the regimes they subsequently brought down. Still, despite these similarities, the way party politics developed in the two countries following the color revolutions drastically varies.

We cannot rely solely upon studies of Western party development to inform us about how institutionalization is achieved and its impact on democratization in third-wave countries. Therefore, more case studies are needed to understand how both political party and party system institutionalization impacts democratic development in post-communist Europe, Latin America, and Asia-Pacific countries. Ukraine and Georgia stand as critical cases for understanding the post-commissioned political processes.

\textit{Party politics as used throughout refers to both political parties and the party system.}
communist transition to competitive/liberal democracy. Specifically, these two countries are in a unique position because with the exception of the Baltic States, they are the two former Soviet Union republics that have successfully battled authoritarian backsliding and have the most democratic potential two decades after the collapse of the USSR. I employ a “most-similar systems” design as it is well suited for regional comparative analysis that can suffer from the “small N, many variables” problem (Lijphart, 1975, p. 163). While most-similar systems design controls for certain comparable political factors - immature party systems, recent semi-authoritarian regimes, a legacy of established elite, high levels of corruption, electoral fraud, and popular uprisings – it avoids for selection on the dependent variable – institutionalized political parties and/or party systems. Political parties are also comparable in the two countries, as they are easy to form, over hundreds exist, and they face a relatively low threshold for entering parliament. Additionally, political parties in both countries play a critical role for consolidating democracy, following long periods of strong executive rule. This design allows for the potential to expand the study to either more countries within the post-Soviet region or even to include other countries that possess similar systems, perhaps in Latin America or Africa.

I analyze both political party and party system institutionalization as I am interested in understanding the interaction of these two processes and the implications for democratization. While the notions of political party and party system institutionalization are often combined and misidentified, they are distinct areas of analysis. Institutionalized political parties contribute to democratization as they socialize the public to democratic ways and they aggregate public interests. Institutionalized party systems, on the other hand, hold parties accountable, provide stability within the political system, and structures party competition and interaction.

The main research questions that structure this work are as follows. At the empirical level, to what degree are political parties and party systems institutionalized in countries where massive social protests offered a “moment of opportunity”? Specifically, I ask (i) what is the state of political party/party system institutionalization in Ukraine and Georgia following the color revolutions? and (ii) how did the 2003 Rose and 2004 Orange Revolutions impact party politics in Georgia and
Ukraine respectively? At the conceptual level I ask, *if and how we can advance our understanding of institutionalization and the interaction between the institutionalization of individual parties and the overall party systems from systematic comparative analysis?* Specifically, (i) how can we understand the effects of uneven political party institutionalization on the party system, (ii) how can we study political party and party system institutionalization together and its combined impact on democratization, and (iii) if and how can we distinguish between the importance of political party versus party system institutionalization for democratic development?

**B. Research Design**

Institutionalization and democratization are both dependent variables, but they can be seen as sequential with institutionalization preceding democratization. Critical junctures such as the color revolutions act as intervening variables that could reshuffle the independent variables, which are the different dimensions of political party and party system institutionalization. The dissertation is divided into three analytically distinct sections. Chapters Four and Five analyze political party and party system institutionalization, respectively, and offer some preliminary analyses of how the given levels of institutionalization impact democratization. Chapter Six then reflects on how the color revolutions brought certain political cleavages to the surface and the ways in which the Orange and Rose Revolution victors approached the deeper ethno-regional, economic, and institutional problems afflicting party politics in Ukraine and Georgia. The conclusion returns to the theoretical discussion of the process of institutionalization, its relationship with democratization, and what can be learned from these two cases.

Political parties come and go in Ukraine and Georgia, and therefore a comprehensive analysis of all major parties since independence was not feasible. Additionally, there are over 100 registered political parties in both countries, therefore only certain political parties could be selected for comparison. My analysis of political party institutionalization centers on the major parties that have been key political actors since the color revolutions until 2014. I include all major, resilient parties in the post-color revolution era, which includes a combination of both old and new parties as well as mainstream and some nationally visible, marginalized parties. I exclude short-lived defunct
parties and small parties that overtly promote anti-democratic agendas. For Ukraine, 

_Batkivshchyna/Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, Party of Regions, UDAR, and Svoboda_ are considered. Our Ukraine was the leading opposition force during the Orange Revolution, but they are not considered in this analysis of political party institutionalization as the party/coalition has failed to occupy a major place in government since 2007, failing to even pass the voter threshold in the 2012 parliamentary elections. Our Ukraine is, however, discussed in the context of a broader overview of Ukrainian politics. The Communist party of Ukraine has consistently been elected into government since the fall of communism, but as the party is anti-democratic it too is excluded from the analysis of political party institutionalization. For Georgia, United National Movement is examined along with the Republican Party and the newer Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia party. For the analyses of the party systems, all active, electorally successful parties are considered for the period of 2004 to 2014.

For the empirical part of the analysis a variety of sources are used including articles from the Ukrainian and Georgian press written in Ukrainian, Russian, and English languages, election data, party documents, and analyses published by international organizations and local think tanks (i.e. Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS), Georgian Democracy Initiative (GDI), Georgia’s Reform Associates (GRASS), Georgian Institute for Strategic Studies (GISS), International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), International Republican Institute (IRI), National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Razumkov Centre, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Transparency International). Primary source data was collected during fieldwork in Tbilisi, Kyiv, and Lviv between March 2013 and March 2014. It consists of interviews with politicians, party members, journalists, and local experts. Secondary material was used to support field research findings and media reports.

C. **Analyzing the Color Revolutions as Moments of Political Change**

Approaches to the color revolutions have typically been about offering explanations to the causes and effects of the revolutions (Åslund and McFaul, 2006; Marat, 2008; Mitchell, 2012; Ó Beacháin and Polese, 2009), first hand recounting of events by participants or observers (Areshidze,
Karumidze and Wertsch (eds.), 2005), and attempts to connect the color revolutions with other established fields of inquiry – such as state capacity and regime change (Hale, 2006; Way, 2008) or electoral revolutions as new modes of democratic breakthrough (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006a). Other scholars have written about the successes and failures of the color revolutions, but these movements consist of various different processes and therefore authors need to take care in explaining what successes they are trying to measure. The color revolutions were undeniably successful mass movements that brought attention to electoral fraud, which resulted in new rounds of elections. However, these successes tell us very little about what type of political change they brought.

Various approaches have been used to analyze the political impact of the color revolutions. For example, Christensen, Rakhimkov, and Wise (2005) as well as D’Anieri (2005) examined institutional changes resulting from Ukraine’s constitutional amendments of 2004 to assess the potential for democratic development. Katchanovski (2008) investigated evolutionary changes in institutions, leadership, and values following the Orange Revolution. Tatum (2009) looked at the role of leadership on democratic development in post-Rose Revolution Georgia, and Chadova-Devlen (2011) analyzed the impact of the color revolutions on press freedom in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan via political news. A common feature of these works is that they analyze whether we see political continuity or change following the color revolutions, and why. In contrast, I am interested in understanding the impact of the color revolutions and the process of democratization through the institutional lens of political parties.

The modern concept of “revolution” refers to deep-seated socio-political change, which entails violent, popular mobilization (Griewank, 1971). Skocpol (1988, p. 151) posits that modern revolutions such as the French Revolution or the Russian Revolution are social revolutions, with class-based uprisings, which propel transformations in class structure and the structures of state power. While the color revolutions do not have the same class-based character or level of violence, they are aimed at displacing the current regime and building more liberal structures of governance. Huntington (1968, p. 264) notes: “A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership,
and government activity and policies.” In the case of the color revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, the movements were rapid and there was demand for a fundamental change of the reigning political system and leadership, however violence was not a necessary element of change.

For the purposes of my work, I look at the color revolutions as a potential moment of change in political party and party system institutionalization. This dissertation examines the Orange and Rose Revolutions as critical junctures that unfolded in two separate ways, returning to one of the larger empirical questions this research is trying to explain: why do we observe different levels of democratization in Ukraine and Georgia? I posit that the color revolutions brought certain political cleavages to the surface, specifically ethno-regional, economic, and institutional problems afflicting both party politics and deeper democratization. Chapter Six analyzes how the Orange and Rose Revolution victors approached problems of minority exclusion/regionalism, political corruption, and power distributions once they assumed office and examines the impact on both political party and party system institutionalization.

While the color revolutions brought an opportunity for political change, development of party politics and increased institutionalization were not guaranteed. Democratic development in the two cases required political actors that would be willing, and capable, of instituting a reform agenda that would contribute to improvements in party politics. The color revolutions were of specific importance for political development in Ukraine and Georgia because in some way or another they identified areas of necessary reform. These areas were ethno-regional conflict, corruption and economic development, and institutional distribution of power.

In order to answer if and how the color revolutions did (not) serve as a catalyst for parties to better address destabilizing socio-economic conditions, I examine the types of reforms, or lack of, that the color revolution victors undertook once in power. Analysis is specifically concerned with how regional divide and territorial conflict were addressed, whether or not measures were introduced to curb political corruption/clan politics, as well as if and how institutional reform was carried out including changes to the distribution of power. Addressing these areas of weakness in party politics
was necessary if either Ukraine or Georgia was to achieve democratic consolidation, as they would impart stability and legitimacy on the party system.

D. Measuring Political Party Institutionalization

Studies of political party institutionalization have had to face difficulty in finding appropriate measures for the concept. This difficulty is related to the fact that many studies conflate the notion of political party institutionalization with party system institutionalization (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; Mainwaring, 1998; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006; Morlino, 1998; Rose and Munro, 2003).\(^\text{10}\) While scholars continue to debate whether political party institutionalization is necessary for party system institutionalization, it should be acknowledged that they are not the same thing nor mutually supportive (Randall and Svasand, 2002). Attempts to identify indicators exclusive to political party institutionalization have been minimal though, and the most utilized (Huntington, 1965; Panebianco, 1998; Randall and Svasand, 2002) are vague and difficult to operationalize.

\(^{10}\) See TABLE I for a comparative overview of the most commonly used frameworks for both political party and party system institutionalization.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party Institutionalization</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Huntington (1968)                   | (1) Adaptability  
(2) Complexity  
(3) Autonomy  
(4) Coherence | 1) longevity and functional adaptability  
2) number of sub-units  
3) independence from external grouping  
4) party organizational consensus, dispute resolution |
| Panebianco (1988)                   | (1) Autonomy  
(2) Systemness | 1) independence from external environment  
2) internal party organization and interdependence of its different internal sectors |
| Randall and Svasand (2002)          | (1) Systemness  
(2) Value Infusion  
(3) Decisional Autonomy  
(4) Reification | 1) organizational development  
2) voter-party linkage  
3) party independence from external sponsors  
4) party as a permanent part of the political landscape |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party System Institutionalization</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Mainwaring and Scully (1995)    | (1) Stability  
(2) Legitimacy  
(3) Party Rootedness  
(4) Party Organization | 1) patterns of rules and nature of interparty competition  
2) political parties and electoral process are accorded legitimacy  
3) parties have “somewhat stable roots in society”  
4) independence/ value of party organization |
| Mair (1997)                      | (1) Government alteration  
(2) Government formulae  
(3) Access to government | 1) partial or complete change in government  
2) change in composition of parties comprising the cabinet  
3) permanent exclusion of some parties from government |
| Lindberg (2007)                  | (1) Stability of party configuration (as measured by 8 different indicators) | 1) Number of parties in legislature  
2) Number of new parties in legislature  
3) Share of parties voted out of legislature  
4) Number of parties voted out of legislature  
5) Share of parties voted out  
6) Share of legislative seats occupied by the largest party  
7) Share of legislative seats held by runner-up  
8) Legislative seat volatility |
This research borrows from the theoretical framework of Randall and Svasand (2002), utilizing their dimensions of (1) systemness, (2) value infusion, (3) decisional autonomy, and (4) reification. However, Randall and Svasand’s (2002) framework, while multidimensional and potentially reliable, is highly theoretical. In order to empirically apply this framework in Chapter Four, I establish a clear set of measures drawing on the work of various other scholars. (See TABLE II) I measure political party institutionalization on a 12-point scale, where zero is uninstitutionalized and 12 fully institutionalized. I assign a possible total of three points for each dimension of institutionalization – systemness, value infusion, decisional autonomy, reification – according to how high the party measures on the dimension (high-3, moderate-2, low-1). I measure each dimension according to the available data as outlined in TABLE II.

**TABLE II. POLITICAL PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Systemness</td>
<td>Organizational development of a party</td>
<td>History and party apparatus, leadership, patron-clientelism, financing</td>
<td>Country reports, Election results, Party surveys and interviews with party officials/leadership, NGO publications/analyses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Infusion</td>
<td>Voter-party linkage</td>
<td>Party Ideology, Party Identity</td>
<td>Party program, language used in party materials/speeches, presence of personalistic politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisional Autonomy</td>
<td>Party independence from external sources/sponsors</td>
<td>Autonomy from external organizations, Autonomy from oligarchic elites</td>
<td>Investigative journalism, corruption reports, legislative records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reification</td>
<td>Party as permanent part of the political landscape</td>
<td>Party solidified in the public mind</td>
<td>Longevity, party symbolism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. **Systemness**

The first dimension – systemness – operationalizes the organizational development of political parties. Scholars have conceptualized and measured organizational development in a variety of ways. In Yardimci-Geyikçi’s (2013) work on Turkey and Southern Europe, membership strength, territorial comprehensiveness, and financial resources are analyzed. Perepechko, ZumBrunnen, and Kolossov (2011) also examine territorial diffusion in their work on Russian political parties, but they further include centralization of power, type of leadership, external sponsorship, and ideology. All of these indicators are arguably essential to a party’s organizational development, however, I limit my analysis to including only four: (a) history and party apparatus, (b) leadership, (c) patron-clientelism, and (d) party financing. I measure systemness according to whether a party organization is highly developed (a score of 3), moderately developed (a score of 2), or poorly developed (a score of 1), based on available data collected via surveys and interviews with party officials as well as reports by local and international NGOs. I additionally refer to election data, party websites, the Central Election Commissions of both Ukraine and Georgia, and country reports.

a. **History and party apparatus**

The history of a party, how it was founded or its origins, is essential for institutionalization as it creates a strong and stable party base that endures over time. It is important whether a party is formed from below or above and whether it arises out of societal groups with a specific common cause or whether it stems from the political ambitions of one person. Furthermore, party apparatus affects its ability to function. Specifically, whether power is centralized or if there is internal democracy is crucial to organizational development and the well functioning of a party. Party membership and territorial reach are also crucial for systemness. Panebianco (1988) finds that the more a party penetrates society - has diverse territorial support - the more it will institutionalize.

b. **Leadership**

The type of leadership a party has – whether or not it is charismatic – impacts party development. The more charismatic a leader, the more difficult it will be for a party to institutionalize. Charismatic leadership is common in both Ukraine and Georgia as most party leaders
employ personalism to attract followers. This has led parties to become leader focused with most resources going towards funding activities on the national level and little attention paid to shoring up regional branches around the country. Change in leadership also affects party organization as longevity is often demonstrated via party evolution, which includes various generations of leadership. Furthermore, leadership change is a sign of party adaptability and evolution.

c. **Patron-clientelism**

Third, the prevalence of patron-clientelism impacts levels of systemness. Clientelism is typically characterized as an informal relationship based on some form of exchange. The patron controls some type of resources that he makes available to the client under certain conditions. The relationship, therefore, is asymmetrical. In the cases of the former Soviet Union republics, a variety of the clientelist model – clan politics – has been used to explain the social organization linking political and business elites (Gould and Sickner, 2008; Kuzio, 2005; Melnykovska & Schweickert, 2008; Sidikov, 2004; Way, 2005; Wedel, 2003). Former Soviet Union republics have had to undergo economic transformation from closed economies to capitalist systems, something that has proved more difficult than the economic transitions carried out by their Central European neighbors who exhibited relatively more open economies under communism. The concentration of resources in the hands of just a few has created oligarchic societies in Eastern Europe, and oligarchic clans have a large stake in political and economic change. Oligarchs therefore, play an integral role in institution building and party politics. In the case of Ukraine, rival oligarchic clans from different regions have levied their political support for economic advantages and protection. In Georgia, clan networks were largely built around the president, Shevardnadze, so that corrupt officials could penetrate various administrations and government agencies.

d. **Party financing**

As a party needs resources to compete, party financing is critical for a party’s organizational development. How as well as where these resources are derived is crucial for institutionalization. The focus is on the source of party contributions, what foundations or outside organizations fund party activities, and the role government subsidies have in party financing. In
particular, the matter of private and business financing is crucial for party sustainability and institutionalization in FSU republics. This is perhaps the most difficult element of systemness to measure, as parties do not typically make their financial records public. While it is possible to reliably measure the amount of state subsidies a party receives, private contributions and those from big business can only be estimated.

2. **Value infusion**

The second dimension of political party institutionalization is value infusion. Value infusion refers to the linkages between parties and voters and determines the extent that a party has created an identity that garners lasting support and develops a popular base. This can either be through association with a larger social movement or by cultivating a distinct culture. Whitehead’s (2000) study on Tanzanian political parties measures value infusion through the articulation of a party’s platform, the presence of policy priorities, and regional distribution. A well-articulated party platform is key to creating a stable and enduring relationship between a party and citizens, however, I view regional distribution of a party’s support more indicative of party organization and therefore include it as a measurement of systemness. An important element that Yardimci-Geyikci (2013) includes in his criteria of value infusion is party identification. I contrast a political party’s ideology, as found in their party program or other party documents, with party identity. Political parties can develop lasting ties with voters based on shared values; therefore ideology often plays a leading role in attracting members and maintaining support. However, as Tomsa (2008) notes, not all parties in new democracies have a clear ideological foundation. While ideology is one way to understand value infusion, Tomsa (2008) posits that identity, that is culture, can also be a means to understand value infusion. Political parties in Ukraine and Georgia do not always have pronounced ideological cleavages separating them, but they do have clear party identities they construct through policy promises that link them with a specific region or class. Two measures are used to assess value infusion among parties: (1) party ideology and (2) party identity. I score a party as high (a score of 3) as concerns value infusion if it possesses a clearly defined ideological foundation. If there is some ideological base or a clear party identity, I score the party as moderately institutionalized (a score of
2). If the party has a weakly defined ideological base and/or party identity I score the party as poorly institutionalized in value infusion (a score of 1). I base these scores off data collected from party programs as well as the language used in party materials and official speeches. To provide a more nuanced understanding of value infusion, I additionally consider the role personalistic politics plays in undermining and/or reaffirming party ideology and identity.

3. **Decisional autonomy**

Decisional autonomy is a party’s ability to create policy independent of its sponsors or supporting organization. A large part of a party’s strength is derived from its ability to make policy and influence a country’s political direction. While there is theoretical debate over the level of autonomy a party must maintain from other institutions, Randall and Svasand (2002) argue that institutionalized parties will form policy and strategy independent of external actors. Similarly, Huntington (1965, p. 401) finds that institutionalization of political parties is the extent to which the organization can “exist independently of other social grouping and methods of behavior.”

While institutionalized parties have strong linkage networks throughout society that provide resources, it is key that the parties remain independent actors in these relationships. Randall and Svasand (2002) identify the military as a typical external organization that can compromise a party’s autonomy if the party is not the dominant partner. In FSU republics, however, the military is typically weak and not in a position to dominate politics. Here Tomsa (2008) expands Randall and Svasand’s (2002) conceptualization of external organizations that can restrict decisional autonomy to include what he calls “money politics” or corruption. As corruption can occur within a party, this alters Randall and Svasand’s internal/external classification of party institutionalization dimensions, making decisional autonomy not just an external problem, but an issue concerning internal structure as autonomy can be compromised from the inside. If a party consistently creates policy in accordance with its stated goals as evidenced in party documents or speeches, then I consider it to be highly institutionalized (a score of 3). If a party occasionally makes decisions that are contradictory to its stated goals or appears influenced by external sources, I score it as moderately institutionalized (a score of 2). If a party consistently makes decisions contrary to its stated goals that favor its external
sponsors or supporters, I score it as poorly institutionalized (a score of 1). Evidence for analysis is collected from investigative journalism, corruption reports, as well as available reports of parliamentary legislation.

4. **Reification**

The last dimension — reification — refers to the ability of a party to solidify itself in the public’s mind and become a permanent fixture in politics. This is necessary for institutionalization as a political party should be recognizable and able to endure. It is particularly important that a party can exist over time as both part of the opposition and the government. Given that Ukraine and Georgia’s electoral democracies have only been in place for just over 20 years, electoral turnover tests are not yet a suitable identifier of reification for most parties. An institutionalized party will also have a recognizable character. Is reification as simple as recognition though, and what else does it entail? Whitehead (2000) and Tomsa (2008) have both measured reification through public opinion surveys that track party name recognition, but this is not a sufficient condition for reification. Both Whitehead and Tomsa use additional measures to gauge reification including symbolism and public image. Symbolism is crucial for building recognition so when voters are handed a ballot a party’s name will evoke particular images that resonate and attract support. While reification is a powerful dimension, there are both pros and cons that come with it. Not all parties can be measured in the same manner, as available data varies. For example, not all parties are always included on public opinion lists that ask about recognition or support overtime. Additionally, charismatic leadership can influence party symbolism and therefore it is difficult to distinguish between a party’s symbolic value and that which is transferred from its leader. Admittedly, reification is rather difficult to measure, though I attempt to overcome many of the obstacles by referring to a variety of sources. I analyze this dimension through party age, party appreciation as expressed in public opinion surveys (when available), and a party’s use of symbolic imagery in the media and its party materials. Based off these materials, I score a party as highly reified (a score of 3), moderately reified (a score of 2), or poorly reified in the public’s mind (a score
of 1). If a party is too new for any conclusive judgment as concerns reification, I withhold a score for this dimension.

E. Approaches to Party System Institutionalization

The institutionalization literature treats political party and party system institutionalization rather differently. There is greater consensus on the criteria and measurements of political party institutionalization than there is for party system institutionalization. This may be a problem of aggregation from trying to operationalize a concept as broad as party system. Many scholars are trying to capture the same thing, but we are looking at various dimensions. It becomes a question of substance, and what we define as the fundamental characteristics of party system institutionalization.

Two of the most commonly used frameworks of party system institutionalization are those developed by Peter Mair and Scott P. Mainwaring. Mair’s (1997; 2007) model of institutionalization focuses heavily on the patterns of inter-party competition. To measure these patterns Mair creates three dimensions: (1) alterations of government (either total or partial), (2) familiarity of the government formulae, and (3) the permanent exclusion of some parties from national government. A benefit of this framework is that is can be quantitatively operationalized and therefore allows for reliable comparison over a large amount of cases (See Casal Bertoa, 2012). Mair’s framework allows for the classification of a system as either closed (highly predictable) or open (relatively unpredictable). What this model fails to consider, however, is the public and how they perceive political parties and the overall party system.

Mainwaring’s (1998) conceptualization of party system institutionalization, first developed by Mainwaring and Scully (1995), consists of four dimensions and seeks to capture a more comprehensive perspective of party politics. First, an institutionalized party system enjoys a great amount of stability and illustrates regular patterns of party competition. Second, institutionalized party systems have strong roots in society. Third, both political elites and the public accord legitimacy to political parties that make up the system, and fourth, political parties are well organized with developed structures. What is immediately apparent in this framework is that it measures elements of both individual political parties and the larger party system. While stability and
legitimacy are both features of the party system, party rootedness and organization are dimensions of political party institutionalization.

Given the competing frameworks to operationalize party system institutionalization, I have chosen not to adopt any single model, rather I compile a set of dimensions that I judge best for capturing and isolating party system institutionalization. The three dimensions of party system institutionalization I analyze in Chapter Five are electoral volatility, legitimacy, and mutual acceptance of parties. I score party system institutionalization on a scale of one to 15, however, the three dimensions of electoral volatility, legitimacy, and mutual acceptance of parties are not weighted equally. Legitimacy and mutual acceptance are valued twice as much as electoral volatility, due to perceived importance for institutionalization based off contradictions in the relationship between electoral volatility, institutionalization, and democratization. This does not suggest that electoral volatility is unimportant for institutionalization and democratization, only that it may have less of a destabilizing impact in younger democracies than older, more established ones. As Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) find, electoral volatility is higher in democracies founded after 1978 because parties played a diminished role in stabilization, due to a decrease in party/voter attachment. For instance between 1989 and 2009, Latvia and Slovakia exhibit high levels of volatility, 50 and 59 percent respectively, but both are established democracies holding membership in the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I score electoral volatility on a scale of one to three, with legitimacy and mutual acceptance of parties scored between one and six. In order to measure these dimensions I use a variety of sources including election data, public opinion surveys, election monitoring accounts, and media reports. (See TABLE III)
### TABLE III. PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral Volatility</strong></td>
<td>Voter behavior, party stability</td>
<td>Tucker and Powell 2014 data set, election databases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Difference in vote capture between elections distinguished by (1) party switching and (2) entrance and exit of parties</td>
<td>IFES &amp; IDEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimacy</strong></td>
<td>Parties are seen as a necessary part of democratic politics</td>
<td>Public opinion surveys (IRI, IFES, Razumkov Centre), election databases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public apathy towards parties and parliament, voter turnout</td>
<td>(IDEA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mutual acceptance of parties</strong></td>
<td>Interparty competition, elite perceptions</td>
<td>Election monitoring reports (IFES, IRI), media reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combative behavior between parties, attempts to restrict party competition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Electoral volatility**

   Practically all notions of party system institutionalization emphasize stability (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mair, 1996; Randall and Svasand, 2002). This is because stability translates into electoral regularity and predictability. Lindberg (2007) argues in his study on African party systems that stability is the most important element of party system stability, along with interaction among parties. In measuring stability he creates eight measures: (1) number of parties in the legislature, (2) the number of new parties, (3) the share/percent of new parties in the legislature, (4) the number of parties voted out, (5) the share/percent of parties voted out, (6) the share/percent of seats in the legislature held by the largest party, (7) the share/percent or seats in the legislature held by the runner-up, and (8) legislative seat volatility as determined by the Pedersen index. While Lindberg is correct in his emphasis on the importance of stability, his operationalization of stability is rather literal and focused solely on the quantifiable aspects of stability. As will later be discussed, the mutual acceptance of parties also bestows stability onto the party system and better captures...
interaction among parties, as attempts to restrict certain parties or politicians from participating in elections can disrupt stable patterns of competition.

This research limits its measurement of stability to electoral volatility. Typically this is one of the most measurable dimensions of party system institutionalization using the Pedersen Index (Bader, 2010; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006; Pedersen, 1983; Schedler, 1995). However, electoral volatility as calculated by the changes in vote share a party receives from one election to another is a very weak indicator of stability if the volatility caused by the entrance and exit of parties in the party system is not considered separately from the volatility caused by vote change among stable parties. Powell and Tucker (2014) have identified these issues with using the Pedersen Index, and have created a new measure that disaggregates the two types of volatility – Type A volatility which is that caused by the appearance and disappearance of parties from the political system and Type B volatility which is when voters switch their votes between existing parties (Powell and Tucker, 2014, p. 2). By measuring these phenomena separately it is possible to account for party mergers and the entry and exit of parties from the party system, something quite common in post-communist countries. These two volatility scores therefore capture a more complete picture of the party systems in Ukraine and Georgia and levels of stability. I score a party system as highly stable (a score of 3) if it exhibits an average of 33 percent or less volatility. I score a two (2) if the system demonstrates moderate levels of stability with an average of between 34 and 65 percent volatility. I award a score of one (1) for extremely unstable party systems that see an average level of 66 percent or higher electoral volatility.

2. **Legitimacy**

The second dimension, legitimacy, refers to acceptance by the electorate.

Institutionalization requires the public to commit to the electoral process and trust in institutions – including parties. This creates a political atmosphere conducive to further democratization where parties work in the name of democracy and the public believes in the functionality of such a system. In institutionalized party systems, political parties are accorded legitimacy by political actors (McFaul, 2005), they are seen as a necessary part of democratic politics, and receive widespread
support when they represent public opinion. In an institutionalized party system, neither politicians nor the public imagine a society where politics is conducted without parties. However, building trust among politicians and parties is one of the most difficult accomplishments to make in new democracies.

Legitimacy has commonly been measured through public opinion surveys that gauge public confidence or trust in political parties as institutions (See Mainwaring, 1998; Zucco, 2010). Others have argued this does not capture the institutionalization of this dimension, as legitimacy also extends to the electoral process. Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) employ Mainwaring’s framework, however, they use a different set of indicators that while still based on perception, measure the legitimacy of individual elections rather than the party system as an institution. I choose to measure legitimacy first through public apathy towards parties, for which I turn to public opinion polls. I measure legitimacy of political parties on a scale of one to six, broken down into three classifications: highly institutionalized (a score of 5-6), moderately institutionalized (a score of 3-4), or poorly institutionalized (a score of 1-2). These scores are based on a combined measurement of public trust as captured by public opinion and voter turnout. I score public trust on a three-point scale according to whether the mean of favorable public opinion towards political parties during the 2000’s is between 100 and 66 percent (a score of 3), 66 and 33 percent (a score of 2), 33 and 0 percent (a score of 1). Tomsa (2010, p. 158) notes that appreciation and acceptance of the party system can also be measured by public participation in elections. I use voter turnout as a measure of legitimacy and compare average turnout for parliamentary elections, both prior to and following the color revolutions, to the average voter turnout for all parliamentary elections since 1989 in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, which is 64 percent. I use a three-point scale and score based on average voter

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11 Their three indicators are 1) whether the opposition boycotted the election, 2) whether the losers of the election accepted the results, and 3) whether international observers deemed the elections free and fair (2001, p. 447).

turnout, with a score of three (3) if voter turnout is above the Eastern European and Caucasus average and falls in the range of 100 to 66 percent. I score a two (2) if average voter turnout is around or marginally below the regional average, falling in the range of 65 to 33 percent. A score of one (1) is given if average voter turnout is well below the regional average, falling between 32 and 1 percent.

3. **Mutual acceptance of parties**

Mutual acceptance of parties is key to party system institutionalization as it is “essential to the notion of party competition” (Randall and Svasand, 2002, p. 7). This dimension captures the interactions between parties – both in how they speak about each other and whether they accept each other as legitimate competition. In a developing democracy, polarization between political parties can only be sustained to a degree. It is not necessary nor expected that parties will like each other, but they need to have the ability to govern together. This dimension needs conceptual clarification, as Randal and Svasand (2002) do not devote much consideration to this. What it does not refer to is negative campaigning between political opponents, which is common in any democracy. Lack of acceptance between political parties, or individual politicians, specifically refers to a lack of political acceptance where one political entity tries to delegitimize another through restriction in competition. In an institutionalized party system, parties would compete in fair contest with genuine opposition. Parties should accept the opposition as legitimate competitors and not try to dominate the party system by restricting competition. Tomsa posits (2008, p. 188), “inter-party competition is much more conducive to democracy than combative competition or, at the other extreme, collusive behavior between parties.” This research will analyze mutual acceptance between parties by looking at how parties interact publically, speak about each other in the media during non-campaign seasons, in addition to attempts to stifle competition or delegitimize the opposition as seen in changes to electoral law and prosecution of key opposition figures. Drawing from the data, I

classify a party as highly institutionalized (a score of 5-6) in the dimension of mutual acceptance if there are no major efforts to manipulate electoral competition through overt attempts to delegitimize the opposition or bar them from competing. A party system is classified as moderately institutionalized in mutual acceptance of parties (a score of 3-4) if there are some attempts to inadvertently stifle electoral competition or delegitimize the competition (e.g. bringing charges against opposition figures). A party system is poorly institutionalized in this dimension (a score of 1-2) if there are frequent and direct attempts to restrict electoral competition and delegitimize the opposition (e.g. creation of new laws aimed at excluding specific political opponents, imprisoning of opposition figures, banning/refusing to register certain parties to run in specific elections.).

F. **Democratization: Where Political Parties and Party Systems Intersect**

Political parties and party systems perform key functions in the democratization process. Understanding Ukraine and Georgia’s future prospects of achieving democratic consolidation, thus requires a careful assessment party politics. Different actors and institutions affect democratization, however this work has made political parties and party systems the focus of research precisely because of the crucial intermediary role they play between state and society. There are many ways to conceptualize and measure democracy both qualitative and quantitative; yet, consensus is lacking. I argue in this work that modern democracy is created and defined by political parties and their interactions. By examining democratic development through party politics, this work approaches democratization in newly transitioned countries via analysis of institutionalization. Political parties direct policy and the party system determines the amount of stability and predictability in the political system. In a well functioning democracy, political parties have durable, autonomous organizations that can sustain over time, are rooted in society, and become a permanent part of the political landscape. The reason for this is that in consolidated democracies the electorate holds parties accountable and policy decisions are made in hope of maintaining popularity and securing reelection.

As Shapiro and Hacker-Cordón (1999) note, part of democracy’s appeal is its ability to secure individuals’ rights and provide for civic participation, which allows for the potential undoing of previous political evils – which in the case of Eastern Europe has been communism. In theory and
often in implementation, democracy offers stability, particularly in the protection of personal freedoms and rule of law. Institutionalization matters for democracy; institutionalized political parties develop an ingrained culture and patterns of behavior that represent public attitudes and institutionalized party systems provide a country with a measure of continuity. Institutionalization entails expectation – of who participates, how they behave, the potential of a given outcome, and that parties are accepted as a core institution. When political parties and party systems are institutionalized they contribute to the stability of the political system, thus strengthening democracy. Alternatively, weak institutionalization hinders democratic accountability, prevents stable party identification, and democratic rules may be undermined (Birch, 2001). Democratization does not hinge solely on institutionalization. However, I argue that because weakly institutionalized political parties and party systems typically have adverse effects on democratic progress, party politics is critical to understanding a country’s political environment particularly in the early stages of democratic transition.

This research additionally stresses the importance of studying political party and party system institutionalization together. While there is value in limiting one’s study to only one type of institutionalization, it fails to capture how the interaction between different levels of institutionalization may be affecting democratization. Is there a tension between the two levels of institutionalization? Furthermore, what does this mean for democratic advancement? The main function of the party system is to provide stability and diffuse conflict. A highly institutionalized party system should have no problem in doing this, but the less institutionalized a party system is, the more this task becomes difficult, particularly if political parties also fail to achieve high levels of institutionalization. Weakly institutionalized parties can undermine weakly institutionalized party systems, and democratic rules and norms are the first to suffer. Additionally important for party system development and democratization is the distribution of political party institutionalization. When political parties exhibit uneven levels of institutionalization it can impact the competitiveness of the party system leading to issues of representation and a decrease in public confidence in the overall political system (Randall and Svasand, 2002). It is important to know the level of
institutionalization among parties, as the strongest party may not be the one who rules government. If
certain parties enjoy distinct advantages – either financially, in who they are associated with, or
access to government – then this can impact the not only the institutionalization of other parties, but
the functioning of the party system. Additionally, lack of a “level playing field” in the party system
can also hinder the development of individual parties and systemic stability. If certain parties enjoy
control over the media and/or monopolization of state resources some parties may be permanently
excluded from power. Understanding how party politics affects the dynamics of democratization
requires a dual analysis of both political party and party system institutionalization.

