The Other Face of Justice
An Investigation of Managers’ Justice Rule Adherence
in the Granting of I-deals

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With love, this dissertation is dedicated to my family. To my parents, Qiujin and Yifei, my husband Paul, and my parents in-law, Gloria and Jon, for loving me unconditionally and giving me the warmth of home.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Antecedents of I-deals</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 The Linkage between Performance and I-deals</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Resource Allocations Based on Performance</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Adherence to Justice Rules</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Antecedents of Justice Rule Adherence</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Boundary Conditions and Exploratory Research Questions</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 Summary</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Past Performance and I-deals</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 The Effects of Adherence to Equity and Procedural Rules</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Antecedents of Adherence to Equity and Procedural Rules</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1 Justice Sensitivity</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.2 Cognitive Motives</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.3 Felt Accountability</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Mediated Moderation Effects</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. METHOD</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Samples and Procedures</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Manager Survey Measures</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Employee Survey Measures</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Exploratory Variables</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 Analytical Strategy</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. RESULTS</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Discriminant Validity</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Main Effects</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Moderating Effects</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Mediated Moderation Effects</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5 Exploratory Analyses</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. DISCUSSION</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Overview of the Results</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 Unexpected Findings</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Theoretical Implications</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Limitations and Future Research</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5 Practical Implications and Conclusion</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURES</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. CFA Analysis and Model Comparison Results</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Intercorrelations of the Study Variables</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Multilevel Modeling Results</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Intercorrelations of the Exploratory Variables</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Hypothesized Model</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Model 1: Relationships between Performance Behaviors and I-deals</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Model 2: Relationship between Archival Performance Appraisal Ratings and I-deals</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Model 4: Antecedents of Employee-Reported Justice Rule Adherence</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Model 5: Moderating Effects of Manager Self-Reported Justice Rule Adherence</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Model 6: Moderating Effects of Employee-Reported Adherence to Equity Rules on the Relationship between Task Performance and I-deals</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Model 7: Moderating Effects of Employee-Reported Adherence to Equity Rules on the Relationship between OCB-I and I-deals</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Model 8: Moderating Effects of Employee-Reported Adherence to Equity Rules on the Relationship between OCB-O and I-deals</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Model 9: Moderating Effects of Employee-Reported Adherence to Procedural Rules on the Relationship between Task Performance and I-deals</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Model 10: Moderating Effects of Employee-Reported Adherence to Procedural Rules on the Relationship between OCB-I and I-deals</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Model 11: Moderating Effects of Employee-Reported Adherence to Procedural Rules on the Relationship between OCB-O and I-deals</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Exploratory Analysis: Task I-deals</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Exploratory Analysis: Flexibility I-deals</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Exploratory Analysis: Financial I-deals</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Confirmatory Factor Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLM</td>
<td>Hierarchical Linear Modeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-deals</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic Deals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMX</td>
<td>Leader-member Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OB</td>
<td>Organizational Behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCB-I</td>
<td>Organizational Citizenship Behavior directed toward Individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCB-O</td>
<td>Organizational Citizenship Behavior directed toward the Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POS</td>
<td>Perceived Organizational Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMX</td>
<td>Team-member Exchange</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUMMARY

This study seeks to investigate how managers’ justice enactment (i.e., adherence to equity and procedural rules) affects the granting of idiosyncratic deals (i-deals). In contrast to studies that focus on employee reactions to injustice, this study takes a managerial focus and attempts to understand why managers behave fairly. Drawing on manager-focused justice theories, I hypothesize that justice enactment from managers strengthens the association between employee past performance and i-deals. Moreover, I identify the dispositional (i.e., justice sensitivity), motivational (i.e., cognitive motives), and social (i.e., felt accountability) factors that underlie justice enactment related to the granting of i-deals. The proposed model builds upon and complements previous research on i-deals by exploring the meaning of fair exchanges as perceived by managers. Hypotheses were tested using a sample of 213 manager-employee dyads nested in 60 work-groups. Results show variation in the degree of adherence to equity and procedural rules across managers as well as variation in the degree of justice rule adherence towards individual employees. Results also provide some support for the general idea that justice enactment affects the granting of i-deals.
1. INTRODUCTION

The seminal work of Rousseau (2001, 2005) conceptualized idiosyncratic deals (i-deals) as the voluntary, mutually beneficial, and personalized agreements negotiated between organizations and their employees. Though a considerable amount of research has improved our knowledge of i-deals (see Liao, Wayne, & Rousseau, 2014 for a review), most of these studies were inspired by the same fundamental ideas. First, i-deals present opportunities to exchange valued resources in the workplace. By focusing on exchanges between organizational inducements and employee contributions (March & Simon, 1958), researchers have attempted to describe a series of interactions that generate obligations to reciprocate (Gouldner, 1960). Second, the parties involved in an i-deal are likely to have different perspectives as both perceptions and judgments are subjective (Rousseau, Ho, & Greenberg, 2006). Researchers have begun to expand the scope of the i-deals literature beyond the employees with i-deals to include other organizational members (i.e., managers and coworkers; e.g., Greenberg, Roberge, Ho, & Rousseau, 2004). On the one hand, i-deals as a special form of resource allocation can provide managers a means of tailoring inducements and rewards for employees “who differ in what they value and have to offer” (Rousseau, 2005, p. 184-185). On the other hand, i-deals create differences among employees and “constitute a fertile breeding ground for potential injustice” (Greenberg et al., 2004, p. 5).

These ideas have deepened our understanding of i-deals, yet they still only present part of the picture. We have gained substantial knowledge of the factors that predispose employees to negotiate i-deals, but less is known about the managerial interests associated with i-deals (Hornung, Rousseau, & Glaser, 2009; Liao et al., 2014). Extant
research also emphasizes employee reactions to injustice, with much less attention given to why managers behave more or less fairly. Justice rule adherence refers to managerial actions that “act in accordance with the standards” governing fair behaviors (Scott et al., 2009, p. 758). Compared to fairness, the perceptions of justice rule adherence are more descriptive, and therefore, less likely to be contaminated by the perceivers’ affects and moral values (Scott et al., 2009; Colquitt & Shaw, 2005). This notion is well suited to study the variation in the use of i-deals across individual managers (Greenberg et al., 2004).

Implicit within the employee-centered view is the idea that a high degree of justice rule adherence is desired when managers grant i-deals (e.g., Lai, Rousseau, & Chang, 2009; Hong, Rupp, & Kim, 2012; Liao et al., 2014). However, when dealing with situations for which the organization has no precedent, managers often do not have policies to rely on, and tend to have more discretion to adhere to or violate the norms associated with other forms of resource allocations. Though an employee perspective is imperative for understanding i-deals, a complementary view is warranted to gain insights into managers’ interests in creating a fair deal in the first place.

Early work by Homans (1961) and Blau (1964) suggested that justice concerns arise in exchanges, because people care about relative distributions. Distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of decision outcomes (Adams, 1965; Leventhal, 1976; 1980; Colquitt, 2001), and is often gauged by whether rewards are commensurate with investments (Homans, 1961), whether outcomes meet expectations (Blau, 1964), and whether one’s own outcome/input ratio is comparable to a referent (Adams, 1965). Although the concepts of inputs and outcomes are fundamental to social exchange
relationships and distributive justice judgments, their treatment has been inconsistent in the i-deals literature. In some cases, managers use i-deals to develop individuals with potential and to motivate employees to “go the extra mile”. Thus, increases in performance may be expected when i-deals are granted. In other cases, however, performance is taken as a valid input when managers are considering whether to grant i-deals (i.e., performance-based i-deals, Rousseau, 2005, p. 181-183). I-deals may not always result in reciprocating behaviors from employees (Liao et al., 2014; Anand, Vidyarthi, Liden, & Rousseau, 2010), but, rather, they may be used as a way to reciprocate for valued employee behavior. In other words, managers use i-deals to reward employees’ contributions to the work performed (Rousseau, 2005). These cases differ with respect to the distributive rules governing managerial decisions.

Leaving aside the issue of distributive justice, i-deals can be viewed as either an outcome or a procedure, which reflects a “curious contradiction” (Greenberg et al., 2004, p. 12). As the term is used within the justice literature, a procedure is the means by which some benefit is assigned (Cropanzano & Ambrose, 2001; Colquitt, 2001). Procedural justice is fostered by giving a voice to employees during the decision-making process (Thibaut & Walker, 1975) or by adhering to a set of procedural rules, including consistency, bias suppression, accuracy, correctability, representativeness, and ethicality (Leventhal, 1980). When employees seek to change their employment conditions, i-deals are what they pursue. However, in granting an i-deal, a manager may be viewed as a rule-breaker by treating an individual in a way that is inconsistent with “ostensibly similar others” (Greenberg et al., 2004, p. 12). It is an intriguing, although yet untested,
possibility that managers put conscientious effort into adhering to procedural rules when granting i-deals.

Distributive justice is the assessment of the ends (i.e., the decision outcome) and procedural justice is the assessment of the means (i.e., how the decision is made). At issue is how managers’ decisions are affected by their desire for justice and adherence to justice rules. Thus, the purpose of the present study is to examine the extent to which managers’ justice rule adherence affects the granting of i-deals, and more importantly, to explore why managers act in accordance with the rules of justice. To guide the theoretical development, I draw primarily from the manager-focused justice literature on resource allocations (e.g., Leventhal, 1980; Meindl, 1989) and managerial fair behaviors (e.g., Folger & Skarlicki, 2001; Ambrose & Schminke, 2009a; Scott, Colquitt, & Paddock, 2009).

Expansive justice research has focused on managers’ role as allocators and has revealed how justice concerns influence their allocation decisions (Colquitt, 2012; Scott et al., 2009). I extend this line of research by addressing the distributional logic and procedural rules that managers may apply to i-deals. The manager-focused justice theories have also identified a few precursors of justice rule adherence (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009a; Scott, Garza, Conlon, & Kim, 2014). I develop a framework that specifies factors, namely managers’ justice sensitivity, cognitive motives (i.e., effecting compliance, identity maintenance, and establishing fairness), and felt accountability, which drive their justice rule adherence in the granting of i-deals.

This research seeks to contribute to the literature in several ways. First, the predominate focus on employees in i-deals research is surprising given that the
employee-manager dyad has been recognized as a natural starting point for negotiating customized work conditions (e.g., Hornung et al., 2009; Anand et al., 2010). A concern over employee reactions to injustice can prompt thoughts of avoiding i-deals or taking an under-the-table approach. Managerial decisions made in this fashion, however, often backfire (Rousseau, 2005). Alternatively, this study aims to advance our understanding of managerial fair behaviors related to i-deals by directly confronting two key questions, “To what extent do managers adhere to equity and procedural rules when granting i-deals?” and “How does managers’ justice rule adherence affect their decisions regarding i-deals?”

Second, research notes that it is not costless for managers to treat employees fairly (e.g., Ambrose & Schminke, 2001). Folger and Skarlicki (2001) provide examples where managers’ desire to avoid interpersonal discomfort affects their decisions. More theory development is needed to answer the question, “Why do managers care about the fairness of i-deals?” This study explores factors that increase the importance of fairness to managers, and therefore, sheds light on the reasons underlying justice rule adherence in the i-deals context. Moreover, the differences in the ways that individual managers respond to employee requests for special arrangements are not well understood (Rousseau, 2005). This study addresses a gap in current i-deals research by investigating variations in managers’ justice rule adherence, as well as looking for sources of impact on managers’ decisions that derive from dispositional, motivational, and situational variations.

Finally, research has heavily relied on a social exchange perspective to understand the underpinnings of i-deals. The proposed model takes a new stance to explore the
interaction effects between managers’ justice rule adherence and employee past performance on the granting of i-deals. This study advances theory on i-deals by identifying elements of how managers’ justice rule adherence enhances the relationship between employee past performance and the granting of i-deals.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW

In this section, I review extant research on the antecedents of i-deals and the factors influencing managerial decisions. I then discuss the relationship between i-deals and performance as well as review research regarding the impact of performance on resource allocation decisions. Finally, I provide a summary of the fairness criteria that apply in organizational settings and present a framework for understanding managers’ justice rule adherence in the granting of i-deals.

2.1 Antecedents of I-deals

I-deals can be construed as “a single theoretical concept that captures the extent to which employees have successfully negotiated special work arrangements with their employers, with their content or facets representing dimensions of i-deals” (Liao et al., 2014, p. 5). Corresponding to the diverse needs and personal goals of employees, i-deals run the gamut from a customized element of an employment arrangement to a completely idiosyncratic job. Based on the particular arrangements and resources involved, Rousseau and colleagues (2006, 2009) identified four types of i-deals commonly negotiated, including adjustments in tasks, developmental opportunities, schedule flexibility, and workload reduction. Expanding on the construct domain across different industries, Rosen and colleagues (2013) further confirmed that i-deals vary in their content and discovered two more types, location flexibility and customized financial incentives.

I-deals could also be categorized based on their timing and how the deals are initiated. I-deals can be made at hire (i.e., *ex ante*) or negotiated on the job (i.e., *ex post*), and both employees and organizations may initiate idiosyncratic arrangements (Rousseau, 2005; Liao et al., 2014). Although i-deals vary widely in their scope, content,
and timing, managerial approval differentiates i-deals from other forms of idiosyncrasy in workplace (Rousseau, 2005; Hornung et al., 2009).

Organizational characteristics and individual differences present opportunities or constraints for i-deals. Organizational factors including obligations towards an employee (Hornung et al., 2009), group heterogeneity and internal labor market (Lee, Bachrach, & Rousseau, in press), work structures and job constraints (e.g., group size and requirement for physical presence, Hornung et al., 2009) can promote or discourage i-deals. Some individual factors, such as proactivity (Hornung, Rousseau, & Glaser, 2008), long organizational tenure, high job level (Hornung, Rousseau, Glaser, Angerer, & Weigl, 2010), high emotional intelligence (Huang & Niu, 2009), political skill (Rosen et al., 2013), and firm-specific human capital (Lee et al., in press) predispose employees to successfully negotiate i-deals.