What often results in transitioning democracies that exhibit weaknesses in both political
party and party system institutionalization is a hybrid regime. Political science scholars have
produced numerous works on cases that present mixed data concerning democracy, labeling them
“hybrid regimes,” “pseudodemocracies,” or “electoral democracies.”\(^{13}\) While the relationship such
countries have with democracy varies, a common factor is that prospects for further democratization,
and eventual consolidation, is complicated by remnants of authoritarianism. Authoritarian features
may present in various ways: restricting opposition’s access to media, prosecution or harassment of
opposition politicians, and/or abuse of state resources (Levitsky and Way, 2002). The result of such
mixing of authoritarian and democratic elements is more likely to occur in countries where party
politics are weakly institutionalized. Even if free and fair elections do occur, meaning Schumpeter’s
minimalist standards are met, that does not tell us about the intentions and capacity of the ruling
elites (Diamond, 2002). Furthermore, unpredictable electoral results and a lack of acceptance
between political competitors often lead to unstable politics.

The remainder of the dissertation tackles the issues outlined above. Chapter Four and
Chapter Five conduct close analyses of political party and party system institutionalization,
respectively. Chapter Six then reflects on the color revolutions and their impact on the development

of party politics in the decade that followed. Finally, the conclusion returns to the theoretical
discussion of the process of institutionalization and what can be learned from these cases in terms of
the interaction between political party institutionalization and party system institutionalization.
IV: Political Party Institutionalization in Ukraine and Georgia

A. Introduction

Just as democratic transition does not ensure eventual consolidation, the creation of political parties does not automatically translate into political party institutionalization. The focus of this chapter is on measuring levels of institutionalization among Ukrainian and Georgian political parties. To this end I apply four dimensions of political party institutionalization developed by Randall and Svasand (2002) – systemness, party rootedness, decision-autonomy, and reification – to assess the degree to which various parties are institutionalized. For Ukraine, Batkivshchyna, Party of Regions, UDAR, and Svoboda are examined.14 In the case of Georgia, I analyze United National Movement, the Republican Party of Georgia, and Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia. As political party institutionalization should not be considered an all or nothing achievement, I measure it according to a scale – evaluating whether each party is weakly, moderately, or highly institutionalized.

In the late 1700s, Edmund Burke defined a political party as “a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.” However, instead of describing what parties are or do, Burke lists what parties should be. The modern understanding of parties is more closely related to Anthony Downs’ (1957, p. 25) description, which describes parties as “teams seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election.” Parties are integral for liberal democracy, and Eastern European countries undergoing democratic transition have had to undertake massive efforts at party building. If parties institutionalize, it can be expected that they will have a clear political orientation, party preferences, target electorate, and thus create stable patterns of inter-party competition.

Political parties contribute to the legitimacy and well functioning of a democratic regime and in a

14 Part of the analyses of party institutionalization for Batkivshchyna and United National Movement were previously published in East European Politics, See Mierzejewski-Voznyak, M. Party Politics after the Color Revolutions: Party Institutionalization and Democratization in Ukraine and Georgia. East European Politics 30(1), 86-104, 2014.
well functioning democracy parties are held accountable and operate within a set of constraints. The two are mutually constitutive. If political parties fail to create strong organizations, represent societal demands, and become an essential part of the political landscape, they inject unpredictability into the party system, which can destabilize a fledgling democracy.

B. **Party Institutionalization in Ukraine**

1. **Party evolution**

   Since the Orange Revolution in 2004, a new group of Ukrainian political parties have become the main actors in the political process occupying a central, permanent place in government (Razumkov Centre, 2010, p. 2). However, party evolution has encountered numerous challenges. Following Ukrainian independence, political parties increasingly developed as personal or business projects, failed to represent societal interests, and did not inspire public trust. As a result of imposed communism in Ukraine during the 20th century, the country has only had around 20 years to develop a party system and establish political parties of a non-communist ideology. The first non-communist political party was founded in 1990, with the first elections in which political parties took part occurring in 1994. Throughout the 1990s, political parties were established and represented all areas of the ideological spectrum. Parliament saw an array of parties/blocs win seats, representing the left, right, and center. The Communist Party of Ukraine along with the Socialist Party of Ukraine, the Peasant’s Party of Ukraine, and the Green Party of Ukraine made up the left. The center right consisted of the People’s Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) and Reforms bloc. The Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United), People’s Democratic Party, and Hromada made up the center. Following the 2002 parliamentary elections, a new set of leading parties found political success – Party of Regions, Batkivshchyna, and Our Ukraine – and there was growing authoritarianism in presidential powers that led ideological dividing lines between political forces to be replaced by “anti-presidential – pro-presidential” identities (Razumkov Centre, 2010, p. 6). Political parties were either an ally of President Kuchma or an opponent, and they were all relatively centrist.

15 A couple parties, such as Rukh and the Republican party of Ukraine, were unofficially founded prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, though as no parties but the Communist Party were allowed to exist they took the form of civil movements or dissident groups.
During the 2004 Orange Revolution, parties that opposed President Kuchma – Our Ukraine and Batkivshchyna – protested the election fraud that saw Party of Region’s candidate, and Kuchma protégé, Viktor Yanukovych declared president. With the nullification of the fraudulent results came a dramatic increase in the role of political parties in governance due to Constitutional revisions. Parties were able to form coalitions in parliament, influence all three branches of government via parliamentary majority powers, and compete in a proportional system of election of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament). This increased role of political parties led to a wave of active party building with 24 new parties established in 2005 alone – likely in preparation for the 2006 parliamentary election. During the most recent period of political party evolution in the second half of the 2000s, socio-cultural divisions have come to structure the party system creating two groups: the “pro-Western” adherents of European and Euro-Atlantic integration and the “pro-Russian” adherents of further Russian socio-cultural, economic, and political integration (Razumkov Centre, 2010, p. 10). This divide is in part based on cultural and linguistic differences. However, following the Orange Revolution, these fault lines have also come to be structured around competing political and economic agendas, particularly integration policies. What has persisted throughout the past 20 years of political party development in Ukraine is a failure among parties in general to achieve high levels of institutionalization. As evidenced in the following analysis of Ukrainian political parties – Batkivshchyna, Party of Regions, UDAR, Svoboda – the use of parties for personal political ambitions, a lack of ideological foundations, and the decisive influence of business interests on party activity, all impact Ukrainian parties’ abilities to institutionalize and act as intermediaries between state and society. The result, however, has not necessarily been politically weak parties, but parties that have failed to contribute to stable democratic progress.

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16 Ukraine has been confronted with dueling integration policies 1) closer cooperation with the European Union via the European Neighborhood Policy and later the Eastern Partnership and 2) strategic partnership with Russia and other CIS countries through The Eurasian Economic Community. These choices have pitted political development against needed economic advancement as well as furthering “pro-Western” vs. “pro-Russian” tensions in the country.
2. *Batkivshchyna (United Opposition - Fatherland)*

*Batkivshchyna* (Fatherland) is perhaps best known by the image of its founder and leader – Yulia Tymoshenko. The party, as part of the larger Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, was part of the Orange opposition that confronted electoral corruption in the early 2000s, but continues to find itself more of an opposition force than a ruling party. Its “orange” alliance with Our Ukraine was short lived and in-fighting between the two political groups following the Orange Revolution earned the party high levels of criticism. However, *Batkivshchyna* did not experience the same amount of public backlash as Our Ukraine, the latter of which no longer holds any seats in government and has fallen out of the public eye. *Batkivshchyna* suffered one of its most significant defeats in 2010 when Tymoshenko lost the presidential election by a narrow margin to Viktor Yanukovych from Party of Regions. However, the party underwent its biggest test of endurance when its leader sat behind bars for nearly two and a half years between 2011 and 2014. *Batkivshchyna* continued to build its organization during this period, though, and merged with two other parties (Front for Change and Reforms and Order Parties) in addition to joining a united opposition alliance with *Svoboda* and UDAR against the increasingly authoritarian Party of Regions government. Though *Batkivshchyna* maintained popularity in a political atmosphere where public support is fickle, the party remains dependent on charismatic leadership, lacks nation-wide support, possesses little internal party democracy, and has a history of being tied to oligarchs. All of this hinders the party’s ability to achieve strong levels of party institutionalization.

a. **Systemness**

Yulia Tymoshenko and Oleksandr Turchynov founded *Batkivshchyna* in 1999 after Pavlo Lazarenko, leader of the *Hromada* party of which Tymoshenko was a leading figure, fled Ukraine to escape embezzlement charges. The party has actually incorporated around seven to eight parties over time. *Batkivshchyna* is based on left populist ideology that is weakly articulated, and according to its party program it defines its party via the term “солідаризм” or
“solidarity.” The party program was revised in 2000 and 2005, but the ideological evolution is rather insignificant and the party continues to have a weakly articulated ideology (Kononchuk and Yarosh, 2013). Specifically, the portion of the party program devoted to a clearly defined ideology is minimal. Following the creation of her own oligarchic successor party, Batkivshchyna, Tymoshenko started the eponymous bloc – BYuT – in 2001. The bloc brought together parties such as Sobor, Ukrainian Republican Party, and the Social Democratic Party for the purpose of increasing their vote capture so that they could pass the electoral threshold and enter parliament. Tymoshenko’s party emerged as a successor party to Hromada and therefore had built-in levels of pre-existing support – similar to how “new” communist parties did following the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Batkivshchyna, the cornerstone of BYuT, had over 200,000 members by the 2002 elections making it stronger than any other individual, opposition party (Kuzio, 2007, p. 50). Medium size entrepreneurs were some of the bloc’s, and are currently some of Batkivshchyna’s, strongest supporters. As reported by Kyiv Post on 30 March 2012, Oleksandr Turchynov, Yulia Tymoshenko’s Deputy, stated that as of March 2012 Batkivshchyna had around 600,000 members. Furthermore, Batkivshchyna has the second most party branches in Ukraine and was long considered to be the most well organized political force among opposition parties (Kuzio, 2010).

The popularity of BYuT and Batkivshchyna has relied upon the popularity of Tymoshenko herself, making it a charismatic party. Such parties are considered weak because as Kitschelt (1995, p. 449) posits, the persistence of the charismatic party hinges on the continued political survival of the charismatic leader. This creates instability within the party, as it is more reliant upon the leader than its organizational structure. Charismatic parties are often expected to disappear when their leaders leave politics (Panebianco, 1988). However this is not always the case as some charismatic parties are able to transform their organization and endure, as seen with the (Peronist) Justicialist Party (JP) in Argentina. The party survived after the death of Peron in 1974, as many leaders remained committed to the party, despite it’s banning between 1976 and 1983 (Levitsky, 1998). Furthermore, the majority of leaders and activists remained loyal to JP even when the party

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17 While “solidarity” is rather vague, it may reference the parties Hromada roots.
abandoned its socio-economic foundations in the early 1990s. Batkivshchyna proved it could continue to operate and maintain voter support during Tymoshenko’s imprisonment, capturing the second largest amount of votes in the 2012 parliamentary election. However, during this time there was still hope that she would be released and return to her position as party leader. Whether or not its reliance on charismatic leadership will eventually prove disastrous for the party remains to be seen, and will require Tymoshenko to permanently leave politics.

A weakness within Batkivshchyna’s organization is its lack of wide territorial presence and support throughout all regions of Ukraine due to the polarizing nature of Tymoshenko’s character. BYuT’s, and Batkivshchyna’s, support is based in western and central Ukraine, and as 2002, 2006, 2007, and 2012 regional breakdowns of parliamentary election results show, (See TABLE IV) the bloc, and Batkivshchyna itself, lacks widespread territorial hold particularly in the South and East. However, as Meleshevich (2006, p. 121) noted, since Ukraine achieved independence there has been no political organization that has been able to uniformly mobilize the electorate across the nation. With the banning of party blocs prior to the 2012 parliamentary election, Batkivshchyna allied with five smaller parties on party lists, later merging with three – Front of Changes, Reform and Order, and part of People’s Movement of Ukraine – in June 2013. This merger was an important step in strengthening Batkivshchyna’s party apparatus, as Front of Changes had strong regional structures that Tymoshenko’s party lacked and was skilled at internal party management.
TABLE IV. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF BYUT’S* SUPPORT, 2002-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*2012 represents votes for Batkivshchyna

Source: 2002 election data from D’Anieri (2007, p. 108); Ukrainian Central Election Commission data 2006-2012, author’s calculation

Note: Total may not equal 100 percent due to rounding. The regions are constructed as follows: west–Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Volyn, Zhytomyr, and Zakarpattya; central–Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Poltava, and Vinnytsya oblasts as well as Kyiv City; south–Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts as well as Sevastopol City and the Crimean Autonomous Republic; east–Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Sumy.

Regional diffusion is an important contributor to party organization as the leadership relies on local officials to strengthen the party organization and build support. Below the national government there are regional administrative units, consisting of 24 oblasts, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and 2 cities “with special status” – Kyiv and Sevastopol. Oblasts have councils where there is a chairman who is the most powerful regional official aside from the oblast governor. Oblast governors are appointed by the President of Ukraine and directly hinge on which party controls that seat, but council members and the chairmen are elected. Oblasts councils, therefore, balance the central government appointed governor. Despite having the second largest number of party branches in Ukraine, as of mid-2012, not a single oblast was chaired by a member of Batkivshchyna. Control of oblasts is important for Ukrainian political parties because control at the oblast or municipal levels allows a political party to build its core support base and to project power during national elections. Oblasts councils also balance the central government appointed governor. Additionally, they provide sanctuaries for parties to retreat following a loss at the national level, and are rallying points during victory years. Effective local leadership also allows politicians to partner with local oligarchs to obtain funding (e.g. Kolomoyskyi in Dnipropetrovsk, Akhmetov in Donetsk).
Batkivshchyna has been successful at building a strong party organization, but high levels of systemness require the party to expand its regional hold and increase its local authority.

In the case of Ukraine, political parties have become clients of oligarchic clans, representing their interests in politics, and thus granting immense political influence and authority to big business. Clans typically aligned themselves with a particular party based on who held political power in their oblast, e.g. the Donetsk clan led by Rinat Akhmetov is linked to the Party of Regions (Kuzio 2005, p. 124). However, oligarchic clans are using the fragmentation of Ukraine’s political system to weaken their connections with established parties altogether and are increasingly creating their own factions in government to increase their business options. Businessmen and managers of large enterprises are increasingly present in the Verkhovna Rada, making up 30 percent of all parliamentarians (Semenova 2012, p. 10). Oligarchs are not unique to Ukraine, and as Andrei Shleifer (2005) notes, they are common in middle-income countries. Anders Åslund (2005, p. 6) even asserts that the contemporary oligarchs in Ukraine and Russia can be compared to the American robber barons of the mid-late 1800s. Oligarchs become dangerous for politics when they feel threatened by the government, which leads them to try and capture the state so as to protect their interests. Åslund (2005) finds that the way to avoid this combative relationship between business and oligarchs is for the state to negotiate with the oligarchs, guarantee property rights and require a certain amount to be paid back to the state.\(^{18}\)

In general, oligarchic clans are antagonistic to party institutionalization in Ukraine as they conflate business and politics. In a rather telling statement about the perceived intermingling of business and politics, Valeriy Khoroshkovsky a wealthy businessman and politician told the St. Petersburg Times in 2006, “I owned mid-sized businesses that had no kind of political influence. I cannot say I gained something for my business thanks to politics or that I had any political advantages thanks to business.” Only a year later, Khoroshkovsky went on to become the Head of the State Customs Service of Ukraine, followed by numerous other appointments in the National Bank of

\(^{18}\) This proposal by Åslund is similar to that which was enacted in Georgia by Saakashvili, however, Åslund is likely suggesting this be carried out by formal, legal procedures.
Ukraine, Member of Supreme Council of Justice, Minister of Finance, and was then the Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine until late 2012 when he is said to have fallen out of favor with President Yanukovych.

Currently political parties in Ukraine only receive indirect public funding. Some parliamentary elections have included reimbursement of election expenditures, which were actually reimbursed - 2006, while others have included similar reimbursement requirements that were never paid out, as State Budget Laws did not provide the funds - 2007 (Kovryzhenko, 2010, p. 93). Ukrainian election law does not require the disclosure of what percent of a party’s budget is derived from membership dues and therefore parties do not make exact figures available; most parties state that between 6 and 10 percent of their budget is derived from membership dues – not enough to finance party activities (Kovryzhenko, 2010). External funding sources previously played a dominant role in Ukrainian politics. Prior to the mid-2000s, electoral financing included a lot of Russian “capital,” but this all but disappeared by the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections. Kuzio (2011a, p. 95) finds that the shadow economy acts as an important, “non-transparent source” of political party funding. Additionally, all Ukrainian parties receive funding from oligarchs who often switch party allegiances making it difficult to actually discern policy effects in their parliamentary factions (Kuzio 2011a, p. 99). Oligarchs and corporations are the most important funding source for Ukrainian parties, which resulted in the election of numerous businessmen into parliament – an issue that will be further addressed under decisional autonomy. For example, Davyd Zhvania, a businessman, provided funding for PORA (It’s Time), a youth NGO that was instrumental in the 2004 Orange Revolution, but defected in 2010 and began supporting then Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych (Kuzio 2011a, p. 95). Some oligarchs that are known to have supported Batkivshchyna and/or BYuT are S. Taruta and V. Gaiduk (ISD), P. Poroshenko (Roshen), K. Zhevago (Ferrexpo), and N. Korolevska (LuhanskKholod). These range from heads of confectionary corporations (and the future President of Ukraine), to entrepreneurial financiers, and an eventual Minister of Social Policy in the Party of Region’s led government – Natalia Korolevska.
Batkivshchyna is a well-organized party that has strong membership support but lacks territorial diffusion. Additionally, it has centralized leadership and known ties to the economic elite, both politically and financially. This leaves it only moderately institutionalized, receiving a score of two, in the dimension of systemness.

b. **Value infusion**

When a political organization becomes “infused with value beyond the technical requirement of the task at hand” in can be considered institutionalized in the dimension of value infusion (Selznick, 1957, p. 17) Value infusion captures long-term loyalties felt by members, who therefore “feel a personal stake in the perpetuation of the organization” (Levitsky, 1998). This creates stability within the party system, as parties must remain accountable to their supporters by maintaining reliable party labels and symbolic capital. Value infusion can be measured through a party’s ideology, as this traditionally creates shared, lasting values between the voters and the party. Included in Batkivshchyna’s 2005 party program revisions was an explicit ideological definition, “Batkivshchyna is a nation-wide, patriotic, centrist party. It is the party of new social ideology, which organically united social solidarity with defense of individual rights and human freedoms. It is the party of those who stand for independent and sovereign [Ukrainian] state of civil, economic, and spiritually healthy society; It is the party for fairness and the social defense of citizens.”19 (Author’s translation)

The party goes on to state that it does not stand for extreme liberalism, rejects ideas of the far left, and does not tolerate business/state collusion. Batkivshchyna posits that it offers a third way to citizens, not the politically left way or right way, but a third-Ukrainian way. This statement is particularly vague, highlighting the lack of ideological clarity within the party. Rather than clearly articulate what it stands for, the party explains what it opposes.

When analyzing the ideology of Batkivshchyna, it must be accepted that charismatic leadership complicates this dimension. As a charismatic party, it will be more difficult to institutionalize party identifications due to the lack of a clear party program and an inherent focus on the leader (Croissant and Merkel, 2004). Batkivshchyna was originally associated with the Orange

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Revolution and a democratic Ukraine, but personalistic leaders are opportunistic with oscillating platforms. *Batkivshchyna*, similar to most parties in Ukraine, does not have strong linkages with any social base and its program documents specifically refer to its “all-inclusiveness” (Kononchuk and Yarosh, 2013). The party is an example of what Otto Kirchheimer defines as a “catch-all party”.

*Batkivshchyna’s* character is tied to Tymoshenko’s person more than any social cause. What BYuT accomplished throughout the 2000s was creating a brand based on Yulia Tymoshenko. She went from “corrupt gas princess” who made riches in the 1990s from questionable gas trading to a national heroine who will sacrifice herself in the hope of creating a just, Ukrainian state (Zherebkin, 2006, p. 22). However, Tymoshenko is seen as a polarizing figure better suited for opposition than head of state and who is foremost concerned with self-preservation (Pattie, 2012, p. 6).

*Batkivshchyna* has used Tymoshenko’s strong image to cultivate voter loyalty, which has kept the party well represented in parliament throughout the 2000s, suffering its only major defeat when it narrowly lost the presidential election in 2010 to Party of Regions (PR). Since the 2011 changes in the Ukrainian election law that prohibit political party blocs from running, the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) has had to undergo rebranding to attract former BYuT supporters to vote for *Batkivshchyna* as opposed to other bloc members (Sydorenko, 2011, p. 1). Tymoshenko’s image continues to be central to this rebranding regardless of her August 2011 imprisonment, which prevented her from participating in politics for over two years. As of early 2014, the top three links on *Batkivshchyna’s* website are to Yulia Tymoshenko’s own official site, her twitter feed, and her Facebook page – links to the party’s Facebook page and twitter feed are only found about half way down the webpage. Despite her physical absence, Tymoshenko was re-elected party leader at the merger congress held in June 2013 that united *Batkivshchyna* with Front for Change, Reforms and Order, and part of People’s Movement of Ukraine. Not willing to replace Tymoshenko and even nominating her for the scheduled 2015 presidential elections (while she was still imprisoned), the party simply created a new position of political council chairman for Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who was the de-facto leader of *Batkivshchyna* during Tymoshenko’s imprisonment.
As Batkivshchyna’s ideological foundation lacks clarity, the party is more easily understood in terms of its identity. In newly democratizing countries many parties have opted to create party identities based on regional, personal, or other distinct values that are unrelated to traditional cleavages (Tomsa, 2008). Batkivshchyna, and other Orange coalition parties, forged a pro-Ukrainian identity during the Orange Revolution that centered on an independent, legitimate, Ukrainian nation (Zherebkin, 2006). However, the party is based off a puzzling mix of business interests and ethnic appeals, constructed for the purpose of capturing votes (Bloom and Schulman, 2011). The use of Ukrainian over Russian is important for Batkivshchyna’s identity in that it imparts on the party a traditional Ukrainian image that resonates with western and central Ukrainian voters (though overall this is not always a successful electoral strategy).20 Batkivshchyna exclusively uses Ukrainian on its website and it is the predominant language spoken by its leader Yulia Tymoshenko since the Orange Revolution – despite her having only spoken Russian in childhood and up until her mid-30s.

Regardless of the party’s oscillating policy platforms tied to Tymoshenko’s personal agenda, the party remains committed to the pro-Ukrainian identity it crafted.

Batkivshchyna is committed to an independent Ukraine, but its identity is a well-constructed electoral tool opposed to an organic party base. The party’s “all-inclusiveness” and undefined ideological foundation fails to fulfill the necessary party function of societal representation. At this point in time, Batkivshchyna is considered weakly institutionalized, receiving a score of one, in the dimension of value infusion.

c. Decisional autonomy

A party’s ability to institutionalize depends on whether it succumbs to external influence, in the case of Ukraine this particularly pertains to letting capital dictate decision. Tomsa (2008) finds in the case of Indonesia that the interconnectedness of business and politics can compromise a party’s autonomy. Similar is the situation in Ukraine. This is often the case because the oligarchs who fund the parties are also members and may be seated in parliament. Panebianco

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finds that the presence of “an external ‘sponsor’” can be detrimental for a party, as it will affect the leadership’s legitimacy. Oligarchs work on behalf of the party as the party represents their interests, but a question arises over what extent the money these businessmen invest buys them favorable decisions that party officials would not otherwise find to be in the best interest of the party.

The absence of state funding for political parties combined with insufficient membership fee payments and the failure of state agencies to investigate party funding creates a party structure that leads leadership to seek financial backing, typically from oligarchs. Media reports found that before the 2007 parliamentary election, BYuT along with the two other major political parties – Party of Regions and Our Ukraine-People’s Self-defense Bloc – were each sponsored by at least one billionaire and multiple other donors whose capital surpasses $300 million (Delo cited in Razumkov Centre, 2009, p. 9). The result is the “‘oligarchisation’ of party policy in Ukraine” (Razumkov Centre, 2009, p. 10). The proportional system of voting in place since the 2002 parliamentary election has voters vote for parties, not actual candidates, which then allows party leaders to choose candidates themselves. Oligarchs holding positions in parliament are able to vote strategically to protect their positions; as Sergey Taruta, Tymoshenko supporter and chairman of ISD Corporation, posits “We [the oligarchs] see that the government is split with each political grouping controlling separate branches of government for personal gain… Some leading business groups are actively involved in [politicians' battles], manipulating the political situation for personal gain” (Wagstyl and Oleachyk, 2010). A public opinion poll carried out in 2010 by the Razumkov Center found that over half those polled, 64.3%, believed that the majority of political parties in Ukraine served the interests of financial and business structures (Razumkov Centre, 2010, p. 19).

Yet, as Tomsa (2008) similarly found in his study of Indonesia, this link between business and politics does not directly translate to a lack of decisional autonomy as it is not apparent that the party falls under the influence of this business elite. For there to be a lack of decisional autonomy Batkivshchyna would have to make decisions that are influenced by money politics and not made autonomously by the party’s leadership. Batkivshchyna, and BYuT generally, have a complicated linkage with oligarchs and it extends to compromised decision-making. On May 14, 2009, Ukrainska
Pravda reported oligarch influence in the Verkhovna Rada when an open bid to rebuild Lviv’s airport was cancelled on the orders of Tymoshenko who then awarded the contract to Azovintex, a company owned by one of her strongest economic backers - Serhiy Taruta. In the same year, Tymoshenko also awarded key government positions to other sponsoring oligarchs - Serhiy Buriak was appointed the head of Tax Administration and Valeriy Khoroshkovskyi became Head of Customs. This is an example of Batkivshchyna’s weak decisional autonomy specifically because it illustrates the collusion of business and state, which the party claims to oppose in their party program. While it was in the state’s interest to hold an open bid for the Lviv airport, this was cancelled by Batkivshchyna so that the contract could be granted to, and thus benefit, one of their financial supporters. Because Batkivshchyna is highly dependent on oligarchic backing and has allowed policy-making and government positions to be influenced by the business elite, the party can be classified as weakly institutionalized, receiving a score of one, in the dimension of decisional autonomy.

d. Reification

Huntington (1968, p. 423) posits, the higher the average age of parties, the more likely they will institutionalize and contribute to a stable party system. Batkivshchyna is only 15 years old, and while this is a formidable age for a Ukrainian political party, it is not a long enough period of time to measure reification. A party’s public image is critical, and since the Orange Revolution Batkivshchyna has capitalized off of Tymoshenko’s personal image, as a Ukrainian folk princess who will preserve an independent Ukraine, to build a lasting place in voters’ minds. It should be noted, though, this transformation of Tymoshenko into the 19th century Ukrainian poetess Lesya Ukrainka, with her blonde-dyed hair and braided crown (Bloom and Shulman, 2011), is more show than substance. Tymoshenko rose in popularity during the Orange Revolution and her party/namesake bloc are therefore embedded with the symbolism of Ukrainian national identity and democracy.21 Batkivshchyna’s pre-electoral pamphlet distributed prior to the 2006 election stated,

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21 However, Tymoshenko’s “Ukrainianness” is often questioned by the opposition. Her maiden name Grygian is usually of Armenian origin and her father has Latvian roots dating back ten generations (Kis, 2007). Her mother’s family, however, is Ukrainian from Dnipropetrovsk dating back ten generations, and she grew up speaking only Russian.
“Yulia Tymoshenko is the first woman since Princess Olga to run the Ukrainian government” (Kis, 2007). This message’s intention was to reaffirm her Ukrainian identity and status as legitimate leader of an independent, democratic Ukrainian state by drawing a historical reference which would resonate with Batkivshchyna’s main constituency of former Orange supporters in western and central Ukraine.

A problem for Batkivshchyna, and all leader-driven parties, as concerns reification is the entanglement of Tymoshenko’s identity with the party, which obscures actual party strength and its ability to endure. As Tymoshenko has not yet retired from politics, or stepped down within Batkivshchyna, it is difficult to assess to what degree the party is institutionalized. However, public opinion data signals that the party does display some elements of reification. In their near-annual public opinion surveys, IFES asks respondents “which party best represents the interests of people like you?” or “are you a supporter of any political party, even if you are not a member of it?” Batkivshchyna stand out as one of only two parties that consistently received over a one percent response rate between 2001 and 2012, the other which is the Communist Party of Ukraine.22 Though it is difficult to draw any concrete conclusions as concerns reification until Tymoshenko leaves the party, Batkivshchyna is considered moderately institutionalized, receiving a score of two. The reason for this classification is because the party has maintained (1) a largely positive public image despite its failures as part of the Orange coalition, and (2) a high level of support for over a decade, making it one of Ukraine’s longest serving parties in parliament.

3. **Party of Regions (PR)**

The 2004 presidential elections led to eventual democratic breakthrough in Ukraine. However, in the eight years that followed the country witnessed multiple failed governments, the jailing of one Orange Revolution opposition leader, and the virtual demise of the pro-democratic Our Ukraine party. While the opposition parties that championed Ukraine’s short-lived democratic triumph have struggled, one party continued to stand strong and win elections up through 2012 – Party of Regions (PR). While it was corruption among PR leaders and members that incited a sea of

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22 All IFES public opinion surveys can be found at http://www.ifes.org/countries/Ukraine.aspx.
Orange-clad demonstrators to take to the streets of Kyiv and protest on behalf of democracy, PR’s strong party organization, popular pro-industry identity, and oligarchic backing translate into high levels of party institutionalization. This has provided PR a lasting place in politics and allowed the party to temporarily halt Ukraine’s democratic development.

a. **Systemness**

A party’s origins shape what it becomes and the political role it plays. PR is a successor party to the Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine (PRRU), which was founded in 1997, and has close ties with the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU), as they traditionally share strong support in eastern Ukraine and PR supporters are largely ex-KPU voters (Kuzio, 2011a, p. 223). PR inherited PRRU’s highly centralized party structure and their party program found on their website, in Ukrainian, outlines the role of local and regional party organizations and states that they are to operate under the Charter and Program of the Party of Regions. The program further calls for mandatory party meetings or conferences and outlines the structure of the party organizations at the primary, local, and regional levels. The various governing bodies and parties are described in detail as well as their duties, which demonstrates the efforts that went into party building. As of late 2013, Party of Regions had the most party members of any party in Ukraine, with an estimated one million four hundred thousand members – or every 32nd Ukrainian. A defining feature of PR is its distinct regional identity as a party hailing from the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine with a strong industrial base. Following the Orange Revolution, PR saw its support drop by half in western and central Ukraine though it doubled in the south. (See TABLE V) With the 2012 parliamentary election, the party has regained its pre-Orange Revolution support in the west, though southern and eastern Ukraine remains the party’s strongholds.
TABLE V. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY OF REGIONS'* SUPPORT, 2002-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data for 2002 refers to votes cast for United Ukraine bloc, which Party of Regions was a part

Source: 2002 election data from D’Anieri (2007, p. 108); Ukrainian Central Election Commission
data 2006-2012, author’s calculation

Note: See TABLE IV for regional breakdown of oblasts. Totals may not equal 100 percent due to
rounding.

While the party program depicts PR as a highly disciplined, efficient party, its activities
reveal a ‘party of power’ looking to couple party with state as it was during the Soviet Union (Kuzio,
2012, p. 432). PR has undergone changes in leadership, though the majority of PR’s tenure in
government has seen Viktor Yanukovych – a pro-Russian, authoritarian-like figure, with a criminal
record in his youth – at the helm. After being elected president, leadership of PR was transferred
back to Prime Minister Azarov (PR’s leader from 2001-2003), though Yanukovych was granted the
title of Honorary Leader of the Party. PR’s strong leadership is not a result of Yanukovych’s
charisma, but his commitment to regional interests – local oligarchs and the pro-Russian agenda.
After being elected President in 2010, Yanukovych filled his administration with officials possessing
disreputable pasts that formerly worked under President Leonid Kuchma and half his cabinet
descends from only one region, Donetsk, which happens to be PR’s stronghold (Kuzio, 2010, p. 208).
The leader-party relationship within PR does not resemble that found in any other Ukrainian party, as
it operates according to machine politics that stem from the Donbas region. PR runs efficiently,
maintains high levels funding, and retained consistent levels of voter support through 2012 precisely
because it functioned as a machine. PR is not held together by strong ideological ties or charismatic
leadership; rather common interests in obtaining and holding office as well as making sure income is
distributed among its leaders and major supporters cement the party, which is detailed in its party
program. As PR rose to power in Donetsk, it became a party of oligarchs and a type of patronage – clan politics – defines its operations.

Typically, oligarchs are quick to shift allegiances among parties to advance their interests. However, there are exceptions to this. Some regions such as Donetsk are home to immensely powerful, and wealthy clans that routinely support the regional governing party - Party of Regions. Party of Regions follows a regionalist-based ideology to a greater degree than other parties, such as Batkivshchyna, uniquely allowing it to benefit from the clans’ unwavering support. In 2012, every second MP in PR was a businessman, the majority of which were notable oligarchs (Semenova, 2012, p. 10). The oligarchs in Donetsk are known to be quite loyal and PR has enjoyed their strong support, particularly the patronage of Rinat Akhmetov. Akhmetov is the founder and President of System Management Capital, owner of Segodnya newspaper, as well as owner of the premier Ukrainian football club Shakhtar Donetsk. He is the richest man in Ukraine and as of March 2013, was ranked by Forbes as the 47th wealthiest man in the world.23 His capital has made him a principal financial base for PR and he has twice (2006-2007 and 2007-2012) been seated in the Verkhovna Rada as an MP for the Party of Regions, where he heavily lobbied for his own interests (Matuszak, 2012, p. 26). Additionally, half of PR’s MPs are believed to be people linked to Akhmetov. PR’s entanglement with clan politics is well known and has played a leading role in strengthening the party’s organization. When Yanukovych took over as President in February 2010, he soon went about forming a government that was full of business elites representing around nine different oligarchic groups (Åslund, 2012). However, after about a year in power, the oligarchic groups in Yanukovych’s government were reduced to two – Akhmetov’s ‘Donetsk clan’ and Dmytro Firtash’s RUE group (Matuszak, 2012, p. 17-18).24 Ukraine is not unique, however, and Di Mascio (2014, p. 679) finds that patronage has been key in the strengthening of southern European party organizations. Italy offers an interesting comparison, as extreme levels of party colonization of the state, led to high

24 The name RUE refers to the oligarchic group representing the RosUkrEnergo gas trade company, which was founded in 2004 and has since become the most pro-Russian group in the Ukrainian business and political elite. Specifically connected to it are Dymtro Firtash, Serhiy Lyovochin, and Yuriy Boyko.
levels of corruption in the early 1990s and an eventual party system breakdown. The continuation of patronage in Italy following this democratic crisis highlighted that historical legacies effect party institutionalization. In Ukraine, parties have had to try and construct democratic, accountable organizations in the face of an inherited Soviet ‘patrimonial’ political culture (Kuzio, 2005; Van Zon, 2001). Di Mascio (2014) claims that only substantive changes to the weaknesses of state bureaucracies that allow state capture can remedy the shortcomings of the party system.