I-deals exist in the broader context of social relationships (Rousseau et al., 2006). A high quality exchange relationship between leader and follower (leader-member exchange; LMX) has been found to facilitate the creation of i-deals (e.g., Rosen et al., 2013; Hornung, Rousseau, Weigl, Muller, & Glaser, 2014). Moreover, the successful implementation of i-deals depends on coworkers’ cooperation and support (Greenberg et al., 2004; Rousseau et al., 2006). Focal employees’ employment arrangements may become less attractive in the shadow of their peer’s i-deal negotiation. The possibility of conflict and unfairness perceptions among coworkers challenges the legitimacy of i-deals. The granting of an i-deal to a peer may also shape focal employees’ expectations for obtaining special arrangements and influence their perceptions of organization obligations and promises. Lai, Rousseau, and Chang (2009) empirically examined
coworkers’ acceptance and fairness perceptions with respect to peers’ i-deals in the context of social exchanges (i.e., friendship among employees and social exchange between employees and their organization). They explicated that employees experiencing a social exchange are more likely to expect comparable future opportunities, which in turn positively affects their acceptance and mitigates unfairness perceptions.

Altogether, these studies described above have deepened our understanding of conditions that facilitate or hinder the creation of i-deals, but less is known about managerial expectations and motives related to i-deals (Rousseau, 2005; Rousseau et al., 2006). The pioneering work of Hornung and colleagues (2009) examined the influences on managerial decisions regarding i-deals and the consequences managers associated with granting three different types of i-deals. These authors demonstrated that managers view flexibility i-deals as work-life balance enhancers, and their decisions to grant flexibility i-deals are influenced by employee initiative, group size, and job constraints. Developmental i-deals are associated with employee motivation and performance standards, and managerial decision-making of this type is driven by employee initiative. Finally, managers’ decisions to grant workload reduction i-deals are based on assessment of imbalance in the employment relationship and job constraints.

Hornung and colleagues’ (2009) findings support several tenets of i-deals theory, such as i-deals provide the means through which managers can target resources to individual employees. Some employees are more interested in certain resources or arrangements that others value less, while some resources are rare and thus unlikely to be allocated through standard HR practices (Hochschild, 1997; Lee et al., in press). I-deals enable managers to create new work roles that meet employees’ personal needs and goals.
(Hornung et al., 2010), and effectively match meaningful organizational inducements with unique employee contributions (Rousseau, 2005; Rousseau et al., 2006).

However, Hornung and colleagues’ (2009) study also points to several gaps in the literature. For example, their findings hint at variations in the use of i-deals. Managers may differ in their willingness and power to make and maintain i-deals, as well as the frequency or criteria with which i-deals are granted. As Rousseau comments, “I-deals give rise to problems when individual managers in the same firm use them differently” (2005, p. 184). It is not entirely clear to what degree managers are aware of their own decision-making practice regarding i-deals and whether they are consistent in applying distributive and procedural rules.

### 2.2 The Linkage between Performance and I-deals

Social exchange theory leads us to expect that employees with i-deals will reciprocate to their organizations by increasing contributions at task, social, and organizational levels (Ng & Feldman, in press). Consistent with the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), employee performance is often viewed as something that results from fair exchanges. Applying this perspective, empirical research has demonstrated that i-deals are related to enhancements in employee performance, such as working longer hours (Hornung et al., 2008), improving task performance (Hong et al., 2012; Hornung et al., 2014), and engaging in constructive voice behaviors (Ng & Feldman, in press), proactive behaviors (Liu, Lee, Hui, Kwan, & Wu, 2013), and other organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs, Huang & Niu, 2009; Hu, Vidyarthi, Anand, & Liden, 2010). Implicit in these studies is the idea that i-deals act as powerful inducements when performance is discretionary in nature or requires stronger motivation (Rousseau, 2005).
However, Anand and colleagues (2010) revealed that the effects of i-deals on OCBs were not significant for employees experiencing high quality relationships (i.e., LMX; team-member exchange, TMX; and perceived organizational support, POS). Extant literature also provides several good examples of fair i-deals made contingent upon individual contributions (Greenberg et al., 2004). For instance, Rousseau (2005) tells stories of “star performers” who capitalize on their exceptional contributions by bargaining for idiosyncratic arrangements. In such cases, employee performance is considered a legitimate input on which managerial decisions are based. I-deals for high performers may be necessary to promote fairness when performance metrics fail to completely capture an employee’s actual contributions (e.g., OCBs) and when it is difficult to execute individual performance-based rewards systems (Rousseau, 2005).

Up to this point, research has only considered the impact of i-deals on employees’ work-related cognitions and behaviors, and neglected the possibility that i-deals may not always engender employee reciprocal behaviors, but rather they may be given by managers as a way of reciprocating for good performance.

### 2.3 Resource Allocations Based on Performance

Whether employee performance is regarded as an antecedent or an outcome of the granting of i-deals changes with the point of view of managers. Part of the inconsistency revolves around how performance information affects managers’ justice judgments. In reviewing previous research on fairness of resource allocations (e.g., Leventhal, Michaels, & Sanford, 1972; Shapiro, 1975), Griffith (1990) found that information about recipients alters which specific justice rule allocators invoke in making decisions. When only information regarding individual attributes (e.g., demographics or ability) was
provided, allocators followed the equality rules. When both individual attributes and performance information were provided, allocators followed the equity rules. Noticing this general pattern, Griffith investigated the use of performance information in different allocation situations (i.e., cooperative vs. competitive tasks). His results showed no significant difference between the effects of performance and diligence information (i.e., effort) on allocations. He also found that when performance information was provided, allocators demonstrated an obvious preference for the equity rules even in the cooperative conditions. One implication of these findings is that allocators view performance as a reliable indicator of merit, and that the provision of performance information sensitizes decision makers to an equity rule.

Turning their attention to the recipients, Conlon, Porter, and Parkers (2004) examined employee reactions to managerial allocation decisions based on performance. They compared the effects of eight allocation criteria that are often applied by managers, including past performance, future performance, rank (status or seniority), random draw, chance meetings, business need, personal need, and political reasons. Their study revealed that allocations based on past performance lead to the highest fairness perceptions and the lowest expectations that these managerial allocation decisions will result in conflict among employees. An interesting observation of this study is that using future performance as an allocation criterion may lead to the highest conflict expectations. Conlon and colleagues offered a possible explanation that basing decisions on expectations or assumptions “leaves too much open to uncertainty” (p. 346). In fact, this may also partly explain why people perceive i-deals predicated on future contributions to be unfair.
Despite the argument that i-deals are often granted to valued contributors (Rousseau et al., 2006; Rousseau, 2005; Rousseau, Ho, & Kim, 2003), we know very little about the actual effect of employee performance on the granting of i-deals. The resource allocation studies described above point to the profound effects of performance information on both the allocators’ decisions and the recipients’ fairness perceptions. However, whether or not these results generalize to the i-deals context is unknown. Moreover, the findings of these resource allocation studies naturally lead to the question of why the various rules of justice are adhered to or not by managers in the first place.

2.4 Adherence to Justice Rules

In general, justice research indicates that there are various criteria for judging fairness (see Colquitt, 2001 for a review). Focusing on the fairness of allocation outcomes, research on distributive justice has identified three primary categories of rules decision makers may apply (Cropanzano, Fortin, & Kirk, 2015), including equity, equality, and need. The equity rules pose that resources should be allocated in accordance with employees’ inputs (Adams, 1965; Homans, 1961; Leventhal, 1976). The equality rules dictate that resources should be distributed equally (Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1976). The need rules argue that resources should be allocated based on the relative deprivation among individuals and their level of need (Rescher, 1966; Deutsch, 1975, 1985). Focusing on the fairness of the process used to make allocation decisions, research on procedural justice has advanced other rules. Thibaut and Walker (1975) suggested that procedural fairness is gauged by procedural control (i.e., opportunity to voice one’s opinions during the decision-making process) and decision control (i.e., ability to influence the decision outcome). Leventhal and colleagues (Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal,
Karuza, & Fry, 1980) provided additional rules. The consistency rule emphasizes that procedures should be applied consistently across employees. The bias suppression rule states that procedures should be neutral and impartial. The accuracy rule argues that decision-making should rely on valid facts and accurate information. The ethicality rule argues that the decision-making process should uphold standards of ethics and morality. The correctability rule requires fair procedures to include mechanisms for correcting poor decisions. As organizational justice research continued to expand, additional justice rules were identified, including informational rules (e.g., honesty or truthfulness, privacy, and justification, Bies, 2001) and interpersonal rules (e.g., politeness, dignified treatment, and respectfulness, Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 1993). By contrast, the impact of informational and interpersonal rules on allocation decision-making tends to be less direct, and therefore, I focused on distributive and procedural rules in this dissertation.

The justice judgment entails how an actor decides which type of justice to attend, and which specific justice rules to follow in making resource allocation decisions (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009a). Leventhal’s (1980) justice judgment model posits that actors attempt to make fair decisions through a multiple-step process. First, actors weigh the relative importance of the justice rules in a given situation. Second, they imagine what the allocations would look like if rules of greater importance had more impact on the decisions. Finally, they evaluate the fairness of the final decision through a linear combination of all applicable rules.

Taking a different approach to justice judgment, Lind and colleagues focus on the effects of order and interpretability of experiences on justice judgment. Their fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001; Van den Bos, 2001) suggests that procedural issues and
distributive outcomes both contribute to the development of an overall fairness judgment, and more importantly, different types of information can substitute for one another. Lind (2001) noted that procedural information plays a more important role in forming justice heuristic, because it is more readily available in the initial interactions. Additionally, Lind, Van den Bos, and colleagues (Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997; Van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, & Vermunt, 1998) found that distributive justice is difficult to judge when social comparisons are impossible or when there is ambiguity regarding comparison referents (e.g., external vs. internal referents; and diverse personal needs). In contrast, procedural issues are often more interpretable by evaluating experience against a set of standards, and thus, have a stronger impact on justice judgment.

Extant justice research lends support to these notions that fairness criteria are applied selectively (see Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001, for a meta-analytical review). Most relevant to the present study, Meindl (1989) examined how justice-related concerns affect managers’ choice of distribution criteria. This research demonstrated that regardless of differing leadership styles (task-oriented vs. people-oriented) or contexts (e.g., interdependence level), managers viewed allocations as a matter of justice. When asked to identify the implications of their allocation decisions for the four valued goals, including productivity, cohesion, positive leader-member relationship, and fairness, managers reported that productivity and fairness were best met by adhering to the equity rules. In other examples (i.e., Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1992; Lissowski, Tyszka, & Okrasa, 1991; Mannix, Neale, & Northcraft, 1995), researchers found that managers provide everyone with a basic amount of resources based on the equality or need rules, but anything above the “basic amount” will be allocated based on
the equity rules. Thus, as Meindl (1989) summarizes, “an equity logic entailing relatively high degrees of differentiation among individuals is the normative choice, generally preferred and accepted over the parity-based logic” (p. 270), because managers often have performance information that is salient to them.

Few studies have examined the relative importance of procedural rules in justice judgments from the manager’s perspective. In a scenario study, Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986) investigated the effects of context (e.g., competitive vs. cooperative tasks) and goal priority (e.g., productivity vs. coherence) on the use of Leventhal’s six procedural rules. This study found no difference between managers and subordinates in reactions to the scenarios. They also found that the consistency rule was the most important in formal, cooperative, and task-focused relationships. In a more recent study using similar scenarios, Colquitt and Jackson (2006) tested the context sensitivity of all procedural justice rules, along with the distributive justice rules. They noted that the consistency rule is important in many of the same contexts as the equality rule (p. 875). This interesting observation echoes Cropanzano and Ambrose’s (2001) argument that consistency or equal treatment is an important aspect of organizational justice (p. 130).

The real interest is not in how the justice rules are different, but in how they are related (Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005). As a special form of resource allocations, i-deals are intended to not only serve individual development and welfare, but also facilitate the attainment of organizational goals (Rousseau et al. 2006). I-deals also represent a relatively high degree of differentiation. Justice judgment in this unique context often involves certain compromises. The differential rules (e.g., equity) are oriented toward enhancing economic productivity, whereas more equalitarian rules (e.g., consistency, bias
suppression, and voice) are oriented toward maintaining cohesiveness, solidarity, and a sense of common fate among organizational members (Kabanoff, 1991; Meindl, 1989). The functionality of i-deals depends more on managers’ adherence to equity rules, whereas adherence to procedural rules acts as social glue that holds a group together (Rousseau, 2005; Greenberg et al., 2004).

2.5 Antecedents of Justice Rule Adherence

Note that managers may agree upon the particular rules to apply in the granting of i-deals, but could assign the rules different weights. The notion of rule weighting as well as the order and interpretability of justice experiences supply mechanisms that explain how certain individual and organizational characteristics could alter the relative importance of equity and procedural rules. It is, however, more important to identify what characteristics actually influence a manager’s decision to act in accordance with these justice standards (Colquitt & Jackson, 2006). The handful of studies that have explicated the reasons for adhering to justice rules can be categorized into three streams.

The first stream of research focuses on managers’ demographic and dispositional characteristics. Early justice research has revealed that allocation preferences covary with demographic and sociological variables such as age, sex, social class, and nationality (Mikula, 1981; Major & Deaux, 1982). More recent studies have linked neuroticism and agreeableness (Mayer, Nishii, Schneider, & Goldstein, 2007), empathy (Patient & Skarlicki, 2010), and moral identity (Brebels, De Cremer, Van Dijke, & Van Hiel, 2011) to justice rule adherence. Based on the evident individual differences in justice judgments and enactments, some scholars have posited that in general people differ in their justice sensitivity, that is, in how readily they see issues as involving fairness and in how they
feel about treating others unfairly (Schmitt, 1996; Schmitt, Baumert, Gollwitzer, & Maes, 2010). Managers’ justice sensitivity is the first step in justice-related behaviors (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009a).