Clan politics keep Ukrainian political parties financed, as oligarchic backing is necessary for operation – particularly election campaigns. PR’s core electorate is largely working class and public service workers, which are not in positions to provide adequate member dues and contributions to fund party activities; therefore, big business makes up the financial base. These oligarchs do not make up a homogenous group and are in constant competition with one another to influence policy and government. Akhmetov is the largest financial supporter of PR, as the RUE group is financially weaker. This does leave PR with two different major business groups to satisfy, which led Yanukovych to attempt to gain some independence from his oligarchic support base. He replaced many of the old oligarchs with a loyal group of people with personal connections to him and his family. Yanukovych’s interests in government were specifically represented by his two sons - Oleksandr who was in charge of business and Viktor who has been an elected MP for PR since 2006 (Matuszak, 2012, p. 41). Though not completely at the mercy of the oligarchs, PR particularly lacks financial independence due to the deep penetration of business elites in PR as both elected MPs and appointed government officials. While this culture of clan politics is currently the norm and accepted by most parties, survey results by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation conducted before the 2012 parliamentary election show that the public does support and believe in finding alternative means of party financing. Findings show that 6% of Ukrainian voters are willing to pay party dues to support political parties in an amount of nearly 1,500 UAH (180 USD) annually. Even if this six percent came only from those currently employed it would still be enough to finance a few powerful parties that would be able to operate free of oligarchic influence (“Taming the oligarchy,” 2013).
The Party of Regions boasts mixed results when it comes to institutionalization in the dimension of systemness, and receives a score of two. Effort was put into party building, but it largely took over where the communist party left off. It has since become a strong, region-based, political machine in eastern Ukraine that has seen changes in leadership, but possesses little to no internal democracy and is entrenched with clan politics.

b. **Value infusion**

Party of Regions’ party program has been revised three times – in 1998, 2001, and 2008. With these changes have come changes to its ideology. According to the evolution of PR and its party program, the party has moved from defining itself as neoliberal when it was founded, in the direction of corporatism with socially populist electoral views (Kononchuk and Yarosh, 2013). Schmitter (1974, p. 93-94) defines corporatism,

> as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, ... hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.

While traditional political ideology has been discarded, patronage has become an inherent part of PR. The party explicitly explains in its party program that it is looking to provide all forms of state resources to its current and prospective members.25 The 2008 party program does contain a specific definition of party ideology; PR claims to stand for “political centrism” and the “consolidation of the Ukrainian polity” (author’s translation). However, while it promotes itself as a centrist party, as do most parties in Ukraine, it is associated with the European Socialists.

Clearer than the party’s stated ideological foundation is its regional identity, just as its name suggest. The party was founded on a common goal to promote business and regional interests in south-eastern Ukraine, not a shared set of beliefs for a certain political or economic social order. While the party has evolved in its ideological stance, the party remains an expert in rhetoric. Yanukovych and his men knew how to employ messages about upgrading the status of the Russian

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25 Party program can be found in Ukrainian at http://elektorat.te.ua (accessed November 17, 2013).
language to lure in left-wing voters in south-eastern Ukraine while simultaneously preaching about budgetary discipline and actively protecting the interests of private big business, which is characteristic of mainstream right-wing politicians (Ritter, 2012). PR became nothing more than a vehicle for oligarchs, namely the Yanukovych family, to accumulate power and dispense patronage. This identity replaced a clear ideological base and is derived from broader territorial fragmentation and clan politics. Party of Regions is perhaps better known for what it stands against than what it stands for, which is western Ukrainian nationalism. PR’s identity has been about big business and increasingly Yanukovych himself, though under the guise of promoting ethnic Russian rights. While its pro-Russian tendencies and anti-Ukrainian nationalism do impart a sense of identity, the party is ideological void and only moderately institutionalized, receiving a score of two, in terms of value infusion.

c. **Decisional autonomy**

Autonomy from external, or in the case of FSU republics internal, influence is impossible for a party like PR where oligarchs finance the party, belong to the party, and hold appointments within the party. The party was founded based on the idea of protecting the business interests of those in the Donbas region of Ukraine. As these interests are imbedded within the party, there becomes a question of when PR is pursuing policy independently and when is it making policy for its financiers – notably Rinat Akhmetov and Dmytro Firtash (Matuszak, 2012, p. 26 & 50).

Firtash’s gas company was near defunct when Yanukovych came to power in 2010, as it could no longer import gas from Russia. State-controlled Naftogaz had direct supply contracts with Russian Gazprom that monopolized the market. Despite the fact these contracts extended until 2019, Yanukovych’s government canceled them in 2011 allowing Firtash to reenter the gas import market and purchase gas at lower prices than those that were offered to Naftogaz (Matuszak, 2012, p. 52). While all of this had negative impacts on Ukraine’s financial condition, it was of immense financial benefit to PR supporter, Firtash. Additionally, in 2013 PR passed legislation that would offer large tax cuts to corporations and entire segments of the economy and industries deemed ‘preferred.’
‘Preferred’ groups would be determined by the Cabinet of Minister, which at the time PR controlled (Open Society Foundation, 2013, p. 16).

While it is clear that PR’s decisions are influenced by its business interests, this does not go against the party’s stated aims as found in its program. The party references taking care of it own, and as its members are businessmen the party’s actions are in line with its goals. Still, many of the decisions made under Yanukovych raised concerns over whether they were in the party’s interest or his own personal interest. Since Yanukovych’s departure from politics in spring 2014, two non-governmental organization, PEP Watch and the Anticorruption Action Center, traced financial deals and assets of Ukraine’s inner circle to multiple shell companies in various countries – attesting to corrupt dealings of the president’s administration (Khmara, 2014). Amassing millions by syphoning money from the Ukrainian government goes beyond using state resources to protect business ventures, it is pillaging pure and simple. Evidence of such corruption means that at this time, PR can only be considered moderately institutionalized, receiving a score of two, in the dimension of decisional autonomy.

d. **Reification**

Party of Regions stands in a unique position regarding reification and its place in the Ukrainian political landscape. PR stood to loose a lot in terms of voter support and oligarchic backing following the Orange Revolution when the party was at the center of electoral scandal surrounding the 2004 presidential election. Regardless of those events, the party went on to win the most seats of any party in the 2006, 2007, and 2012 parliamentary elections as well as winning the 2010 presidential election. According to annual IFES public opinion polling in Ukraine between 2001 and 2012, Party of Regions received the highest average response rate in terms of which party best represents the interests of the people. Symbolically, PR stands for regional political and business interests in south-eastern Ukraine and this has allowed it to cultivate a strong, stable support base. The motto of the party according to its website is “Powerful Regions! Strong State! Prosperous People!” which echoes the party’s identity and policy platforms.

26 All surveys can be found at http://www.ifes.org/countries/Ukraine.aspx
Party of Regions, while often criticized for its dealings with oligarchs and pro-Russian agenda, is a permanent party in Ukrainian politics for the foreseeable future because it remains true to its regional roots and has no regional competition. The pro-western and/or nationalist parties – Batkivshchyna, UDAR, Svoboda – are fractured, so even when they do ally there are still fundamental differences that prevent the parties from acting in complete harmony. In the end, these three parties compete with each other, which splits the anti-PR votes. Following the Euromaidan uprisings of 2013-2014, PR’s popularity suffered particularly as a result of Yanukovych’s orders to fire upon protestors. The party was not oblivious to this though, and in a surprising effort of self-preservation, PR denounced former President Yanukovych after he fled Ukraine and did not contest the early 2014 presidential elections. While Yanukovych maybe done with Ukrainian politics, it does not appear PR will go down with him. The Party of Regions is institutionalized in the dimension of reification, receiving a score of three, which highlights the fact that in Eastern Europe commitment to democratic principals is not a pre-requisite for long-term party success.

4. Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform – UDAR

The Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform was registered in its current name with the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on June 7, 2010, however, it is the legal successor to the Political Party ‘European Capital’ founded in 2005 (renamed New Country in 2009). UDAR was founded a few months prior, arising out of the Vitaliy Klychko Bloc – a local Kyiv political alliance. Vitaliy Klychko, a champion heavyweight boxer, was involved heavily in Ukrainian politics since 2004 when he came out in support of the Orange Revolution. Soon after, the world champion athlete began his own political career in Kyiv in 2006. Klychko met with success in Kyiv’s municipal elections and was elected Mayor of Kyiv in May 2014. It was in 2010 though, that UDAR truly began to carve out a political place for itself as a party, winning 400 representatives in municipalities and oblast councils. By the 2012 parliamentary election, UDAR was ready to compete nationally and won 40 of the 450 seats.
a. **Systemness**

UDAR was the youngest party to win seats in the *Verkhovna Rada* in the 2012 parliamentary elections, but it has established itself as a well organized party in this relatively short time. While there are those who speculate Klychko’s fame, attractiveness, or familiarity has contributed to UDAR’s rapid success, it is the attention that was paid to party building that has most benefited the organization (Rachkevych, 2012). Klychko used his athlete status and network of powerful contacts in the West, which he accumulated during years of competing and traveling, to build a party according to a Western European model. The Konrad-Adenauer Foundation in Germany was one of the primary consultants. The Adenauer Foundation continued to advise Klychko for years, arranging meetings between him and senior German advisors and answering general questions on party building (“The Boxer’s Punch,” 2012). One area UDAR has achieved extreme success, particularly in contrast to its opposition, is in avoiding public infighting between party members. The party was built from the bottom-up and has established a team of experts that respect each other’s position within the organization and ability to carry out necessary functions. As UDAR began on the municipal level, it is interested in slow change at all levels of government that will create long-term benefits, and it is this type of organized politics that will likely translate into political longevity for the party.

Leader-party relationship is complicated when analyzing UDAR. There is an innate power of Klychko’s personality as he is a world champion athlete – arguably Ukraine’s most accomplished and well-known athletic export. He is the leader of UDAR, the face of the party, and as will be discussed, a primary benefactor. Klychko’s power as party leader is more symbolic at the national level, than as dictator of party activities at all levels. Part of Klychko’s political success with UDAR is organized party-building. UDAR has focused on strengthening the party at the local level so as to impact policy-making regionally as well as nationally. According to statistic on their website, as of mid-2012 UDAR has 596 active party organizations and 399 deputies of local councils at various

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27 Author’s interview with UDAR party representatives in Kyiv, June 2013.
levels in 15 of Ukraine’s 24+3 regions.\textsuperscript{28} According to personal interviews with party representatives in Kyiv during June 2013, half of the heads of the regional organizations in each oblast are MPs, which the party claims is strategic so to bring more effective political change that will reach the people. MPs are committed to maintaining their visibility at city council meetings and during local elections to build public trust in the party as a strong, political organization not just Klychko’s pet-project. UDAR performs better than most Ukrainian parties as concerns territorial diffusion, and the 2012 parliamentary election illustrated that the party has somewhat similar levels of support in all regions, though it is a bit weaker in the west. (See TABLE VI) This is a real accomplishment, as it distinguishes UDAR from all other parties in Ukraine and may be the key to long-term success.

\textbf{TABLE VI. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES CAST FOR UDAR IN 2012 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>East</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>South</th>
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<td></td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Source:} Ukrainian Central Election Commission data 2006-2012, author’s calculation

\textit{Note:} See TABLE IV for regional breakdown of oblasts. Totals may not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

As a relatively new party, UDAR is not entrenched in clan politics to the same degree as Batkivshchyna and PR. It is impossible to partake in Ukrainian politics, however, without there being interaction with some of the well known financial giants. UDAR has been the subject of speculation that asserts the party has relationships with oligarchic circles, be it directly or peripherally. In particular, the party has been questioned about party members Roman Chernega and Yuriy Savchuk who are supposedly close with oligarch Ihor Kolomoiskiy (Lyelich, 2012). Additionally, claims surfaced that the party is close with Serhiy Kunitsyn who is close with oligarch Dmytro Firtash, and a former representative of Yanukovych in Crimea (Lyelich, 2012). Klychko admits that some of its

\textsuperscript{28} 24+3 references Ukraine’s 24 oblasts, the autonomous region of Crimea, and two cities with special status – Kyiv and Sevastopol.
candidates for MPs in the 2012 parliamentary election belonged to various businessmen’s entourages, however that it is a matter of “someone [being] familiar with someone” and not any indication that UDAR had fallen prey to oligarchic influence (“Klitschko: UDAR’s…,” 2012). Still, the future holds much to be seen as concerns UDAR and oligarchic penetration.

Part of Klychko’s appeal to voters is that he built himself up through athletics and therefore comes from “honest money.” He is not an “organic” part of the political system and therefore offers hope of cleaner Ukrainian politics. The party asserts that Klychko himself is one of the major financial backers of the party with local branches providing funding for campaigning. As opposed to turning to business elites for financial support, UDAR appeals to younger voters as well as small and medium size businesses, which fits the party’s image as representative of the middle class. However, with speculation about oligarchic ties comes conjecture about party funding. While there is no evidence that UDAR has accepted any financing from oligarchs, there are claims that some financial support was less than “honest money.” Specifically, there are questions about Klychko’s friends and party members Artur Palatnyi and Pavlo Rjabkin having past mafia ties (Lyelich, 2012). While such claims are nothing more than conjecture at this time, UDAR does have extreme pressure on it to maintain its Western style of “clean” politics and not become another political cover for oligarchs.

UDAR is a well developed, quickly growing party that is represented at various levels of government. Additionally, it carries support in all regions and continues to expand its regional offices. The party possesses strong leadership, is financially healthy, and has largely remained free of clan politics. The party is considered highly institutionalized in the dimension of systemness, receiving a score of three.

b. **Value infusion**

Not all of UDAR’s party program is well articulated, but on certain issues the party does clearly state its goals. As explained in the party program, UDAR strongly stands for the transformation of Ukraine, which is based on people’s self-reliance where the state is there to serve the people but is restrained in their actions by law. Furthermore, the state is to be controlled by
an active civil society and held accountable via free and fair elections. On the political spectrum, UDAR is a liberal democratic party. Similar to most parties in Ukraine, UDAR lacks a strong ideological base opting instead for moderate, centrism without radical political or economic beliefs. While the party is relatively young in comparison to the others with which it shares power, it developed out of the Klychko Foundation, a community service organization set up to assist children and adolescents in Ukraine, and therefore inherited certain political norms aimed at “transforming Ukrainian social values.” The Klychko Foundation’s strong ties with European organizations such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation led UDAR to also develop meaningful relationships with Western groups such as the Christian Democratic Union in Germany. The party additionally holds observer status of European People’s Party. Such ties have fostered a true pro-Western/European value system within UDAR that amounts to more than the personality politics that structure parties like Batkivshchyna. The problem with UDAR’s ideological base is that it may rest too broadly on democratic ideals as opposed to specific political and economic principles that will shape policy-making in years to come.

UDAR’s identity as a pro-European party is more indicative of the political values most important to those who lead and belong to the party than its strong ideological agenda. Klychko himself is symbolic of this identity, having spent a large part of his life in Western Europe and speaking multiple languages to a proficient degree – Ukrainian, Russian, English, German. The party is not free of charismatic politics however, and capitalizes off Klychko’s persona to attract supporters. UDAR’s web address is klichko.org and the boxer’s photos abound on the webpage. Despite the fame of its leader, UDAR appeals not to the Ukrainian elites but to a somewhat politically neglected segment of Ukrainian society, the middle class. While Batkivshchyna and PR are often seen as working for the oligarchs who fund them, UDAR has positioned itself as a catchall for the working class. UDAR noted that there is a new generation growing in Ukraine that orients itself toward the West, is moving away from socialist ideals, and looking for changes as regards the country’s future –

29 Author’s summary and translation. Party program can be found in Ukrainian at http://klichko.org/about/programma/ (accessed October 20, 2013).
this is who they as a party seek to identify with and represent. Ideologically UDAR lacks a solid foundation, but it does posses genuine pro-European values aimed at the middle class. Until Klychko’s organization partakes in more national elections though, it is difficult to determine whether the party will succumb to populist tactics aimed merely at power hoarding. Currently it can only be assessed as weakly institutionalized, receiving a score of one, in the dimension of value infusion.

c. **Decisional autonomy**

Decisional autonomy is difficult to measure as UDAR has a short record in parliament. UDAR’s party program, as uploaded to its website as of August 2013, highlights the social transformation that is at the center of the party’s value system. It discusses development of Ukraine as a democratic country, establishment of a social market economy, ensuring the rule of law, and placing priority on civil rights and liberties. UDAR has drafted bills that are aimed at making policy that fits with such values, despite criticism from the major parties Batkivshchyna and PR. For example, in mid-2013 UDAR proposed bill No. 2508a which would drastically increase the freedoms of peaceful assembly in Ukraine, decreasing the time notice must be submitted before the demonstration and narrowing the scope for injunctions of the peaceful assembly (“УДАР предложил…,” 2013). UDAR is drafting policy in support of creating a more democratic Ukraine, however, much of this aims at rights and freedoms leaving important issues such as economic reform and foreign policy neglected. UDAR’s attempt to bring Ukraine’s civil liberties closer to Western standards is laudable, but the actions of party members have been too narrowly focused on broad improvements to democratic governance without addressing the tangible everyday needs of citizens.

UDAR is not an oligarchic creation, which creates optimism, but it is a minority party that has less overall influence on policy-making. UDAR’s short record in parliament does not allow for conclusive findings on decisional autonomy, though at this point in time the party demonstrates at least moderate levels of institutionalization, receiving a score of two.
d. **Reification**

No conclusions concerning reification can be made at this time as UDAR is an untested political force, but some points can be drawn concerning the party’s capacity to create a lasting image that will resonate with voters. As a new party that was not part of the Orange coalition, which is largely considered to have failed, it can position itself as a new power led by respectable Vitaliy Klychko. Viktor Yanukovych was able to not just win the 2010 presidential elections, but see his Party of Regions take the 2012 parliamentary elections in large part because of the disenchantment with the Orange coalition forces- Our Ukraine and Batkivshchyna – after their failure to deliver democracy to Ukraine. While Klychko himself supported the Orange Revolution, UDAR did not exist at the time and therefore the party had no political ties with the movement. UDAR does not have to work against any past failures, and as Klychko is considered a responsible, Ukrainian legend, the party has some built-in legitimacy. Additionally, the party’s acronymic name, *UDAR*, means “punch” or “hit” in Ukrainian, which is symbolic of the champion leading it.

As the only political party to offer a European perspective for Ukraine’s future, UDAR offers genuine values as concerns democratic governance and freedom that will attract younger voters. UDAR has also invested time and resources into shaping itself into a genuine European party, which is witnessed in its pro-European and anti-corruption agenda. In a 2012 public opinion poll conducted by the Razumkov Centre, 48% of Ukrainians felt that Ukraine needs to join the European Union, as opposed to only 29% who disagreed. UDAR is the most pro-European political party holding seats in the Ukrainian parliament and therefore has the potential to attract a new generation of Ukrainian voters that are beginning to desire a more European-Ukraine.

5. **All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda**

Despite winning seats in the *Verkhovna Rada* for the first time in the 2012 parliamentary election, *Svoboda* is one of the oldest, well known political parties in Ukraine that has long made headlines at home and abroad. *Svoboda* is a right-wing, nationalist party that is often

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labeled xenophobic and anti-Semitic by academics, journalists, and its political opponents. *Svoboda* is an easy target for criticism as it is one of the only political parties in Ukraine with a strong ideological base centered on Ukrainian nationalism, anti-corruption, and social justice. While the party has developed a more moderate platform since it was founded in the early 1990s, key party officials, such as party leader Oleh Tyahnybok, are seen as too polarizing for mainstream politics. The party’s radical nature and strong convictions are what has brought it increasing success, made it the target of vitriol, and propelled it to be one of the most institutionalized parties in Ukraine.³¹

a. **Systemness**

Formerly known as the Social National Party of Ukraine (SNPU), *Svoboda* was founded in 1991 in Lviv. The party was created in opposition to other parties at the time, which were espousing communist ideology. *Svoboda* formed from the unification of political activists and nationalistic organizations – such as Varta Rukhu, the Spadshchyna, and the Ukrainian Veterans of Afghanistan – endowing *Svoboda* with high levels of party organization. *Svoboda* was formed from below developing out of a certain set of ideas and beliefs rather than from above as a personal vehicle for political success. It relied upon human resources as opposed to monetary ones and is the best example of a grass-roots organization in Ukrainian politics. The party has experienced a change in leadership with the original party leader being replaced by Oleh Tyahnybok in 2004, when the party officially changed its name to *Svoboda*. Additionally, Tyahnybok was elected which demonstrates high levels of party organization where leadership is not assumed or immobile.

*Svoboda*’s party make-up also differs from others in that the majority of leading party figures are less than 40 years of age and lack political experience. While the lack of experience does put the party at a disadvantage, their youthfulness gives them time to prove themselves and accomplish real goals instead of being power hungry life-long politicians willing to jump parties for the right appointment. *Svoboda* started with local political ambitions, participating at the municipal level and first achieving success in the Lviv oblast council elections. As western Ukraine is typically more

nationalistic, the party soon saw its support expand along the western border to the Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts. While *Svoboda* does lack territorial reach due to its anti-Russian, nationalistic foundations, it has developed a strong, unwavering support system in west Ukraine with over 15,000 members as of 2013. The party currently participates in all types of elections, including presidential, though most of the party’s success still rests in local politics.

Oleh Tyahnybok, party leader of *Svoboda*, is considered to be quite charismatic, however, his charisma is not centered on his personal character but the party’s ultra-nationalist beliefs, which he espouses. The leader - party relationship functions within boundaries; Tyahnybok has maintained his position as party leader through bi-annual elections which he has won since 2004, though he is the de-facto face of the party. However, it has been claimed that Tyahnybok has consolidated power in his own hands and exerted full control over the party since becoming leader (Shekhovtsov, 2011, p. 215). The challenge for *Svoboda* as concerns leader-party relationship is that the leadership’s charisma often amplifies the party’s already controversial principals. While the party has moved towards a more moderate party platform, leadership has a history of using inflammatory speech. Indeed it was notorious anti-Semitic and anti-Russian statements that got *Svoboda* ejected from Viktor Yushchenko’s “Our Ukraine” parliamentary faction in 2004. *Svoboda* also has strong leadership at the various political levels. It was not until 2009 that *Svoboda* gained national popularity; previously its success came strictly in the form of municipal electoral victories. As of 2013, *Svoboda* has factions in eight of Ukraine’s 25 regional oblast councils and is the leading faction in three. The party’s dominance in western Ukraine has even allowed them to push through local policies that represent their controversial party program – such as initiating pension payments for local veterans of the SS Galicia division (Ehrenfeld, 2013).

*Svoboda* stands alone among Ukrainian parties when it comes to disassociation from oligarchs. A major tenant of the party’s program is social justice and anti-corruption. While other parties count oligarchs among their largest financial supporters who routinely hold seats in parliament, *Svoboda* distances itself from these ties even though it comes with financial burden. The

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32 Author’s interview with *Svoboda* party representatives in Kyiv, June 2013.
party has, however, benefited from clan politics. *Svoboda’s* rise in popularity in the late 2000s came in part as a result of the increased amount of media coverage that Tyahnybok and other party members received. In the run-up to the 2010 presidential election, media outlets such as television channels like *Inter* and *TRK Ukraina*, blocked the opposition’s access (Shekhotsov, 2011, p. 260). Media censorship specifically targeted *Batkivshchyna* and Yatsynuk’s Front of Changes. These media outlets are under the sphere of influence of oligarchs close to the Party of Regions, notably Valeriy Khoroshkovskyi the former Vice Prime Minister and Rinat Akhmetov a PR deputy (Shekhotsov, 2011, p. 260). These anti-democratic tactics were meant to cut the public off from the opposition, but as *Svoboda* was not considered a threat at the time, the party rocketed to national recognition as it was given mass amounts of airtime. As political entertainment programs on *TRK Ukraina* and *Inter*, like “Shuster Live” and “Big Politics,” relied upon politicians to take part in political discussion, *Svoboda* leaders were routinely invited despite their marginal political status at the time because it was not a threat to the ruling Party of Regions.

Funding is an area where *Svoboda* is rather weak, as it does not have similar oligarchic backing as other parties. Furthermore, membership is lower than other parties and therefore even if membership fees were routinely paid, they would still not be able to provide for the party’s financial needs. *Svoboda* notes on their website that in 2006 the party established an economic council that consists of representatives of small and medium size businesses, most of whom are party members, which provide the majority of the financial support for the organization. By attracting the mid-size businesses, the party maintains a financial independence and avoids reliance upon oligarchic elites. However, *Svoboda* stands at a clear fiscal disadvantage compared to other political parties in Ukraine. Additionally, *Svoboda* has not managed to evade all speculation concerning oligarchic sponsorship. Media has whether the western Ukrainian oil and gas giant, Ihor Kolomoysky, has financially supported the party or if Party of Regions itself has funded *Svoboda* in an effort to shore up the right-wing party in hopes they will split the opposition vote in turn weakening *Batkivshchyna*. If the party continues to grow and expand its support base, funding will increase as well, however,
the party needs to drastically shore-up its financial “health” if it is to campaign as effectively as other parties.

*Svoboda* stands in a much better position than some other parties where it concerns levels of *systemness*. *Svoboda* is considered highly institutionalized, receiving a score of three. The party has a well-defined organization and attention was given to party building. *Svoboda* impressively operates free of oligarchic influence but this dramatically limits its financial resources which it will have to increase if it is to expand its voter base.

b. **Value infusion**

Save for the Communist Party of Ukraine, *Svoboda* is the only Ukrainian political party that has a clear, well-articulated, ideological base. The Socialist National Party of Ukraine was founded on a belief system stemming from the book “Two Revolutions” by Yaroslav Stetsko, leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. As *Svoboda* outlines on their website, the concept of a nation, a community ‘bound by blood and spirit’ is central to the party and acts as the grounds on which the party excludes atheists and former communist party members. Far from just being rhetoric, *Svoboda* creates its party platform in line with its beliefs. The party created two party programs, in 2004 and 2011. A main focus of the party’s ideology is ethno-identity. In 2006, *Svoboda* focused their ideological efforts and created a ‘Program for the Protection of Ukrainians’ that consisted of seven points focused generally on the genocide of Ukrainians in the 20th century, recognition and gratitude to OUN-UPA (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Insurgent Army respectively), the protection of the Ukrainian language, free media, Ukrainian energy independence and security, social justice, right to homeland and state security, and preserving national identity. This eloquent program highlights what is at the heart of the party – nationalism. However, *Svoboda* has also referenced at times, for instance in their 2012 parliamentary election program, the return to state control of electric, gas, heat, and water enterprises, denying the privatization of strategic enterprises, and state control over natural monopolies which is similar to the program of the Communist Party of Ukraine. This emphasis on nationalism and wariness of private ownership signals the party’s tendency towards radicalism.
Most parties in Ukraine do not have ideological foundations and must be understood in terms of their constructed identities. *Svoboda*’s ideology represents the party’s recent trend towards moderation, their identity, however, exposes the party’s controversial character. *Svoboda* is a nationalistic party, and it clearly identifies itself as such. In the party program’s preamble, from 2011, the party explains their ideological goal as “constructing a powerful Ukrainian state founded on social and national justice” (author’s translation). It has been cooperating since 2000 with Euronat – European Association of Nationalistic Parties. However, the party’s first concern is not becoming more European, but to continue its focus on “Ukrainianness.” For instance, *Svoboda* advocates that passports should not just be reflective of citizenship but should document ethnicity. This near obsession with nationalism has led the party to be identified as both anti-Semitic and xenophobic. Particularly harmful have been past comments and statements by party leaders and members. In 2004 while speaking in the Carpathian Mountains at a gravesite of a commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Tyahnybok referred to the “Moscow-Jewish mafia ruling Ukraine” and further used what can be considered derogatory terms to refer to both Russians and Jews – Moskali and Zhydy respectively (Shekhovtsov, 2011).

*Svoboda*’s identity as a radical, nationalist party satisfies a niche in Ukraine’s political landscape. Regardless of what its values consist of, *Svoboda* is consistent both ideologically and in terms of party identity making it institutionalized in term of value infusion, receiving a score of three.

c. **Decisional autonomy**

*Svoboda*, despite being a new player in national politics and occupying only a marginal role, does possess high levels of decisional autonomy in contrast to other Ukrainian parties. *Svoboda* leaders find their nationalist party to be a political alternative to the “crisis of parliamentarianism and seizure of power by the oligarchic clans, who deprived the people of any possibility to influence the processes in the country” (Petrunya, 2008 cited in Shekhovtsov, 2011, p. 220). In a political system where the business elite manipulates politics, *Svoboda* operates with

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33 Party program can be found in Ukrainian at http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/ (accessed April 2, 2014).
minimal amount of oligarchic influence. According to Svoboda party representatives, the party particularly opposes social injustice towards small business and agriculture, something not addressed by other parties. All of the party’s MPs have made their income and a list of assets public, having it published in the “Voice of Ukraine.” The party finds that key to their success is a clear hierarchic structure within the party, where it is elected party officials that control decision-making not oligarchic bank accounts. Yet, Svoboda’s autonomy from oligarchic influence does not exclude the party from policy-making; the party is highly active in parliament and in the first eight months of its holding seats in the Rada it registered 126 bills and 76 draft resolutions, which averages to each deputy drafting 3.4 bills – second only to Batkivshchyna (Svoboda party website, 2013). Svoboda, however, has a limited scope of interest when it comes to policy making. Tyahnybok when seated in parliament as a non-party candidate from 2002-2006 was also active submitting 36 motions for debate, although the majority of them focused solely on rejecting the introduction of Russian as a second official language and 32 of them were rejected (Shekhovtsov, 2011, p. 216). Svoboda has high levels of decisional autonomy, receiving a score of three, as it is not influenced by oligarchs or its politically moderate opposition allies. Still, until the party expands its policy-making agenda to more substantive and less ideologically perceived needs of the public Svoboda is unlikely to increase its levels of support.

d. **Reification**

Out of all the parties holding seats in the parliament as of 2012, Svoboda is the oldest democratic party, having been founded in 1991.\(^\text{34}\) When Svoboda, then SNPU, first ran in the 1998 parliamentary elections as part of the “Fewer Words” bloc, they won only one seat in the Verkhovna Rada, which was assumed by Tyahnybok. This low level of support did not cause SNPU to fade from the public eye and the party used this time to expand their supporters. The party has maintained a presence due to its role in local governance and through the organization of many marches and high-profile events. Undeniably, the party has demonstrated a sense of longevity.

\(^{34}\) I specify “democratic party” as to exclude the Communist Party of Ukraine, which is not considered in this analysis as they do not claim to nor have exhibited any democratic tendencies.
In the early 2000s when the party changed leaders, it also replaced its old party logo of “I + N” that stood for “idea of a nation” as it was considered to have neo-Nazi connotations. This was an attempt by the party to soften its image and expand its appeal. Svoboda’s current logo is a three-fingered hand that is reminiscent of a pro-Ukrainian independence symbol used in demonstrations during the 1980s. The three fingers mimic the Tryzub, or trident, that is the coat of arms of Ukraine. While not necessarily a widely appealing party due to its extremist views on certain topics, Svoboda’s long existence and increase in popularity that led it to enter parliament in 2012 proves it satisfies a political niche. Svoboda is highly institutionalized in the dimension of reification, receiving a score of three. TABLE VII presents a comparative chart of party institutionalization in Ukraine.

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<th>Decisional Autonomy</th>
<th>Reification</th>
<th>Overall</th>
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<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
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<td>Weak-Moderately Institutionalized</td>
</tr>
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<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderately Institutionalized</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDAR</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Moderately Institutionalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svoboda</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Institutionalized</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Party Institutionalization in Georgia

1. Building party culture

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) created an environment in Georgia where parties are not seen as an important component of a vibrant political community. Modern political parties have suffered the backlash from this. United National Movement had tremendous success following the 2003 Rose Revolution and dominated politics in Georgia up until the 2012 parliamentary election. The result of this has been a number of minority parties that are
vying to get their name out there and win seats in government. As Georgian expert, Dr. Alexander Rondeli, explains, “a normal [Georgian] man does not want to belong to any party. He is a Napoleon, thinking ‘why do I need a party?’ He really only wants to belong to the winning party.” Political parties in Georgia are faced with the normal difficulties of trying to institutionalize quickly after decades of communism, but these challenges are only compounded by the fact that party culture just does not exist.

Georgia has a weak party cadre, where too often there is a dominant party and politics in general are more of a one-man show. Few people join Georgian political parties for ideological reasons; rather they join due to charisma and sympathy towards a specific leader. Parties in general need intellectual improvement as there are few experienced, proven politicians in government and parties lack a strong core of skillful people. There is a lack of inflow of the educated, younger generation and opportunism is still too high within parties compared to that in Western democracies. The intellectual level of politicians needs to change so the capability to debate within and between parties increases and extremism declines. In Georgia, parties still see being in opposition as a game of combativeness, where cooperation is tactical and not based on a common vision. Party politics in Georgia needs a balance of forces, as in every democracy. Historically in Georgia, the outgoing party disappears and a new party of power replaces it taking full control of government. Since the 2012 Parliamentary elections, the Georgian party system has demonstrated great growth as outgoing UNM defied tradition and did not dissolve. The following examination of a few political parties – UNM, Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia, the Republican Party – finds that issues of party building, charismatic leadership, stable funding, and weak ideology prevents high levels of party institutionalization (See TABLE VIII). Still, Georgian parties are nearing equal levels of reification to Ukrainian political parties and the Georgian parties are less plagued by clientelism, and hence demonstrate a higher level of decisional autonomy than their counterparts in Ukraine.

### TABLE VIII. LEVELS OF POLITICAL PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN GEORGIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Systemness</th>
<th>Value Infusion</th>
<th>Decisional Autonomy</th>
<th>Reification</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United National Movement</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderately Institutionalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>(Unknown)</td>
<td>Weakly Institutionalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Institutionalized</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2. United National Movement (UNM)

The 2003 Rose Revolution brought the end of an era. With the resignation of Eduard Shevardnadze, who had ruled for a total of 30 years first as the Communist Party boss during the Soviet-era and then after independence, Georgia was poised to usher in democracy. This came about with students peacefully handing roses to soldiers signaling that the forceful tactics employed during the years of Soviet occupation were forever gone. While 2004 saw free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections, much criticism has since been lodged against the Rose Revolution victors, United National Movement (UNM), for building democracy with an authoritarian bend. During its eight years in power, UNM operated as a party of power and this allowed it to monopolize state resources, operate without opposition, and push through controversial policies that supported its ideological foundations.

a. **Systemness**

National Movement was founded by Mikheil Saakashvili in October 2001, after he left the Citizen’s Union of Georgia (CUG) party. Saakashvili and National Movement first gained political success in Tbilisi Council Elections and subsequently played a key role in the Rose Revolution in 2003 that brought down former President Eduard Shevardnadze and his corrupt, authoritarian regime. In 2004, Saakashvili’s National Movement joined with the United Democrats renaming the party United National Movement (UNM) and it began to operate and function like a
stable political organization. When National Movement was founded it drew strong levels of support from CUG, where Saakashvili defected. Between Saakashvili’s popularity in Tbilisi and the diverse support from some former CUG supporters, National Movement was able to rapidly ally with other opposition parties and position itself within the political landscape. Additionally, in the 2004 presidential elections, National Movement faced no real political opposition allowing its leader, Mikheil Saakashvili, to win the presidency with 96% of the vote.

The leader-party relationship that defines party organization in UNM is complicated. While UNM has an organized party configuration, it is the super-executive structure of the Georgian government that has undermined party institutionalization. Internal structural reform within UNM in 2004 and 2005 created a solid organizational structure; however, the party is still dominated by Saakashvili’s character and in October 2013, Saakashvili was reelected chairman of the party. UNM’s main governing body is a Congress of 200 delegates which vote on decisions by simple majority – including party chairman. As chairman, Saakashvili was accorded the right to govern the party directly and act as its definitive representative (Nodia and Scholtbach, 2006, p. 257). Since independence, Georgia has been a presidential democracy and Saakashvili ruled his country, and party, without fear that his power might be curtailed. Saakashvili handpicked the MPs to be placed on UNM’s list, thus commanding ultimate party loyalty (Mitchell, 2006, p. 674). Furthermore, Saakashvili’s amendments to the new constitution, in February 2004, empowered the president “with permanent dominance over every branch of government by giving him the right to disband the legislature and to call early elections at will” (Areshidze, 2007, p. 198). A major attempt by UNM to increase internal democracy was the primary elections the party held to select the 2013 presidential candidate. Davit Bakradze was nominated for the candidacy after winning all six party conferences that were held throughout Georgia in which four candidates debated, followed by UNM delegates voting for their favorite after each round. This move is a sign that UNM is serious about promises of party renovation that will replace the one-man regime with a more democratic organization.

When United National Movement took over government following the Rose Revolution, it inherited the highly corrupt system that operated under Shevardnadze. As Karklins (2005, p. 30)
posits, “extreme cases of state capture involve the de facto takeover of public institutions not just for business interests, but for outright criminal activity.” This was the case of Georgia in the early 2000s. UNM’s government is one of the most successful in all former Soviet republics in eliminating the patronage system that defined Soviet politics. A personal project of Saakashvili’s, eliminating corruption became UNM’s main priority and the party went about arresting and imprisoning former government officials and businessmen who were part of the pre-Rose Revolution patronage system. By the late 2000s, Georgia was effectively rid of clientelism, but the means by which UNM accomplished this has brought its own criticism.

Saakashvili did not keep his promises to grant amnesty to businessmen and instead used his newfound state power to legally punish them for their past corrupt dealings by allegedly extorting money from them to fund his new government (Areshidze, 2007, p. 212-216). High profile targets were selected, arrested, held in jail with no evidence presented against them, and compelled to pay an agreed amount of money to the government or turn over their stakes in privately owned Georgian companies. The majority of these individuals never went on to face trial and/or agree to a plea bargain. In 2004 Saakashvili’s government requested pre-trial detention for 1,540 detainees, many of which did not qualify for confinement, and the judiciary granted approval in 83% of the cases (Areshidze, 2007, p. 213). UNM officials as well as journalists have argued that these dealing should not be considered acts of state corruption but “unofficial” taxation of the wealthy that provided government with the funds necessary to provide essential services. Additionally, while some current and former UNM MPs agree that the means used by the Saakashvili government to obtain this funding was unacceptable and should have been carried out by legal means, it was necessary.36

Analysis of funding as it contributes to party systemness is difficult to assess in Georgia. Party financing lacks transparency with the exception of international funding. UNM has been able to implement their pro-Western, democratic agenda due to the financial support of agencies like International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute (Bader, 2010). Furthermore, United National Movement was a party of power until the 2012 parliamentary elections, and it

36 Author’s interview with UNM MPs in Tbilisi, March-September 2013.
significantly benefited from state resources that were not available to opposition parties. In 2005, UNM changed the law on state financial support for political parties so that it is dependent on passing the election threshold in the parliamentary elections and then determined by the amount of votes received; this law openly favored UNM as the dominant, ruling party. For example, in 2006, the amount of money received by UNM from the government for party financing was 1,543,500 GEL (855,124 USD) compared to the 179,682 GEL (99,547 USD) which was the most earned by any opposition party (Transparency International Georgia, 2008, p. 5). Georgia’s dominant one party system allowed party financing to become starkly asymmetrical where UNM monopolized resources limiting opposition party development, and thus controlling policymaking. However, this scenario can no longer persist as UNM lost its status as a party of power with the 2012 parliamentary elections; Funding is a weakness in UNM’s party infrastructure that will have to be addressed if the party is to continue to operate.

In terms of party apparatus, UNM is well organized and its dominant party status enabled it to capture widespread support. However, the party structure and super-executive government allowed Saakashvili to rule unchecked. No real transfer or power has yet occurred and the party still needs to develop its identity separate of Saakashvili’s persona. Additionally, UNM needs to prove financial stability now that it no longer has state resources at its disposal. Therefore, until more time passes with UNM out of power, the party is assessed as only moderately institutionalized in the dimension of systemness, receiving a score of two.

b. **Value infusion**

UNM has often been defined by Saakashvili’s personalism, and its nationalist agenda has presented its own set of obstacles when it comes to value-infusion. It has been difficult to discern UNM’s ideological platform from Saakashvili’s personal beliefs and agenda, but the party continues to reaffirm its center-right, pro-democracy, ideological foundations. Where UNM has excelled in this dimension of institutionalizing is in its consistently pro-Western, nation building agenda that has established a clear ideological base. While this is not a class-mass party with socio-economic roots, UNM’s pro-Europeanness has produced adequate commitment among supporters
that transcends self-interest and looks to create a distinct culture focused on modernizing the inherited regime (Randall and Svasand, 2002, p. 13; Fairbanks and Gugushvili, 2013). Most all Georgian political parties claim to support democracy and integration with the West, but UNM has the advantage of having a clear record of pursuing such goals during their eight years in power that proves these elements are key to the parties ideological foundations. During President Saakashvili’s inauguration he had the European Union flag raised alongside the Georgian one illustrating the extent of UNM’s pro-European ideology. UNM has two clear goals, first to create a strong Georgian state with territorial integrity and second to improve the social conditions for the people (Nodia and Scholtenbach, 2006, p. 256). Aspirations of Georgian unification and social improvement through increased integration with the West, aimed at NATO, even EU memberships, have created value within UNM that has aided institutionalization through party cohesion.

United National Movement has also forged a unique identity as democratic reformers and state builders that continue to attract high support throughout Georgia. UNM received around 75 percent of the vote in the 2004 parliamentary election and nearly 60 percent of the vote in the 2008 parliamentary election. Saakashvili himself has taken on the role of a pragmatic reformer, which seeks democratic transformation through modernization and full separation from the old regime. Saakashvili has taken the lead on creating this identity; he is Western educated, travelled, multi-lingual, and nationalistic. UNM’s nationalistic identity is committed to territorial integrity and since the Rose Revolution it has vowed to unify Georgia including its breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The party aims at identifying with ethnic Georgians who make-up the majority of the population – 83.75 percent as of 2002 (Wheatly, 2009, p. 122). In June 2004, 27 percent of Georgians found territorial integrity to be the main problem facing Georgia – a number that has decreased since reaching a low of 16 percent in polls conducted in April-May 2011.37 Saakashvili approached territorial re-integration with patriotic charisma, and while in some cases it paid off, in others it only exacerbated the conflict. Following the Rose Revolution, Georgia was able to

peacefully re-integrate Adjara and once again place it under Georgian law. However, the situations in South Ossetia that led to low-level fighting, and Abkhazia that culminated in the Georgian-Russian War of 2008 proved disastrous for UNM. Despite the unpopularity that has accompanied many of UNM’s policy decisions, these decisions were made in accordance with UNM’s ideological foundation and it is this identity that has been successful at attracting support. UNM is considered moderately institutionalized, receiving a score of two, in the dimension of value infusion.

c. **Decisional autonomy**

The case of Georgia is different than Ukraine given that the country up until the 2012 parliamentary elections has operated as a dominant party system. The former ruling party – United National Movement – had a high level of decision autonomy. As previously discussed, UNM channeled the majority of state financing to their party granting them decisional-autonomy. This discouraged UNM from establishing strong linkages with other organizations or groups within society, which currently leaves it vulnerable as it has lost its dominant party status. UNM’s efforts to eradicate corruption in Georgia led to the arrest and/or imprisonment of many oligarchs and sent a message to the West that Georgia was committed to becoming a modern, democratic state. UNM saw to the firing of around 50,000 police officers as part of the anti-corruption measures used to clean up government and the Justice Ministry in particular. According to UNM party representatives, when modernizing the Justice Ministry it was not just about changing a name – from militia to police – but about changing the substance of the institution. From these anti-corruption policies flowed large amounts of international aid that UNM used to further institutional reforms and monopolize decision-making structures (Bader, 2010, p. 172-175).

The concentration of power in the hands of the Georgian president and the absence of the system of checks and balances created a virtual one-party system. Saakashvili established his own political machine in Georgia that found ways to operate without external interference. He influenced the appointments of heads of civil society institutions such as universities, sports organizations, and unions as well as created a system of loyalty among public administration workers (Muskhelishvili and Jorjoliani, 2009, p. 696-697). Additionally, Saakashvili rotated officials often to ensure a tight
grasp on government resources and positions, keeping the patronage system intact which he alone controlled (Timm, 2010, p. 13). For eight years, decision-making rested solely in the hands of party leadership, which allowed for decisional autonomy, however, it functioned in a dominant party system where it had complete control over government. Therefore, UNM can only be considered moderately institutionalized, receiving a score of two, in the dimension of decisional autonomy until it proves it can operate equally independently as part of the opposition.

d. **Reification**

Despite the 2012 parliamentary and 2013 presidential losses that leave UNM the minority party in government, it is reasonable to assert that the party possesses name recognition. UNM has taken steps to forge a permanent place in the political landscape, making itself a concrete fixture. After the Rose Revolution, one of the first decisions taken by National Movement was replacing Georgia’s old black, white, and red flag with the party’s flag which was a large red cross with four smaller crosses in the corners. This was known as the “five crosses” modeled on a Middle Ages flag of Georgian monarchs; the distinction between party and state became permanently blurred (Cheterian, 2008, p. 695). The Rose Revolution won over Georgians in large part due to its commitment to state-building, and UNM, under Saakashvili, became the ultimate reformer ridding the country of corruption, transforming education and the economy, and strengthening state institutions. Throughout this massive restructuring Georgia has effectively become a one-party-state, which is hardly conducive to UNM’s promises of a democratic Georgia. UNM stands in a precarious position when it comes to reification; the party is recognizable and has created a place for itself in the party landscape but it risks fading from existence as it loses its dominant status in government.

Georgia’s political history exhibits a cyclical pattern where a leader comes to power – Saakashvili, Shevardnadze, and Gamsakhurdia before them – effectively creates a one-party-state, and proceeds to render the opposition irrelevant (Cheterian, 2008, p. 707). Each time promises of democracy are replaced with an authoritarian-like reality that results in uprising, a change in government, and the previous ruling party being rendered defunct. Here, UNM defied tradition as it continues to exist, function, and ready itself for the 2014 local elections. At this time it is difficult to make any long-
term conclusions regarding UNM’s level of reification, as a turnover in leadership is needed. However, the party’s continued existence following its 2012 and 2013 political losses is indicative of high levels of reification, for which the party receives a score of three.

3. **A united opposition – A true “Georgian Dream?”**

   Party politics in Georgia took a dramatic turn with the 2012 parliamentary elections, as the nascent Georgian Dream coalition toppled the powerful UNM winning a majority of the 150 seats. Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia is the political party that anchors the coalition that was established on April 19, 2012 by Georgian billionaire businessman, and former Prime Minister, Bidzina Ivanishvili. When it comes to institutionalizing, Georgian Dream is still in the infant stages. The coalition is comprised of five other political parties which themselves are more or less established – Republican Party of Georgia, Our-Georgia – Free Democrats, National Forum, Conservative Party of Georgia, and Industry will Save Georgia. The haphazard amalgamation of the coalition highlights the inherent weakness of the coalition’s origins. Some members are truly pro-Western and pro-market while others are xenophobic nationalists who openly denounce further integration with the West. For the purposes of measuring party institutionalization among the coalition partners, this research limits itself to two parties – the youngest and the oldest, Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia and the Republican Party of Georgia respectively.

4. **Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia**

   To speak of the Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia (GD-DG) party at this point in time in terms of institutionalization is difficult. The party was founded in April 2012 by Bidzina Ivanishvili and named after a rap song by the founder’s son, from which the party also gets its logo. The party was derived from the Georgian Dream Civic Movement NGO, which was a personal project of Ivanishvili’s. In late 2013, the party only occasionally had a working website, no listed phone number, and its party headquarters in Tbilisi were staffed only by security guards when the author visited it in March 2013. Despite such challenges that come with political immaturity, as of early 2013 Georgian Dream has started to open regional offices outside Tbilisi and appoint regional
chairmen for six-month terms. The party made additional efforts to build its organization, aware of its own political inexperience, by approaching the local International Republican Institute (IRI) office to enroll 12 of its first time members of parliament into a parliamentary training program in Spring 2013 run by IRI out of its Vilnius office. Though GD-DG is a new party, it controls government and therefore stands in an important position to direct Georgia’s democratic future.

a. **Systemness**

When it comes to leadership-party relations, GD-DG follows a top-down model. Ivanishvili has complete control over the party and coalition. Despite most coalition parties’ maintaining their own factions in parliament, Ivanishvili’s power is tied to financial resources and political appointments, which gave him ultimate authority as Prime Minister from 2012-2013. For example, in January 2013 Ivanishvili demoted Vice-Premier Irakli Alasania allegedly due to the latter’s presidential aspirations. However, officially neither party confirmed these allegations and stated the demotion was so that Alasania could focus on his duties as the Minister of Defense (“PM Ivanishvili…,” 2013). Rather interesting was the GD coalition’s choice for presidential candidate in Giorgi Margvelashvili, as opposed to an experienced politician from one of the coalition parties. Margvelashvili does not hold membership in any party and is unproven in politics. A philosopher by training, Margvelashvili has been active in politics since the Rose Revolution, though as a consultant or critic and not as an actual politician. While the nomination of Margvelashvili is said to be unanimous by Georgian Dream, there has been speculation by some members of the coalition parties and UNM that it is his personal relationship with Ivanishvili that propelled him into candidacy. Ivanishvili’s character played a large role in the party’s political rise to power. However, the philanthropist left his position as PM and party leader in November 2013, because as he said, he is not “a Messiah” and Georgia needs to end its reliance on political saviors. Whether GD-DG or the coalition can survive and maintain popularity without its political champion remains to be seen.

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38 Author’s interviews with Georgian-Dream party consultants in Tbilisi, March-September 2013.
39 Author’s interviews with UNM as well as two Georgian Dream coalition parties, Tbilisi, August-September 2013.
Clientelist practices in Georgia have largely been eliminated from most parties. However, with Ivanishvili’s entrance into politics the patronage system seems to be revived. He is often seen as a patron who has rebuilt his hometown of Chorvila constructing schools and roads as well as paying for healthcare and home appliances (Ioffe, 2012). Ivanishvili is a businessman who made his billions in Russia during the 1990s when “cowboy capitalism” allowed him to sell-off and invest in various industries. It is Ivanishvili’s own money and influence over those he has provided for that threatens the coalition’s legitimacy and party organization. According to various interviews with Georgian politicians, journalists, and scholars, a large amount of party members joined Georgian Dream in hopes of obtaining some kind of personal benefit. Party members in regions outside Tbilisi have found themselves receiving professional benefits such as government posts that are undermining rules and procedural democracy. There have been various reports that Georgian Dream has been operating extra-legally by forcibly taking over local administrative positions occupied by elected officials from UNM (Socor, 2013). Despite local elections not taking place until 2014, Georgian Dream is treating the parliamentary transfer of power as justification for overtaking local level positions and regional party members are reaping the benefits. Ivanishvili previously stated he would not get involved in local affairs, but has since changed his position noting this will result in a more peaceful and orderly outcome. Near the end of March 2013, 54 chief executive officials and their staff had been removed unlawfully and 25 local councils (Socor, 2013).

Funding has been a complicated area for the Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia. Ivanishvili has billions of dollars and stakes in numerous corporations, but Georgian election law imposes certain restrictions on funding sources and amounts. Saakashvili’s government therefore made it difficult for the GD coalition to operate, as it tried to protect its financial advantage. In June 2012, Georgian Dream was hit with a $90 million fine after two suits by the States Audit Services were approved. The first suit concerned the illegal distribution of free satellite dishes by Global TV – the only satellite company that carries a television station owned by Ivanishvili’s wife (“Ivanishvili-led…,” 2012). The other suit concerned preferential treatment in the supplying of vehicles and minibuses to coalition members. Since coming to power in late 2012 though, there have been reports
by coalition members that funding from Ivanishvili is being withdrawn.\textsuperscript{40} Willingness to fund coalition parties will largely determine the success of the coalition, however the GD-DG will remain financially stable. Having been founded just a few years ago and with only a couple years experience in government, Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia is only weakly institutionalized in the dimension of systemness, receiving a score of one. Much still needs to be seen in way of party building, change in leadership, and diversified financing.

\textbf{b. Value infusion}

GD-DG lacks a clear ideological foundation, and serves more as a vehicle for its founder’s interests. It came to power through the use of Ivanishvili’s charisma, rhetoric aimed at denouncing UNM and Saakashvili, and populist-like promises of removing taxes for low-income families. Georgian Dream came on the political scene as UNM’s popularity was waning and was able to capitalize off events such as the Gldani prison scandal which came to light in September 2012. Videos showed the torture and sexual assault of male prisoners by prison guards which tarnished UNM’s anti-corruption/pro-human rights identity. In terms of identity, GD-DG is strongly tied to the identity of its founder– Ivanishvili. He is beloved in Georgia primarily for his philanthropic work. Members of the GD coalition and UNM agree that few if any other individuals in Georgia had the potential to unite opposition parties and win the 2012 parliamentary elections as Ivanishvili did. However, one commonality in identity among all coalition members exists – a dis-trust and dis-like of UNM. While joining the Georgian Dream coalition meant that some ideological compromises among member parties would be required, it allowed them the chance to be seated in government and take part in the policy-making process, something unattainable under UNM political dominance. Still, value-infusion needs to be more identifiable if the party is to institutionalize. As of early 2014, the party remains weak in the dimension of value infusion, receiving a score of one.

\textbf{c. Decisional autonomy}

While GD-DG does not have a group of oligarchs that exert influence, it was founded by a businessman who lacks political experience and may rule more as a tycoon and less as

\textsuperscript{40} Author’s interviews with Georgia Dream coalition MPs, Tbilisi, September 2013.
a democratic leader. Again, it is not external corruption but internal that is the threat to party institutionalization in most FSU republics. While no patronage system exists as in the case of Ukraine, as long as Ivanishvili is effectively the sole benefactor of the Georgian Dream coalition, the GD-DG party will likely dominate the decision-making process. In speaking with various local Georgian experts in Tbilisi, it was stated that unlike UNM, Georgian Dream was not pushing for business restrictive legislation, as Ivanishvili’s party has no interest in controlling big business.\footnote{Author’s personal communications in Tbilisi, August-September 2013.} While this is positive for institutionalization as it keeps ties between politics and oligarchs minimal, it keeps Ivanishvili’s party in a privileged position as concerns funding. Despite maintaining separate factions in parliament, coalition parties will likely remain loyal and follow GD-DG’s decision-making until it is no longer financially beneficial. Institutionalization in terms of decisional autonomy for GD-DG will depend on how the party operates over the long-term, following Ivanishvili’s departure from politics in late 2013, and whether his sponsorship of the party continues to allow him to direct policy. Currently the party does not appear to be influenced by external sponsors, and thus receives a score of three for decisional autonomy.

**d. Reification**

With such a short existence GD-DG cannot be considered institutionalized in the dimension of reification. Furthermore, nothing conclusive can be gleaned about the party’s potential to become reified in the public’s mind in the future. The party and coalition have existed barely three years at the time of this research and have experienced no major challenges in terms of re-election, change in leadership, or voter disillusionment. NDI found Georgian Dream to have a 63% approval rating immediately following the October 2012 parliamentary election – their highest ever – but as there had not yet been time for the party to be evaluated on their accomplishments, or lack or, it tells us little about how the party will fare over time. The 2013 presidential elections was another success for the party, but now the larger challenge begins with the young and politically inexperienced Irakli Garibashvili taking over as Prime Minister. The coalition itself it fractious and if the more experienced parties – the Republicans and Free Democrats – breakaway the whole coalition
may crumble leaving GD-DG to disappear. The departure of Ivanishvili from politics after only establishing his party less than two years prior and before the end of his term has great potential to devalue the GD government’s legitimacy and hinder any chances of GD-DG from becoming a permanent part of Georgian politics, but again more time is needed before conclusions can be drawn.

5. Republican Party of Georgia

The Republican Party of Georgia stands in the unique position of being the oldest, active Georgian political party, founded on May 21, 1978. Its party origins are rooted in its emergence as a dissident group that opposed the communist Georgian government and believed in an independent, free-market Georgia where political plurality existed. While this party was built according to a bottom-up model, the party continues to be seen as an organization for Georgian intelligentsia. One of the Republican Party’s strongest, and unique, qualities is that all its founders and previous chairmen remain members of the party. This enables it to maintain a strong and loyal following, though small. The party does not appeal to any specific segment of the population, which in part inhibits it from capturing a larger part of the electorate. They have yet to ever gain widespread support but they competed in the first multi-party elections in 1991 and have continued to participate in politics since, even if not always passing the electoral threshold.

a. Systemness

The Republicans have organizations in almost all regions of Georgia, though not always based out of business offices. Sometimes branches are simply based out of a local leader’s home, though larger regional offices exist in major cities such as Batumi, Kutaisi, and Rustavi. The leadership admits to failing to hold regular meetings with the regional organizations, as the budget does not allow. However, since gaining seats in parliament in 2012 the local offices have seen more activity and the overall party a slight increase in support; the Samegreli region has been a particular area of growth. Since 2005, the party also has a strong youth organization that undertakes different projects with a particular focus on training future leaders.

Unlike many other Georgian and Ukrainian parties, the Republican Party was not the political offspring of just one individual; it is a legitimate organization that has seen several changes
in leadership and continued to exist even when founding members were jailed under the communist system. The Republican Party stands as the most internally democratic Georgian party with a well-functioning party apparatus. However, this was not always the case as changing leadership gave Georgians the perception that the party might be weakly organized and function more as an intellectual club than real political player (Nodia & Scholtbach, 2006, p. 143). Criticism has been leveled at the party that it is a mix of individual egos overshadowing party development and a common goal. However in 2003, the Republican Party proved it could be a powerful political partner as one of the founders of United National Movement and leaders of the Rose Revolution. The leadership relationship of the Republican Party now stands as a model for most parties in Eastern Europe.

In 2005, the party underwent an overhaul under previous leader Davit Usupashvili. The goal was to change the image of the party as an organization with a number of well-spoken, intelligent figures, to one of a well-developed political institution. Party members elect the party’s governing committee of 35 members every four years, whom then elect a chairman who also serves a four-year term. The party has additionally worked on gaining more women in its ranks and increasing internal democracy. As part of its efforts to ensure internal democracy, the party has previously called upon the International Republican Institute office in Tbilisi to observe their internal party election where the main council elects their chairman. As of November 2013, the party elected a female – Khatuna Samnidze – as the new party leader.

Clientelism has not been a problem for the Republican Party. The party maintains a small core of members who share similar ideological goals and work to achieve them. Ultimately, the party has held too few seats in parliament and/or key ministerial positions to encourage clientelist practices. Additionally, the party has remained free of corruption scandal, financial or otherwise, which speaks highly to the party’s key principal of rule of law.

The Republican Party, similar to all small opposition parties, is particularly troubled when it comes to the issue of funding. Specifically there is a lack of it. Membership dues exist, though they are a small percentage of financing and are unstructured according to party rules. As noted in the chapter on UNM, state funding is dependent on passing the electoral threshold and then distributed in
accordance to the number of MPs a party has. The Republican Party has long been reliant upon budget financing. The party does not have big business backing them as it has rules prohibiting the party from receiving heavy business financing. According to some party members, the purpose of such rules is to remain free from “owing favors.” This is not to say the party has not had wealthy businessmen support them in the past, but it has been limited.

In the dimension of systemness, the Republican Party of Georgia is highly institutionalized, receiving a score of three. It has a strong party structure, loyal voters – though few, effective party-leader relationship, and is free from clientelism. However, adequate funding does remain a crucial problem for the party and will continue to impact the party’s ability to grow and compete.

b. **Value infusion**

The Republicans are a center-left party with a rather general ideological base. It was founded in Batumi and appeals to a small, liberal section of society making it is difficult for them to expand support. Georgia is a traditional society where the majority of citizens are highly religious. Part of the Republican’s liberal agenda is separation from the church and relaxed nationalism in favor or a more pro-Western identity. Voters often fault this liberal ideology, viewing the party as not religious or nationalistic enough for Georgia. The party is a member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party. The Republican Party’s identity is clearer than its ideology as the party remains identifiable by the same key principles and figures since its creation. Rule of law, developing free-market economy, protecting private property and furthering minority rights continue to be the fundamental elements the party revolves around. The party’s commitment to these principles are often exhibited in its entering and leaving coalitions, such as when it left UNM following the Rose Revolution when Saakashvili’s government re-imposed authority over the Autonomous Republic of Adjara. The Republicans are also identified as a party of experts, which creates disconnect between the public and the party. The strength of the Republican remains its ability to rely upon its own intellectual resources and its pro-European/ Euro-Atlantic commitment with minimal compromise even if it leads it to occupy but a small space in Georgian politics. The Republican Party has a clear identity, but as it lacks a true ideological base and represents a weakly
defined subsection of society. Still, in comparison with the majority of parties in Georgia it does possess moderate levels of institutionalization as concerns value infusion, receiving a score of two.

c. Decisional autonomy

When it comes to decisional autonomy and the Republican Party of Georgia, it must be acknowledged that the party has held very few seats in government and controlled virtually no portfolios since the Rose Revolution, making it an almost non-player when it comes to policy-making. However, the party consists of some of the most experienced politicians in the Georgian government, taking part in the drafting of the 1995 constitution and as already noted, as part of the Rose Revolution. As a small party not routinely seated government, it has allowed the Republicans to work on policy they believe in and support with little risk of being coerced from “money politics.” The party has long been the main proponent of a parliamentary system of government, which just recently took effect following the 2013 presidential election. Furthermore, current legislation being drafted to promote local self-government and decentralization is based off ideas the Republicans have long advocated. As of fall 2013, the party has only 9 MPs in Georgian Dream’s 85 seats and one ministerial position with one deputy minister. According to representatives for the Republican Party, despite only holding the position of Minister of Agriculture, they have created an active committee pursuing progressive reforms. The Speaker of Parliament, Davit Usupashvili, is the former leader of the Republican Party and one of the most proven politicians in the Georgian Dream coalition, however he was not selected as the coalition’s presidential candidate for the 2013 presidential election. The party’s experience works against them in coalitions, as it can be perceived as a threat and therefore the party’s power is kept limited.

According to Nodia and Scholtbach (2006, p. 254), the Republican Party has the longest and most successful record of cooperation with Georgian NGOs and the author’s original research also found this to be true with American NGOs working in Tbilisi. The Republican Party is the dominant actor in its decision-making and the party is devoted to political dialogue where consultation among party leaders and external specialists, when necessary, is key to party culture. However, the Republican Party acknowledges that its supporters often demand more action from them, as it is
never the first to react to situations or events and does not issue emotional, urgent statements like other parties. The Republican Party’s expertise, strong links with external organizations, and willingness to abandon alliances over their core policy principles affords the party high levels of decisional autonomy, for which they receive a score of three.

d. **Reification**

The Republican Party has been active in the party sphere since Georgian independence, even if not serving in parliament for the majority of the time. Unlike most parties in Georgia, the Republicans have had time to grow-up as a party and truly become part of the political landscape. Parties in Georgia often disappear once they are no longer in government, but the Republicans have survived for years out of power and came back as part of the Georgian Dream coalition in 2012. The Republicans’ longevity is in great part derived from their stable base of voters, even if they don’t amass to very many. In speaking with party representatives, they admit though that their voters are also sometimes a large problem for the party. Republican party supporters are opinionated and they therefore are comfortable disagreeing with decisions made by party leadership, which at times leads them to abstain from voting. The symbol of the Republican Party is “people,” which is specifically meant to identify the party not with any individual leader but a collective of experienced experts. This is positive for reification, as the party is not attached to any specific leader. However, when a party openly declares itself to being about the people, the people will feel entitled to question the party on decisions with which they disagree. The Republican Party of Georgia is institutionalized in the dimension of reification, receiving a score of three. It has proven longevity and that it can operate in government as well as on the sidelines.

**D. Implications of Weak Political Party Institutionalization**

Stockton (2001, p. 96) posits, “[i]mproved democracies are perpetuated by the routinization of a political process based on political parties that are consistent to a large degree in their ideological and policy positions, parliamentary and extraparliamentary discipline, and organization.” Parties should lend stability and legitimacy to the political system within which they operate, which is why party institutionalization increases the chance of democratic consolidation. If parties are to contribute
to democratization they need to operate in accordance with democratic norms. The state of party politics is in part determined by the extent to which political parties are institutionalized in a given country. According to Panebianco (1988, p. 58), if parties are highly institutionalized then the party organization restricts its internal actors’ political actions and focuses their strategies into obligatory paths. Institutionalized parties act as linchpins securing democracy, preventing it from backsliding. Weakly institutionalized parties lack these traits, the output of which is democratic deficit. (See FIGURE 1 for a comparison of levels of political party institutionalization in Ukraine and Georgia)

FIGURE 1. Political Parties Compared

Analyzing party institutionalization in the case of Ukraine finds that democracy constantly needs to battle charismatic figures and oligarchic influence, which largely resulted from the delayed economic reforms and democratic liberalization in the 1990s (to be discussed more in Chapter Six). Parties in Ukraine have placed a decent amount of effort in party building, have strong leadership capabilities, and can secure adequate funding – though by questionable means. However, parties are still more about the leader than a well-articulated party program and voters ascribe to this mentality
of personalistic politics, which allows for only moderate levels of political party institutionalization. Additionally, big business has vast influence within political parties restricting their ability to enact political and economic reform. Lack of ideology also creates weaknesses, as parties find it easier to build an identity centered on a figure or regional culture than to actually develop a system of beliefs. While *Svoboda* does differ in regard to ideology, its nationalist rhetoric is rather polarizing in eastern parts of the country – similar to how the Communist Party of Ukraine’s ideology is anathema to Western oblasts. The dilemma with Ukrainian parties remains that individual parties hinder the democratic progress as they are on average only moderately institutionalized and more interested in state capture than implementing effective economic and political reforms. This is in large part a result of parties’ inability to develop along clear socio-political cleavages and the mutually supportive relationship between the state and the oligarchs that sees the former protect the latter in order to win support.