The second stream of research explores justice-related motives. For example, Leventhal (1976) demonstrated that managers use the equity rules instrumentally to elicit desired levels of motivation from their groups. Greenberg (1990) revealed that managers adhere to justice rules to attain impression management goals. In addition, Folger and colleagues (Folger, 2001, 2012; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Cropanzano & Stein, 2009) argued that justice rule adherence is a morally motivated action and fairness itself is an intrinsically valued goal. These studies suggest that managers who adhere to justice rules are motivated by the belief that behaving in a fair manner provides a path toward attaining valued goals (e.g., Leventhal, 1980; Meindl, 1989; Kabanoff, 1991; Greenberg, 1990; Scott et al., 2009). Justice rules will be followed to the extent that they help managers attain these goals (Yamagishi, 1984; Mikula, 1980; Scott et al., 2009, 2014).

The third stream of studies emphasizes the social pressures that enforce justice rules. In these studies, justice is conceived as a social norm (Sampson, 1975), and justice rule adherence is a form of conformity (Allen, 1982; Folger & Cropanzano, 2001; Lerner, 2003). Justice rule adherence results from the internalization of norms and proper conduct (Deutsch, 1975, 1985; Sampson, 1975; Lerner, 1980). More importantly, justice rule adherence is dictated by the threat of social disapproval or punishment for norm violations (Coleman, 1990). High normative expectations of justice give justice elements greater legitimacy, and therefore, cause justice judgments to have a stronger impact on people’s attitudes and behaviors (Blau, 1964; Crosby, 1976; Greenberg & Cohen, 1982;
Shapiro & Kirkman, 1999). The status and esteem often ascribed to managers are only so ascribed if they act in accordance with the normative expectations of their positions (Lind & Tyler, 1992; Chen, Brockner, & Greenberg, 2003). The feelings of being evaluated by others make managers more sensitive to how their decisions impact others and prompt them to take into account others’ opinions, which are important precursors of justice rule adherence (Blader & Chen, 2012).

The theorizing of justice rule adherence is still at an early stage (Folger & Skarlicki, 2001; Scott, Colquitt, & Zapata-Phelan, 2007). The related empirical research is undertaking a piecemeal approach to exploring factors that affect justice rule adherence. These efforts, however, set the foundation for a more systematic investigation by identifying three classes of variables, including dispositional characteristics, motivational factors, and normative expectations, and elaborating the mechanisms by which they influence managers’ justice rule adherence.

2.6 Boundary Conditions and Exploratory Research Questions

In reviewing the literature, I noted that there are likely to be variations in managers’ justice rule adherence that affect the granting of i-deals. The bases for these differences are many, including the salience of performance information, dispositional justice sensitivity, justice-related motives, and social pressures that managers face. The present study aims to identify the factors that make managers make decisions in accordance with the equity and procedural rules and test their effects on the relationship between employee past performance and i-deals. The proposed model of justice rule adherence in granting i-deals, however, should be tempered by consideration of some boundary conditions.
One important variable to consider is the type of i-deal, which can influence the potency of the relationships that I propose. The pre-employment negotiations (ex ante i-deals) typically involve economic and other formal conditions such as compensation, base location, and job duration (Rousseau, 2005). Once on the job, employees can seek more personally meaningful conditions (ex post i-deals) based on shared information (Rousseau et al., 2006). The ex ante i-deals are often granted by the human resources department or upper management, whereas individual managers (i.e., an employee’s immediate supervisor) act as primary decision makers for the ex post i-deals (Rousseau et al., 2006; Hornung et al., 2009). Thus, this study focuses on the ex post i-deals that are granted by managers.

Ex post i-deals can be further differentiated based on the nature of resources involved. Resources have distinct properties that signify types of exchange relationships (e.g., social vs. economic exchanges, Rousseau et al., 2006; Foa & Foa, 1980). Not all justice rules equally fit given resources and relationships. As noted in my literature review (e.g., justice judgment model and the relationship between distributive and procedural rules), however, justice rules are not mutually exclusive. Most allocations result from a “counterbalancing” combination of rules (Leventhal et al., 1980; Martin & Harder, 1988; Meindl, 1989). It is important to first understand the “ground rules” that guide manager’s fair behaviors in the granting of different i-deals. Thus, this study focuses on how and why i-deals are granted rather than on the type of i-deal granted.

Instead of offering hypotheses targeting each type of i-deal, I explore possible differences based on the speculations that the equity rules are more important for allocating material resources, whereas the procedural rules (e.g., consistency and bias
suppression) are more important for allocating socioemotional resources (Martin & Harder, 1988). Adherence to equity rules is most likely to affect the granting of financial i-deals, reflecting the exchanges of service for tangible rewards in an employment relationship. Similarly, task i-deals are often associated with a road to advancement (e.g., promotions and future pay), and thus are more subject to the equity rules. In contrast, flexibility i-deals are often concerned with work-family balance and involve more particularistic resources. Therefore, procedural rules are likely to exert more influence over flexibility i-deals.

In addition, theory developed in this study is predicated on the prominence of equity rules and it is anticipated by assumptions regarding the exchange basis of employment relationships (e.g., Deutsch, 1985). However, these assumptions fail to address the fact that managers’ goal priorities may vary in different allocation situations (Meindl, 1989). It is arguable that i-deals, as a special form of resource allocation, serve distinct situational goals that constrain the choice of distributive rules. The justice literature shows consistent evidence that five alternative managerial value contexts (i.e., defined in terms of situational goal priority) are linked to differential allocation preferences. These values include group productivity, individual development and welfare, group cohesion, leader-member relationships, and fairness (e.g., Meindl, 1989; Chen, 1995). There is a lack of research, however, on how these situational goals influence the thinking of managers who are in a position to create i-deals. Such possibilities were built into the present study by asking managers to indicate the importance of each of the above-mentioned goals when granting i-deals and exploring how these values affect managers’ adherence to equity and procedural rules.
Third, justice rule adherence is a more descriptive perception, whereas fairness and unfairness are more evaluative (Scott et al., 2009). I recognize that a manager’s intent to be fair does not guarantee that he or she will be perceived as fair. The visibility of i-deals could influence employee fairness perceptions both positively (e.g., decision transparency and open communication) and negatively (e.g., embarrassing disclosure or feelings of inequity). High visibility of an i-deal is likely to make managers’ concern over coworker reactions salient as well as prompt them to hide or even avoid i-deals. The under-the-table approach and the avoiding alternative may be viewed as violations of justice rules (Greenberg et al., 2004). On the other hand, a manager’s adherence to procedural rules (e.g., consultation with coworkers) is likely to increase the visibility of i-deals. The relationship between visibility of i-deals and the managers’ justice rule adherence may be more complex than it appears. Also, a manager may seek approval from an audience, but the view of said audience (i.e., normative expectations) may be unknown. The fairness of i-deals will be best captured by simultaneously considering the manager, the focal employee with an i-deal, coworkers, and a set of exchange relationships (i.e., LMX, TMX, and POS). Yet, it is premature to consider the dynamic nature of fairness perceptions without understanding the basic psychology of managers’ justice rule adherence. In this study, I take the opportunities of exploring visibility, allocation norms, and perceived overall manager fairness in the context of granting i-deals.

Finally, some justice researchers have cautioned that justice rule adherence may be both a between-manager phenomenon and a within-manager phenomenon (Scott et al., 2009). Justice rule adherence is influenced by the manager’s dispositions and relatively
stable cognitions (e.g., values, beliefs, and goals), as well as by positive or negative affect that the manager experiences (Scott et al., 2014). These cautions have important implications for the manager-focused studies on i-deals. It is important to recognize that employees negotiate i-deals individually. Inconsistency in the granting of i-deals at both between- and within-manager levels can have adverse consequences (Rousseau, 2005; Greenberg et al., 2004). Yet, justice judgment and enactment increase in complexity when considering the interactive and unique nature of individual negotiations. This study identifies relatively stable precursors to justice rule adherence, and as such, places more emphasis on between-manager differences.

2.7 Summary

As Rousseau (2005) comments, “we judge ourselves by our intentions, while others judge us by our behaviors” (p. 64). This study explores managers’ intentions as well as their behaviors. Although not explicitly posited by the model, the synthesis of the manager-focused justice literature has the potential to illustrate both benefits and liabilities of an i-deal from the manager’s perspective. As I elaborate next, different factors affecting adherence to justice rules and the association between employee past performance and i-deals may have implications for managerial interests in granting i-deals. This study can serve as a springboard for future research that integrates different perspectives on the fairness of i-deals.
3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

3.1 Past Performance and I-deals

Performance is conceptualized as “actions and behaviors that are under the control of the individual and contribute to the goals of the organization” (Rotundo & Sackett, 2002, p. 66). In order to survive, organizations must achieve derivative goals, including productivity, social harmony, and individual development and welfare (Kabanoff, 1991). Task performance contributes to the production of a good or the provision of a service, while various OCBs contribute to the social and psychological environment that facilitates organizational functioning. Resource and reward allocations in organizational settings are often made contingent upon performance behaviors (e.g., Martin & Harder, 1988; Conlon et al., 2004).

Employee past task performance is expected to increase the granting of i-deals through several mechanisms. First, past task performance is a credible indicator of merit (Conlon et al., 2004) and “competence at individual actions that further attainment of group goals” (Hollander, 1960, p. 365), which give rise to employee market value and bargaining power (Rousseau, 2005). Managers thus face pressure to retain and motivate individuals who have demonstrated their value (Rousseau et al., 2006). Second, salient individual task performance information amplifies the perceived differences in relative contributions to the group, which downplays the importance of equal treatment from the manager’s perspective (Meindl, 1989). Finally, exceptional task performance can reduce the processes of social comparison by making one’s peers less of a referent standard (Greenberg et al., 2004), as well as create divergent expectations regarding rewards and opportunities (Rousseau et al., 2006). Thus, high performance can prompt an employee’s
pursuit of idiosyncrasy, which in turn makes standardized position-based rewards less effective. Managers are likely to feel compelled to provide high performers a particularly suitable reward by granting i-deals.

**Hypothesis 1a.** Employee past task performance is positively related to the granting of i-deals.

Managers, however, may not anticipate all situational contingencies in advance and often cannot specify all behaviors they desire from employees. While task performance reflects in-role requirements and is often explicit in the job description, OCBs are more discretionary in nature. OCBs can be extremely valuable to managers (Rotundo & Sackett, 2002), and therefore, play an important role in the granting of i-deals. Performance-based reward systems are seldom comprehensive enough to completely capture OCBs. I-deals serve the interests of the organization when they complement the standardized human resource practices, and they are especially powerful when managers feel “good performance is difficult to reward formally” (Rousseau, 2005, p. 182). More precise specifications of the targets of OCBs enhance our understanding of the links between citizenship behaviors and i-deals. OCBs can target specific individuals, such as helping coworkers and providing additional assistance to managers. These discretionary behaviors engender positive affect and trust (e.g., Lawler, 2001), which in turn create relational support for an i-deal (Lai et al., 2009). OCBs can also be directed toward the organization such as following rules or defending the group to outsiders. This type of citizenship behaviors entails a sense of group membership. I-deals are more likely to be granted if they are viewed as consistent with values of insiders (Rousseau, 2005, p. 130).
**Hypothesis 1b.** Employee past OCB-I is positively related to the granting of i-deals.

**Hypothesis 1c.** Employee past OCB-O is positively related to the granting of i-deals.

### 3.2 The Effects of Adherence to Equity and Procedural Rules

As noted previously, variability in the relationship between performance and i-deals highlights both a need and an opportunity to explore the manager’s justice rule adherence. In the case of i-deals, distributive justice is most likely to be framed as equity with respect to either external (market conditions) or internal (coworkers) referent standards (Rousseau et al., 2006; Greenberg et al., 2004). A fundamental assumption underlying equity theory (Adams, 1965) is that people should be rewarded in proportion to their relative contributions. Adherence to equity rules prescribes that managers take into account employee contributions in the granting of i-deals. Although there are a variety of ways in which the equity rules can be operationalized in organizations, such as basing allocations on past performance, future performance, human capital, or seniority, evidence suggests that the past performance criterion will be seen as more fair than other criteria and will result in less intragroup conflicts (Conlon et al., 2004). Adherence to equity rules is, therefore, expected to strengthen the relationship between past performance and i-deals.

I-deals also signal their fairness during the managerial decision-making process. Adherence to procedural rules is expected to strengthen the relationship between performance and i-deals for two reasons. First, the very nature of i-deals makes it difficult for managers to define “consistency” in operational terms (Greenberg et al., 2004).
Performance is likely to be viewed as a legitimate (accurate and unbiased) basis to compare individuals with unique personal needs and talents. In order to implement consistent ground rules, that is, to offer comparable future opportunity and to evaluate different requests with the same criteria, managers are likely to rely on past performance as the criterion in their decision-making. Second, enacting procedural justice involves seeking out information regarding the coworker’s perspective on a potential deal (Rousseau, 2005; Greenberg et al., 2004). Akin to the phenomenon of dues-paying (Ford & Newstrom, 1999; Martinko, Douglas, Ford, & Gundlach, 2004), knowing an individual’s past contributions promotes the belief that he or she deserves special consideration in a precipitating situation. Also, idiosyncrasy credits (Hollander, 1958) are often accorded to high performers and good organizational citizens (Rousseau, 2005), which allow them to deviate from the group norms. When voice (i.e., process control and/or decision control) is granted to coworkers, evidence of high performance could result in their cooperation and support of i-deals. Adherence to procedural justice rules coordinates different perspectives on i-deals, which in turn imposes the use of past performance as a criterion.