Democratic politics requires party organizations to become reliable institutions that espouse democratic goals. There is a disparity in party knowledge and development in Georgia, which has led to varying degrees of party building, ideological foundations, and reification among political parties. In large part, this is a result of the various ages and experience of political parties, which creates for mixed levels of political party institutionalization (the average of which is lower in Georgia than Ukraine). While some parties such as the Republican Party have a developed party culture, they have little experience actually governing. Others, such as Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia, have found themselves holding the presidency and leading the ruling coalition in parliament, but have existed for barely two years and are mostly comprised of inexperienced, junior politicians. The presidential system has also affected the way parties construct themselves in Georgia. The concentration of power in the hands of the executive meant parties became dependent on the personalities of their leaders and disregarded party-building. Georgian parties did not establish themselves as the “principle players in political life” following the collapse of communism, and therefore they did not feel obliged to develop strong organizations (Nodia and Scholtbach, 2006, p. 99). Furthermore, parties have been rather ambiguous and inconsistent on issues of ideology. In order for parties to build-up their constituencies they need to start focusing on distinct social interests. The
party landscape is beginning to change, however, with UNM reinventing its image as part of the opposition and the electoral success of the Georgian Dream coalition turning power over to both new and previously marginalized parties. This is but an opening for political change, however, and Georgian political parties are going to need to prove they can survive as institutions and adapt to change.
A. Introduction

The Orange and Rose Revolutions provided democratic stimuli, which revitalized Ukraine and Georgia’s political systems. And yet, in the years since, democratic progress in Ukraine and Georgia gradually stalled. Scholars have traditionally maintained that party institutionalization is a necessary condition for democratic consolidation (Diamond, 1989; Dix, 1992; Lewis, 1994; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Markowski, 2001). As political parties are integral elements of any party system, the party system writ-large is the axis for political change in newly transitioned political regimes (Power, 1997). The party system structures patterns of competition and affects public acceptance of democracy. As established in Chapter Four, political parties in both Ukraine and Georgia generally exhibit moderate levels of institutionalization. In both countries, parties suffer from similar problems regarding personalism, adequate funding that is free of oligarchic ties, and a strong ideological base. While lack of stability among parties imparts a degree of instability on the party systems, an institutionalized party system must overcome a variety of other obstacles. As outlined in the methodology section, this research uses some standard measures of party system institutionalization – electoral volatility and institutional legitimacy – while combining it with the less common but equally important factor, mutual acceptance of parties, to conceptualize party system institutionalization. These three measures when taken together isolate the party system and those variables that either contribute to or hinder the establishment of a well-functioning, reliable party system. Analyzing party system institutionalization pertains not to the levels of institutionalization among individual actors – parties – but the system as a whole that is comprised of multiple actors, yet has its own distinct characteristics. These characteristics are the sum of all the parts – that is political parties – and refer to the regularity of the system, patterns of inter-party interactions, and voters’ belief that democratic politics and institutions are necessary and desirable.
B. **Electoral Volatility**

Institutionalized party systems experience a certain amount of stability. In turn, stability will result in regular party competition – regularity being defined as reoccurring participation by the same major parties that maintain consistent levels of support (Mainwaring, 1999). This allows for party alternatives, “enhancing prospects of electoral accountability” (Randall and Svasand, 2002, p. 7). The conventional measure of regularity in party competition is electoral volatility, traditionally computed by adding the net change of vote percent gained or lost by each party for a set of elections and then dividing by two. As detailed in the methodology section, I employ a slightly different formula for measuring electoral volatility, which was developed by Powell and Tucker (2014). This new model distinguishes between Type A volatility, *new or exiting party volatility*, and Type B volatility, *existing party volatility*. Two volatility scores are therefore calculated to provide more clear conclusions about party system stability. Powell and Tucker establish a two percent threshold for parties, where parties receiving less than that percentage of total vote share are deleted. I adopt this two percent as the electoral threshold in Ukraine and Georgia has fluctuated overtime. Since there are literally hundreds of parties in these two countries, the majority of which do not even capture one percent of total votes cast, assigning a two percent threshold creates consistency in the measure. Type A volatility, *new or exiting party volatility*, is calculated for each pair of elections where a party received less than two percent of the total vote in only one election and over two percent in the other. Type B volatility, *existing party volatility*, is calculated for each pair of elections where a party received over two percent of the total vote in both elections. After the datasets have been arranged according to these bases, volatility is calculated the same way as for the Pedersen Index.

Volatility scores have been calculated for all parliamentary elections in Ukraine and Georgia since independence in the early 1990s, and are presented in Tables IX and X. Both countries exhibit moderate levels of electoral volatility, exceeding 33 percent but less than 66 percent. The type of volatility differs though, as Ukraine has slightly higher, though increasingly more stable, levels of Type B volatility than Georgia. This is explained by the fact that while Georgia has typically seen parties completely exit politics after a loss with new parties filling the void, Ukraine has maintained a
small cadre of stable parties. Three parties out of the hundreds that are registered - Batkivshchyna, Party of Regions, and the Communist Party of Ukraine - routinely pass the electoral threshold and have occupied a major place in government since the early 2000s. Type A volatility fell dramatically since the Orange Revolution, but major changes in the political landscape resulted in increased volatility after the 2012 parliamentary elections. Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party - and Orange Revolution ally of Batkivshchyna - is no longer represented in Rada (Parliament) since 2012. That election also saw two new parties enter government - Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR) a new party led by Vitaliy Klychko and Svoboda, a marginalized, nationalist party that has existed since independence.

Type A volatility in Georgia is higher than that in Ukraine and is approaching the levels seen prior to the Rose Revolution. Georgia’s party system went through a phase of over-institutionalization and stability following the 2003 Rose Revolution, with few new parties entering the system and little to no vote change between existing ones – type B volatility was at an extreme low of less than five percent. However, over-institutionalization is typically a transitory phenomenon (Schedler, 1995). The 2012 parliamentary election disrupted the hyper-stable party system in Georgia with the win of the new Georgian Dream coalition, which sent Type A volatility levels soaring back up to over 40 percent. The 2013 presidential election that saw UNM’s power in government completely replaced by Georgian Dream might indicate a larger, more problematic pattern of electoral competition where there are spikes of high volatility following periods of one-party dominance.
### TABLE IX. ELECTORAL VOLATILITY IN UKRAINE, 1994-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type A – new or exiting party volatility</th>
<th>Type B - existing party volatility</th>
<th>Total Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>28.98</td>
<td>8.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2002</td>
<td>54.39</td>
<td>4.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2006</td>
<td>7.88</td>
<td>31.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>8.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2012</td>
<td>19.29</td>
<td>8.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean Volatility</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.40</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.31</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE X. ELECTORAL VOLATILITY IN GEORGIA, 1992-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type A – new or exiting party volatility</th>
<th>Type B – existing party volatility</th>
<th>Total Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992-1995</td>
<td>57.78</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1999</td>
<td>23.59</td>
<td>22.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>25.75</td>
<td>4.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2012</td>
<td>41.77</td>
<td>12.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean Volatility</strong></td>
<td><strong>37.22</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.26</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Georgia’s higher levels of volatility are partially explained by the fact that parties are poorly rooted in society and partisanship is weak. However, Georgians place high levels of trust in parties as institutions. This is seemingly contradictory, but when types of electoral volatility are considered a much clearer picture of the party system emerges. Georgia’s volatility is largely type A, meaning that it is a result of parties entering or exiting the party system. As mentioned above, Georgia’s party system has previously been defined by periods of over-institutionalization, where competition is stifled and leaning towards semi-authoritarianism, punctuated by complete changes in government with new parties entering politics and old parties disbanding. Georgian voters have long known the power of their vote and their ability to remove a party from power, which has led to complete changeovers in government as the public will largely abandon support for an older party in favor of a new one. This explains the high levels of new or exiting volatility as there is a high incentive for the formation of new parties and older parties typically disband once falling out of power. Since the Rose Revolution though, opposition parties are increasingly engaged in the political process and there is finally government alteration with the former ruling party becoming part of the opposition. While the 2012 parliamentary election saw the formation of a new party – Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia – the success of the Georgian Dream (GD) coalition was possible only because multiple older parties were willing and able to work together under the newly formed GD banner. This brought renewed competition to the party system, and Georgia for the first time is seeing not only a strong coalition in power but a strong opposition.

By analyzing new or exiting volatility separate from existing volatility it can be discerned that while both Ukraine and Georgia reveal similar levels of electoral volatility, for which I score them both a two, the types of volatility they suffer from differs. Georgia is primarily affected by broader instability within the party system, while Ukraine has begun to see some predictability when it comes to electoral participants. Still, the 2012 elections in both countries attest to the fact that the rapid rise and fall of parties is not unthinkable. The lack of a stable base of parties prevents high levels of stability thus undermining the party system’s effectiveness as a link between state and
society and the legitimacy of party actors and parties in general, which will further be addressed in the other three dimensions.

1. **A caveat to volatility**

As Powell and Tucker’s (2014) new formula for calculating electoral volatility proves, it is important to ask what our measurements are not considering. Electoral volatility is a result of change in vote preference, but why was there a change? It may be a result of change in party leadership or policy direction, it could be a result of parties entering or exiting the party system, but it could also be a result of changes in the “rules of the game” – that is alteration to electoral law. Whenever there are changes to laws there can be unintended consequence.

A distinctive feature of Ukrainian elections is that they are often governed by a new set of laws. Four times since the country’s independence the electoral law governing parliamentary elections has been changed. In 1990 and 1994 the elections were held under the majoritarian electoral system, 1998 and 2002 elections were held under a mixed (proportional-majoritarian) system, the 2006 and 2007 elections were held under a proportional system, and the 2012 elections reverted back to a mixed system (Razumkov Centre, 2012, p. 19). Such frequent changes undermine party system stability as the electoral system structures competition. This is particularly true in the case of Ukraine where changes were made during times of tough political struggle, in the run-up to an election, and the changes are focused on the electoral system and electoral procedure.

New election laws have been used to manipulate competition and are in direct conflict with the acceptance of party competition as they have clear political implications on suppressing the opposition. Changes to the electoral threshold were also intended to effect the composition of parliament. While the decrease from four percent to three percent following the Orange Revolution was meant to increase representation of smaller parties, the increase to five percent in 2010 intended to favor the ruling majority and exclude smaller ideological parties. Another major change to electoral law that had implications on the interactions between parties was the banning of electoral blocs prior to the 2012 parliamentary election. The ruling PR attempted to limit
collaboration among opposition parties by preventing them from allying at the polls. It was a clear attempt of the ruling authorities to secure a majority of seats for themselves by restricting interparty competition via a complete ban on blocs.

Georgian electoral law remains largely more stable than that in Ukraine. The system has always operated according to a mixed (proportional representation – majoritarian) system since independence. However, 2008 saw a decrease in the number of members of parliament from 235 to 150 and the electoral reform law of 2011 increased the number of seats to 190. There was a brief change to the electoral threshold in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with an increase to seven percent, but it has otherwise remained at a stable five percent. Greater stability in the electoral system has allowed for more efficient strategy for competition among the political parties. The mixed system has created predictability in how parties compete and the restoration of the five percent threshold following the Rose Revolution creates more opportunities for the opposition. While the fragmented nature of the opposition in Georgia has traditionally relegated it to a marginal role in government, the 2012 parliamentary elections attests to evolution within the opposition where there has been advancement in competition strategy. Strategy develops over time and requires consistency in rules. The success of the Georgian Dream Coalition in 2012 is the first piece of evidence that greater predictability in inter-party interaction, which extends to political elites’ tendency to modify the electoral system for personal gain, strengthens the functioning of the party system. The fragmented opposition came together to create more dynamic competition towards UNM, which was not stifled by last minute attempts to up the electoral threshold or ban coalitions as in Ukraine. While electoral law and party system institutionalization are not traditionally considered together, their relationship should be treated more thoroughly.

42 It should be noted that there was no electoral threshold established for the 1992 parliamentary election following independence. The five percent threshold first took effect in the 1995 parliamentary election.
C. **Legitimacy**

Important for institutionalization is legitimacy of the party system. Institutionalization requires the public to commit to the electoral process and trust in institutions – including parties. Mainwaring (1998) notes that legitimacy is necessary for institutionalization as it implies actors create patterned behavior in the expectation that democratic politics will endure. This creates a political atmosphere conducive to further democratization where parties work in the name of democracy and the public believes in the functionality of such a system. As parties are the primary political actors in a democracy, it is important that the public values their performance. When parties fail to deliver democracy, then there is increased pressure for radical institutional change, which may deviate from democratic ideals. Therefore, legitimacy is not about individual parties but the larger party system. Legitimacy is typically measured through subjective perceptions of performance (e.g., Diamond, 2010; Mainwaring, 1999; Weatherford, 1992). This is fitting because according to Beetham (1991, p. 11), legitimacy is subjective as it needs to account for historical-context; he posits, “a given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs.” Whether or not Ukrainians and Georgians view the party system as legitimate is directly tied to their expectations following the color revolutions. This research relies upon the traditionally used perceptions of performance, and depending on the opinion polls, the public was asked whether they trust institutions, are confident in them, or have favorable opinions. In some countries, positive attitudes may develop immediately following democratic transition, in others it can take years until the party system begins to meet people’s expectation. As Lipset (1994) claims, the legitimacy of institutions comes from citizens judging them as such, judging them to be the best possible ones for their society.

Positive attitudes of citizens towards parties in general and in comparison to other state institutions increase the likelihood of party system stability. It signals that people are satisfied with the way parties are performing their democratic functions, and if this is the case, then governance should be stable. Democracy is influenced by a variety of institutional and systemic conditions, but equally important is the role of the citizenry and their trust in the legitimacy of such a system.
Disaffection with parties has been common among the third-wave democracies, though some countries fair better than others.

According to recurrent polls carried out by the Razumkov Centre from 2001 to 2013, an average of only about 17 percent of Ukrainian respondents answered positively when asked, “Do you trust political parties?,” with less than 3 percent of respondents answering they “fully trust” political parties. The majority of respondents cited parties’ irresponsibility in fulfilling promises of election programs as their reason for mistrust followed by parties’ caring more about fighting for power than attending to the everyday needs of the people (Razumkov Centre, 2010, p. 27). In Georgia, public opinion is slightly more positive towards political parties with an average of 37 percent of respondents reporting a favorable opinion when asked, “How would you describe your confidence in political parties?” in recurrent opinion polls carried out by the International Republican Institute (IRI) between 2003 and 2013. These figures, while low in both countries, are stable over the past decade or so, not varying more than around ten percent. Despite the color revolutions being championed by political parties who promised democratic progress, parties are still viewed as having low levels of legitimacy in Ukraine and only moderate levels of legitimacy in Georgia. The result is instability in the party systems as the party system presents more as an artificial “superstructure” over society in whose abilities the public lacks confidence.

While parties fared rather poorly when it comes to public opinion, the primary institution which parties occupy – parliament – received more favorable reviews. In Ukraine, between 2000 and 2012, confidence in the parliament averaged about 28 percent according to recurrent polls carried out by International Foundation for Electoral Systems. While not approaching the 50 percent mark, those expressing confidence in parliament as a democratic institution is marginally higher than those who trust political parties. However, the Verkhovna Rada enjoys the lowest confidence levels of any

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institutions polled – including the media, military, President, and the Cabinet of Ministers. (See TABLE XI) Furthermore, opinion polls conducted by the Razumkov Centre between 2000 and 2012, show only around seven percent of Ukrainians answered “fully support” or “support certain activities” when asked “Do you support the activities of the Verkhovna Rada?” It is not uncommon for the legislative branch of government to be unpopular – November 2013 Gallup polls saw the U.S. Congress hit new lows in approval ratings capturing only nine percent (Newport, 2013). But while the U.S. is an established democracy, Ukraine is not and these polls show deep distrust not just in the democratic actors in Ukraine – the political parties – but the primary democratic institution – parliament.

**TABLE XI. CONFIDENCE/TRUST IN UKRAINIAN INSTITUTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2012</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2010</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2009</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2007</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2005</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2005</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2003</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2002</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2001</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov/Dec 2000</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Georgians hold much higher opinions about the work of their parliament with an average of just over 50 percent holding favorable opinions between 2003 and 2013 when asked, “How would

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you describe your confidence in the parliament?” by the International Republican Institute. Trust in parliament jumped drastically after 2004, from 18 to 54 percent, and then again in 2011, from 53 to 69 percent, increasing to a high of 82 percent in early 2013. Various factors have likely contributed to this increase in approval rating – the reduction of corruption, improved infrastructure and urban modernization, as well as increased foreign direct investment. Furthermore, the parliament passed constitutional amendments that transferred powers to the parliament, weakening the position of president, an issue of contestation during Saakashvili’s tenure. Political opposition is also increasingly recognized and accepted, which the smooth transfer of power following the 2012 parliamentary elections attests. While Georgian political parties still need time to individually develop and institutionalize, Georgia is proving more successful at consolidating democratic institutions and practices as witnessed with the 2012 parliamentary and 2013 presidential elections that saw peaceful transfers of power.

High voter turnout signals high levels of legitimacy as participation in elections attests to faith in democratic procedure. Voter turnout for all parliamentary elections in Ukraine and Georgia is 70 and 64 percent respectively. (See TABLE XII) These averages are well above that witnessed in Poland and Lithuania, 49% and 52% respectively. In the case of Georgia they are right at the average seen in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus and Ukraine’s average is actually one of the highest in post-communist Europe, similar to that seen in countries like Slovakia and Moldova. Interestingly, following the color revolutions, both Ukraine and Georgia see lower voter turnout than the post-communist average of 63 percent. Between 2006 and 2012, average turnout in Ukraine dropped to 62 percent. In Georgia, the average turnout fell to 59 percent between 2004 and 2012. This signals that while the color revolutions brought a change in political regime they did not increase the public’s belief in key democratic mechanisms, which undermines the party system’s legitimacy.


Voter turnout figures are author’s calculations as described in Chapter 3: Methodology.
Ukraine is weak-moderately institutionalized in the dimension of legitimacy with an overall lack of trust in the democratic actors, institutions, and procedures. Ukraine earns a score of three out of six in the dimension of legitimacy as trust levels fail to surpass 33 percent and voter turnout following the Orange Revolution fell to 59 percent. After the Orange coalition failed, people became disillusioned with the democratic promises most parties were touting. The result was a decrease in the average voter turnout and the election of the former Orange Revolution losers, Party of Regions, to parliamentary majority and the executive. This has affected democratic development by granting power to actors who do not accept the “rules of the game” – democratic norms and beliefs. As parties are the main institution for political contestation, failure of actors to accord them legitimacy weakens the prospects of democratic survival. While Georgia continues to see new parties emerge and inexperienced politicians assume the highest political ranks, there remains faith in democratic institutions and procedures. Georgia is considered moderately institutionalized in the dimension of legitimacy. The country earns a score of four out of six, as both trust levels and voter turnout fall.
between 33 and 65 percent. While political parties still lack adequate development, the regularity in the party system is building trust and confidence with fair elections encouraging public participation. Georgia is considered moderately institutionalized in the dimension of legitimacy.

D. Mutual Acceptance Among Parties

Party system institutionalization also entails mutual acceptance between political parties – that is the interactions and relationships between parties. Parties accept the opposition as legitimate competitors and do not try to dominate the party system by restricting competition. Sartori posits,

Parties make for a “system” only when they are parts (in the plural); and a party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from interparty competition. That is, the system in question bears on the relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function (in a mathematical sense) of the other parties and reacts, competitively or otherwise, to the other parties. (1976, p. 44)

In parliamentary democracies, it is accepted that multiple parties will compete and in the end share power according to vote capture. This has become standard practice because parties perceive each other as legitimate competition. However, in post-communist Europe there is still a struggle to accept any form of opposition. How this impacts the party system is crucial, as Randall and Svasand (2002) note, because the way parties interact and react to the actions of others, and how policy and tactics are formed based off these interactions, impacts whether the party system can operate as a functioning, responsive whole. Interactions refer to coalition building and dissolution, as well as cooperative vs. competitive behavior (Casal Bertoa, 2011). It is crucial for the functioning of the party system that parties have the potential to build and maintain trustful working relationships. While competition is a defining feature of a healthy party system, conflict is not. Functional coexistence is the goal, which is characterized by both peaceful relations and recognition of the opposition.

In Ukraine, the party system is defined by political infighting and the manipulation of electoral law. Following the election of President Yanukovych in 2010, there was a consolidation of power, fragmentation and persecution of the political opposition, and a weakening of all government institutions (U.S. Congress, 2011). Since the Orange Revolution there has been no lasting progress as concerns the party system. The first attempt to control how parties compete was seen with the
banning of party coalitions (or electoral blocs) prior to the 2012 parliamentary election, which was meant to weaken opposition groups, thus favoring the ruling Party of Regions. Opposed to accepting political opposition, Party of Regions persecuted them with the following figures having been arrested or under-investigation as of 2011: Volodymyr Ivashenko – former Acting Minister of Defense, Ihor Didenko – Deputy Head of Naftogaz Ukrainian Energy Company, Mariya Kushnir – Chief Accountant at Naftogaz, Tatyana Grytsun – Deputy Head of State Treasury. Furthermore, Yuriy Lutsenko, former Interior Minister, was sentenced in 2012 to four years in jail for embezzlement and abuse of office (though being pardoned by President Yanukovych in April 2013) and former Prime Minister/leader of the opposition All Ukrainian Union – Fatherland (Batkivshchyna), Yulia Tymoshenko, was sentenced to seven years in prison after being found guilty of numerous charges related to abuse of power. Tymoshenko was not the only party leader Yanukovych tried to bar from politics. In November 2013, President Yanukovych signed into law legislation that would prevent permanent foreign residents in a foreign country from being considered a resident in Ukraine. This move specifically targeted UDAR’s Vitaliy Klychko, who had spent several years living and paying taxes in Germany where his sports promotion business is based. According to Ukrainian law, a presidential candidate must be a Ukrainian resident for the ten years prior to the election, so the passing of this new law was an attempt by Yanukovych to eliminate another political opponent. Klychko also reported that during private negotiations during the Euromaidan uprising, Yanukovych threatened to dismiss the parliament removing Klychko’s, and all other deputies, parliamentary immunity (Klychko, 2014). Party of Regions is not the only party that fails when it comes to mutual acceptance of parties in Ukraine. As found in the previous chapter on party institutionalization, it is not uncommon for parties to be founded by leaders to advance their own interests. This creates issues with leadership where there is a mistrust of political parties, rampant dishonesty, and overall fear of competition.

The absence of acceptance and respect between parties is also evident in the way they address and/or speak about each other publically, especially if there are attempts to delegitimize the competition. A large failure of the Orange Coalition was its inability to work together due to
Yushchenko’s and Tymoshenko’s personal egos and inherent distrust. In 2009, the Kyiv Post reported then Prime Minister Tymoshenko giving her opinion on President Yushchenko in which she stated, “all people have seen that the president is not of the kind of the leader they need when Ukraine is undergoing a test for strength under the strikes of the powerful world economic crisis” (“Tymoshenko slams…,” 2009). Personal rivalries between former Orange allies did not end with their failed government either, as Yushchenko supported Tymoshenko’s sentence that saw her imprisoned from 2011 to 2014. As Kuzio (2011b) posits, such behavior “reveals political immaturity, a lack of dignity and willingness to prioritize personal revenge over Ukraine’s national interests.”

While much of the criticism directed at Yanukovych is valid, the way other politicians spoke of him demonstrated their complete lack of respect toward him as President and his party. Oleh Tyahnybok, leader of Svoboda, has called PR a “gang” and made claims that Yanukovych is trying to “revive Stalinism” (“Thousands rally…,” 2013; Svoboda party website 13 January 2014).

Such hostility and disrespect, often illustrated through physical fighting in Parliament, points to a lack of acceptance between political actors that hinders effective governance by undermining the functioning of the party system. According to Karina Korostelina (2014), Ukrainian politics typically employs something called divergent insults, which emphasize core differences between political parties based on cultural, ethnic, and/or regional differences. This has consisted of Eastern Ukrainian based political parties and politicians, notably PR, connecting Western Ukrainian nationalism with fascism and the Nazis. Western Ukrainian based parties, particularly Orange coalition members, retaliated by claiming parties based in Eastern Ukraine supported Soviet ideology and Stalinist ideas. In the case of Ukraine, political parties trade insults that are meant to preserve social boundaries, Western Ukrainian nationalism versus Eastern Ukrainian Soviet nostalgia. Political parties’ use of such historically based insults creates a lack of cohesion in the party system. Instead of accepting each other a part of a congruous whole, working together for Ukraine’s democratic future, political parties continue to use historical legacies to reject each other’s validity further contributing to the fractionalization of the party system.
In Georgia, mutual acceptance of parties has also been plagued by hostility and fighting. Periods of hyper stability where one party ruled and opposition parties played little to no role in politics created a conflict between ruling and opposition groups. Coalitions between small opposition parties have therefore been common, where even if parties did not share similar policy preferences they would politically ally to challenge the ruling regime. Interactions between parties must be understood differently than in Ukraine, as only recently with UNM has a party that lost power continued to exist and become part of the opposition. More than ever before in Georgia, parties are actively participating in elections and are eager to contest parliamentary seats (U.S. Congress, 2011, p. 11). The 2012 parliamentary election was a turning point in interparty competition and interaction. UNM continued to exist, compete, and recognized opposition wins both in parliament and presidential elections. Still, the way parties attack one another by using legal means underlines residual issues that need to be addressed if the party system is to continue to develop. In order to limit the financial capacity of Georgian Dream’s parliamentary campaign, Saakashvili’s government levied $125 million in fines at Ivanishvili, his companies, his political allies and donors for illegal donations and vote-buying without due process and in an intimidating manner, according to the OSCE, in order to deter other potential donors (Fairbanks and Gugushvili, 2013, p. 121). In what can be interpreted as retaliatory behavior, Ivanishvili had several dozen members of Saakashvili’s government prosecuted after Georgian Dream came to victory in 2012 on the usual charges of corruption and abuse of power (Dolidze, 2013). These undemocratic techniques of seeking political retribution have to be abandoned if the party system is to institutionalize. Additionally, while party competition is beginning to be accepted on the national level, local politics are still underdeveloped with Georgian Dream Coalition members seizing control of local apparatuses following their national victory without legitimate claims to those offices.

The lack of mutual acceptance of parties is also illustrated by parties’ attempts to delegitimize each other publicly. From 2004 to 2012, UNM dominated government and Saakashvili could afford to disregard opposition parties. Once Georgian Dream won the 2012 parliamentary elections and a year of cohabitation began, some substantial flaws in interparty-relations became
visible. Perhaps the most notable example was in August 2013 when Prime Minister Ivanishvili and President Saakashvili made a rare joint appearance on a U.S. naval ship visiting the coastal town of Batumi. During the speeches made at the reception, the President suggested that Ivanishvili either “does not love Georgia or has other kind of problems or is in alliance with Georgia’s enemy [Russia]” (“Saakashvili, Ivanishvili…,” 2013). When the topic moved to Georgia’s 2008 war with Russia, Saakashvili stated that Georgia does not bear any responsibility, but PM Ivanishvili interjected saying “Georgia bears no [responsibility], but you do, you personally.” A fight that erupted in parliament during mid-December 2013, also points to the political immaturity of the Georgian party system. After UNM MP Giorgi Baramidze discussed standing in solidarity with the Ukrainian demonstrators who had been the victims of police brutality, GD MP Soso Jachvliani commented that it would be better if first they condemned the use of force by Saakashvili’s government against protestors in November 2007 and May 2011 – words which ignited physical confrontation (“Brawl erupts…,” 2013). Georgian Dream, despite continuously condemning UNM and Saakashvili’s dominance of government for nearly a decade, is proving equally intolerant of the opposition. Prime Minister Garibashvili expressed a clear intolerance for the opposition when he remarked that “we will not allow” victory of a political force other than the ruling GD coalition in local elections set for June 15, 2014 (“PM slammed…,” 2014). While democratic rules of competition have been followed in practice, comments like this demonstrate that political parties have not yet internalized respect for building a competitive political regime. Until political parties come to accept one another as legitimate political alternatives, the party system cannot institutionalize and create predictable patterns of competition.

All democracies have a level of inter-party hostility; in the U.S. this is most commonly illustrated through negative campaigning. However, analyses of party system institutionalization needs to ask under what conditions the lack of mutual acceptance between parties becomes destabilizing to the party system. This study sets this limit at (1) when ruling parties try to legally restrict competition and/or (2) delegitimize the competition to where it impacts potential for fair competition (i.e.: unlawfully imprisoning, bringing inflated charges against, or summoning for
questioning key opposition figures). Frequent attempts to restrict competition through the jailing of opposition figures, the creation of laws to restrict how parties are allowed to compete, in addition to the introduction of new laws intended to limit who is eligible to compete for certain political offices, leaves Ukraine weakly institutionalized in the dimension of mutual acceptance of parties. I thus score it a two out of six for this dimension. Interestingly, a 2009 public opinion poll by the Razumkov Centre asking people “how likely Ukrainian politicians are to violate law in their struggle with political opponents,” found that 46% responded that it is not only likely, but occurs often, 37% said that it very likely, 6% said that is unlikely, and 1% that it doesn’t occur.49 While coalition building is common, the Orange Coalition stands as a cautionary tale about leader-based parties’ ability to work together. Yanukovych’s increasing authoritarianism gave the parties a common enemy to ally against, the Party of Regions, but with his exit from politics it is difficult to foresee if parties will deepen their respect for one another or return to the hostile fighting that proven disastrous for the Orange coalition.

Georgia, alternatively, can be considered moderately institutionalized as concerns mutual acceptance of parties, for which I score it a four out of six. While both political organizations and elite actors continue to struggle with political acceptance of one another, they are largely abiding by democratic rules of competition and learning how to effectively compete given electoral constraints. Part of why Georgia score higher than Ukraine in this dimension, is due to the dominant party system in place immediately following the Rose Revolution, which marginalized the opposition. However, with the election of Georgian Dream there are renewed concerns over the ability of the opposition to freely compete, as key figures within UNM have had various political changes brought against them. Georgia is still adjusting to having an active multi-party system, and while stability is slowly developing, parties are still adjusting to the idea of inter-party acceptance. According to one political party consultant in Tbilisi, progress in the party system will require parties to develop tolerance for

49 “Наскільки ймовірно, що українські політики можуть порушити закон у боротьбі з політичними оппонентами?” http://razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=449
E. **Summing Up the Systems**

As Casal Bertoa (2011, p. 4) posits, the party “system involves something more than the sum of its component parts” (i.e. Political parties). Party systems have their own unique attributes that consist of patterns, interactions, and values. When institutionalization of the party system occurs, these patterns and interactions have a predictability and rhythm. Furthermore, the system gains a sense of legitimacy and values become ingrained. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) found that low levels of party system institutionalization led to unstable governance. Party system institutionalization is not a zero-sum measure though, and achievement has to be assessed in degrees. Ukraine and Georgia demonstrate similar levels of moderate institutionalization, however the results are rather mixed as concerns which dimensions are responsible for each country’s successes and failures.

1. **Ukraine**

Ukraine’s party system suffers from moderate levels of electoral volatility, legitimacy is low, and competition is far from accepted. The party system, therefore, is only moderately/weakly institutionalized. Electoral volatility is more dispersed between type A and type B in Ukraine, which points to a positive trend of stability among a core set of parties with the entrance and exits of fewer parties to the system. Opposed to wholly disregarding a party once it losses power, Ukrainians are trying to find the right combination of old and new parties to run the government. Electoral volatility scores show that while not all parties have found their natural levels of support, a majority of voters do have party preferences. However, there is still doubt concerning voter attachment to parties, due to the primacy of personalities when it comes to elections.

Beyond volatility, legitimacy provides a great deal of information about the state of the party system in Ukraine. Low levels of legitimacy attest to the fact that Ukrainians are somewhat disillusioned with democracy and reluctant to accept political parties as the deliverers of it.

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50 Author’s interview with political party consultants, Tbilisi, March 2013.
Following the underwhelming success of the Orange Revolution, Ukrainians have seen democratic backsliding. The result is skepticism concerning political parties’ abilities and institutions’ capabilities of producing a democratic system. Elections are not well trusted with only 40 percent of those polled in a 2012 IFES survey responding that the elections would be either fully, or somewhat free and fair. This figure is barely higher than that found in pre-Orange Revolution polling when 31 percent of respondents reported that elections would be somewhat free and fair. Additionally, turnout declined since Orange-clad protestors took over the Maidan with only 55 percent of the population participating in the 2012 parliamentary elections – the lowest in the country’s history.

Intertwined with this are low levels of mutual acceptance of parties where competition tends to be collusive or combative. The problem with this, according to Norden (1998), is that inter-party fighting, or defeating one’s rival, overtakes the importance of democratic practice. While competitive elections stimulate accountability, the combativeness in Ukraine stifled the opposition and led to attempts to restrict competition.

2. **Georgia**

Georgia’s party system can be considered at best moderately institutionalized as it continues to experience moderate levels of electoral volatility and it cannot find stable patterns of competition. A major problem for Georgia is that parties have not been deeply rooted in society, disappearing overnight, which injects a high level of instability into the party system. Political parties are highly valued in Georgia, though, and since the Rose Revolution public approval of the parliament has drastically increased as well. Overall, the party system is currently more stable than that in Ukraine and exhibits potential for further development. (See FIGURE 2)
FIGURE 2. Party Systems Compared

A weak party system hinders a country’s ability to achieve democratic consolidation, however the strength of Georgia’s party system is that while it may have shortcomings in terms of regularity, democratic rules are slowly taking root and the system is beginning to function accordingly. Opposition parties are engaging in the political process and seats in government are contested, which is having an overall positive effect on parties’ by forcing them to define a clear message and reach out to Georgian society (U.S. Congress, 2011). Huntington (1968, p. 12) described institutionalization as “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.” Stability within the party system has yet to come, but democratic procedures have already acquired value and Georgian politics increasingly resemble a hybrid-democratic regime than the politics of its neighbors, with the exception of Turkey.

F. Implications of Weak Party System Institutionalization

In addition to political party institutionalization, party politics is also concerned with the extent to which a party system is institutionalized. Whether the party system is stable or fragmented has direct impact on whether democratic progress occurs. If party systems are volatile, not embedded in society, and lack cross-party cooperation, democratic politics become erratic and as Mainwaring and Scully (1995) stress, governing becomes more complicated. Furthermore, institutional
constraints are also important for increased levels of institutionalization. Changes to electoral law and form of government affect how parties compete, predictability in election results, and the possibility for coalition building. A party system can be identified as patterns of interactions, and these interactions create boundaries for the decision-making process through precedent. Political parties are the primary institutional agents of democratization, and the party system must foster the negotiation and compromise that is necessary for consolidation.

Democratic consolidation relies on stable democratic practices from parties as it lends legitimacy to the party system as a whole. The mixing of business and politics in Ukraine has introduced high levels of corruption, which raise questions about the overall legitimacy of the party system. Even parties in Ukraine that strive toward cleaner politics – Svoboda and UDAR – still compete in a system where opposition leaders can be imprisoned for the purpose of easing the consolidation of power. Additionally, since the 2004 Orange Revolution, an “East versus West” narrative increasingly dominated Ukrainian politics and party identity. Western Ukraine, where Batkivshchyna and Svoboda are strong, is seen as nationalists pushing pro-European agenda and using the Ukrainian language (Kuzio, 2011a, p. 227). Eastern Ukraine, where Party of Regions dominates, is focused on preserving the “paternalistic Soviet past” (Kuzio, 2010, p. 7). To some degree this is a bit simplified and its explanatory power overvalued, but the fact remains that Ukraine’s party system is fragmented and polarized which prevents consensus on long-term issues of national development and creates unstable patterns of interaction between parties.

Ukraine also faces the additional problem of individual parties’ commitment to democratization. Party of Regions is of specific concern as it has been a key political player following the Orange Revolution and enjoys stable levels of support, yet on too many occasions it discounts the worth of democracy and operates in an autocratic fashion. The decision of President Yanukovych not to initial the European Union Association Agreement in November 2013 in Vilnius,

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51 This “East vs. West” paradigm is a bit simplistic as Ukrainian parties cannot be divided so cleanly into either pro-Western or pro-Russian. To do so ignores other competing interests, particularly those of party leaders themselves. Additionally, most Russian speaking Ukrainians living in the country’s east and south identify themselves with Ukraine rather than Russia.
Lithuania, attests to the fact that he put his family’s business interests and his party’s interests before the interests of Ukrainian democracy. Yanukovych chose to align his foreign policy with Russia’s position in order to reap billions of dollars in financial assistance and avoid economic sanctions. Further, the use of deadly force by Yanukovych’s underlings running the power ministries against the protestors on Kyiv’s Maidan in early 2014 shattered any façade of democratic legitimacy. The use of violence by the government is also very troubling from the perspective of political system development because it suggests that Ukrainian political parties function within a fractured system that fails to commit to democratic rules and norms. As ousted President Yanukovych sits on an international most wanted list and Ukraine struggles to regain stability following Russia’s invasion and annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, there can be no doubt that the struggle for a democratic Ukraine is still ongoing even 10 years after the Orange Revolution.

In Georgia, a large deterrent to party system institutionalization has been marginalization of opposition parties. When the opposition is disenfranchised and the ruling parties rarely continue to exist once leaving power, this injects high levels of unpredictability in the party system. The major obstacle for Georgia going forward remains electoral volatility. “Party death” has been quite common and parties rarely take part or gain representation in consecutive elections (Nodia and Scholtbach, 2006, p. 103). This trend held for over 20 years of Georgia’s post-Soviet independence, but may be changing. Since 2012, UNM has given up power, but remained “alive,” and it continues to operate as part of the opposition. Additionally problematic are the way parties and politicians behave; being in the opposition has always been approached as a game of combativeness where any cooperation is tactical and not based on a common vision. The longer that the Georgian Dream coalition maintains political cohesion, the longer it proves that party politics can overcome individual egos. Furthermore, the change to a parliamentary system in 2013 is likely to assist in further party system institutionalization, as now political competition for power will reside within the legislature and force all parties to acknowledge one another as legitimate competitors. The key strength of Georgia’s party system, though, is that all parties are committed to further democratic development.

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52 Author’s interview with Professor Ghia Nodia, Ilia State University, Tbilisi, March 2013.
and European-integration – despite initial doubts that surrounded the long-term democratic goals of Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream. Georgia has always stood out from the other former Soviet republics, excluding the Baltic States, in that its democratic aspirations were genuine (King, 2004). However, despite this authentic desire for democracy, legitimacy within the party system remains low due to a lack of public confidence in the political elites’ ability to rule democratically.
VI: Contextualizing the Color Revolutions and Their Effect on Party Politics

“The Orange Revolution did not bring change – it brought the opportunity to achieve change”
(Yushchenko, 2008, p. 160)

A. Introduction

The previous chapters of the dissertation, Chapters Four and Five, measured levels of institutionalization among Ukrainian and Georgian political parties and the party systems. They highlight the importance of analyzing both the parts of the system and the system itself together. The variation between political party and party system institutionalization stems from the paradox of hybrid regimes – there is a combination of authoritarian and democratic elements that create uncertainty for a country’s political development. This chapter now returns to the color revolutions and analyzes these critical junctures that unfolded in two separate ways. This will allow comparison between the long-term effects each movement had on party politics. Institutionalization of political parties and the party system is important for the deepening of the democratization process as it signals political stability and efficiency. By analyzing the political preconditions in Ukraine and Georgia as well as tangible reforms following the color revolutions, this chapter offers a context to address some of the problems hindering institutionalization and democratic progress.

As electoral fraud was the tipping point that led to mass mobilization, party politics was naturally at the center of the color revolutions. While Ukrainians and Georgians had long been growing dissatisfied with the political and economic situations of their countries, it was the discrepancies in voter turnout and exit polling that brought people to the streets. Electoral fraud has occurred in many countries, what was different about the color revolutions was that they spurred a massive reaction to perpetuating problems, which in the cases of Ukraine and Georgia was the presidential abuse of power. The color revolutions were social movements that disrupted the political status quo, which was growing increasingly undemocratic. The movements formed around opposition parties, though civil society and international actors were also key players. The short-term
goal of the opposition was to have the fraudulent results overturned, but the larger aim was to
decisively alter regime dynamics and confront general democratic deficits. Specifically, the
revolutions brought the main political cleavages to the surface. Issues such as “corruption,
clientelism, underdeveloped political parties, and lack of transparent decision making” would require
more than mass protest though, and the victors of the color revolutions would be responsible for
enacting extensive political reforms (Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009, p. 1405). These specific issues
are obstacles to democratization as they are symptoms of weak political party and party system
institutionalization. Weak levels of institutionalization generally result from the social, cultural,
economic, and political contexts of a given country. The Orange and Rose Revolutions brought
regime change, but democratic development would depend on how the political victors approached
the deeper ethno-regional, economic, and institutional problems afflicting party politics in Ukraine
and Georgia. What becomes apparent from this comparison is that many of the differences in how the
color revolutions impacted party politics, and thus democratic development, are due to differences in
the color revolutions themselves, specifically as concerns the extent to which they were able to alter
the existing regime dynamics.

B. Political Preconditions

1. The Kuchma era in Ukraine

Political corruption under former President Kuchma had become expected, but what
changed with the protests that erupted in the center of Kyiv following the fraudulent 2004
presidential election, was that Ukrainians finally felt they had a real modern political alternative –
Viktor Yushchenko – who could help build democracy in Ukraine. It was also the first time since the
1991 presidential elections that there was a leading candidate who was not from the Socialist Party,
the Ukrainian Communist Party, or who was previously a top official in the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. Rigged elections that saw Viktor Yanukovych declared winner, following last minute
upsurges in voter turnout in the East, were just the last in a series of efforts to steal the presidential
election from pro-Western candidate Yushchenko (Karatnycky, 2005, p. 36-37). In the six months

53 In 1990, political dissident Viacheslav Chornovil ran from People’s Movement of Ukraine.
prior to the elections, state-run media attacked Yushchenko’s character without allowing him the opportunity to defend himself. Travel restrictions prevented him from attending rallies, and he was poisoned with dioxin that nearly killed him and left him disfigured.

These political conditions—regional power plays, political corruption, abuse of executive power—defined Ukraine under Leonid Kuchma. Much of the Orange Revolution’s democratic prospects lay with the ability of political parties and the party system to create a well-functioning, stable, cooperative political environment. This would require addressing the regional divide that fragmented the party system, clan politics that crippled both party development and transparent policy-making (as discussed in Chapter Four), and developing the role of political parties. The success of the Orange Revolution was in large part due to its leadership. Tymoshenko, a former Chair of the Parliamentary budgetary committee and Deputy Prime Minister for the fuel and energy committee, used her charismatic personality to rally supporters, and Yushchenko, former Chairman of the National Bank of Ukraine and Prime Minister under Kuchma, was a personable, experienced politician who convincingly promised democracy. However, democratization requires leadership qualities that extend to more than just promises and personality; Ukraine’s political development demanded tangible reforms of state institutions and the economy.

Kuchma ruled for over a decade, from 1994 to 2005, during which time Ukraine was closer to a semi-authoritarian regime than a democracy. Political corruption was common, freedoms restricted, and pervasive violence against journalists and Kuchma’s political opponents was a grim reality. During the 1990s, oligarchic clans - informal groups of elites who promote their shared political and financial interests - emerged as political actors decreasing the role traditionally reserved for political parties. According to Kuzio (2005), in the early 2000s three large oligarchic clans controlled 150 of the 230 deputies in the Verkhovna Rada. Additionally, the Committee to Protect Journalists named Kuchma in the top ten worst enemies of the press worldwide in 1999 and 2001 (“Ukraine: Negotiating…,” 2003). Kuchma’s time in office was also marred by other scandals. The most notorious of these was the scandal known as “Kuchmagate,” which resulted in the first massive public protests since Ukraine’s independence. In November 2000, secretly recorded tapes were
revealed to the public that included an order by President Kuchma to “deal” with opposition journalist Georgiy Gongadze and founder of Ukrainska Pravda – a major national newspaper known for its investigative reporting – who had disappeared two months prior (Kuzio, 2005). His decapitated body was later found near Kyiv, sparking public outrage at the brutality of the crime, threat to free media, and illegitimacy of the Kuchma regime. As of 2014, no one has yet been charged with ordering Gongadze’s murder, which highlights a separate but related institutional problem in Ukraine – the judicial system. Ukraine’s judiciary remains one of the least trusted institutions, with only 21% of respondents having any confidence in it as of 2010. The judiciary remains dependent on the political power of the president, and requires massive overhaul before it can be considered independent and fair.

One of the biggest obstacles for Ukrainian democracy has been the lack of acceptance between parties and their failure to act in accordance with democratic rules. While competition for power is healthy in a well-functioning democracy, it can turn into political war in hybrid regimes like Ukraine. The contestation of power is important in democracies, and election season often sees politics get rather heated. However, in Western democracies this competition must fall within established legal parameters and those currently in power do not alter the rules of competition to eliminate their opposition. In countries like Ukraine, electoral law is more something to maneuver around than parameters that structure political competition. Additionally, the ruling elites’ attacks on other parties and political opponents are not just limited to smear campaigns, but entail persistent harassment and even imprisonment on false charges. Kuchma often used state administrative bodies, such as the tax administration to target pro-opposition businesses, which occasionally included detention or arrest. Similarly, Yanukovych went about arresting opposition figures after being elected president in 2010, most notably ex-Premier Yulia Tymoshenko.

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Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, regional political cleavages materialized in Ukraine and continue to create significant regional differences in party support (See TABLE XIII). Studies attribute this regional divide to various ethnic, cultural, economic and religious factors. The West tends to be more nationalist and pro-Western with the East being more nostalgic for the Soviet past and tolerant of authoritarianism in exchange for relative economic well being. This has resulted in conflicting regional identities, leading to a political stalemate where parties from eastern and western Ukraine are constantly trying to consolidate power and dominate their competition. Furthermore, this divide has allowed parties to ignore constructing ideological bases in favor of regional identities. Intertwined with regional identity is clan politics that see local businessmen buy their way into politics. Because of the extensive entanglement of business and politics in Ukraine, there is a perpetual question of do the oligarchs work for the politicians, or do the politicians work for the oligarchs. Necessary for Ukrainian democratic development was reducing and/or regulating business’ influence on party politics. While business interests are represented in politics in all liberal democracies, they have to act as a stabilizing force and cannot come at the expense of the public good. A further issue for Ukraine was the “strong-president” and “weak parliament” pattern that had developed under Kuchma. This diminished the role of parties, as did the mixed electoral system in place in Ukraine since 1998. Democratization of Ukrainian politics required political parties to play a larger role and not be overshadowed by individual oligarchs and the president.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Center</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Batkivshchyna</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Regions</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDAR</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svoboda</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of Ukraine</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentages are shown only for those parties that could pass the 5% electoral threshold in a given region.

2. Shevardnadze’s Georgia

Electoral fraud was merely the final offense in what was years of political misconduct by President Shevardnadze’s government. Prior to the 2003 Rose Revolution, Georgia was a borderline failed state where abuse of power, rigged elections, and corruption were common. Shevardnadze’s Citizen’s Union of Georgia (CUG) party dominated politics and power was held by a small group of political elites in Tbilisi. This had three major effects on the development of party politics. First, minorities were not represented in government and the central government lacked territorial control over the country. Second, “state capture” was the norm as political elites were concerned with protecting their own economic and political interests over the general interest of the people. Third, the government structure created a semi-presidential system where the majority of power rested in one man’s hands and opposition parties were marginalized.

The result of this political environment was that parties were weakly established in terms of organization and ideology, and the CUG itself was built around Shevardnadze’s personality. Clientelistic networks surrounded the president and he wielded his executive power to forge a group of political elites who ruled with little public participation and lack of transparency (Nodia and Scholtbach, 2006). Political corruption was the nuts and bolts of the political system; people would ask ‘how can I take control of a share of government and make money.’ Rule of law was near absent,
economic hardship meant that corruption was common, and those who had power could abuse it. The party system was stable only in the sense that politics were stagnant and the country was moving towards autocracy. Furthermore, electoral thresholds were kept at a high seven percent to maintain single party dominance and prevent opposition groups from entering government. The rigged parliamentary elections of 2003 were evidence of the lack of a competitive party system, but electoral fraud was a byproduct of the political system that had been in place for over a decade. Even once Saakashvili received Shevardnadze’s resignation, changes to Georgian politics still required fundamental government reforms that would allow parties to function democratically. Saakashvili spoke of creating national unity, a modern economy, and European institutions, but could the Rose Revolution deliver all this?

C. Ethnic and Regional Divides

Sartori (1976) emphasized that parties make up a system only when they are part of a coherent whole. Societal cleavages, such as regional and/or ethnic divisions, can undermine this and the party system in general. A successful case of party system institutionalization is Sweden, where there is a discernable, cohesive system of parties. The Swedish party system is strong and has been stable over time. While party leaders and policy issues have come and gone, the ideological orientation remains the same since the system was founded some 90 years ago (Granberg and Holmberg, 1988). Furthermore, attitudes towards parties are stable and closely linked with voter behavior. It is important to note that ideology has acted as a stabilizer in the Swedish case, creating predictability. As traditional left-right ideology has been replaced by Ukrainian regional or Georgian ethnic interests, the systems lack fixedness and are increasingly defined by confrontation and volatility.

1. One Ukraine or many?

Free elections in Ukraine that see multiple parties compete are what Kuzio (2010, p. 96) terms, “pluralism by default,” as it is a product of regional diversity and not tolerance of opponents holding different political views. This specifically prevents compromise, as these parties are not working towards social integration but differentiation, which polarizes the party system.
Policy goals are derived from specific regional interests as concerns domestic and foreign policy and a compromised, balanced alternative is often not reachable, as it would undermine a party’s regional legitimacy. The Orange Revolution could not be expected to unite Ukraine, however, it was not expected to create further political divides. Following the Orange Revolution, tensions between parties were not just limited to Ukraine’s “East vs. West,” but Ukraine’s “West vs. West” due to the falling out between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. The new government, instead of trying to bring south-eastern Ukraine closer by exposing that part of the country to un-biased media, was embroiled in a power struggle, which ultimately undermined their democratic cause. Ukraine’s social divisions are deep, but ideally attempts would be made to bridge this divide by satisfying the concerns of voters nation-wide – such as inflation, poverty, and unemployment, which are routinely mentioned as the most serious problems facing Ukraine. By the end of Yushchenko’s term in 2010, the party system was more split than under Kuchma. However, Yanukovych’s presidency between 2010 and 2014 was polarizing enough to reunite the opposition in support of a pro-western Ukraine. This renewed East-West divide culminated in the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution in late 2013, following Yanukovych’s refusal, under pressure from Russian President Vladimir Putin, to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union. Euromaidan started as a wave of demonstrations in November 2013 on Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence square). The demonstrations reached a climax in February 2014 when clashes with government escalated and both protestors and police began firing on one another, leaving over 100 dead and hundreds injured. By 22 February the government fell and Yanukovych as well as many of his cabinet members fled Ukraine.

Ukraine is not the only country that displays marked regional divisions. The case of Belgium is also notable as there are distinct regional divisions between Flanders and Wallonia. In Belgium, however, even local competition is distinctly divided between Dutch-speaking and French-speaking parties, with the exception of the city of Brussels (Devos and Sinardet, 2012, p. 110). In Ukraine, the

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division is not as drastic; Party of Regions competes and attracts votes in western Ukraine on both the local and national level and Batkivshchyna is based out of central/eastern Dnipropetrovsk but is mostly popular in central and western Ukraine. National politics in Belgium see the inclusion of both Dutch-speaking and French-speaking parties, though there are still problems of cooperation. Linguistic cleavages are a stable element of the Belgium party system. However, Belgium is an extreme case of regional linguistic divide, and party system studies have found that there are actually two parallel subnational party systems that create political stability for the nation (Bardi and Mair, 2008). In Belgium, with the exception of Brussels, there is no electoral interaction between the Flemish and Walloon parties. In the Flanders region there is intense competition between the Dutch-speaking parties and in Wallonia strong competition exists among the French-speaking parties; therefore, the Belgium party system actually consists more of two sets of parties divided along linguistic lines than one cohesive party system. Still, what has been key for institutionalization is that political parties within the Belgium party system are rooted in traditional socio-political cleavages. The linguistic cleavage may be dominant, but also visible are an ethical-religious cleavage and socio-economic cleavage. Though somewhat similar cases of countries with pronounced regional divides, politics in Belgium developed rather differently than that in Ukraine. Linguistic differences are not the sole divider in Ukraine, and while they may be important for electoral politics they do not carryover to public policy (Hrycak, 2006). Furthermore, complex historical, cultural, and economic issues prevent a clear eastern-western Ukrainian political boundary from being established. An explanation for why many Ukrainian political parties adopt a populist, centrist platform is perhaps because it would be disadvantageous to build parties around socio-political cleavages that while present, are difficult to define and isolate.

Ukraine’s party system is undercut by societal cleavages, and this continues to prevent it from functioning as a cohesive whole. As Mainwaring (1999, p. 22) notes though, while societal-cleavages affect the party system, it cannot be underestimated how the state and political elites have shaped the system from above. In Ukraine, it has been this unwillingness of elites to cooperate and accept each other as legitimate competition that has further fragmented the party system. Regional divide in
Ukraine is based not just on elite conflict, however, it is a result of deep societal divisions. Language is seen as a divider in Ukraine, although it is not just the everyday language spoken, but a person’s native language or what Kulyk (2011) calls language identity. Furthermore, Kulyk finds this language identity is strongly associated with regional location and influences people’s views on other cultural and political matters such as foreign policy and historical memory, which in Ukraine have become political battlegrounds.

D’Anieri (2011) finds that regional divisions are a structural constraint in Ukraine that politicians and political parties have to combat. When Yushchenko came to power, he lacked any support in the East, which proved detrimental to his long-term success. For Ukraine’s democratic success, it is important that its political elite and political parties in power find some way to extend support spatially, which likely will come from a moderate centrist as opposed to a western nationalist or eastern Rusophile. The challenge is that such a party has not traditionally existed in Ukraine. Klychko’s UDAR may prove to be just this type of party if its pro-European identity can trump the East-West narrative. However, the party needs to continue to keep itself at a distance from Svoboda and Batkivshchyna if it wants to be seen as a legitimate political alternative.

The question of whether Ukraine’s regional divide is irreconcilable is difficult to answer. For example, in 2012 Razumkov Centre asked the public, “Lately, people say that Ukrainian society is divided into two antagonistic halves based on regional identity. What do you think?” While 16% responded that it was difficult to say, 41% responded that it exists and 40.5% responded that it did not exist. (See Figure 3) Some regional differences in response rates can be noticed, with the majority of respondents who do not acknowledge such a divide being located in the West and Center and the majority of those who responded it does exist being located in the South and then East. While this signals that there may be different regional understandings of what constitutes “antagonistic,” it does not confirm the existence of any type of territorial separatism.
FIGURE 3. “Lately people say that Ukrainian society has divided into two antagonistic halves based on regional identity. What do you think?”

What is relatively certain though, is that Ukraine will not become a monolingual, ethnically homogenous nation in the near future unless further annexation of eastern Ukrainian territory by Russia, such as of the Crimean Peninsula, continues to occur. If political parties cannot find a way to increase their territorial diffusion, then the question becomes how to perceive policy plans in a context that unites. Positions on foreign policy remain deeply divided as they are related to ethno-linguistic preferences that extend to culture – closer integration with the West vs. further reliance on Russia. It is not as easy as identifying a common threat, such as Georgia has done with Russia, because there are many Russian sympathizers in Donetsk and Slovyansk. Russian fostered instability in eastern Ukraine in April 2014 attests to the fact that those regions are penetrated by the Russian political, military and security forces who are interested in undermining the legitimacy of the central government in Kyiv by funding and organizing subversive activities of separatists in these regions that further challenge Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Alternatively, is the problem more endogenous, i.e. institutional? Would decentralization of power and the introduction of a federal system, such as in Belgium, help alleviate daily tensions that stall effective governance? Reconciling regional divisions via federalism is not without problems; Belgium may be a highly institutionalized country but it has gone periods of time (about a year) without a government. While this has not been destabilizing, it
points more to the unique ability of Belgium to manage internal conflict, which has been learned over centuries (Devos and Sinardet, 2012). The country controls conflict through power sharing and certain competences are reserved for the federal government (fiscal policy, justice, foreign policy, economy, energy) while other policy issues are handed down to the regional level. Ukraine is a much larger and politically immature country than Belgium though; creating more administrative structures and strengthening regional autonomy may only intensify political chaos and separatist efforts. A Razumkov Centre opinion poll carried out in late 2013, found that the majority of Ukrainians support Ukraine’s unitary system, with less than seven percent preferring a federal system and less than eight percent supporting any type of regional separation in Ukraine.58 While the party system may demonstrate regional fragmentation, it does not support any notions of regionalism (i.e.: separatism). Regional differences in Ukraine persist, but perhaps the country’s political success will eventually arise from acceptance of regional diversity and strength derived from maintaining Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

2. **Territorial integrity and Georgia’s ethnic minority**

Georgia is a multiethnic country that saw ethnic minorities make up 30 percent of its population when the Soviet system fell in 1991, though this has since decreased to around 16 percent due to the separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Nodia and Scholtbach, 2006, p. 63). If the Rose Revolution were to deliver democracy, it would need to address Georgia’s territorial divisions and provide for minority political representation that is an intrinsic part of Western-style politics. While this may be too much to expect from one political party, it would at least be necessary not to exacerbate existing regional tensions. Under Shevardnadze, the situations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were considered “frozen conflicts;” these regions were not acknowledged as autonomous independent states and they desired to breakaway, but violence was largely avoided. UNM opted for more aggressive strategies aimed at territorial cohesion, however they backfired, first in 2004 with the closing of the Ergneti market that resulted in negative economic impact on South Ossetians and

violent confrontation that left 22 dead (Wheatly, 2009, p. 128). Subsequently, in 2006, tensions between Tbilisi and Abkhazia escalated after the Georgian government turned Upper Kodori Gorge into a temporary administrative center ousting local leadership.

The final blow to efforts to restore territorial integrity came in 2008 with the five day war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia that left over 600 dead. Not only did all these efforts fail to bring South Ossetia and Abkhazia under Georgian sovereignty, but it highlighted the consequences of UNM’s aggressive nationalism. Territorial integrity is key for democratic independence, but UNM leadership’s impulsive attack on the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali not only gave Russia a pretext for invasion but demonstrated how unchecked executive authority threatened the legitimacy of political parties and democratic aspirations.

Ethnic divides inside of Georgian territory mostly concern Armenian and Azerbaijani minorities. These groups have become increasingly isolated due to language issues, as Russian language largely fell out of use following the collapse of the Soviet Union. For news and education, the minority groups have had to turn to their kin-state or Russia (Wheatley, 2009). In addition to being isolated culturally, these groups failed to be adequately represented in government either prior to or after the Rose Revolution, with a high of 16 ethnic minority MPs between 1995-2004 and recently 8 ethnic minority MPs elected in the 2012 parliamentary elections, out of a total 150 seats.\(^{59}\)

The issue is one of public space; the majority wants to consume the whole political sphere, leaving no room for minority interests. With the fall of the Soviet Union, ethnic issues came to the forefront of politics and a continuing problem with political parties is that very few are willing to discuss these issues. UNM touts its progress on minority issues, as it improved infrastructure in minority dominated areas, created recruitment programs to encourage minority employment in civil service, and attempted integration of minority groups. These efforts have not been without criticism though, and some see UNM’s real goal to be forced assimilation of minority groups.

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\(^{59}\) Three of these were majoritarian candidates from UNM and one from GD; the other 3 MPs were elected from the Georgian Dream party list. None of the 35 UNM minority candidates were elected from their party list, likely due to their remote positions. Interestingly though, UNM won in all ethnic minority dominated districts (“Minorities in…,” 2012).
An issue for party system development in Georgia is that sections of society still fail to be represented. The majority of parties are not formed around regional, ethnic, or religious cleavages. However, they are also not structured around socio-economic cleavages. There remains a populist mentality to attract votes via general rhetoric without building a specific voter base. Furthermore, Georgia continues to ban regional parties. By excluding regional-based parties this law effectively denies minority groups the right to form their own political representation. Minority groups are predominantly located in specific regions, Samstkhe-Javakheti for Armenians and Kvemo Kartli for Azeris. One of the most cited examples of a minority party being denied registration is Virk (old Armenian for Georgia). As this party was based in Javakheti it was considered a regional party and has been repeatedly turned down for registration since 1998 (Nodia and Scholtbach, 2006). As Diamond (1996, p. 23) notes, in a liberal democracy “cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups, as well as traditionally disadvantaged or unempowered majorities, are not prohibited (legally or in practice) from expressing their interests in the political process, and from using their language and culture.” While efforts have been made to protect minority rights generally, political inclusion remains minimal preventing further democratization. Additionally complicating the matter is that a large percentage of the ethnic minority population does not speak the official language, Georgian.

Parties attempt to attract minority support around election time by creating cooperative agreements with local elites, but this is only an option for the main political actors. In reality, minority interests are not represented, which results in an exclusionary party system.

D. Politics, Economics, and Corruption

1. Regional disparity and oligarchic Ukraine

Political corruption in Ukraine is a result of intertwined power and property that sees oligarchs, or financial-industrial groups, as powerful political players whose foremost goal is to protect their own economic interests. Oligarchs, which typically represent a specific regional clan, are traditionally weak sources of support for parties as they can be quick to withdraw their financial backing and switch political allegiances if their interests are not being protected. The Orange Revolution needed to make combating political corruption and diminishing the role of oligarchs a
priority if democratization was to succeed – something understood well by Georgian politicians following the Rose Revolution. The creation of democratic institutions requires the removal of Soviet institutional legacies, specifically the “close ties between enterprises and the state” (Johnson, 1997, p. 360). Following the revolution, the political elite accepted the rules and limitations of democracy, but only to the extent that it did not impact their business interests. When it came to reforming corruption at all levels of society, the results of the Orange Revolution can be understood as a missed opportunity. Neither elite level nor low-level political corruption was eradicated, neither was any institutional entity dedicated to combating corruption established.60

Ukraine is considered one of the most regionally, economically unbalanced countries in Europe (Mykhnenko and Swain, 2010). This economic regional divide mirrors the political divide that sees eastern and western Ukrainians overwhelmingly support opposing candidates in presidential elections. Economic growth was built upon inherited regional specialization from the Soviet era, which has led to territorial disparity in independent Ukraine (Mykhnenko and Swain, 2010, p. 143). Regional difference can in part be understood through statistics. (See TABLE XIV) In terms of gross regional product, the East is over 25% more affluent than the West. The wealthiest regions are Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk, all seats of prominent oligarchic clans (Åslund, 2005). Monthly income between Ukraine’s different regions is much more even, however, with the exception of Kyiv city where monthly income is over 40% higher than the national average. While eastern Ukraine does earn more than western Ukraine, the average income in the East is only 8% greater. What statistics are not inclined to reveal about regional differences, is that the major problem facing Ukraine is that of geographically bounded regional economies that depend on either exporting commodities and manufactures (East/South) or importing external capital (West/Center). As political parties represent regional interests, the economic rationality of political elites differs. Kuchma promoted an export-led model of economic growth that specifically benefited oligarchs in eastern Ukraine who were engaged in the steel and iron industries, while Yushchenko shifted to a finance-led model of economic growth.

60 For example in Latvia, the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau, KNAB, was established in 2002 to curtail the country’s escalating problem of corruption.
promoting increased FDI and service sector activities in western and central Ukraine, along with re-privatization (Mykhnenko and Swain, 2010; Åslund, 2009). Still, while differences in commercial interests spurred contrasting economic policy, all political elites similarly have been unwilling to restrict the power and influence of oligarchs.
### TABLE XIV. REGIONAL ECONOMIC STATISTICS BY OBLAST IN UKRAINIAN HRYVNIA (UAH) AND US DOLLARS (USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eastern Oblasts</th>
<th>Average Monthly Income 2013</th>
<th>GRP 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>UAH</strong></td>
<td><strong>USD</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>2878</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipropetrovsk</td>
<td>3337</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>3762</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhzhya</td>
<td>3148</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhansk</td>
<td>3342</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mykolayiv</td>
<td>3106</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odesa</td>
<td>2960</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumy</td>
<td>2706</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>2980</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>2474</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevastopol**</td>
<td>3119</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Oblasts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinnitsya</td>
<td>2656</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volyn</td>
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<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhytomyr</td>
<td>2571</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakarpatska</td>
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<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivano-Frankivsk</td>
<td>2690</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>3369</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirovohrad</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lviv</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poltava</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rivne</td>
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<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ternopil</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khmelnytskyi</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Chernihiv</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyiv city**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyiv City Average</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Average</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Average</td>
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<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Average</td>
<td>2934</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In millions unless otherwise noted.

** Denotes cities with special status that are considered separately from their oblast.

Under Kuchma there existed competitive oligarchy; first oligarchs they made their money from gas trade and then expanded their business interests from industry to banking and real estate, all while dominating government, parliament, and media (Åslund, 2009). Particularly a lack of economic reforms up until the early 2000s, allowed oligarchs to amass fortunes. The economic problem posed by Ukraine’s oligarchs is easily seen in a breakdown of GDP. An estimated 100 individual oligarchs, out of Ukraine’s 46 million population, control 80 – 85% of the GDP, with just 15% left for the rest of the 99.9999% of the population (Holoyda, 2013, p. 2). While there have been efforts to improve the business environment for small to medium size businesses, Ukraine’s economy still relies upon big business with SMEs contributing only 10-15% to GDP opposed to the average of 60% seen in the European Union (Holoyda, 2013, p. 5). Part of the problem in Ukraine is a result of the mutually supportive relations between state power and the oligarchs. Under Kuchma, Ukraine was moving closer towards authoritarianism than democracy and the presidency was becoming the key political institution, which allowed the rise and consolidation of the oligarchs (Puglisi, 2003). Kuchma offered economic benefits in return for elite support, which included privileged access to the privatization of state assets. Following the 1998 elections that saw business representatives assume 28 percent of seats in the legislature, the lines between politics and economics became permanently entangled. Oligarchs now had direct access to policy making and the presidential administration was able to offer protection of their interests. An inefficient tax system has also allowed oligarchs to build their fortunes with little paid back to the state. A recent testament to this is the 2013 Yanukovych tax reform, which introduced a system where “preferred” groups of businessmen – as determined by the state – would be exempt from paying taxes (Open Society Foundation, 2013, p. 16).

Following the Orange Revolution, not all oligarchs continued to rally around the president. Some such as Viktor Pinchuk left politics, while those in Donetsk began to create an informal
network built around Yanukovych and Party of Regions, while still other entrepreneurs, like Petro Poroshenko, who supported the Orange coalition acquired new oligarchic status (Pleines, 2009, p. 112-113). While the individual oligarchs influencing government changed to an extent, what did not was the fact that the political elite continued to profit from supporting the economic interests of wealthy businessmen.

All parties in Ukraine have some oligarchic backing, so any reforms that would target improper party financing or the shadow economy in general would be widely unpopular because money translates into power. Furthermore, the fractured party system would make consensus on such reforms near impossible (Kuzio, 2012). Instead of placing skilled, morally responsible government managers in power, Yushchenko left much of the old corrupt regime in place and the few new people who did come into power were not much different than their predecessors. For instance, Ukraine’s judicial system has long been considered highly corrupt, but Yushchenko was slow to change the inherited Prosecutor-General Sviatoslav Piskun. When Yushchenko finally dismissed Piskun at the end of 2005, he chose another Donetsk figure, Oleksandr Medvedko, who according to Kuzio (2012) lacked real understanding of Western-style rule of law. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index finds that the country made no long-term change in perceived corruption during the Yushchenko years, as the 2004 score was 2.2 and the 2009 score also 2.2 – where 0 means fully corrupt and 10 designates the absence of perceived corruption.\(^\text{64}\) Ukraine continues to struggle economically and the entanglement of business and politics is largely to blame. Where Ukraine stumbled following the Orange Revolution, was in not introducing proper reforms. The state needed to increase state revenues, for example by either co-opting the oligarchs, as was done in Georgia, and demanding financial contributions to the state or by instituting progressive taxation as seen in the United States. While it is difficult to hypothesize about the best way to stem oligarchic influence in Ukraine, and beyond the scope of this work, the country’s economic future largely depends upon combating this form of corruption.

\(^{64}\) Ukraine’s score improved during 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 to a high of 2.8, but then fully regressed by 2009.
Overall low economic growth and uneven regional development in Ukraine leads to the pinning of east vs. west, which prevents territorial cohesion but also results in fluctuating economic policy aimed at benefiting one group or another. Economic and social networks are regionally based in Ukraine, thus political organizations are built around them and tied to particular geographic areas and commercial interests. Thus when a certain party or political leader controls the national government, it is often viewed as a particular region dominating the country (D’Anieri, 2011). An ongoing problem for Ukrainian politics remains the entanglement of business and government. Politics in Ukraine continues to be about how much elites can seize in the short term, both in terms of power and wealth. This is possible because of weaknesses in party politics, particularly the absence of ideology. When parties lack a strong ideological base they have to find other means to attract support, and this is often done through patronage. Additionally, as voters likely lack strong party attachment due to the absence of shared values, they are more likely to trade political loyalty for financial benefits (D’Anieri, 2011). The reliance on oligarchs for support and financing, however, perpetuates weak political party institutionalization by hindering transparency and reliability. There remains a question of why this cycle of patronage developed and continues to persist in Ukraine. Delayed economic reforms and political liberalization in the 1990s allowed business and politics to develop an unhealthy codependence. Politicians found electoral and financial support in the business elite and the oligarchs were able to protect their economic interests via political connections; such relationships have continued into the 2010s. These alliances keep political parties weakly developed and allow the country’s economy to remain stunted due to the monopolization of key market sectors. While oligarchic influence on politics is unlikely to be eliminated, there needs to be some agreement concerning regulation so that individual interests are not prioritized over the collective, undermining democratic decision-making.

2. **Combating corruption and state-building in Georgia**

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the Caucasus countries were considered the most corrupt of the FSU republics. In particular, Georgia was plagued by political corruption and organized crime. As one UNM MP recounted, in 2003 over a third of the known mafia heads living in the
former Soviet Union republics were ethnic Georgians.\textsuperscript{65} Abolishing crime and corruption was a cornerstone of the Rose Revolution. Almost immediately, Saakashvili’s government began arresting corrupt, high-level officials and known criminals, which would continue for a couple years. Legislative changes allowed plea deals and the confiscation of property, which returned millions of US dollars to the Georgian national budget, though there is doubt about whether all confiscated money was recorded (Kukhlanidze, 2009, p. 226). Additionally, increased tax revenues from 15% of GDP in 2003 to 25.8% in 2007 increased the supply of public goods (Wheatley, 2009). While a zero-tolerance stance towards corruption is laudable, there is speculation concerning whether this policy was applied selectively and investigations always conducted ethically. Furthermore, at times Saakashvili used the fight against corruption to target political competitors, while turning a blind eye to abuse of power among his closest allies (Börzel and Pamuk, 2011).