**Hypothesis 2.** Adherence to equity (a) and procedural (b) rules strengthens the positive association between employee past performance behaviors and the granting of i-deals.

### 3.3 Antecedents of Adherence to Equity and Procedural Rules

Justice research suggests that individual managers differ in the degree of justice rule adherence. Justice researchers have used managers’ dispositional and motivational characteristics as well as their perceptions of social pressures to predict their justice rule
adherence. Drawing on this approach, I identify several antecedents of managers’ adherence to equity and procedural rules related to i-deals, including justice sensitivity, cognitive motives, and felt accountability.

3.3.1 Antecedents of Adherence to Justice Rules: Justice Sensitivity

Being insensitive towards injustice is a “roadblock” to fair behaviors (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009a). Justice sensitivity refers to the stable tendency of how an individual feels about injustice experiences (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1985, 1987; Montada, Schmitt, & Dalbert, 1986; Dar & Resh, 2001; Van den Bos, Maas, Waldring, & Semin, 2003). In contrast to early equity sensitivity work that focuses on the recipient’s reactions, Schmitt and colleagues (Schmitt, Neumann, & Montada, 1995; Schmitt, 1996; Schmitt & Dörfel, 1999; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005) suggest that the sensitivity from the recipient’s perspective reflects a concern for justice for the self, whereas the sensitivity from the actor’s perspective reflects concern for the justice toward others.

Schmitt and colleagues explicitly explored individual differences in how people feel about treating others unfairly. Several findings based on their work on the actor’s justice sensitivity are important to the present study. First, injustice is not simply inequity, but also includes unfair procedures (Schmitt, 1996; Schmitt, Rebele, Bennecke, & Förster, 2008). Second, individual differences in the readiness and strength of fairness perceptions are stable across time and different contexts (Schmitt et al., 2005). Third, justice sensitive actors are more likely to interpret social situations as involving justice and ruminate longer about potential injustice (Schmitt et al., 2010). Fourth, committing injustice is cognitively absorbing as well as emotionally disturbing for actors who are
more sensitive (Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004; Gollwitzer, Rothmund, Pfeiffer, & Ensenbach, 2009).

In effect, a high level of justice sensitivity increases the awareness of injustice. Justice sensitive managers are more likely to be aware of issues of equity, consistency, voice, and other fairness criteria in the granting of i-deals. Additionally, justice sensitivity indicates the intensity of feelings about injustice. Justice sensitive managers are more likely to feel guilty for alleged injustice, which leads to a salient concern about fairness of i-deals (Greenberg et al., 2004). Together, justice sensitive managers are more likely to act in accordance with equity and procedural rules in the granting of i-deals.

**Hypothesis 3.** Manager justice sensitivity is positively related to adherence to equity (a) and procedural (b) rules.

### 3.3.2 Antecedents of Adherence to Justice Rules: Cognitive Motives

Managers may recognize i-deals as an issue involving fairness, and may also understand the implications of potential injustice. However, justice motivation is another roadblock to enact the course of actions identified by justice rules (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009a). Justice motivation reflects the degree to which concerns of fairness dominate other concerns of importance in an organizational setting (Tyler, 1994, Ambrose & Schminke, 2009a). Drawing on the expansive justice literature, Scott, Colquitt, and Paddock (2009) identified three cognitive motives that underlie fair behaviors. First, *effecting compliance* refers to a manager’s desire to control and influence his or her employees’ reactions. Second, *identity maintenance* refers to a manager’s desire to create or maintain a particular social identity, and to manage others’ impressions. Third, *establishing fairness* refers to a manager’s desire to keep the scales of
justice in balance as a way in which to maintain a sense of fairness. The first two motives suggest that managers use justice rules as strategies to achieve some distal, self-interested goals, whereas the third motive indicates that being fair is a valued goal in its own right.

In a more recent study of 90 managers, Scott and colleagues (2014) found support for the effects of all three cognitive motives on managers’ adherence to equity and procedural rules. Specifically, they found that the dominant motive for adherence to equity rules was effecting compliance, while the dominant motive for adherence to procedural rules was identity maintenance. These findings fit well with the employee-centered view in the i-deals literature, which argues that justice is crucial to the functionality of i-deals (i.e., equitable allocations elicit desired reactions from recipients and coworkers) and is valued by employees (i.e., fair procedures aid in cultivation of a manager’s positive image).

These cognitive motives provide a starting point for explaining managers’ fair behaviors related to i-deals. When managers are motivated to control and influence employee outcomes related to i-deals, adherence to equity and procedural rules makes the contribution-reward relationship salient, which in turn helps to elicit desired levels of motivation from the coworkers by promoting vicarious learning (Bandura, 1977). Moreover, because i-deals signal changes in the employment conditions, they are likely to be “phase shifting” events (Lind, 2001; Folger & Cropanzano, 2001) that could alter employees’ fairness heuristics (Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, & de Vera Park, 1993) and prompt fresh judgments of manager’s legitimacy and trustworthiness (Lind & Tyler, 1992). When managers are motivated to create and maintain a desired social identity, adherence to equity and procedural rules cultivates a fair image and reputation. Finally, when
managers are motivated to live up to or defend the “belief in a just world” (Lerner, 1980; Folger, 1993, 2001), adherence to justice rules helps them to ensure that an employee deserves special treatment and that coworkers get what they deserve for their cooperation (Lerner & Miller, 1978).

**Hypothesis 4.** Manager effecting compliance motive is positively related to adherence to equity (a) and procedural (b) rules.

**Hypothesis 5.** Manager identity maintenance motive is positively related to adherence to equity (a) and procedural (b) rules.

**Hypothesis 6.** Manager establishing fairness motive is positively related to adherence to equity (a) and procedural (b) rules.

3.3.3 Antecedents of Adherence to Justice Rules: Felt Accountability

When granting i-deals, managers’ decisions may be closely scrutinized and potentially questioned. Felt accountability captures a manager’s expectation that “one will be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others” (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, p. 255). The reason why felt accountability makes managers act fairly relies on the idea that people conform to social pressures (Allen, 1982; Tetlock, 1992; Lerner & Tetlock, 2003). Lerner (2003) suggests that the pervasive concern about being evaluated negatively by others as well as the expectations for sanctions result in displaying normative and fair behaviors. In other words, accountability pressure is a regulatory mechanism for justice rule adherence (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001).

Felt accountability reduces egocentric tendencies (Lerner, Tetlock, Schneider, & Shanteau, 2003), as well as elicits open-minded and critical thinking (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, 2003), which affects the manner of decision-making. Research has shown that felt
accountability causes decision makers to search more thoroughly for relevant information (Pennington & Schlenker, 1999), process information in a less biased and more accurate way (Rozelle & Baxter, 1981), and use more credible decision criteria (Mero & Motowidlo, 1995). It can be expected that having to justify an i-deal is likely to influence how managers make the decisions, by increasing their reliance on equity and procedural rules. Adherence to equity rules helps managers to avoid being exploited (Blau, 1964; Molm, 2003), while adherence to procedural rules ensures the decision-making process is accurate and unbiased.

More importantly, accountability pressure makes managers more attentive to employees’ expectations and evaluations (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2009; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999), which affects the nature of their decisions (Tetlock & Henik, 1985; Hall, Frink, Ferris, Hochwarter, Kacmar, & Bowen, 2003). Felt accountability increases managers’ cognitive effort to make socially appropriate decisions, and thus, their decisions show a greater tendency to go along with the normative expectations (Chen, Shecter, & Chaiken, 1996; Lerner, 2003; Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Semin & Manstead, 1983). Norms associated with managerial positions often dictate that managers should act in a fair manner toward others (Tyler, 1994; Lind & Tyler, 1988, 1992; Folger, 1986). Adherence to equity and procedural rules has consistently been shown to affect employees’ evaluations of their managers (e.g., Lind, 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1992; Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 2001; Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000). In high accountability conditions, therefore, managers are more likely to strike a deal by carefully adhering to justice rules.
**Hypothesis 7.** Manager felt accountability is positively related to adherence to equity (a) and procedural (b) rules.

### 3.4 Mediated Moderation Effects

From a theoretical standpoint, examining antecedents of adherence to equity and procedural rules in the context of granting i-deals can help us to gain insights into why i-deals are used differently across managers. A limited amount of research provides guidance with regard to formulating hypotheses about the direct effects of manager’s justice sensitivity, cognitive motives, and felt accountability on i-deals. However, the above-mentioned hypotheses together examined the two essential conditions of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) approach for establishing mediation: (1) the relationship between the independent variable (i.e., justice sensitivity, cognitive motives, and felt accountability) and mediator (i.e., adherence to equity and procedural rules) and (2) the relationship between the mediator and dependent variable (i.e., the dependent variable in this situation is the relationship between performance and i-deals). As outlined by researchers (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005; Edwards & Lambert, 2007; Grant & Berry, 2011), mediated moderation is present when a moderating effect is transmitted through a mediator.

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Insert Figure 1 Here

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In combination, I propose that manager’s justice sensitivity, cognitive motives, and felt accountability result in adherence to equity and procedural rules, which in turn strengthens the relationships between employee past performance behaviors and i-deals. Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical model.
**Hypothesis 8.** Adherence to equity rules mediates the moderating effects of justice sensitivity (a), effecting compliance (b), identity maintenance (c), establishing fairness (d), and felt accountability (e) on the relationship between employee past performance behaviors and i-deals.

**Hypothesis 9.** Adherence to procedural rules mediates the moderating effects of justice sensitivity (a), effecting compliance (b), identity maintenance (c), establishing fairness (d), and felt accountability (e) on the relationship between employee past performance behaviors and i-deals.
4. METHOD

4.1 Samples and Procedures

The data for this study were collected from two organizations in China. These two organizations were chosen because there is a high likelihood of i-deals among their professional employees doing relatively independent work (Rousseau, 2005). The selected groups of managers and employees span a large range of functional departments such as corporate finance and accounting, human resource (HR) management, marketing, information technology, customer services, and in-house legal counsel. The diversity of this sample helps to increase the generalizability of the findings. Email addresses of 196 managers and 590 employees were provided to me along with information regarding dyadic relationships, job levels and job titles. Online surveys were distributed (via Qualtrics) to managers and their employees, and code numbers were assigned to matched dyads and were used to link the corresponding responses. Prior to launching the surveys, the HR teams of both organizations held meetings with the selected groups of managers and employees to inform them about the research and to assure them of the confidentiality of responses.

Both the manager and employee surveys were administered in Mandarin. All survey instructions and items underwent a back-translation procedure (Brislin, 1986). Two translators fluent in English and Chinese conducted the one-way translations independently, and discrepancies were identified and solved through discussion. HR managers of the participating organizations reviewed the Chinese-version of the surveys to guarantee the accuracy and clarity of translation and to ensure proper contextualization of items for the sample.
The manager survey included measures to assess their own adherence to justice rules, justice sensitivity, cognitive motives, felt accountability, employee past performance behaviors, unfulfilled obligation, and performance expectation. The number of direct reports was also gathered from managers along with their age, sex, race, education, managerial tenure, and organizational tenure. The employee survey included measures to assess the granted i-deals, perceptions of their managers’ adherence to justice rules, proactivity (i.e., personal initiative), and LMX. Demographic variables, such as age, sex, education, organizational tenure, and dyadic tenure, were also included.

In order to minimize the threat of common method variance, different response anchors (e.g., “1 = not at all”, to “5 = a very great extent”; or “1 = strongly disagree”, to “7 = strongly agree”) were used for items assessed by the same source (Podsakoff, Whiting, Welsh, & Mai, 2013). Specifically, in the manager survey, a 7-point scale was used for justice rule adherence, while a 5-point scale was used for antecedents of justice rule adherence and other measures. In the employee survey, a 7-point scale was used for i-deals, while a 5-point scale was used for the remaining variables. Appendix A provides a summary of measures used, sources, response anchors, and adaptations (if applicable).

In the beginning of both manager and employee surveys, I provided participants with a description of i-deals (see Appendix B). I asked managers and employees whether they had negotiated an i-deal within the past 8 months (January 2015 to August 2015) and, if they had, to provide when as well as with whom. The information of timing, negotiation partner, employee organizational tenure, and dyadic tenure was used to govern the decision to include a participant in the analyses. To be considered, the i-deal must have been negotiated with the manager, within the 8-month period, and on-the-job.
69 managers (response rate = 35.2%) and 226 employees (response rate = 38.3%) completed the online surveys, yielding 213 matched dyads of managers and employees that met the inclusion criteria (effective dyads response rate = 36.1%). The final sample for analyses consisted of 60 managers and 213 employees.

Of the 60 managers, 42.1% were men. The average age of these managers was 35.51 years ($SD = 7.52$) and their average managerial experience was 5.63 years ($SD = 4.83$). In terms of their education, 11.9% held less than a bachelor’s degree, 54.2% held bachelor’s degrees, and 33.9% held postgraduate degrees. Of the 213 employees, 35.9% were men. Their average age was 32.46 years ($SD = 6.56$), average dyadic tenure was 3.11 years ($SD = 1.18$), and average organizational tenure was 4.64 years ($SD = 2.93$). In terms of education, 18.4% held less than a bachelor’s degree, 62.2% held bachelor’s degrees, and 19.4% held postgraduate degrees.