Georgia stands as one of the few success stories in the former Soviet Union when it comes to battling corruption, particularly in relation to its color revolution counterpart - Ukraine. However, it is important to recognize the scope of this comparison, as Yushchenko and Saakashvili were not in similar positions to bring reform. Saakashvili and UNM possessed the agency necessary to restore the power of the state and reduce the amount of corruption and government mismanagement. Saakashvili chose to make a clean break with the past, removing Shevardnadze’s cronies from power. This was the benefit of having strong executive powers and possessing the majority of seats in government. Furthermore, UNM inherited a state on the verge of collapse, which not only made sweeping reforms necessary, but inevitable. Yushchenko took charge of an institutionally stable country that was not failing. Additionally, part of the compromise that saw the fraudulent elections overturned was the reduction of executive power, making Yushchenko a rather weak president. Lastly, as previously noted, much of the old corrupt regime officials in Ukraine retained their positions in government, which perpetuated the status quo of political corruption. Corruption was endemic to Georgia, but UNM proved that decisive reform given the right circumstances could fundamentally change an ingrained culture.

\textsuperscript{65} Author’s interview with UNM Minister of Parliament, Tbilisi, March 2013.
Organized crime was largely eliminated in Georgia following the Rose Revolution, which also diminished much of the illegitimate sources of party funding. By attempting to regulate all of big business though, the government began to control it and use harassment and threats to finance the state.66 Cleaning up the informal economy was an urgent task, and while the coercive manner of carrying it out was not ideal, it was arguably necessary. Parties were no longer able to offer direct incentives for joining, as was done in Shevardnadze’s system. While this made partisanship fickle, it helped (at least theoretically) to eliminate the ruling party’s unfair advantage. Years of political corruption left financial development of parties stunted, and for democracy to evolve parties would have to learn how to develop party financing. Additionally, as organizations they would have to learn how to attract voters based on their program and not the expectation of benefit.

E. Institutions

1. Instability in Ukraine

Institutional reform encompasses numerous areas, but this research is predominantly concerned with the constitutional division of power and parliamentary election rules. Following the color revolutions, of specific importance were who would hold power and how positions of power and authority would be allocated. When days of mass protest gave way to the invalidating of the fraudulent election results, a new election was scheduled but the outgoing regime forced the opposition to sit down and discuss constitutional amendments. Institutional reform topped the agenda at the end of Kuchma’s term, and the negotiated transfer of power gave the outgoing regime the opportunity to dilute the Orange victors’ power. Institutional reform was tied to the success of the Orange Revolution; the president’s powers would be drastically reduced and transferred to the parliament by the end of 2005. Parliament would play a new, increased role in Ukraine, which meant Yushchenko would not be able to direct political change alone. Power was shifted from the elite level to political parties and would increase the accountability of the ministries and legislature. This redistribution of power can be considered an improvement in democratic responsiveness, but its functioning relied upon the political dynamics. Parties would have to work together if they wanted to

66 Personal communications with representatives from Transparency International Georgia, 2013.
ease the political tensions between the east and west that the revolution incited. This highlighted the new role of the parliamentary majority coalition, which would have to create a majority program if coalition support was to be maintained (Christensen et al., 2005). This power shift created a political atmosphere more conducive to democratic development; however, it is not just institutions, but the actors that affect long-term results.

The second substantive institutional change that came with the Orange Revolution was the change to proportional representation (PR). The move to a fully proportional system placed more responsibility on parties, as independents could no longer run in majoritarian elections. Christensen et al. (2005) further note, a PR system sees a greater number of parties participate, which makes elections more competitive. This expands party options, which makes voters feel less alienated and in turn increases voter turnout while limiting opportunities for fraud. The electoral threshold also decreased from four to three percent, increasing the ease with which parties could enter government. Taken together, these institutional reforms created an opportunity to develop democratic stability but it would require political actors to work towards long-term goals and not short-term advantages.

While the institutions changed following the Orange Revolution, elite mentality did not; it was still “I” not “we” and “us vs. them.” Cooperation failed to materialize and not just between the Orange victors and the opposition, but within the ruling coalition itself. Yushchenko’s political coalition was an amalgamation of former Kuchma supporters, oligarchs, free-market libertarians, civic activists, and the social-democratic left (Karatnycky, 2005). While government transparency and media freedoms were immediately increased when Yushchenko took office, institutional stability was not. The first government following the Orange Revolution, chaired by Yulia Tymoshenko, was dismissed in less than seven months and the second government, led by Yuriy Yekhanurov, was also dismissed in less than a year. The result of this government instability was that matters crucial for democratic development – fighting corruption and effective judicial reforms – were neglected. Furthermore, this fragmentation among the ruling elites allowed the opposition, Party of Regions, to regroup and win the plurality of seats in the 2006 parliamentary elections. By 2006, Yanukovych had returned and was appointed Prime Minister until being replaced by Tymoshenko following the 2007
early parliamentary elections. Like previously in Ukraine’s history, the democratic forces lacked unity and placed their self-interests before the interests of the country. This chaos, battle of egos, failure to overcome regional divide and eliminate political corruption, resulted in failure of the pro-western elites to deliver lasting political change accorded to them by the Orange Revolution. Additionally, the party system became further fragmented with the splitting of the Orange coalition. In 2010, Yanukovych won the presidential elections, annulled the 2004 constitutional amendments, and began attacking the failed Orange leaders. Effectively, the country was politically no closer to democracy than it was six years prior.

2. **Redefining Georgia’s institutions**

The constitutional changes of 2004 consolidated power in the Georgian president’s hands and prevented even elected members of his own party from challenging him. Power corrupts, and by concentrating power this allowed Saakashvili, just like his predecessor, to abuse his presidential authority. This led some parties, such as the Republicans, that were part of the ruling coalition to break alliances with UNM. Saakashvili’s strong rule was not solely for personal gain, however, he was committed to state building and at times this came at the expense of democracy. Strong presidential power meant that reforms could be implemented quickly, but with little oversight and without deliberation. It is for this reason that Saakashvili’s legacy remains debated. UNM’s successes of cleaning up corruption, reforming the traffic police, and restructuring the higher education system can still be witnessed a decade later, but this was done at the expense of creating a competitive, balanced party system.

Constitutional amendments made in 2010 put in place drastic changes to the Georgian political system by shifting primary powers from the president to the prime minister. Changes went into affect following the 2013 presidential election, moving Georgia to a parliamentary-presidential model of government. Presidentialism has become highly criticized in contemporary scholarship when it comes to new democracies, as the parliamentary form of government is more prone to negotiation and internal party discipline (Karvonen and Anckar, 2002, p. 16). Critics, however, worried that this transfer of power would be reminiscent of the similar move made by Russian
President Vladimir Putin just prior to the end of his presidential term limits before he became prime minister. The change to a stronger parliament has thus far been successful in Georgia. Saakashvili peacefully transferred power over to his opponents following the 2012 and 2013 elections, and UNM has accepted its new role as the opposition. There has been a noticeable exiting from Georgian politics of charismatic figures since the end of 2013, and political parties are now functioning as the main political actors.

Changes to electoral law also affect how political parties compete as well as determine who makes it into government. Electoral law in Georgia has been relatively stable with a mixed system in place since 1990.67 Greater stability in the electoral system has allowed for more efficient strategy for competition among the political parties. Additionally, stability of the mixed system has created predictability in how parties compete. Prior to the Rose Revolution, the electoral threshold was set at seven percent, almost double the four percent that was set in 1990 when the country held its first elections. This was rather high, particularly as one party typically dominated the parliament. By maintaining this high threshold in the early years of their rule, UNM protected their parliamentary strength. However, by ignoring suggestions of the OSCE-ODIHR and Council of Europe to lower the threshold, UNM was also inhibiting fair representation. By 2008, UNM finally pushed through constitutional reforms that would lower the electoral threshold to five percent. This created more opportunities for the opposition that was traditionally relegated to a marginal role in government. The 2012 parliamentary elections attest to evolution in party politics since the 2003 Rose Revolution as there was peaceful transfer of power, the ruling party did not disappear, but became part of the opposition, and electoral rules were followed. Institutional changes following the Rose Revolution were slow in coming, but ten years later the country has created a more stable, competitive party system more poised to deliver democracy.

67 The number of MPs has changed a few times as have the amount of MPs elected by proportional representation and under the majoritarian system.
F. Party Politics After the Protests

The color revolutions emerged out of public dissatisfaction with established regimes that had been in place for a decade. The revolutions were examples of successful mass mobilization that changed the status quo, and yet they did not guarantee democratic consolidation. The specific challenge for democratization in Ukraine and Georgia after the color revolutions was to address socio-economic and institutional conditions that made democratic development difficult. Once the Georgians and the Ukrainians cleared the streets, having accomplished their part, democratization rested on the shoulders of the political elites and parties, which emerged victorious and whose task now was to represent their electorate. Party politics can have immense democratizing effects when institutionalized and functioning properly. If institutionalization is weak though, democratic consolidation while not impossible is unlikely to occur, as parties will struggle to act as intermediaries between state and society and party systems will fail to create predictability and bestow a sense of political legitimacy. Political parties are a key democratic institution as they articulate and aggregate public interests. Furthermore, a strongly structured party system can act as its own stabilizing force in an otherwise unpredictable political environment. Regional and ethnic divisions, political corruption, and institutional arrangements created preexisting conditions in Ukraine and Georgia that influenced political development. The impact these factors had on democratization was a result of the ways in which they affected party politics. This chapter concludes with a discussion on how the color revolutions shaped the direction of party politics in Ukraine and Georgia from 2004 to 2014 and the democratic implications.

1. Political parties

As concerns political party institutionalization, it is a party’s ability to develop its organization, build an ideological base, remain free from external influence, and become a lasting part of the political landscape that determines levels of institutionalization. The extent to which political parties have developed distinct ideological bases has remained unchanged by the color revolutions, and still points to a major weakness in both Ukrainian and Georgian politics. The Orange Revolution did little to alter political parties’ regional identities, which means that the majority of parties still lack
ideological bases and rely on regional support. While this does strengthen individual political parties, it is a major obstacle for party system development. Ukrainian parties have strong regional organizations and membership bases, but this fails to build-up national support. In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, regional tension was only exacerbated and even once aligned pro-Western parties fell victim to infighting. Instead of bringing democracy, the Orange Revolution brought chaos. In Georgia, the Rose Revolution failed to solve any problems of territorial fragmentation and Saakashvili’s aggressive reaction to Russian provocations in South Ossetia only led to further loss of territorial control. Additionally, no genuine efforts were made to expand political party representativeness to minorities. Georgian political parties remain geographically centralized and Tbilisi continues to be the main political battleground. Parties lack regional offices and membership is fickle, which creates vulnerability. Georgian parties have been rather ambiguous and inconsistent on issues of ideology, preferring charismatic figures. This keeps parties weak with no reliable constituency, thus making them poor political representatives. In order for Georgian parties to build-up their member bases, and create a more inclusive party system, they need to start focusing on distinct social interests. This means finding ways to work with minorities and not just attempting forced assimilation with the majority.

Ukrainian parties’ tendencies to construct regional identities and ally with oligarchic clans is mutually reinforcing when it comes to weak institutionalization. Ukrainian political parties largely accept the role business plays and continue to rely upon oligarchs for funding and shoring up support. First, this does not allow a deep party culture to develop and second, it keeps parties reliant upon the business elites and indebted to them. This prevents decisional autonomy, as policy-making is constrained by business relationships. The Orange Revolution may have been a reaction against political corruption, but it did little to change this practice. Lack of cooperation among the Orange victors themselves, let alone with the opposition, made combating corruption impossible. Major reforms are needed not just to the judicial system and other state bodies but to party financing law. This means those who currently benefit from corruption must vote to eliminate it. This proves rather difficult for Ukraine, as political figures tend to be self-serving and primarily interested in the
immediate political and financial benefits of holding power. The result has been weak political will among politicians to undertake radical reforms for the sake of long-term national benefit, as it will likely affect short-term popularity and oligarchic backing. The Rose Revolution impacted party politics in just the opposite manner; it strengthened the individual capacities of political parties by largely eliminating corruption and organized crime in the decade that followed. This helped to legitimize individual parties over time and encourage voter participation, as a decrease in political corruption increases the amount voters’ feel they can genuinely affect the political system.

During the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili preached change, and he delivered concrete results by tackling corruption. The significance of this change is evident in political parties and the increased efforts to develop party organizations separate from the state and their attempts to transform into reliable institutions that espouse democratic goals. This has been a big challenge for UNM who undeniably benefited from state resources while in power, but continues to develop and re-brand itself since being voted out. The President and a clientele network previously ran Georgia, but parties have now taken the political reigns and are the primary decision-makers, whom voters can hold accountable.68

2. **Party systems**

Political parties make-up the party system, but it is interactions among the political parties that affect levels of party system institutionalization. When political party institutionalization varies among individual parties, as it does in both Ukraine and Georgia, the party system provides the structure that directs democratization. The color revolutions were expected to create and maintain institutional changes that would impart stability and legitimacy onto the party system.

Political party institutionalization in Ukraine increased only marginally following the Orange Revolution due to the lack of reforms that were brought. While there were increases in parties’ political strength, development of party organizations remained low. Political parties have therefore become deterministic for the party system, contributing to stalled democratic development. The

68 Ivanishvili’s control over GD-DG continues to raise concern though, as it would be very easy for the country to slip back into old habits - letting clientelism resurge.
inability or refusal of parties’ to adapt and reshape their organizations, contributed to a malfunctioning party system. Democratic development in Ukraine, therefore, heavily relied upon the effectiveness of the institutional changes that came with the constitutional amendments adopted during the Orange Revolution. Interestingly, Georgia has seen major increases in party system institutionalization following the Rose Revolution. While this seemed unlikely at first, due to Saakashvili’s authoritarian-like grasp on power, over time the country adopted lasting institutional changes that redistributed power and eased competition making political parties the main political actors. While such changes were slow to be realized in Georgia, a decade later the country boasts a much more competitive party system that has developed stronger checks and balances.

An eastern-western Ukrainian regional divide has fractured the party system and the Orange Revolution was not prepared to address this. Internal fighting over power within the Orange coalition only added to combative relationships between parties by further splintering pro-Western parties. Political infighting by both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko led to poor government coalitions and overall lack of reform. While the 2004 constitutional amendments created a more democratic system on paper by dispersing power, they only further entrenched divisions within the party system (O’Brien, 2010). Yushchenko was a weak transitional leader who failed to address pre-existing tensions, but all parties failed to seize the opportunity brought by the regime change and build stability and cohesion in the party system. Furthermore, the inability to cleanly break with the previous regime left many of Kuchma’s cronies still occupying seats in government after the revolution, which restricted the potential for democratic reform.

Kuzio (2011a) terms Ukraine an “immobile state,” because a tolerance for corruption, willingness to bend rule of law, and refusal to implement necessary economic and political reforms has created path dependency where the outcome of elections does not largely change Ukraine’s democratic development. Instead of delivering democracy, the Orange Revolution created disenchantment among the electorate with the political leaders that were supposed to deliver it. The weakness of the Orange leaders to reform the state led to voter disillusionment and a general dissatisfaction with the outcome of the revolution. A 2008 poll conducted by the Razumkov Centre
found that only 21.4 percent of respondents thought Yushchenko performed his duties as president better than Kuchma, while 24.5 percent felt Kuchma performed them better. This aligns with the results of both the 2010 presidential elections and the 2012 parliamentary election, where the Orange victors came up short and formerly disgraced presidential candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, took over government along with his party.

When Yanukovych was elected president in 2010, he quickly consolidated power and reversed the previous constitutional amendments as if pressing a reset button that made him the legitimate winner of the 2004 fraudulent elections. The 1998 constitution was reinstated and power was returned to the president, diminishing the role of parliament and opposition parties. Any institutional progress made by the Orange Revolution, even if not yet realized, was undone. Kuchma’s scion went a step further though, in de-legitimizing the party system by outlawing electoral-blocs to stifle competition. Due to Yanukovych’s authoritarianism, the fragmented party system actually found unification among the opposition. While Yanukovych’s decision to outlaw party coalitions was meant to reduce the power of the opposition, it had the counter effect of allying them – with Svoboda, Batkivshchyna, and UDAR all rallying against PR. This alliance has important implications for the party system, as it demonstrates that parties are learning to trust each other and work together for political change, something that failed to occur immediately following the Orange Revolution. However, a stable, legitimate, cohesive party system is still far from being institutionalized in Ukraine. Specifically, the release of Tymoshenko in February 2014 and her impending return to politics creates speculation that Ukraine’s party system will again fracture. Such a charismatic and polarizing figure is unlikely to work with either Svoboda’s Tyahnybok or UDAR’s increasingly popular Klyuchko. The fear is that it will become not just Lviv and Kyiv vs. Donetsk and Odessa but every politician for themselves, leaving voters once more disenchanted with the democratic process.

69 12.6% found it difficult to answer and 41.4% could not decide whether either was better than the other.
70 Yulia Tymoshenko’s party was part of a larger bloc bearing her name, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc. By outlawing such an organization PR hoped to split the opposition’s vote during election and remove familiar “party” names from the party lists.
The success of the Rose Revolution can in part be measured by its ability to create a balanced party system that sees an effective number of parties compete. Georgia’s tradition of a “party of power,” that is one dominant party, restricted party competition and delegitimized the party system. Nodia and Scholtbach (2006, p. 99) finds that Georgian parties did not establish themselves as the “principle players in political life” following the collapse of communism, and therefore they did not feel obliged to develop strong organizations that would endure and compete in consecutive elections. Since 1990, one party held all the political power and the opposition was of little relevance. The strengthening of the executive branch following Saakashvili’s presidential win did little to change the unbalanced party system. The 2010 constitutional amendments that curbed presidential powers and increased the responsibility of parliament are proving beneficial to the party system, however. By strengthening the role of parties, the opposition has an increased role in governing and authoritarian-like leadership is being avoided.

One of the strongest attributes of Georgia’s party system is that all parties are committed to further democratic development and European-integration – despite initial doubts that surrounded the long-term democratic goals of Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream. This creates a common goal among parties that can stabilize the party system. Still, these goals should not obscure the value of ideological diversity among parties. Parties need to crystalize around programmatic cleavages and minorities need genuine representation, two things the Rose Revolution failed to encourage. While part of the hindrance to minority representation may be Georgia’s mixed electoral system, the party system should not be accessible to only the majority (Lijphart, 1991). However, this stems from a larger problem within Georgia’s party system, which is a low level of polarity. The dominant parties are still largely centrist and directed by charismatic leaders, while smaller programmatic parties like the Republican Party or the Free Democrats are overshadowed due to their small constituencies. A major obstacle for Georgian democracy will be to create a more balanced party system that is not constantly divided into “party of power” and opposition.

A significant weakness in Georgia’s party system is that there has traditionally been limited political space for opposition parties to operate, which has created an inherent lack of acceptance
among parties. Additionally, this leads to markedly uneven levels of political party institutionalization. When the opposition is marginalized and the ruling parties rarely continue to exist once leaving power, this injects high levels of unpredictability in the party system. The major obstacle for Georgia is balancing electoral volatility and routine party competition. Elections should bring some change, but not complete change. Additionally, parties must not be thought of as temporary political vehicles meant to obtain power, but stable organizations. The party landscape is beginning to change, however, with UNM reinventing its image as part of the opposition. Despite being a previous “party of power,” UNM, did not disappear after losing both parliamentary and presidential elections as had its predecessors. The party continues to function and accept the rules of party competition. Additionally, smaller parties are using their individual strengths to create a larger and more politically viable opponent via party coalitions (ex. Georgian Dream). This is but an opening for political change, however, and parties are going to need to prove they can survive as institutions and adapt to change. Until Georgian political parties are further developed, much of the country’s democratic potential will depend upon the competitiveness of the party system and its ability to remain legitimate in the voters’ eyes.

G. Conclusion: Why the Different Colors had Different Political Effects

Social movements disrupt the current political environment, but political parties have to catch and use the mobilization if they are to usher in political change. Failure to do so does not mean that parties lack the capacity to alter the political course, just that the ruling political elite, efforts of political parties, and voter preference did not align in a way that produced lasting change. As Sultan Tepe notes, “it is important to remember that democracy has a range of appearances and meanings, from a procedural one (the distribution of power via fair elections) to a liberal one (the safeguarding of individual rights and freedoms)” (2005, p. 70). Part of what made democratic development difficult following the color revolutions was a lack of common understanding among political elites, parties, and the people about what democracy would look like and how it would be achieved. While the Orange and Rose Revolutions may have been similar, the strength of political elites in Ukraine
and Georgia differed, as did the agency of political parties to produce the institutional change that was necessary for democratic development.

The disparate ways the color revolutions impacted party politics invites us to rethink what was inherently different about the internal mechanisms of the color revolutions. Often overlooked is the difference in the type of election that spurred the Rose and Orange Revolutions. In Georgia, the protests were a result of electoral fraud surrounding the parliamentary election, while in Ukraine it was fraudulent presidential elections. Both countries were semi-presidential systems prior to the revolutions, so it might be assumed that there was more at stake in the Ukrainian case. However, by 2003 Shevardnadze’s regime had become weak, and the president opted to resign from his position when protests erupted as opposed to enter a period of cohabitation with the Rose victors. As a result, new presidential elections were also scheduled along with repeat parliamentary elections, allowing Georgia to usher in a completely new government. In Ukraine, such concessions were not made, and the Supreme Court decision to hold a new round of presidential elections was agreed to in conjunction with other Constitutional amendments that would shift power from the president to the parliament (which was not due for election). Hence in Ukraine it was a negotiated transition more than an overthrow of the old regime; the Orange victors walked away with the presidency but it had become more of a shallow, symbolic, head-of-state position. Important executive powers that were transferred during these negotiations were the nomination of the Prime Minister and ability to dismiss cabinet members.

In both Ukraine and Georgia there was the physical appearance of a transfer of power, however, it obscured where the real locus of power was located. In Georgia, weakness within the former ruling CUG party allowed Saakashvili’s UNM to come in and take over government, ousting the old political elite. In Ukraine, parties remained strong and used their newly found parliamentary power to perpetuate the same story – regionally divided politics, corruption, and weak institutions. The differences in which branch of government the color revolutions brought change to, and any alterations in power attached to such changes, have explanatory value for the overall impact of the color revolutions on party politics and thus democratization.
The Rose Revolution had a major advantage over the Orange Revolution, in that there was one clear leader who was backed by a strong political party. Saakashvili had the strength and determination necessary to advance his reformist agenda and his party possessed the agency to carry out the needed reforms. While the means by which many of these reforms were carried out are debated, they did nonetheless manage to create a more liberal Georgia. In contrast, Yushchenko was a rather weak leader who relied upon Tymoshenko’s charisma throughout the Orange Revolution. Furthermore, though promises were made, Yushchenko lacked concrete plans to reform Ukraine’s corrupt political system or if plans existed, he did not have the political backing to carry them out. Yushchenko’s party did not have overwhelming public support and relied upon coalitions to run the government. Inter-party fighting led to multiple failed governments during his tenure and public dissatisfaction grew in Ukraine as democratic hopes diminished.

When Yushchenko took over the presidency from Kuchma he held considerably less power, and was arguably not in a position to initiate complete institutional overhaul like Saakashvili. The grandiose promises by Orange leaders to stamp out corruption and introduce economic liberalization turned into the government’s biggest failures. There was virtually no change in corruption by the end of Yushchenko’s term, and the country was among the hardest hit by the economic crisis in the late 2000s due to failure to institute economic policies that would support long-term economic growth. The pro-Western political parties that championed the Orange Revolution failed to advance democracy and only further fractured the party system due to their failure to work together towards any common goals. By 2010, Ukrainians demanded change, but the failure of the Orange leaders led to the election of Orange Revolution nemesis, Viktor Yanukovych, as president. The 2010 elections were considered free and fair, signaling electoral progress, however, the election of Yanukovych inevitably halted democratic development in Ukraine. Once in office, his decisions to first annul the 2004 constitutional amendments that transferred power to the parliament and later to restrict press and individual freedoms were evidence of democratic backsliding.

Ukrainian politics are plagued by the fact that not all parties are interested in advancing democracy. Its political trajectory, therefore, continues to be directed by which party is in power.
case of Georgia is rather different. Ghia Nodia notes, in Georgia democracy is like a “sacred cow,” the majority of Georgians find it preferable to other forms of government.\textsuperscript{71} Furthermore, all major political parties advocate a liberal, democratic Georgia with close ties to the West, despite the country being surrounded – with the exception of Turkey – by authoritarian states. Still, while the public agreed with Saakashvili’s and UNM’s prioritization of democratically oriented reforms, they did not condone the means by which it was achieved. While corruption was nearly eliminated, the tax system reformed, and economic liberalization introduced, there were numerous accounts of abuse of power and intimidation. UNM’s popularity dropped as a result of this, and the party lost the 2012 parliamentary elections. The case of Georgia attests to the fact that democracy does not come without pain and even if some decisions were, in retrospect, not ideal, that is not to say they were not necessary for democratic development.\textsuperscript{72} Like Ukraine, Georgia continues to struggle with democratization, however the small Caucasus republic has seen substantial accomplishments since 2003.

Neither the Orange nor the Rose Revolution lived up to all the democratic expectations that were placed upon them. While it could not be expected that democracy would emerge overnight, analysis of the decade following the revolutions reveals the contrasting impact of the color revolutions on party politics and Ukraine and Georgia’s political paths. Specifically, it is a difference between the strengthening of political parties versus the party system. As will be further discussed in the concluding chapter, this introduces the question of whether it is strong political parties or a strong party system that is more important for democratization.

Following the Orange Revolution, political parties in Ukraine emerged as strong political actors, while the party system proved unable to provide the necessary constraint needed for democratic development. The negotiated outcome of the Orange Revolution highlighted the need for parties to be strong if they were to survive and compete with the entrenched former elite that had learned how to manipulate the system. The transfer of power attached to the overturning of the 2004

\textsuperscript{71} Author’s interview with Professor Ghia Nodia in Tbilisi, March 2013.
\textsuperscript{72} Author’s interviews with current and former UNM Members of Parliament in Tbilisi, March 2013-September 2013.
fraudulent presidential election results, which was then deemed unconstitutional only five years later once the Orange victors lost power, was a result of the combination of strong, opportunistic parties and a weak party system that failed to provide balance, demonstrate legitimacy, or stimulate healthy electoral competition.

In the case of Ukraine, political party institutionalization increased slightly with parties like Batkivshchyna solidifying its place in politics and smaller, institutionalized parties like Svoboda playing a larger role in government. The party system, however, deteriorated with competition growing increasingly combative between both parties and political elites. Furthermore, failed efforts, or lack of effort, to combat corruption and create more inclusive politics after the Orange Revolution resulted in voter disillusionment with political parties and the democratic process. A lingering problem in Ukraine is that rules can easily be changed, making democratic advances only temporary. Another dilemma lies in the fact that there is currently a gap in how political parties understand and speak about democratization.73 While parties like UDAR speak of European-style democracy that entails freedom and liberalization, Party of Regions fails to demonstrate a basic understanding of the tenants of democracy and uses the term “democracy” only for political posturing. In a 2010 interview, then President Yanukovych stated, “democracy is order.” In his mind this perhaps justified his use of deadly force on the Maidan protestors in February 2014. Political parties in Ukraine possess moderately-high levels of institutionalization, which makes them powerful political actors. However, political parties are more concerned with self-preservation than democratic advancement. Under this party system, conflicting regional and cultural interests obstruct cooperation on the national level particularly as concerns political and economic reforms necessary for political development.

In Georgia, the situation was rather different. All parties were systematically weak, which allowed for full government changeover following the Rose Revolution. With this came long overdue lessons about the dangers of a dominant party regime, which aided in the emergence of a more competitive party system by the 2012 parliamentary elections. Parties remain weak in Georgia and are only now learning how to construct enduring organizations, but the party system saw major

73 Author’s interviews with party representatives and Members of Parliament in Kyiv, June 2013.
institutional developments with a peaceful – and only partial - turnover in power, the transfer of the ruling party to part of the opposition, and increased legitimacy. Despite continued hostility between parties, democratic rules and procedures are coming into effect and being followed.

While UNM’s strong grasp on power following the Rose Revolution led many to doubt that a democratic Georgia was possible in the foreseeable future, this period actually proved to be one of political learning for Georgians that has led to increased party system institutionalization – and thus democratization – a decade later. Political parties realized the downfall of a dominant party system – one party makes all the decisions but it also receives all public backlash. When UNM fell out of favor with the public, witnessed with its losses in the 2012 and 2013 parliamentary and presidential elections, it was forced to refocus on building its organization and creating an identity separate from that of the “Rose victors.” The opposition also gained some vital knowledge about the strength of allying and working together. The 2012 parliamentary elections saw several small opposition parties come to power under the banner of Georgian Dream coalition. While party politics did not receive the overhaul it needed following the Rose Revolution – political party institutionalization remains low as individual parties still lack strong party apparatuses and ideological bases – the party system experienced some substantial improvements that have encouraged democratic development. Uncertainty in who competes is decreasing, as parties are not fated to disappear when they lose power, and democratic mechanisms are taking root. Two orderly, successful elections attest to Georgia’s commitment to democratic principles and the political progress made since 2003.
VII: Conclusion

A. Introduction

The institutionalization of political parties and party systems is considered vital to democratic consolidation. The literature has reflected this with an increasing amount of efforts to bring these two debates together.\(^74\) The value of the color revolution cases lies not in their uniqueness, but in their insights for some conceptual generalizability. They highlight the importance of analyzing institutions, not just the actors, which are responsible for democratic change. The public can call for political change via social movements and political elites can direct a country’s political trajectory to an extent. However, it is institutions that structure the available political options for a country. Past analyses of Ukrainian and Georgian democracy following the color revolutions tended to focus on the role played by civil society, external democracy promoters, and the electorate. What failed to be addressed though, is the role of the color revolutions in the development of party politics.

Parties are rooted in society, and often act as a microcosm of a specific population. Political parties, therefore, can and in some cases do play a critical role in changing a country’s political direction. Following the color revolutions, parties stood in a position to change the course of democracy in Ukraine and Georgia by adopting and enacting the principles and norms associated with democratic governance. Chapters Four through Six answered the empirical question, to what degree are political parties and party systems in Ukraine and Georgia institutionalized and how did the color revolutions impact party politics? The color revolutions created a space for the consolidation of democratic rules and norms and pro-democratic leadership like Yushchenko and Tymoshenko as well as Saakashvili to address the institutional weaknesses of the old autocratic systems and install more inclusive practices. Such a shift towards consolidation relied upon not just the will of political elites though, but the ability of parties to

institute political change. The previous chapters showed that not only the process but also our analysis of democratization in transitioning countries can benefit from more inclusive treatment of institutionalization and party politics, as it allows for a more nuanced understanding of the political climate and bureaucratic obstacles. The subsequent discussion revisits the debate on democratic consolidation and turns to the critical question of if and how we can advance our understanding of political party and party system institutionalization based on what these cases told us about the interaction between these two levels of institutionalization. In an effort to advance our measurement of the main indicators of institutionalization and thus democratization the subsequent analysis also highlights both the achievements and limitations of this research and the measures employed. Given the turmoil that marred Ukraine during the final stage of this study, the analysis briefly concludes with a discussion of the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine, and how this recent popular uprising confirms my model’s findings.

B. Party Politics and an Institutional Approach to Democracy

Barrington Moore’s work, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1967), highlights how the attainment of democratic freedom is to be revered, but the costs of this achievement typically entail violence and suffering over a long period of time. Using Moore’s framework, Vlad Mykhnenko (2009) argued that the victory of the Orange coalition in 2004 should be considered “a natural historical outcome of the evolution of the urban bourgeoisie as ‘a social group with an independent economic base which attacked inherited obstacles to a democratic political outcome.’” Many debate the actual democratizing effects of the Orange Revolution; most find that it accomplished little more than regime change. Undeniably, democratic development is a long struggle and the process of institutionalization that accompanies it is equally challenging, requiring a substantial amount of time to materialize as party building needs to occur and the party system must find routinization and balance. Institutionalization is the process in which organizations and practices become established and accepted (Mair, 2006, p. 206). The length of time since democratic transition, or authoritarian collapse more specifically, is therefore seen as an important factor for institutionalization, as this corresponds to democratic progress and the length of political party
development. Peter Mair (2006) finds that this is where third-wave democracies are at a disadvantage as parties have not had time to firmly establish roots in society and the party system fails to exhibit patterned interactions that create continuity.

As democratization inherently includes the notion of change, Mair’s idea of gradualism is rather important. Does institutionalization require a more gradual approach as opposed to the rapid undertaking seen in Eastern Europe following the collapse of communism? Parties, as organizations, develop over time, refining their program and responding to the challenges in the party system. The nationalization and modernization of politics in Western Europe took over a century, with the gradual formation of national electorates, party organizations, and party systems. During this time, party programs and policy issues became nation-wide in scope and social cleavages transformed into functional electoral alignments (Caramani, 2004). Weffort and O’Donnell (1992, p. 11) find that democracy building is a process of institutionalizing conflict, and this is done through the establishment of a well-functioning party system. In the West this was accomplished by building parties upon other diverse, established groups – such as trade unions, farm associations and ethnic or religious groups. These civil society institutions were therefore crucial for the establishment of party systems and modern democracy. For example, in Belgium the main socio-political cleavage is language, but also important is the religious cleavage that separates Catholics from non-believers (Frognier, 1978). Ukrainian and Georgian political parties were not created the same way, leading to weaker more shallow party organizations. Due to the totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union, there was an absence of modern civil society and in only a few Soviet satellite bloc countries, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, did any civil society groups exist (Diamond, 1994; Lipset, 1994). Post-communist Europe undertook democratic transition rapidly and therefore lacked the time Western Europe had to naturally develop party organizations, a responsible electorate, and a stable party system. Difficulty achieving institutionalization in Eastern Europe is thus a byproduct of the truncated period of political modernization and communist past.

It should be noted that there are rare cases of rapid transition from authoritarianism to competitive party system, where democratization emerged in a relatively short time. South Korea in
the 21st century enjoys a vibrant democracy, despite its recent authoritarian history. Electoral democracy was established only in 1987, following 25 years of military domination, however the country is considered to have already matured into a well-functioning democracy (Chaibong, 2008; Park, 2009). South Korea is an extreme case of rapid democratization. The country has been able to stabilize its party system; its has experienced successful power turnover that has enabled all major parties and political figures to hold power, the public views the democratic system as legitimate, and mutual acceptance and cooperation between political elites/parties has prevented government disruption (Chaibong, 2008). Furthermore, the country has successfully handled mass protests, rampant corruption, as well as weathered economic crisis (Diamond and Kim, 2000; Chaibong, 2008). South Korea’s success largely rests with parties’ reform agendas as well as their ability to not allow regionalism to cripple the party system. Though political parties are relatively weak organizations - highly personalistic and fluid – the country remains committed to democratic rules and norms (Diamond and Kim, 2000; Jonsson, 2014). Hellmann (2014) found that while parties remain underdeveloped due to clientelism and personalistic leadership, the party system has established itself along programmatic/ideological lines that provide stability. This is interesting as it highlights the complex nature of party politics; political parties and party systems interact with one another, but their development is not mutually dependent.

Since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, scholars expected that political parties would institutionalize, party systems would function efficiently and effectively, and democracy would take root. As opposed to the party systems that developed in the late 19th and early 20th century, however, the party systems that arose in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s reflected specific features of post-communism – parties did not represent the interests of civil society (as civil society was absent during communism), political parties were fleeting, and there was widespread public distrust in politicians (Rose and Munro, 2003). Furthermore, democratic rules and norms were slow to be accepted by political elites. This research looks at a short period of time,

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75 For more on regionalism in South Korea see Moon, W.: Decomposition of Regional Voting in South Korea Ideological Conflicts and Regional Interests. Party Politics, 11(5): 579-599, 2005.
specifically because in the post-communist context there was the idea that the color revolutions were to act as a quick fix for problems of institutionalization and thus democratization. However, while the color revolutions were about change, there was nothing inherent about them that guaranteed change would equal more democracy. As Ivan Krastev (2006) posits, the victors of the color revolutions won as opposition movements, not democratic ones.

C. Theoretical Reflections: Dual Levels of Institutionalization

The institutionalization of political parties or party systems is not always accepted as being correlated with democratization (To´ka, 1997; Okole, 2002). However, this may be a matter of how we are measuring institutionalization and which type of institutionalization – political party or party system – we are analyzing. The conclusion now returns to the theoretical question this work proposed, if and how we can advance our understanding of political party/party system institutionalization based on what these cases tell us about the interaction between the two levels of institutionalization? The conclusions of Chapters four and five assessed the impact of political party and party system institutionalization on democratization separately. However, in reflecting on both cases it is clear that these two areas of analysis are not mutually exclusive and the interaction between the two levels of party politics affects democratic progress. There are three specific points of interest here: (i) what are the effects of uneven political party institutionalization on the party system, (ii) how can we understand political party and party system institutionalization together and its combined impact on democratization, and (iii) if and how can we distinguish between the importance of political party versus party system institutionalization for democratic development?

While political party institutionalization is important for understanding the functioning and success of party organizations, it is also crucial for explaining the operation of the larger party system. Uneven political party institutionalization affects the nature of the party system as levels of institutionalization impact parties’ power and the political role they play. Additionally, institutionalization matters as it shapes a parties’ success. When some parties possess weaker organizations or are newer than others this creates uneven levels of institutionalization, and a direct consequence can be a lack of predictability and continuity in the party system.
The analyses of political parties in Chapter Four found that political parties in both Ukraine and Georgia exhibit uneven levels of institutionalization. There are established parties in both countries – Svoboda and the Republican Party – that are institutionalized and create continuity in the party system. However, there are also new parties – UDAR and Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia – that are still unproven, creating the potential for instability. Most interesting are the parties that demonstrate moderate levels of institutionalization – Batkivshchyna, Party of Regions, United National Movement – as these are among the largest and most powerful parties in the two countries. Moderate levels of institutionalization signal that these parties possess certain weaknesses that hinder their ability to function effectively. All parties have to institutionalize to a certain degree if they are to survive over time, but it is possible for the levels of institutionalization among parties to vary greatly.

As parties are integral elements for the functioning of the party system, it can be expected that a lack of political party institutionalization contributes to dysfunction within the overall party system. Both Ukraine and Georgia see one party better institutionalized than the rest – Svoboda and the Republican Party respectively – however, neither of these parties has played a leading role in government diminishing the importance of their institutional strengths. Svoboda’s advantages are having a strong party apparatus and defined ideological base. However, this is only of minor benefit to the party as its nationalist party program specifically targets western Ukrainians. Svoboda’s well-developed organization keeps it popular in western Ukraine, but does not translate into national success. The Republican Party in Georgia also has a developed party structure, high levels of decisional autonomy and is well reified in the public mind. Still, the party’s small support base keeps it marginalized and it typically plays a supporting role in national politics through coalitions and alliances. While both of these parties are highly institutionalized, their political impact is minimal.

Important for the functioning of the overall party system, and thus democracy, is not the institutionalization of just one party, but the average level of institutionalization among all major parties. Uneven institutionalization means some parties are operating with poor organizational structures, without a strong value system, and/or as a completely new operation with little to no
political experience. Low or moderate levels of institutionalization among the majority of parties, therefore, inserts a high amount of unpredictability into the party system, which is demonstrated in electoral volatility.

Uneven levels of party institutionalization can also privilege certain parties over others, creating democratic deficits in the party system. UNM is a large party that dominated the Georgian government for nearly a decade. As state financing of parties is determined by the amount of legislative seats held, UNM was able to monopolize state funding, build their organization, and keep other parties weak. Additionally, even though UNM is only moderately institutionalized, its advantages in decisional autonomy allowed it to “drift toward autocracy” (Fairbank and Gugushvili, 2013, p. 117). Former President Saakashvili was able to make decisions unchecked, such as reacting to Russian provocation in South Ossetia and dragging the country into the 2008 war with Russia as well as relocating the parliament outside of Tbilisi. While these decisions may not have been popular with the public or other political parties, UNM possessed institutional advantages that allowed it to rule autonomously. In Ukraine, Party of Regions’ strong party apparatus has proved highly successful for the organization. While it was allied with the Kuchma regime in the early 2000s, PR learned how to monopolize power, built a strong support base in eastern Ukraine, and created a strong network of oligarchs. Despite electoral fraud surrounding its 2004 presidential candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, PR was able to win the plurality of seats, 186 and 175 out of 450, in the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections, respectively. PR capitalized off its high levels of systemness by financing strong campaigns, mobilizing its voters, and employing anti-Western rhetoric (Kuzio, 2011a). Furthermore, the party’s ties with oligarchs who owned media outlets allowed PR to block the oppositions’ access to airtime prior to the 2010 presidential elections. This disadvantaged other parties by limiting their ability to get their message out to the public. The advantages enjoyed by UNM and PR gave them a political edge that would otherwise not exist if equal levels of institutionalization among parties existed. Such advantages prevented a “level playing field” within the party system.
When political parties are of various ages this also produces uneven institutionalization, which can in turn destabilize the party system. New parties will inevitably be less institutionalized than older parties creating imbalance. This analysis looked at UDAR and Georgia Dream – Democratic Georgia, both new parties, that could not be assessed in the dimension of reification as they have competed in only one regularly scheduled parliamentary election. Svoboda and the Republican Party have existed for decades and even Batkivshchyna and UNM proved surprisingly resilient following the color revolutions, despite decreases in popularity and losing power. The routine participation of these parties in elections, even if they fail to always obtain the minimum vote threshold, creates patterns in electoral competition that affords familiarity and knowledge about what a party stands for and represents. Furthermore it provides for continuity in the party system. New parties typically have to rely on populist strategies and leader recognition to attract voters, as the party is still forging an identity and may have not yet established a political reputation. Again, this creates unpredictability in electoral outcomes and the type of politics that will result. While this is not a major problem in Ukraine because UDAR successfully transitioned to national politics after starting off locally in Kyiv, the case of Georgia is different. GD-DG entered politics inexperienced and poorly organized, relying on Ivanishvili’s notoriety and money. When new parties enter politics, and find success quickly such as GD-DG, it can create political panic about the future of democracy. Georgia has made immense political strides since the Rose Revolution, but current President Margvelashvili is an academic by training and PM Irakli Garibashvili is a mere 31 years of age and has only ever worked for Ivanishvili – making him a political novice. If and how these two can keep the country on a democratic path is a major question, particularly given Georgia’s aggressive political culture that makes cooperation between opposing parties difficult.

In assessing the role of party politics in democratization, the interaction between parties and the system is crucial. How the party system functions and the type of politics it produces, is in part dependent on the political parties that function within it. If political parties generally lack high levels of institutionalization, and the party system itself poorly or only moderately institutionalized, it will have a negative impact on democratization. Ideally, political parties and the party system would be
well institutionalized, but that is not the case for countries undergoing democratic transition. When political parties are weak actors their internal dynamics often fail to conform to official party rules and procedures, and elements like corruption and personalism begin to drive the party. In such instances, a strong party system is necessary to structure behavior and shape political competition. While political party institutionalization is important, the party system can have corrective effects on weak party organizational structures if it is well institutionalized. Hellmann (2014) found in the case in South Korea that strong and stable interparty competition was able to correct for weaknesses in political party organization. If the system itself is largely weak though, or only moderately institutionalized, then there is increased potential for parties to act outside of democratic norms.

Chapter Six concluded by correlating the democratic results of the color revolutions with the difference in the movements themselves, and specifically whether or not they resulted in the strengthening of political parties or the party systems. While conceptually I have treated political party and party system institutionalization as distinctly important areas of analysis, I do not find their impact on democratization to be equal. My findings suggest that an institutionalized party system can be distinguished as having a greater, more positive impact on democratization in transitioning countries than institutionalized political parties, and as Hellmann (2014) posits, a strong system can exist without strong political parties. This is because a well-institutionalized party system has the potential to correct for problems and deficiencies within political parties, keeping democratic development on track. The stabilization of interparty competition provides for democracy as understood via a minimalist definition; it allows for a strong party system that enables voters to hold politicians responsible and express their dissatisfaction at the polls as opposed to on the streets in protest. Furthermore, it structures the nature of relationships between parties, which is crucial when the majority of political organizations are relatively young or politically inexperienced. As opposed to viewing a linear relationship between party development and party systems, as Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) framework suggests by including the dimension of party organization in the measurement of systemic institutionalization, I view the party system as functioning as an
independent variable in democratization. While the party system is partially influenced by political parties, it also exists and functions independently of them.

This work also emphasizes the impact of party system institutionalization on democratization over that of political party institutionalization because of the different role parties play in new democracies. Mair (2006) notes that the role of political parties as membership organizations is declining and parties are less organized around ideological cleavages. Moreover, parties are becoming more elite-choice driven as opposed to policy oriented, which further demands increased popular accountability and legitimacy. As party organizations become more identity, rather than ideologically, driven due to the enhanced role of personality and leadership, party systems will be tasked with structuring competition and maintaining stability in an increasingly competitive political environment.

D. Limitations and Achievements

There are certain questions this dissertation was able to answer and other issues that this research could not address, which is where future work needs to go. Of specific importance in any study of institutionalization is acknowledgement of what the measures used could and could not do. Additionally important, are the limitations of the theoretical framework itself and what it does and does not consider.

I have expanded the dimension of electoral volatility to include electoral law stability, despite this being an issue primarily debated in the field of electoral theory. This is not a novel idea, as Rose and Mackie (1988) have suggested that electoral systems affect party system institutionalization. Still, there is little to no work that has attempted to account for how the electoral system impacts institutionalization. It is important to include this element in my analysis because while changes to the electoral system are not enough to de-stabilize an institutionalized party system, they can strongly impact an un-institutionalized one. Specifically, such changes can impact the number of parties that are represented in government and the dynamics of competition – whether parties ally. Powell and Tucker (2014) made a first step at creating a more nuanced view of party system stability by breaking down how we calculate and understand electoral volatility, but I argue
this dimension could be unpacked further by asking how institutional changes can contribute to volatility. As Siavelis (1997) posits, consolidated democracies are unlikely to see major changes to the electoral system as elites are unwilling to alter the system that brought them to power. However, in newer democracies where there is a history of electoral volatility, political elites are more likely to make changes to the electoral formulae. While this change alone is not the only variable that can exert transformational effects on party systems, it can increase the chances that fragmentation will occur. In young democracies such as the FSU republics, I argue that change – particularly frequent change – to electoral systems affects the stability of party systems as concerns the number of parties represented in government and coalition formation.

An additional suggestion for further research would be to expand the decision-making role of politicians and their impact on political party institutionalization. A factor rarely considered in the approaches to political party institutionalization is party switching by parliamentarians. McMenamin and Gwiazda (2011) claim that this has explanatory value for whether or not a party institutionalizes. If a political party has not yet acquired value and created deep ideological commitments, then it will likely fail to retain its deputies. McMenamin and Gwiazda (2011) find in the case of Poland the cause of party switching was predominantly vote-seeking, that is deputies were motivated by political survival. In Georgia, party switching has been a particular problem especially for UNM after the 2012 parliamentary loss. Further research on party institutionalization in both Ukraine and Georgia may benefit from such an approach that emphasizes the role of parliamentarians in the party organization.

Lastly, if we are to be critical of how the party system is being measured, we should acknowledge that the party system cannot be divorced from the economic system. Something this work struggled with was how not just to account for the role of oligarchs in party politics but to explain why they play such an important role. A more holistic approach that accounts for the interrelated nature of politics and economics is needed. As the complicated case of Ukraine illustrates, there needs to be a systematic way of seeing oligarchs’ relationship with state power in order to understand the development of party politics. It is not enough to just say that patronage leads
to weak institutionalization. We need to ask why and not just how oligarchs have been able to insert themselves into the party system and influence political party development and autonomy.

This notion of viewing the party system and economic system together raises an additional critique of the theoretical limitations of party system frameworks. The separate analyses performed here of political party and party system institutionalization support that they are individually distinct phenomena despite their intertwined relationship. While political party institutionalization aids in party system institutionalization by lending stability and decreasing electoral volatility, the party system depends on other variables. This dissertation has looked at both legitimacy of the party system and mutual acceptance of parties as other key dimensions of systemic institutionalization. However, it is possible that even more can be learned about the party system and its role in democratization through further attempts to understand the system in a context of more than just parties. Party system institutionalization frameworks, such as Mainwaring’s, takes a bottom-up approach by making parties a major component of systemic institutionalization. However, this takes a very narrow view of the party system. Considering the party system in a broader institutional framework would help establish the role played by other institutions and how there can be collective effects on institutionalization.

In newly transitioned countries where the party system is still developing and parties themselves are relatively new enterprises, secondary actors – other institutions – are also integral for the institutionalizing of the party system. Institutions are impacted by the functioning of other institutions, and a set of strong institutions can have mutually corrective behavior where weaknesses are overcome. If the majority of institutional systems are weak however, it can be mutually reinforcing. The cases of Ukraine and Georgia demonstrate the importance of the economic system and the judicial system for the institutionalizing of the party system.

A strong economy is important for party politics. Where economic development is poor, parties and political elites may not want to risk losing power and thus try to restrict competition so as not to lose economic advantages that come with controlling government. In an economically stable and prosperous country, clientelism will more likely be discouraged, allowing for cleaner politics.
This is the case because as Lipset (1959) posits, the poorer the country the greater the chance (1) of nepotism and (2) that the loss of office by one party may mean loss for major power groups that will then resort to undemocratic means to protect their political/business interests. Furthermore, without sustainable economic growth government often fails to prioritize public goods and services as parties are opportunistic and try to monopolize power. Ukraine and Georgia both lack strong economies.

Even prior to the 2008 economic recession, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development found that neither Ukraine nor Georgia had returned to their 1989 levels of GDP by 2007 (Orenstein, 2009). In the 1990s and early 2000s, slow economic development led to high-level corruption that penetrated politics (See the section of Chapter Six entitled Politics, economics, and corruption).

While both countries still need effective economic reforms to strengthen their economies, Georgia has at least taken steps to mitigate the impact a weak economic system has on the party system. As already discussed, Georgia has strengthened legal institutions to combat corruption, allowing the party system to function more predictably and transparently. Eliminating corruption through the establishment of an anti-corruption agency (or by other means) is crucial as it creates horizontal accountability across institutions, thus allowing them to strengthen independently and eventually become mutually reinforcing (Diamond, 2008). Economic stability creates its own amount of political stability that not only the party system, but democratic development in general, can capitalize off.

An autonomous judicial system also needs to be recognized and respected by parties. The courts need to be able to rule unbiased in issues of electoral misconduct and remain free from interference by political officials. Ukraine’s judicial system needs complete overhaul before it can become self-governing. As of 2014, the presidential administration exerted decisive influence on the courts and judges in particular, as the President was able to control the transfer and dismissal of judges. According to a 2009 research study on Judicial Independence in Ukraine, conducted by the Centre for Judicial Studies, the process of judicial appointment lacks transparency and is affected by corruption to the degree that one can hardly become a judge without patronage or preliminary agreements (“Centre for Judicial….,” 2009). This creates a mutually dependent relationship between
judges and politicians that destabilizes the party system. Only 66% of judges themselves find that the Ukrainian Constitution sufficiently guarantees the independence of the judiciary ("Centre for Judicial…", 2009). The main problem for Ukraine has been a separation of the judiciary and the government administration, which is additionally hampered by a weak legal community in Ukraine, leaving the rule of law unprotected. Political parties have both used this to their advantage and suffered because of it. In 2007 and 2008, the liquidating of courts and dismissal of judges that ruled with the opposition were clear examples of state authorities undermining judicial independence (Transparency International Ukraine, 2011). As a result, Ukraine’s party system will remain somewhat fragile, lacking in stability and routinization, until constitutional provisions protecting judicial independence are brought closer to European standards.

While judicial reform in Georgia helped ensure institutional independence, the judiciary still exhibits some weaknesses that make it difficult for the party system to institutionalize. Similar to Ukraine, oversight of the executive branch is complicated by a lack of institutional separation. For example, Freedom House’s 2010 Nations in Transit annual report found that undue influence by the Prosecutor’s Office has allowed electoral violations to go unaddressed.76 Unlike Ukraine though, there are established legal provisions that prevent the arbitrary dismissal of judges and protect them from undue influence by politicians or other public servants (Transparency International Georgia, 2011). Furthermore, bribery has been near eradicated and judges are considered to act independently in civil cases. In matters of electoral disputes, the Prosecutor’s office still exerts influence and there has been a notable pro-government bias. Similarly, corruption studies have found that defendants linked to the governing parties fair far better than those associated with the opposition, creating an inherent imbalance in the Georgian party system.77

I do not propose that current frameworks for analyzing party systems are unsuitable. Rather, I suggest that analyses of party system institutionalization would benefit from further explanation of

how levels of institutionalization can be understood in the larger institutional context. By adopting this approach, it is apparent that both Ukraine and Georgia’s party systems are part of a larger weak institutional environment. Both systems are comprised of parties that possess varying levels of institutionalization, but external obstacles presented by corruption, a weak economy, and lack of judicial autonomy are more a threat to Ukraine’s party system than Georgia’s.

E. Euromaidan: Confirming the Model’s Findings

What the 2013-2014 Euromaidan Revolution confirms is that while the 2004 Orange Revolution was successful at overturning fraudulent election results, it provided no lasting reform to the institutions of power in Ukraine. While the demonstrations known as Euromaidan are not directly included in this analysis, as they occurred after research had been conducted and fall outside the period of my study, my findings provide some key insights to the current events in Ukraine. With the events of Euromaidan, it appears that Ukraine has come full circle – again protesting the abuses of presidential power (this time under Kuchma’s intended “heir,” Viktor Yanukovych). Attempts by Yanukovych to prevent Ukraine’s further integration with the European Union, eliminate the opposition, restrict individual rights and freedoms, and consolidate power culminated in massive demonstrations that saw the President order the killing of his own people before he finally fled the country. The recurrence of such mass protests can be understood via the failures of the Orange Revolution as concerns party politics and democratization. Particularly, this new “colorless” revolution confirms weak institutionalization in Ukraine. As Chapter Six concluded, much of Ukraine’s democratic failure was a result not of weak parties – parties in Ukraine are in fact organizationally strong and politically influential – but of a weak party system.

On November 21, 2013, over 2,000 protestors gathered on Ukraine’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti after news surfaced that the Yanukovych government was hesitating about signing the European Union Association Agreement.78 This number swelled to over 10,000, mostly students, within a week after the government failed to sign the agreement. On November 30th, the government sent Berkut

troops – military police – to break-up the protestors, attacking them in the middle of the night and injuring around 80 people. Clashes continued on December 1st, with the number injured increasing to around 170. Protestors continued to occupy Maidan throughout December and into January 2014, with numbers soaring into the tens of thousands. Yanukovych’s government began to pass anti-protest laws and ban freedom of assembly, but Maidan demonstrators had built barriers insulating themselves in the heart of Kyiv. A brief break in tensions was observed over the New Year’s and Christmas holidays in early January 2014. However, by the end of January, tensions had mounted and violence began to escalate – the first three deaths occurred on January 21st and 22nd due to confrontations with police. Access to the city center was soon restricted, and it became clear that any end to this new “colorless” revolution was far from sight.

Negotiations between opposition leaders and the Yanukovych government continued into February, which led to the release of 200 protestors and the reduction of protest barricades. However, February 18th saw renewed clashes between police and protestors that led to dozens of deaths. On February 19th, Berkut and police forces opened fire and killed protestors gathered on Kyiv’s main central square where 10 years ago the Orange Revolution began. The Yanukovych government forces started shooting despite an announced truce; violence escalated as the protestors began to defend themselves by firing back at Berkut and police; the police now targeted not just protestors but journalists and medical workers alike. As members of government started to flee the country, 75 people were confirmed dead, killed in broad daylight in the middle of a major European capital in the 21st century. While Yanukovych attempted to end the chaos by signing a deal with opposition leaders to hold early presidential elections, some opposition factions found this not to be enough. The “self-defense” troops occupying Maidan claimed control of Kyiv, and it was soon reported the Yanukovych had fled Ukraine. By February 22nd, opposition parties assumed control of the Ukrainian parliament and Yanukovych was relieved of the presidency, with new elections set for May 25, 2014. By the end of February an interim President and Prime Minister were appointed, as well as an interim cabinet made up of members from Batkivshchyna and Svoboda. By February 2014,
the victory of the Orange Revolution was but a faint memory now lost amid the smoke from the burnt Budynok Profspilok (Trade Union Building) on Maidan.

Euromaidan protests not only targeted the ruling regime, but the party system more generally, which failed to constrain political actors. In the decade following the Orange Revolution, patterns of party competition did not manifest more regularly and there has been no increase in party accountability or representativeness. In effect, the party system is not providing structure for democratic politics (Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007). As Chapter Six discussed, this was a result of the negotiated transition that parties used to maintain their grasp on power, which perpetuated abuses of power and proper institutional reform. The findings of this dissertation suggest that another mass revolution in Ukraine, such as Euromaidan, was inevitable due to the democratic deficits perpetuated by a weakly institutionalized party system. As of mid-2014 though, improvements to the party system are not at the top of the agenda and institutional reform will have to wait until external threats are diminished. The new Ukrainian government that formed in Kyiv in February 2014 took its seats without an election and was confronted with the loss of Ukrainian territorial integrity as a result of the Russian invasion of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine. Furthermore, the destabilization of eastern Ukraine by Russian fighters sent to battle against the Ukrainian military in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts is of primary political concern. The case of Ukraine attests to the importance of a well functioning, accountable party system that pursues necessary reforms. Politics in Ukraine needs a complete reorientation following Yanukovych, where the goal is again a more European-model and authoritarian rule is truly abandoned once and for all.

To contrast the situation of Ukraine with that of Georgia, there are some key reasons we have not seen a repeat of the 2003 Rose Revolution. First, the 2003 Rose Revolution created a political opening in Georgia and political parties seized this opportunity to alter the country’s political course. While the country still struggles to conform to democratic rules and behavior, there is little doubt about political actors’ willingness to pursue democracy at all costs, unlike in Ukraine. The general commitment to democratization by political parties, even if occasionally pursued by less than democratic means, is one of Georgia’s strongest assets. The result has been a crackdown on
organized crime and corruption, the rebuilding of state institutions, as well as recent free and fair elections, all of which occurred without major civic uprisings. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Georgia’s party system is becoming increasingly more institutionalized, which has stimulated democratic development. A reasonably competitive, multi-party system has emerged, political parties are gaining in legitimacy, and there has been substantial progress towards free and fair elections. Georgia may be best described as a case of “political shock therapy,” where difficult and drastic institutional overhaul had democratizing effects, even despite occasional backsliding in the consolidation of democratic rules and procedure. However, given uneven levels of party institutionalization and the weak party system, Ukraine has come full circle again pushing back against authoritarian structuring of the political system. It can only be hoped that the country will be a case of lessons learned, where parties this time will use their power to reform state institutions and the economic system, increasing their levels of legitimacy in the eyes of the voters, and contribute to an increasingly stable and effective party system.
CITED LITERATURE


Exemption Granted

May 2, 2012

Melanie Mierzejewski
Political Science
1007 W Harrison St, M/C 276
Chicago, IL 60612
Phone: (312) 714-8587 / Fax: (312) 413-0440

RE: Research Protocol # 2012-0397
“After the "colors" fade: Party politics, institutionalization, and democratization in Ukraine and Georgia”

Sponsors: None

Dear Ms. Mierzejewski:

Your Claim of Exemption was reviewed on May 2, 2012 and it was determined that your research protocol meets the criteria for exemption as defined in the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects [(45 CFR 46.101(b)]. You may now begin your research.

Exemption Period: May 2, 2012 – May 1, 2015
Performance Site(s): UIC
Subject Population: Adult subjects only
Number of Subjects: 600

The specific exemption category under 45 CFR 46.101(b) is:
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.

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   b. The purpose of the research,
   c. The extent of the subject’s involvement and an explanation of the procedures to be followed,
   d. Whether the information being collected will be used for any purposes other than the proposed research,
   e. A description of the procedures to protect the privacy of subjects and the confidentiality of the research information and data,
   f. Description of any reasonable foreseeable risks,
   a. Description of anticipated benefit,
   b. A statement that participation is voluntary and subjects can refuse to participate or can stop at any time,
   c. A statement that the researcher is available to answer any questions that the subject may have and which includes the name and phone number of the investigator(s).
   d. A statement that the UIC IRB/OPRS or JBVMAC Patient Advocate Office is available if there are questions about subject’s rights, which includes the appropriate phone numbers.

Please be sure to:
→ Use your research protocol number (listed above) on any documents or correspondence with the IRB concerning your research protocol.

We wish you the best as you conduct your research. If you have any questions or need further help, please contact me at (312) 355-2908 or the OPRS office at (312) 996-1711. Please send any correspondence about this protocol to OPRS at 203 AOB, M/C 672.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Hoehne, B.S., C.I.P.  
Assistant Director, IRB # 2  
Office for the Protection of Research Subjects

cc: Dick W. Simpson, Political Science, M/C 276  
Sultan Tepe, Political Science, M/C 276
Exemption Granted
UIC Amendment #1

June 11, 2013

Melanie Mierzejewski, PhD
Political Science
1007 W Harrison St
M/C 276
Chicago, IL 60612
Phone: (312) 714-8587 / Fax: (312) 413-0440

RE: Research Protocol # 2012-0397
“After the "colors" fade: Party politics, institutionalization, and democratization in Ukraine and Georgia”

Sponsor: None

Dear Dr. Mierzejewski:

The Amendment to your Exempt research was reviewed on June 11, 2013 and it was determined that your amended research continues meets the criteria for exemption.

Amendment Summary: UIC Amendment #1 is an investigator-initiated amendment involving follow-up interviews to the surveys.
Performance Site(s): UIC
Subject Population: Adult subjects only
Number of Subjects: 600

The specific exemption category under 45 CFR 46.101(b) is:
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.

You are reminded that investigators whose research involving human subjects is determined to be exempt from the federal regulations for the protection of human subjects still have responsibilities for the ethical conduct of the research under state law and UIC policy. Please be aware of the following UIC policies and responsibilities for investigators:
1. **Amendments** You are responsible for reporting any amendments to your research protocol that may affect the determination of the exemption and may result in your research no longer being eligible for the exemption that has been granted.

2. **Record Keeping** You are responsible for maintaining a copy of all research-related records in a secure location in the event future verification is necessary. At a minimum, these documents include: the research protocol, the claim of exemption application, all questionnaires, survey instruments, interview questions and/or data collection instruments associated with this research protocol, recruiting or advertising materials, any consent forms or information sheets given to subjects, or any other pertinent documents.

3. **Final Report** When you have completed work on your research protocol, you should submit a final report to the Office for Protection of Research Subjects (OPRS).

4. **Information for Human Subjects** UIC Policy requires investigators to provide information about the research protocol to subjects and to obtain their permission prior to their participating in the research. The information about the research protocol should be presented to subjects in writing or orally from a written script. **When appropriate**, the following information must be provided to all research subjects participating in exempt studies:
   a. The researchers' affiliation; UIC, JBVMAC or other institutions,
   b. The purpose of the research,
   c. The extent of the subject’s involvement and an explanation of the procedures to be followed,
   d. Whether the information being collected will be used for any purposes other than the proposed research,
   e. A description of the procedures to protect the privacy of subjects and the confidentiality of the research information and data,
   f. Description of any reasonable foreseeable risks,

   Please be sure to:
   → Use your research protocol number (2012-0397) on any documents or correspondence with the IRB concerning your research protocol.

We wish you the best as you conduct your research. If you have any questions or need further help, please contact the OPRS office at (312) 996-1711 or me at (312) 355-2908. Please send any correspondence about this protocol to OPRS at 203 AOB, M/C 672.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Hoehne
Assistant Director
Office for the Protection of Research Subjects

cc: Dick W. Simpson, Political Science, M/C 276
    Sultan Tepe, Political Science, M/C 276
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Melanie Mierzejewski</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>University of Illinois-Chicago</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>or Legal Name of Individual</td>
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<td>Business/Organization/Individual Address</td>
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<td><a href="mailto:mmierzej2@uic.edu">mmierzej2@uic.edu</a></td>
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"Stalled on Substance: Democratization and Public Opinion in Post-Orange Revolution Ukraine"

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Governing Law. This Agreement shall be construed under and governed by the laws of the District of Columbia. The parties consent to the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of the courts located in District of Columbia for all purposes related to this Agreement.

Entire Agreement. This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the Parties with regard to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all other oral or written statements and representations pertaining to the subject matter of this Agreement.

This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be a duplicate original, but all of which, taken together, shall be deemed to constitute a single instrument. IFES and Licensee have executed this Agreement as of the Effective Date.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inter Foundation for Electoral Systems</th>
<th>Licensee: Melanie G. Mierzewski</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By:</td>
<td>By: Melanie G. Mierzewski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Print Name: Kimberley M. Absolms</td>
<td>Print Name: Melanie G. Mierzewski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title: Chief Compliance Officer</td>
<td>Title: PhD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date: 3/28/2014</td>
<td>Date: 7/28/2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please send all requests for permission or questions to:
Communications Department, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 1850 K Street, NW, Fifth Floor, Washington, D.C. 20006 editor@ifes.org or (202) 350-6802.
VITA

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Political Science - University of Illinois at Chicago, 2014

M.A., Central European Studies – Jagiellonian University, Centre for European Studies, Krakow, Poland, 2007.

M.A., Interdisciplinary Humanities – Arizona State University, 2005

B.A., Interdisciplinary Humanities – Arizona State University, 2003

PUBLICATIONS and BOOK REVIEWS


WORK EXPERIENCE

July 2014 – current Freelance Academic Editor, Riga, Latvia

Spring/Summer 2013 Survey Contractor for United States Embassy in Riga, Latvia

Jan. 2010 – May 2012 Lecturer, Westwood College (Arlington, VA), General Education Department


Jan. 2008 – Jan. 2010 Research Assistant for Dr. Doris Graber, University of Illinois at Chicago, Department of Political Science


Summer 2009 Research Internship for Hudson Institute - Center for Political-Military Analysis, Washington, D.C.

Summer 2009 Researcher and editor on Mass Media and American Politics, 9th ed. by Doris Graber; Washington: CQ Press

Aug. 2005 – May 2006 Lecturer, South Mountain Community College (Phoenix, AZ), Department of General Education

June 2004 – May 2005 Editing Assistant on Inventing Intelligence by Paul Privateer
Aug. 2003 – May 2005 Teaching Assistant, Arizona State University, Department of Humanities

AWARDS, HONORS

“Echols Memorial Award” for best comparative politics paper, University of Illinois – Chicago - 2012

“Manatt Research Fellowship on Democratization,” International Foundation for Electoral Systems – Summer 2010

"Victoria Kokernak Scholarship" for graduate study in Poland, Kosciuszko Foundation – 2006/2007

"ASU Outstanding Humanities Undergraduate Student Scholarship" for graduate study in Humanities, Arizona State University - 2003

SELECTED PRESENTATIONS

“Institutions after revolutions: party system institutionalization in Ukraine and Georgia following the color revolutions” presented at the Midwest Political Science Association 72nd Annual National Conference, April 2014

“Charismatic Parties and the Anti-Democratic Challenge in Ukraine and Georgia” presented at the 5th bi-annual International Graduate Student Symposium “Ukraine in a Global Context,” January 2012

"More Than Elections: Public Opinion, Institutional Bias, and Democratic Assessment in Poland and Ukraine" presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, August 2011

“Stalled on Substance: Democratization and Public Opinion in Post-Orange Revolution Ukraine” accepted for presentation at the Midwest Political Science Association 69th Annual National Conference, April 2011 (accepted not presented)


“Slavic Populism: Disaffection with Democratic Transition in Poland and Slovakia” presented at the Midwest Political Science Association 68th Annual National Conference, April 2010

“The Unintended Consequences of Populism in Post-Communist Poland: from Democratic Learning to Consolidation” presented at the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, April 2, 2009

“From Democratic Transition to Populism: Voter Disaffection in Poland and Slovakia” presented at the UIC Department of Political Science Colloquium, September 24, 2008
OTHER

Professional Membership: American Political Science Association (APSA), Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA)

Languages: Polish (intermediate), Russian (Beginner)

Familiar with qualitative methods: surveying and interviewing

Familiar with SPSS statistical software