I obtained employee annual performance appraisal ratings for 2014 from one of the two organizations. The organization’s performance appraisal consisted of 3 items capturing the quantity, quality, and timeliness of work completed by the employee, and had a scale of “1 = unacceptable, 2 = needs improvement, 3 = meets expectations, 4 = effective, and 5 = outstanding”. Note that the appraisals were completed by the employees’ direct supervisors and recorded by the end of 2014, supporting some degree of temporal precedence of the hypothesized performance - i-deal relationship. It should also be noted that I had access to the composite scores (i.e., an average across the 3 items) for only 82 of the employees in the final sample, and that the reliability information was not available.
4.2 Manager Survey Measures

**Adherence to Justice Rules.** Adherence to justice rules was measured following Scott and colleagues’ (2014) approach. Managers were asked to recall all i-deals that they had negotiated in the past 8 months, both granted and rejected, and then indicate the extent to which they agree with each item. For adherence to equity rules, six items from Price and Mueller’s (1986) distributive justice scale were used. Example items are “My decisions reflected the amount of effort that my subordinates had put forth.” and “My decisions reflected the stresses and strains of my subordinates’ job.” (α = .80). For adherence to procedural rules, seven items from Colquitt’s (2001) procedural justice scale were used. Example items include “My subordinates were able to express their views and feelings during my decision-making process.”, “My decision criteria were applied consistently.”, and “My decision criteria were free of bias.” (α = .73).

**Justice Sensitivity.** The 10-item scale written by Schmitt, Baumert, Gollwitzer, and Maes (2010) was used to measure manager justice sensitivity. Example items are “I have a bad conscience when I deny someone the acknowledgment he or she deserves.”, “I feel guilty when I treat someone worse than others.”, and “It takes me a long time to forget when I allow myself to be careless at the expense of someone else.” (α = .76).

**Cognitive Motives.** Manager’s cognitive motives were assessed using 17 items developed and validated by Scott and colleagues (2014). Managers were asked to recall all i-deals they had negotiated within the past 8 months, both granted and rejected, and then indicate the extent to which each item described the reason for their behaviors related to these deals. An example item for **effecting compliance** is “to ensure my subordinates behave in the ways that I want them to at work.” (6 items, α = .82), for
**Identity maintenance** is “to ensure my subordinates think of me as a good leader.” (6 items, \( \alpha = .92 \)), and for **establishing fairness** is “to ensure my subordinates realize that people get what they deserve” (5 items, \( \alpha = .85 \)).

**Felt Accountability.** To assess manager felt accountability, eight items from Hochwarter, Kacmar, and Ferris (2003) were used. Example items include “I am held accountable for my actions at work.”, “I often have to explain why I do certain things at work.”, and “Co-workers, subordinates, and bosses closely scrutinize my efforts at work.” (\( \alpha = .78 \)).

**Employee Past Performance Behaviors.** Managers were asked to recall employee performance in the past year (2014) and rate task performance and organizational citizenship behaviors directed towards individuals (OCB-I) and the organization (OCB-O), using 18 items from Williams and Anderson (1991). An example task performance item is “Fulfilled responsibilities specified in job description.” (6 items, \( \alpha = .81 \)), an example of an OCB-I item is “Helped others who had heavy work loads.” (6 items, \( \alpha = .85 \)), and an example of an OCB-O item is “Adhered to informal rules devised to maintain order.” (6 items, \( \alpha = .72 \)).

**Manager Control Variables.** Hornung and colleagues (2009) found that managers would grant i-deals to compensate unfulfilled obligations to employees and that the granted i-deals correlated with performance expected from the individuals. In order to rule out these alternative explanations, I controlled for unfulfilled obligations and performance expectations. **Unfulfilled obligation** was measured with the same 3 items that Hornung and colleagues (2009) used. These items are “The organization did not fulfill its obligations towards them.”, “The organization did not provide them with
everything it promised.”, and “The organization broke commitments it made to them.” ($\alpha = .76$). Managers were asked to reflect how they felt at the end of 2014 and indicate the general level of unfulfilled obligations toward their employees. *Performance expectation* was also measured with 3 items created by Hornung and colleagues (2009). Managers were instructed to reflect on any increases in their performance expectations of *each* employee in the past 8 months and to evaluate individual employee on 3 aspects, including “amount of work”, “quality of work results”, and “compliance with deadlines” ($\alpha = .89$).

In addition, managers’ demographic characteristics such as their age, sex, education, and managerial tenure, may influence their resource allocation preferences (e.g. Major & Deaux, 1982). The structural conditions such as group size (i.e., number of direct reports) may impose constraints on the creation of i-deals (Hornung et al., 2009). Managers who have more influence and power (e.g., at a higher job level) are better positioned to create i-deals (Rousseau, 2005). Thus, these variables were also controlled in analyses. Job level was used as a proxy for *position power*.

### 4.3 Employee Survey Measures

*Idiosyncratic Deals.* Six items from the task and work responsibilities subscale, three items from the schedule flexibility subscale, and five items from the financial incentives subscale developed by Rosen and colleagues (2013) were adopted to assess granted i-deals. I chose this measure for two reasons. First, these three types of i-deals are more likely to be observed in the study samples, which comprise managerial professionals and a skilled workforce. Second, this measure specifies that special arrangements are negotiated with managers. This focus is consistent with the present
study. A time frame for the granted i-deals was highlighted. Employees were asked to report i-deals that they had successfully negotiated with their managers since January 1st, 2015. An example task i-deals item is “At my request, my supervisor has assigned me tasks that better develop my skills.”, an example flexibility i-deals item is “Outside of formal leave and sick time, my supervisor has allowed me to take time off to attend to non-work-related issues.”, and an example financial i-deals item is “Because of my personal circumstances, my supervisor has created a compensation arrangement that is tailored to fit me.”. The Cronbach's α for the overall scale was 0.91.

**Adherence to Justice Rules.** Perceptions of managers’ adherence to distributive and procedural justice rules were measured following Scott and colleagues’ (2007) approach. Employees were asked to recall all i-deals negotiated in the past 8 months, both granted and rejected, and then indicate the extent to which each statement described managers’ behaviors related to i-deals. For equity rules, employees were referred to the decisions made by the managers. Six items from Price and Mueller’s (1986) distributive justice scale were used. Example items are “My manager’s decisions reflected the effort I had put into my work.” and “My manager’s decisions reflected the amount of education and training that I have had.” (α = .92; median Rwg(j) = .76). For procedural rules, employees were referred to the procedures their managers use to make decisions. Seven items were adapted from Colquitt’s (2001) procedural justice scale. Example items include “I had influence over my manager’s decisions.” and “My manager’s decision criteria were applied consistently.” (α = .87; median Rwg(j) = .73).

**Employee Control Variables.** Past research of i-deals (see Liao et al., 2014 for a review) has shown that employee age, sex, organizational tenure, proactivity (i.e.,
personal initiative), and LMX can influence i-deals. Task interdependence has also been shown to influence the importance of justice rules for judging fairness (Colquitt et al., 2006) and the implementation of i-deals (Rousseau, 2005). Thus, I controlled these variables in analyses. Three items from Hornung and colleagues’ (2009) study were used to assess employee proactivity in terms of self-starting, persistent, and anticipatory pursuit of goals (Frese, Fay, Hilburger, Leng, & Tag, 1997). These items are “I take initiative immediately even when others don’t.”, “I use opportunities quickly in order to attain my goals.”, and “I am particularly good at turning ideas into action.” (α = .79).

The 12-item measure of LMX developed by Liden and Maslyn (1998) was used to assess the perception of individual employees regarding the quality of exchange relationship with managers (α = .95). Task interdependence was assessed using the 5-item scale developed by Van der Vegt and colleagues (2001). An example item is “I depend on my colleagues for the completion of my work.” (α = .74; ICC(1)interdependence = .10, F = 0.69, p = .95; median Rwg(j) = .74).

4.4 Exploratory Variables

As discussed previously, the proposed model should be tempered with several boundary conditions. Although it is premature to develop hypotheses, a set of exploratory variables, including managerial value contexts, visibility of i-deals, distributive norms for granting i-deals, and perceived overall fairness of managers were measured and explored. Managerial value contexts were assessed by asking managers to reflect on their previous experiences regarding i-deals and indicate the importance of each of the following goals in granting i-deals, including collective productivity, individual development and welfare, group cohesion, leader-member relationships, and fairness. Five items created for this
study were included in the employee survey to assess visibility of i-deals. An example item is “If someone in my work group got a customized deal, I would know who he/she is.” (α = .72; ICC(1)_visibility = .06, F = 1.25, p = .15; median Rwg(j) = .83). Distributive norms were measured from both managerial and employee perspectives by adapting the equity and need preference scales developed by Fortin and colleagues (2011). Both managers and employees were instructed to indicate to whom the preferences should be given, in order to create i-deals in a fair manner. An example equity norm item is “those who contribute more.” (for managers, α = .85; for employees, α = .93; ICC(1)_equity = .06, F = 1.22, p = .17; median Rwg(j) = .76). An example need norm item is “those who have more difficulties.” (for managers, α = .72; for employees, α = .83; ICC(1)_need = .14, F = 1.58, p < .05; median Rwg(j) = .72). The 6-item measure developed by Ambrose and Schminke (2009) was adapted to assess individual employee’s perception regarding Overall Supervisor Fairness. An example item is “In general, I can count on my manager to be fair.” (α = .97; ICC(1)_fairness = .06, F = 1.24, p = .15; median Rwg(j) = .70).

4.5 Analytical Strategy

The present data contained a hierarchical structure in which responses of individual employees were nested within managers. Managers also provided performance ratings for several employees, with an average of 3.67 employees being rated by each of the 60 managers. Therefore, I first examined the proportion of variance in employee reports of justice rule adherence that was within-manager. By estimating null models in hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), I partitioned the total variance in employee reports of justice rule adherence into within (i.e., variance that exists because a manager enacts justice rules differently for different employees or because employees
perceive the same behavior of the manager differently) and between (i.e., variance that exists because managers generally adhere to justice rules differently) levels. For employee-reported adherence to equity rules, the within level variance was .50, whereas the between level variance was .73, indicating that 40.38% of total variance was within-manager. For employee-reported adherence to procedural rules, the within level variance was .41, whereas the between level variance was .47, indicating that 46.41% of total variance was within-manager. I also assessed the extent to which variability in i-deals and performance ratings (i.e., task performance, OCB-I, and OCB-O) was attributable to differences across managers. ICC(1)_{i-deals} = .09, F = 1.12, p = .29, indicating that the granted i-deals did not vary significantly across managers. However, performance ratings appeared to depend on managers, ICC(1)_{task performance} = .33, F = 5.19, p < .01; ICC(1)_{OCB-I} = .39, F = 6.34, p < .01; ICC(1)_{OCB-O} = .40, F = 6.43, p < .01. In addition, ICC(1)_{archival} = .10, F = 1.336, p = 0.18, suggesting that the archival performance appraisal ratings were not biased by group membership. Taken together, these results suggest that meaningful variance exists at both within- and between- manager levels, justifying multilevel modeling as the appropriate analytical technique. Hence, a series of models were tested in Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2012) by following a multilevel path-analytic framework, in which hypothesized relationships were estimated concurrently (Bauer, Preacher, Gil, 2006; Edwards & Lambert, 2007; Preacher, Zhang, & Zyphur, 2010).

**Estimation of Main Effects.** To estimate the main effects of performance behaviors on i-deals (Hypothesis 1), I group-mean centered task performance, OCB-I, OCB-O, performance expectation, and LMX, and specified within level (Level 1) slopes of these variables to be random. In addition, visibility of i-deals, employee proactivity,
and employee perceived task interdependence were included as controls with fixed
effects on i-deals. At the between level (Level 2), I controlled for unfulfilled obligation,
number of direct reports, manager education, and job level, as well as group means of the
Level 1 predictors (i.e., task performance, OCB-I, OCB-O, performance expectation, and
LMX). All control variables were grand-mean centered. To conserve statistical power
and reduce the risk of Type I errors, I excluded organizational membership, tenure,
manager sex, and other demographic controls that were not significantly correlated with
the variables of interest (Becker, 2005). I also estimated the main effect of archival
performance ratings on i-deals with the subsample of 82 dyads using a similar two level
random coefficient model. In this model, I specified group-mean centered archival
performance ratings, performance expectation, and LMX as Level 1 predictors, and
included all of the above-mentioned Level 1 and Level 2 control variables. These two
models served as the baseline for exploring moderating effects. Significant variance in
the slopes of task performance, OCB-I, OCB-O, and archival performance ratings would
warrant further investigations of moderating effects.

To estimate the main effects of manager justice sensitivity (Hypotheses 3a and
3b), cognitive motives (Hypotheses 4a and 4b to 6a and 6b), and felt accountability
(Hypotheses 7a and 7b) on adherence to equity and procedural rules, I first tested a model
using manager self-reported justice rule adherence as the dependent variables, controlling
for unfulfilled obligation, number of direct reports, managerial tenure, manager sex,
education, and job level. Note that this model involved relationships between variables at
the same level (between-manager, N = 60). It should also be noted that this model was
subject to common source biases, although different scale anchor points across
antecedents and justice rule adherence measures were used to create “cognitive distance” (Podsakoff et al., 2013). Second, I estimated another model by using employee reports of justice rule adherence as the dependent variables. I specified the relationships of the predictors with the between level component of justice rule adherence and controlled for unfulfilled obligation, number of direct reports, managerial tenure, manager sex, education, and job level. At the within level, I controlled for the effects of visibility and LMX on the within level component of justice rule adherence. To facilitate the interpretation of results, employee reports of justice rule adherence and all control variables were grand-mean centered.

**Estimation of Moderating Effects.** Hypotheses 2a and 2b were estimated in two ways. First, I estimated the moderating effects of manager self-rated justice rule adherence (Level 2) on the within level (Level 1) relationships between performance and i-deals. At Level 1, I group-mean centered task performance, OCB-I, OCB-O, performance expectations, and LMX, and specified their slopes to be random. I also controlled for visibility of i-deals, employee proactivity, and task interdependence with fixed effects. At Level 2, I specified the cross-level direct relationships between justice rule adherence with i-deals, and the cross-level moderating effects of justice rule adherence on the relationships between Level 1 predictors and i-deals. I also controlled for group means of task performance, OCB-I, OCB-O, performance expectation, and LMX, as well as unfulfilled obligation, number of direct reports, manager education, and job level. Manager self-reported justice rule adherence and all control variables were grand-mean centered.
Second, I followed the latent moderated structural equation (LMS) method recommended by Preacher, Zhang, and Zyphur (in press), which enabled me to decompose the multilevel interactions. I estimated the moderating effects of both the between and within components of employee-reported justice rule adherence on the within level relationships between performance and i-deals. Due to a relatively small sample size, I tested the significance of all 12 (2 types of justice rule adherence x 3 types of behaviors x 2 interactions) possible multilevel moderating effects in 6 separate LMS models. I also excluded control variables whose effects were not significant in the baseline models (in testing the main effects). In each LMS model, I set paths between the indicators and latent factors equal to the square root of the reliability for the respective indicator and fixed paths between the error terms and the indicators at (1-reliability) x the variance of the indicator (Williams & Hazer, 1986).

*Estimation of Mediation.* All above-mentioned analyses examined the two essential conditions of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) approach for establishing mediation, being the relationship between the independent variable and mediator as well as the relationship between the mediator and dependent variable (i.e., the dependent variable in this situation is the relationship between performance and i-deals). I further examined the moderating effects of justice sensitivity, cognitive motives, and felt accountability on the relationships between performance behaviors and i-deals in a random coefficient model. In this model, I specified group-mean centered task performance, OCB-I, OCB-O, performance expectation, and LMX as Level 1 predictors with random slopes, and specified visibility, proactivity, and task interdependence as controls with fixed effects. In addition, I specified the cross-level direct effects of justice sensitivity, the three cognitive
motives, and felt accountability on i-deals, as well as cross-level moderating effects of these variables. I also included group means of all Level 1 predictors, unfulfilled obligation, number of direct reports, managerial tenure, manager sex, education, and job level as control variables at Level 2. All control variables were grand-mean centered.

To create the final mediated moderation model, I followed the procedures described by Grant and Wrzesniewski (2010) and Grant and Berry (2011). I excluded Level 1 and Level 2 predictors that failed to fulfill the preliminary criteria for testing the mediation effects. I specified paths from the remaining Level 2 predictors to justice rule adherence, direct paths between Level 2 predictors and i-deals, and the paths for the interactions of justice rule adherence with each remaining Level 1 predictors. Using the path coefficients from this final model, I ran Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals surrounding the indirect effect coefficients (Edwards & Lambert, 2007).
5. RESULTS

5.1 Discriminant Validity

Prior to testing hypotheses, I conducted a series of confirmatory factor-analyses (CFA) at within level to examine whether scores obtained from the same source captured distinctive constructs. These analyses were performed in LISREL 8.7 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1996) with the covariance matrix of the grand-mean centered items. For manager reports, I created item parcels due to the small sample size relative to the total number of scale items (Bagozzi & Edwards, 1998; Landis, Beal, & Tesluk, 2000). I first combined items with the highest and the lowest factor loadings into one aggregated score, then the second highest with the second lowest, and so on. Raw items were used for 3-item scales. Ultimately, I specified 36 items in a 12-factor model (3 parcel items each for task performance, OCB-I, OCB-O, adherence to equity rules, adherence to procedural rules, justice sensitivity, felt accountability, effecting compliance, identity maintenance, and establishing fairness; 3 raw items each for performance expectation and unfulfilled obligation). This model yielded acceptable fit to the data ($\chi^2 (528) = 1351.67, p < .05; \text{RMSEA} = .08; \text{CFI} = .92; \text{TLI} = .90$). I tested the discriminant validity by contrasting the 12-factor model against four alternative models. For example, in a 6-factor model, all performance-related items (i.e., expectation, task performance, OCB-I, and OCB-O) fall under a single factor, all cognitive motives items fall under a single factor, and all items for the two types of justice rule adherence fall under a single factor. As shown in Table I, the 12-factor model was superior to all four of the alternative models with fewer factors.

For employee reports, aggregated scores on the four dimensions of LMX were used as indicators for the latent variable, while raw items were used for other constructs. I
specified 37 items in a model with 9 first order factors (adherence to equity rules, adherence to procedural rules, task i-deals, flexibility i-deals, financial i-deals, LMX, visibility of i-deals, proactivity, and task interdependence), while the 3 types of i-deals fall under a higher order factor. This model yielded a good fit to the data (\( \chi^2 (605) = 1314.08, p < .05; \) RMSEA = .07; CFI = .96; TLI = .96). As shown in Table I, this model was superior to the four alternative models. Particularly, I contrasted this model with a 9-factor model, where the 3 types of i-deals are distinct but correlated first-order factors. Results showed that the decrease in degree of freedom of this alternative model was associated with a non-significant decrease in \( \chi^2 \), which provided support for the higher order factor model. Therefore, leading me to use overall i-deals as a latent variable in hypotheses testing.

5.2 Main Effects

Means, standard deviations, reliability coefficients (\( \alpha \)), and correlations among grand-mean centered study variables at within-manager level are presented in Table II. Somewhat unexpected was the weak bivariate correlations between manager self-reported justice rule adherence and employee-rated justice rule adherence. Three out of the four correlation coefficients were negative and not significant (\( -.01 \) to \( -.07 \)). Only equity rule adherence rated by the two sources positively correlated (\( r = .14, p < .05 \)). This is an intriguing finding that lends further importance to consideration of both sources in hypotheses testing. I will return to this issue in the discussion of results and
implications. Table III provides a summary of multilevel models employed to examine the main effects.

Insert Table II and Table III Here

Hypothesis 1. I hypothesized that employee past performance is positively related to i-deals. Multilevel modeling results (Figure 2, Model 1) demonstrated a significant positive effect of task performance on the granted i-deals ($\gamma = .28, p < .05$), providing support for Hypothesis 1a. However, the effects of OCB-I ($\gamma = .03, p = .82$) and OCB-O ($\gamma = .15, p = .43$) were not significant, failing to provide support for Hypotheses 1b and 1c.

The results also showed significant variances in the slopes of task performance ($\tau = .17, p < .01$), OCB-I ($\tau = .09, p < .01$), and OCB-O ($\tau = .11, p < .01$), suggesting that the effects of these three types of behaviors on i-deals varied across managers. Similarly, the main effect of performance expectation was not significant ($\gamma = -.14, p = .34$), but there was significant variance in its slope ($\tau = .12, p < .01$). In contrast, a significant positive main effect of LMX was found ($\gamma = .65, p < .01$), but the variance in the LMX slope was not significant ($\tau = .03, p = .24$).

Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 Here

I also examined Hypothesis 1 in a separate model (Figure 3, Model 2) using archival performance appraisal ratings as the predictor. Results suggested that the
archival performance did not show a significant relationship with i-deals ($\gamma = -.06, p = .50$), and the variance in the archival performance slope was not significant ($\tau = .001, p = .996$). I therefore did not include archival performance appraisal ratings in the subsequent analyses.

Insert Figure 4 and Figure 5 Here

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**Hypotheses 3 to 7.** I employed two sources to assess justice rule adherence, and separated my analyses based on different sources (Figure 4, Model 3, and Figure 5, Model 4). As expected, significant positive effects of manager justice sensitivity on manager self-reported adherence to equity rules ($\gamma = .39, p < .01$) and procedural rules ($\gamma = .68, p < .01$) were found. However, the results based on employee reports suggested that there was a significant negative relationship between justice sensitivity and adherence to equity rules ($\gamma = -.41, p < .01$), and the relationship between justice sensitivity and adherence to procedural rules was not significant ($\gamma = -.20, p = .10$). Thus, Hypotheses 3a and 3b were only supported by estimations based on manager self-reports.

Effecting compliance motive was hypothesized to positively affect adherence to equity rules and procedural rules. However, the results generally indicated that effecting compliance motive did not show a significant relationship with adherence to equity rules ($\gamma = .10, p = .19$ for manager self-reported; $\gamma = .04, p = .72$ for employee rated), failing to provide support for Hypothesis 4a. A significant positive relationship was found between effecting compliance motive and manager self-reported adherence to procedural rules ($\gamma = .31, p < .10$), supporting Hypothesis 4b.
Surprisingly, identity maintenance motive showed meaningful effects in the opposite direction to what was hypothesized. Results revealed that identity maintenance motive was negatively related to adherence to equity rules ($\gamma = -0.15, p < .01$ for manager self-reported; $\gamma = 0.03, p = .82$ for employee rated) and adherence to procedural rules ($\gamma = -0.28, p < .01$ for manager self-reported; $\gamma = -0.05, p < .01$ for employee rated). Thus, Hypotheses 5a and 5b were not supported.

Results based on manager self-reports suggested that establishing fairness motive was positively related to adherence to both equity rules ($\gamma = 0.33, p < .01$) and procedural rules ($\gamma = 0.22, p < .01$). In contrast, results based on employee reports suggested that establishing fairness motive was not significantly related to adherence to equity rules ($\gamma = -0.29, p = .14$), and was negatively related to adherence to procedural rules ($\gamma = -0.24, p < .05$). Again, only manager self-reports lent support to Hypotheses 6a and 6b.

As expected, felt accountability was positively related to adherence to equity rules ($\gamma = 0.25, p < .01$ for manager self-reported; $\gamma = 0.28, p < .05$ for employee rated) and adherence to procedural rules ($\gamma = -0.04, p = .70$ for manager self-reported; $\gamma = 0.28, p < .05$ for employee rated). Taken together, these results provide support for Hypotheses 7a and 7b.

5.3 Moderating Effects

Hypotheses 2a and 2b concerned the cross-level moderating effects of adherence to equity and procedural rules. I tested them by setting up a series of models presented in Figure 6 (Model 5), Figures 7 to 9 (Models 6 to 8), and Figures 10 to 12 (Models 9 to 11).
In support of Hypothesis 2a, the results of Model 5 showed a significant positive effect of manager self-reported adherence to equity rules on the random slope between task performance and i-deals ($\gamma = .56, p < .05$). Interestingly, the results also suggested that as the degree of adherence to equity rules increased, the relationship between performance expectation and i-deals became less positive ($\gamma = -.33, p < .05$). To further explore these two significant interactions, I plotted the moderating effects at conditional values of adherence to equity rules and then conducted simple slope tests (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). As shown in Figure 6, with a high degree of adherence to equity rules (one standard deviation above the mean), task performance was positively related to i-deals ($\gamma = .50, p < .01$), and when the degree of adherence to equity rules was low (one standard deviation below the mean), the relationship between task performance and i-deals became negative ($\gamma = -.17, p < .01$). For performance expectation, its positive relationship with i-deals was significant ($\gamma = .41, p < .01$) with a low degree of adherence to equity rules, but the relationship was not significant ($\gamma = .02, p = .62$), with a high degree of adherence to equity rules. The results of Model 5, however, suggested that adherence to procedural rules did not significantly moderate relationships between performance behaviors and i-deals, failing to provide support for Hypothesis 2b.

I also followed Preacher and colleagues’ (in press) suggestions to decompose the multilevel interactions by examining the moderating effects of between and within
components in employee-reported justice rule adherence. Figures 7, 8, and 9 show the results of the three LMS models tested to examine Hypothesis 2a. Results revealed two significant interactions between adherence to equity rules and OCBs. First, Model 7 (Figure 8) suggested that the effect of OCB-I on i-deals was moderated by a manager’s relative degree of adherence to equity rules towards an individual employee (i.e., the within component of adherence to equity rules interacted with OCB-I, $\gamma = -1.97, p < .01$). Results of simple slope tests showed that with a low degree of relative adherence to equity rules (one standard deviation below the mean), OCB-I was positively related to i-deals ($\gamma = 1.69, p < .01$), and with a high degree of relative adherence to equity rules (one standard deviation above the mean), OCB-I was negatively related to i-deals ($\gamma = -1.25, p < .01$). Second, Model 8 (Figure 9) suggested that a manager’s relative degree of adherence to equity rules also moderated the effect of an employee’s relative OCB-O within a group on the granted i-deals (i.e., the within component of adherence to equity rules interacted with OCB-O, $\gamma = .55, p < .05$). Results of simple slope tests suggested that with a low degree of relative adherence to equity rules, the effect of OCB-O on i-deals was negative ($\gamma = -.19, p < .01$), but the effect became positive ($\gamma = .64, p < .01$) with a high degree of relative adherence to equity rules.

Insert Figures 7, 8, and 9 Here

Combining these findings, adherence to equity rules showed meaningful impact on the relationships between performance behaviors and i-deals. Differences in the degree of adherence to equity rules between managers strengthened the effect of task
performance, while weakening the effect of performance expectations. In addition, a manager’s relative degree of adherence to equity rules towards an individual employee weakened the effect of OCB-I but strengthened the effect of OCB-O. Thus, Hypothesis 2a was partially supported.

Insert Figures 10, 11, and 12 Here

Figures 10, 11, and 12 show the results of the three LMS models employed to examine the moderating effects of adherence to procedural rules. Only one significant interaction was found. In Model 10 (Figure 11), the relationship between OCB-I and i-deals was moderated by a manager’s relative degree of adherence to procedural rules towards an individual employee (i.e., the within component of adherence to procedural rules interacted with OCB-I, $\gamma = -1.57$, $p < .05$). This moderating effect, however, was in the opposite direction as expected. Results of simple slope tests showed that with a low degree of relative adherence to procedural rules, the relationship between OCB-I and i-deals was positive ($\gamma = 1.84$, $p < .01$), but the relationship turned negative ($\gamma = -.52$, $p < .01$) with a high degree of relative adherence to procedural rules. Together, results failed to provide support for Hypothesis 2b.

5.4 Mediated Moderation Effects

Hypotheses 8 and 9 predicted that the moderating effects of justice sensitivity, cognitive motives, and felt accountability on the relationships between performance behaviors and i-deals are transmitted through adherence to justice rules.
I first explored whether justice sensitivity, cognitive motives, and felt accountability have direct effects on i-deals as well as the cross level interactions between these variables and performance behaviors. None of the correlation coefficients (see Table II) between these hypothesized between-manager predictors and i-deals were significant. The multilevel modeling results also suggested that these predictors did not show significant relationships with i-deals. However, there was a significant interaction effect between establishing fairness motive and task performance. As the degree of establishing fairness motive increased, the relationship between task performance and i-deals became less positive ($\gamma = -0.71, p < .01$).

Previous analyses indicated that variations in the degree of adherence to equity rules across managers only showed significant moderating effect on the relationship between task performance and i-deals. The relationship between mediator and outcome is a prerequisite for mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Thus, Hypotheses 8a to 8e were tested with a condensed model, in which I excluded OCBs and only included significant control variables based on results of Model 5 (i.e., visibility and performance expectation). After adding adherence to equity rules into the final model, the moderating effect of establishing fairness motive became non-significant ($\gamma = -0.13, p = .58$). However, in this final model, the moderating effect of adherence to equity rules was also not significant ($\gamma = 0.24, p = .33$), failing to provide support for Hypotheses 8a to 8e.

Overall, the findings indicated that differences across managers in adherence to procedural rules (i.e., between-manager level) did not strengthen the relationships between performance behaviors and i-deals, which failed to fulfill the preliminary criterion for testing Hypotheses 9a to 9e.
5.5 Exploratory Analyses

Means, standard deviations, reliability coefficients ($\alpha$), and correlations among grand-mean centered exploratory variables at within-manager level are presented in Table IV.

Insert Table IV Here

The first set of exploratory analyses focused on whether or not the effects of adherence to equity and procedural rules vary depending on specific types of i-deals. Figures 13, 14, and 15 show that none of the direct paths between performance behaviors and each specific type of i-deals was significant. Interestingly, two significant interactions were found between adherence to procedural rules and performance behaviors with respect to financial i-deals (Figure 15). As the degree of adherence to procedural rules increased, the relationship between task performance and financial i-deals became less positive ($\gamma = -1.07, p < .01$). In addition, as the degree of adherence to procedural rules increased, the relationship between OCB-I and i-deals became more positive ($\gamma = .34, p < .01$).

Insert Figures 13, 14, and 15 Here

The second set of exploratory analyses examined the value contexts for granting i-deals. In terms of relative importance of the values, group productivity had the highest mean scores (Mean = 4.82, $SD = .45$), followed by fairness (Mean = 4.57, $SD = .43$),
cohesion (Mean = 4.40, SD = .68), individual development (Mean = 4.37, SD = .64), and leader-member relationship (Mean = 4.07, SD = .72). The pair-wised mean differences were all significant (p < .01), except the difference between cohesion and individual development (p = .65).

The bivariate correlations suggested that group productivity value was negatively related to task i-deals (r = -.16, p < .05) and flexibility i-deals (r = -.17, p < .05), while cohesion value was negatively related to flexibility i-deals (r = -.21, p < .01). I further examined the effects of these values on each type of i-deals by specifying the five values as Level 2 predictors of i-deals and controlled for visibility, employee proactivity, LMX, task interdependence, number of direct reports, manager education, and job level. None of the paths between the value contexts and i-deals was significant. To explore the effects of value contexts on managers’ adherence to equity and procedural rules, I used the employee-reported justice rule adherence as the dependent variables and specified the five values as Level 2 predictors, controlling for visibility, employee proactivity, LMX, task interdependence, number of direct reports, manager education, and job level. Results showed two significant paths, being the positive relationship between fairness value and adherence to procedural rules (γ = .19, p < .05), and the negative relationship between group productivity value and adherence to procedural rules (γ = -.19, p < .05).

The last set of exploratory analyses explored the fairness perceptions related to i-deals. As visibility is controlled in all the above-mentioned analyses, its relationship with i-deals, in most cases, was positive and significant. In terms of allocation norms associated with i-deals, the mean scores for equity norm were found to be significantly higher than the mean scores for need norm in both manager and employee samples (p <
.01). However, the bivariate correlations between the norm scores reported by the two sources were not significant. I further examined the correlation table and found that manager reported equity norm negatively correlated with flexibility i-deals ($r = -.15, p < .05$). Manager reported equity norm also negatively correlated with employee reported adherence to procedural rules ($r = -.14, p < .05$). Moreover, the manager self-reports of adherence to equity and procedural rules were not significantly correlated with employee-rated overall manager fairness.
6. DISCUSSION

6.1 Overview of the Results

The primary goal of this study was to explore managers’ fair behaviors related to i-deals. I-deal researchers have so far focused on potential employee reactions to injustice associated with i-deals. However, little is known about managers’ perspective on the fairness of i-deals. The present study took a step toward addressing the questions of why managers care about fairness of i-deals in the first place and how managers’ justice rule adherence affects the granting of i-deals.

What stood out most from this study was the unexpected disagreement between managers and employees with respect to their perceptions of justice rule adherence in granting i-deals. Contrary to Scott and colleagues’ (2009) suggestion that perceptions regarding adherence to justice rules are more descriptive and thus one should expect more inter-rater agreement, I found that in the context of granting i-deals, manager self-reports of justice rule adherence were meaningfully different from employee reports on the same set of justice rules.

Recall that I asked both managers and employees to consider all i-deals they negotiated over the past 8 months. The manager self-reports assess his or her degree of adherence to equity and procedural rules in granting i-deals to all employees, while the employee reports capture more variation in a manager’s relative degree of justice rule adherence towards an individual employee. These measures were designed to capture two theoretically different, but related, constructs. Although one could argue that manager self-reports appeared to be upwardly biased, I still found significant results despite the range restriction.
Study results, however, varied depending on the sources used. When manager self-reports were used, results provided support to the idea that justice sensitivity, establishing fairness and effecting compliance motives, as well as felt accountability predict adherence to justice rules. In contrast, when employee reports were used, results showed that the effects of justice sensitivity and establishing fairness motive were in the opposite direction to what was hypothesized. Results based on manager self-reports also supported the idea that adherence to equity rule strengthens the relationship between past performance and i-deals, whereas results based on employee reports showed that only manager’s relative degree of justice rule adherence had meaningful moderating effects and two out of the three significant interaction effects were in the opposite direction as that hypothesized. The study design could not eliminate all sources of common method bias, but these biases are unlikely to explain my findings regarding the moderating effects. Broadly, these findings extended our knowledge of variation in justice rule adherence in the context of granting i-deals. Although the theory developed in this study focused on why some managers adhere to equity and procedural rules more than others, the design enabled me to explore the possibility that a given manager varies in his or her justice rule adherence toward individual employees.

Another goal of this study was to understand the underpinnings of i-deals. Results showed that past task performance was positively related to the granted i-deals. In addition, results showed that as the degree of adherence to equity rule increased, the relationship between task performance and i-deals became more positive. Although the hypothesized relationships between OCBs and i-deals were not supported, I found that the effect of OCB-O on i-deals was moderated by the degree of relative adherence to
equity rules. With a low degree of relative adherence to equity rules, the effect of OCB-O on i-deals was negative, but the effect became positive with a high degree of relative adherence to equity rules. These findings lend some support to the interpretation of i-deals as performance-based with a high degree of adherence to equity rules.

6.2 Unexpected Findings

To answer why managers adhere to, rather than violate, equity and procedural rules in the granting of i-deals, I looked into dispositional, motivational, and social factors that increase the importance of fairness to managers. Results revealed significant negative relationships between identity maintenance motive and manager self-reported adherence to equity and procedural rules, as well as employee reported adherence to procedural rules. A manager’s motive to be viewed as effective and capable was associated with less equitable and less consistent decision-making regarding i-deals. One possible explanation is that norm violations for prosocial reasons are perceived as more powerful and responded favorably by employees (Van Kleef, Homan, Finkenauer, Blaker, & Heerdink, 2012). Managers who violate equity and procedural rules do so in part because they realize that a manager who accommodates employee personal needs, takes into account more contingencies, and sets less rules might be a better leader in the eyes of his or her employees.

Ironically, the least functional motive was effecting compliance, influencing only manager self-reported adherence to procedural rules. This finding casts some doubts on the assumption that managers grant i-deals to influence employee behaviors. It is likely that most of the ex post i-deals captured in this study were driven by employee requests. Managers in these cases were more responsive than proactive. Middle managers are
managing their own employment relationship with the organization and their subordinates’ employment relationships. Such duality challenges the assumption that organizational interests could override managers’ self-interest or their consideration of others’ interests (i.e., an individual employee or groups of employees’ interests), although the supplementary analyses demonstrated that managers in the study sample value group productivity in the granting of i-deals over individual development and welfare.

Moreover, counterintuitive interaction effects were found between adherence to procedural rules and performance behaviors (i.e., OCB-I and task performance). When managers vary in their relative degree of adherence to procedural rules towards individual employees, the relationship between OCB-I and i-deals was positive with a low degree of relative adherence to procedural rules, but the relationship turned negative with a high degree of relative adherence to procedural rules. When a manager adheres more to procedural rules in general, the relationship between OCB-I and financial i-deals was strengthened, but the relationship between task performance and financial i-deals was weakened. As noted at the outset, the concept of procedural justice reflects a curious contradiction. From managers’ perspective, granting i-deals represents a form of voice for employees, while it also could be inconsistent treatment across employees. In this study, I defined and measured adherence to procedural rules as both granting voice to individual i-dealers (i.e., 2 items in the scale reflect decision control and process control, Thibaut & Walker, 1975) and using fair decision-making procedures (i.e., 5 items in the scale assess consistency, bias suppression, accuracy, correctability, and ethicality, Leventhal, 1980). It is possible that more refined measures that tease apart the effects of voice vs. decision-making components can help to explain these intriguing findings.
6.3 Theoretical Implications

Research has only recently begun to ask why managers act more or less fairly (Scott et al., 2009). Most of the studies, although suggestive, do not take into account the events that are subject to fairness judgment and only rely on one source (self or other) to report justice rule adherence.

To my knowledge, this is the first study to empirically examine managers’ justice rule adherence in the context of granting i-deals. Results of this study meaningfully extend previous research in several ways. First, existing studies emphasized the importance of interactional justice rule adherence, suggesting that managers have less discretion over distributive and procedural justice (Masterson et al., 2000; Scott et al., 2009). In this study, however, I found that the degree of adherence to equity and procedural rules varies across managers, as well as depends on the individual employees. Second, it appears that the reasons underlying managers’ justice rule adherence may be context sensitive. For instance, contrary to Scott and colleagues’ (2014) finding that establishing fairness motive is not as influential as effecting compliance or identity maintenance motives, my results revealed that managers view i-deals as a matter of fairness and establishing fairness motive showed stronger effects on their adherence to equity and procedural rules. Together, this study sheds light on the uniqueness of fair behaviors related to i-deals.

In addition, although it is well known that justice perceptions affects the development of workplace relationships (e.g., Colquitt, Scott, Rodell, Long, Zapata, Conlon, & Wesson, 2013; Masterson et al, 2000), previous research emphasizes how a significant event can trigger employee’s fresh judgments (e.g., Rousseau, 1995), but
neglects the possibility that an i-deal could also be a “landmark” in the leader-member relationship as perceived by the manager. Arguably, introspective reports are more suitable to glean insight into managers’ interests and motives (e.g., Scott et al., 2014). Therefore, this study provided a more complete picture of managers’ adherence to equity and procedural rules by examining both self-reports and employee reports.

This study also advances our knowledge of the relationship between i-deals and performance. A defining feature of i-deals is that they benefit both individual employees and the organization. It is well acknowledged that i-deals are often granted to “valued employees” in order to facilitate the achievement of organizational goals (Rousseau et al., 2006). Although good past performance seems to be a necessary condition for being valued, previous research treated the relationship between i-deals and performance as a one-way street. Results of this study provided some support for the idea that i-deals granted based on past performance are likely to be viewed as fairer from a manager’s perspective. Indeed, past performance is not the only standard criterion for granting i-deals. It is evident that LMX and performance expectations affect the creation of i-deals. It may be more appropriate to interpret my findings as suggesting a potential reciprocal relationship between i-deals and performance. As Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005) suggests, “Relationship development is not a matter of a single stimulus-response. It is more analogous to climbing a ladder” (p. 890). The content of early exchanges may impact the creation of i-deals, while the fair treatment in the granting of i-deals may further contribute to developing the relationship.
6.4 Limitations and Future Research

Although this study possesses several strengths, such as the use of two sources, possible limitations should be also noted. First, I used retrospective measures and treated granting i-deals as a “general event”. This is similar to previous research examining fairness of performance appraisals. By using this approach, it might be argued that results are subject to memory biases. Also, asking about overall experience causes problems associated with aggregating across potential disparate events (e.g., adhered to justice rules at one time but violated at another time). It is, however, a real challenge in i-deals studies to capture each of the individual negotiations as a specific event. That being said, future research should consider utilizing other methods, such as experience-sampling technique or qualitative case analyses, to examine the dynamics in i-deal negotiations.

Moreover, I treated i-deals as an aggregated construct in this study. It might be argued that I missed out on potentially important distinctions among specific types of i-deals. The content of an i-deal reflects on both the employee’s and manager’s motives for creating the i-deal (Rousseau et al., 2006). The resources exchanged in an i-deal impact the interpretations of the relationship quality (Rousseau et al., 2006). Particularistic i-deals (e.g., development and mentoring, special tasks, and flexibility) promote interactions between managers and their employees over time. Exchanges of nonmonetary resources also require managers to invest time and effort, which demonstrates social support to employees. Thus, these nonmonetary i-deals are more strongly and positively related to perceptions of the exchange quality (Rousseau et al., 2006), and in turn, are positively related to willingness to reciprocate (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976). In contrast, the interpretations of financial i-deals are likely to be less
consistent (Rousseau et al., 2003; 2006). The nature of resources exchanged also shapes the managerial experience with the i-deals. Although monetary and other concrete resources can be exchanged with limited information about the other party or even without an established relationship, the tangible and universal nature (i.e., having common value across contexts) makes their exchanges more subject to allocation norms (Rousseau et al., 2006; Parks, Conlon, Ang, & Bontempo, 1999). Therefore, future research should more carefully examine whether managers’ justice rule adherence depends on the types of i-deals.

Third, participants of this study were recruited from two organizations in China. Consequently, there could be concerns about homogeneity of perceptions due to shared employment and cultural experiences. To address these concerns, I compared means and variances of key study variables with those observed in other studies conducted in the United States or European countries (e.g., Scott et al., 2014; Hornung et al., 2009). Means and variance levels were similar. I do acknowledge, however, that some findings (e.g., non-significant effects of OCBs and group productivity as the most important situational goals for granting i-deals) may be subject to culture influences. Organizational cultures may shape the values that members hold and the legitimacy of i-deals (Rousseau, 2005). In addition, societal culture may shape the resource allocation norms and the acceptability of i-deal negotiations. Research has also suggested that current dimensions of OCBs as identified in the Western literature may differ from Chinese formulations (Farh, Zhong, & Organ, 2004). Future research should consider examining the extent to which these results could be generalized.
Although none of the individual difference variables (i.e., justice sensitivity, cognitive motives, felt accountability, job level as a proxy of position power, and demographic control variables) that I examined showed significant direct influence on the granted i-deals, my findings provided a basis for speculating about why or why not managers’ individual differences can create inconsistencies in the use of i-deals (Rousseau, 2005). More research is needed to explore how and to what extent the inconsistency in the use of i-deals are due to differences across managers. Some researchers have started exploring how employee characteristics and behaviors trigger managerial actions (e.g., Scott, Colquitt, & Zapata-Phelan, 2007). It could be that manager’s justice rule adherence in the granting of i-deals is influenced by why and how the individual employee engages in a negotiation.

Finally, the effects of interpersonal relationships on managers’ decisions and justice rule adherence clearly warrant future research attention. In this study, I found significant positive relationship between LMX and i-deal in almost all models examined. However, the relationship between LMX and justice rule adherence is not yet explicated. Furthermore, coworkers are important enablers of i-deals. It is often assumed that coworker reactions concern managers. In this study, I did find that social pressure (i.e., felt accountability) influences manager’s justice enactment, but future research should look into the relational context for granting i-deals and explore how managers perceive and react to different relational contexts.

6.5 Practical Implications and Conclusion

Managers need to be aware that employee’s perceptions of fairness, not the intentions of a manager, shape reactions to i-deals. Even if a manager were to believe that
equity and procedural rules were adhered to in the granting of i-deals, employees may nonetheless perceive the situation differently. Managers may need to be trained in how to send clear signals that they are making decisions in accordance with justice rules. In addition, organizations could facilitate a feedback process to provide managers with information regarding their direct reports’ perceptions on the customized work arrangements.

Insights into what is valued by managers are also useful to all potential i-dealers. Employees may benefit from being aware that performance can influence their chance for successfully negotiating an i-deal. Moreover, managers’ justice rule adherence may, to some extent, depend on individual employees (Scott et al., 2007). With a better understanding of why managers act more or less fairly when granting i-deals, employees may be able to proactively prevent injustice.

In conclusion, creating a shared knowledge base of why managers make i-deals and what factors influence managers to act in accordance with equity and procedural rules is important to the legitimacy of i-deals. By explicitly addressing managers’ perspectives on how and why i-deals could be created in a fair manner, this study contributes to our understanding of the role of managers as employees’ negotiating partners and justice enactors. The findings both extend and challenge the literatures on i-deals and justice rule adherence as well as point to the need for more research so as to continue exploring a broad range of justice-related issues in the granting of i-deals.
REFERENCES


TABLE I
CFA Analysis and Model Comparison Results

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*Note.* The analyses were conducted at within level (N = 213) with the covariance matrix of the grand-mean centered items. df = degrees of freedom; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; All changes scores were calculated against the hypothesized measurement model (i.e., the 12-factor model for manager reports, and the 9-factor model with a higher order factor for employee reports).

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.  

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**Note.** Employee reports (Level 1) N = 213; Manager Reports (Level 2) N= 60. Sex was coded as 1 for male and 0 for female. Cronbach’s α reliabilities are reported along the diagonal. * p < .05; ** p < .01.
TABLE II (continued)

Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Intercorrelations of the Study Variables

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Note. Employee reports (Level 1) N = 213; Manager Reports (Level 2) N = 60. Sex was coded as 1 for male and 0 for female. Cronbach’s α reliabilities are reported along the diagonal. * p < .05; ** p < .01.
TABLE III
Multilevel Modeling Results: Models 1 to 4

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Note. Level 1 N = 213; Level 2 N = 60.
### TABLE IV
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*Note. Employee reports (Level 1) N = 205 - 209; Manager Reports (Level 2) N= 59. Cronbach’s α reliabilities are reported along the diagonal. * p < .05; ** p < .01.*
FIGURE 1. Hypothesized Model

Justice Sensitivity (M) → H3a&b

Cognitive Motives:
- Effecting Compliance (M) → H4a&b
- Identity Maintenance (M) → H5a&b
- Establishing Fairness (M) → H6a&b
- Felt Accountability (M) → H7a&b

Justice Rule Adherence:
- a) Adherence to Equity Rules (M/E) → H2a & H2b
- b) Adherence to Procedural Rules (M/E)

I-deals:
- a) Flexibility (E)
- b) Task (E)
- c) Financial (E)

H8a-H8e: Mediated moderation effects of Adherence to Equity Rules
H9a-H9e: Mediated moderation effects of Adherence to Procedural Rules

In all relationships, controlling for:
- Manager demographics: sex, age, education, & managerial tenure;
- Employee demographics: sex, age, & organizational tenure;
- LMX, performance expectation, & dyadic tenure;
- Manager unfulfilled obligation & job level;
- Employee proactivity & task interdependence
- Organizational membership, unit size, & job type.
- Exploratory variables: managerial value context, visibility of i-deals, allocation norms, and overall manager fairness.

95
FIGURE 2. Model 1: Relationships between Performance Behaviors and I-deals

Note. Employee reports (Within Level) N = 213; Manager Reports (Between Level) N = 60. * p < .05; ** p < .01. For the reason of brevity, I did not present the effects of control variables that were not significant or did not help to rule out alternative explanations.
FIGURE 3. Model 2: Relationship between Archival Performance Appraisal Ratings and I-deals

Note. Employee reports (Within Level) N = 213; Manager Reports (Between Level) N = 60. * p < .05; ** p < .01. For the reason of brevity, I did not present the effects of control variables that were not significant or did not help to rule out alternative explanations.
FIGURE 4. Model 3: Antecedents of Manager Self-Reported Justice Rule

Adherence

Note. Manager Reports (Between Level) N= 60. * p < .05; ** p < .01. For the reason of brevity, I did not present the effects of control variables that were not significant or did not help to rule out alternative explanations.
FIGURE 5. Model 4: Antecedents of Employee-Reported Justice Rule Adherence

Note. Employee reports (Within Level) N = 213; Manager Reports (Between Level) N= 60. * p < .05; ** p < .01. For the reason of brevity, I did not present the effects of control variables that were not significant or did not help to rule out alternative explanations.
FIGURE 6. Model 5: Moderating Effects of Manager Self-Reported Justice Rule Adherence

Note. Employee reports (Within Level) N = 213; Manager Reports (Between Level) N= 60. * p < .05; ** p < .01. For the reason of brevity, I did not present the effects of control variables that were not significant or did not help to rule out alternative explanations.
FIGURE 7. Model 6: Moderating Effects of Employee-Reported Adherence to Equity Rules on the Relationship between Task Performance and I-deals

Note. Employee reports (Within Level) N = 213; Manager Reports (Between Level) N= 60. * p < .05; ** p < .01.
FIGURE 8. Model 7: Moderating Effects of Employee-Reported Adherence to Equity Rules on the Relationship between OCB-I and I-deals

Note. Employee reports (Within Level) N = 213; Manager Reports (Between Level) N = 60. * p < .05; ** p < .01.
FIGURE 9. Model 8: Moderating Effects of Employee-Reported Adherence to Equity Rules on the Relationship between OCB-O and I-deals

Note. Employee reports (Within Level) N = 213; Manager Reports (Between Level) N= 60. * p < .05; ** p < .01.
FIGURE 10. Model 9: Moderating Effects of Employee-Reported Adherence to Procedural Rules on the Relationship between Task Performance and I-deals

Note. Employee reports (Within Level) N = 213; Manager Reports (Between Level) N = 60. * p < .05; ** p < .01.
FIGURE 11. Model 10: Moderating Effects of Employee-Reported Adherence to Procedural Rules on the Relationship between OCB-I and I-deals

Note. Employee reports (Within Level) N = 213; Manager Reports (Between Level) N = 60. * p < .05; ** p < .01.
FIGURE 12. Model 11: Moderating Effects of Employee-Reported Adherence to Procedural Rules on the Relationship between OCB-I and I-deals

Note. Employee reports (Within Level) N = 213; Manager Reports (Between Level) N = 60. * p < .05; ** p < .01.
FIGURE 13. Exploratory Analysis: Task I-deals

Note. Employee reports (Within Level) N = 213; Manager Reports (Between Level) N = 60. * p < .05; ** p < .01. For the reason of brevity, I did not present the effects of control variables that were not significant or did not help to rule out alternative explanations.
FIGURE 14. Exploratory Analysis: Flexibility I-deals

Note. Employee reports (Within Level) N = 213; Manager Reports (Between Level) N = 60. * p < .05; ** p < .01. For the reason of brevity, I did not present the effects of control variables that were not significant or did not help to rule out alternative explanations.
FIGURE 15. Exploratory Analysis: Financial I-deals

Note. Employee reports (Within Level) N = 213; Manager Reports (Between Level) N= 60. * p < .05; ** p < .01. For the reason of brevity, I did not present the effects of control variables that were not significant or did not help to rule out alternative explanations.
## Appendix A. Measures, Sources, Response Anchors, and Adaptations of Study Variables

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## Control Variables

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## Exploratory Variables

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<td>group productivity, group cohesion, individual development and welfare, leader-member relationship, and fairness, in the granting of i-deals.</td>
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Appendix B. Definition of I-deals for Participants

*Customized Work Arrangements:* a customized work arrangement is a voluntary, personalized agreement of a nonstandard nature that is negotiated between an employee and his or her supervisor. Such arrangements may include adjustments in pay, re-assignment to different tasks, and flexibility in work hours.

The following are the key characteristics of customized work arrangements:

1. They are individually negotiated after the employee is on the job—not before being hired.
2. The conditions that are negotiated are usually not available to everyone else that performs a similar job.
3. The new arrangement is intended to benefit both the employee who negotiates the arrangement and the organization as a whole.
4. The duration of the arrangements may vary according to employees’ needs.
VITA

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   Dissertation Committee: Sandra J. Wayne (Chair), Robert C. Liden (Advisor),
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• Organizational Culture
• Discretionary Workplace Behaviors & Adaptive Performances

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Instructor, Organizational Behavior (MGMT 452), Fall 2012, Fall 2014, Summer 2015
Instructor, Introduction to Organizations (MGMT 340), Summer 2012, Summer 2013

Average Teaching Evaluation: 4.4/5.0

PUBLICATIONS

Papers

**Book Chapters**


**MANUSCRIPTS UNDER REVIEW**
Marinova, S. V., & Cao, X. Constructive Organizational Culture and Organizational Citizenship Behaviors: A Configurational View. 1st Revise and Resubmit at *Journal of Organizational Behavior*.

**REFEREED CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS**


**GRANT RESEARCH PROJECTS**

**RESEARCH IN PROGRESS**

115


SELECTED ACADEMIC HONORS & FELLOWSHIPS

Greenleaf Scholar, the Greenleaf Center for Servant Leadership 2014
The Greenleaf Scholars Program is offered by the Greenleaf Center for Servant Leadership to award promising early career scholars who wish to study the impact of servant leadership in various organizational or social contexts.

Liautaud Graduate School of Business Fellowship 2010 - 2014
Liautaud fellowships are competitive awards for outstanding doctoral students at Liautaud Graduate School of Business, University of Illinois at Chicago.

Graduate Student Travel Grant, University of Illinois at Chicago 2010 - 2014

UIC Department of Managerial Studies Fellowship 2010 - 2012

Academic Excellence Scholarship, Renmin University of China 2004 - 2006

ACADEMIC MEMBERSHIP
• Academy of Management
• SHRM
• International Association for Chinese Management Research

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

Conference Reviewer
• Academy of Management Annual Meeting, 2011-2014
• IACMR Conference, 2015

Ad hoc Journal Reviewer
• Journal of Business Research
• Eurasian Business Review

**METHODS TRAINING**

- Quantitative training (data collection and analysis): Experimental design; Field surveys; Meta-analysis; Multilevel Analysis; Latent Growth Modeling for Longitudinal Data; Multilevel Structural Equation Methods; Polynomial Regression & Response Surface Methods; Scale Development
- Qualitative training (data collection and analysis): Case-study; In-depth interviewing; Template analysis

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February – June 2009  
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