The Path to Political Incorporation:

Place Matters

BY

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THESIS

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For Robert, who kept me on the path, too.
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SUMMARY

An established literature describes political incorporation as the extent to which a group has achieved significant representation and influence in political decision-making (Browning et al. 1984; Bobo and Gilliam 1990). Political incorporation theory is largely developed through studies of the elections of black mayors in large central cities. Because central cities tend to share characteristics, and because there is little variation in the sociopolitical context of these cities, political incorporation theory cannot account for the degree to which context matters to the achievement of incorporation. This research is shaped by John Mollenkopf’s (1986) use of an anomalous New York City to convey the point that the specificities of place matter more to political incorporation than Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) initially recognized. What are the different paths that cities take toward incorporation? How do context-related characteristics determine the path that each city takes?

This research uses a comparative case study of two Chicago suburbs—Evanston and Waukegan—to deepen our knowledge of the process of political incorporation. Using qualitative methods—including interviews and focus groups with residents, political activists, civil rights organization members, educators, and political officials—this research focuses on three aspects of the sociopolitical context: black civic fabric, political leadership, and racial dynamics. Despite the demographic similarities between Evanston and Waukegan, both cities have vastly different sociopolitical contexts, opposite paths to incorporation, and different resulting levels of black political incorporation.
This dissertation reveals that the achievement of political incorporation is context-specific. The path toward incorporation in both cities was continually shaped by the local sociopolitical context, and numerical strength within the black population alone was insufficient for overcoming context-related obstacles to incorporation. While parts of the sociopolitical context that are external to the black community shape the path to political incorporation significantly more than the current literature suggests, this dissertation also concludes that factors internal to the black community—like racial solidarity and a closely-knit black civic fabric—have a greater ability to overcome sociopolitical contexts that are oppositional to political incorporation than previously expected.
1. IS NUMERICAL STRENGTH ENOUGH? BLACK INCORPORATION AND EXCLUSION IN SIMILAR CITIES

“You think you know a story, but you only know how it ends. To get to the heart of the story, you have to go back to the beginning.”

King Henry VIII

During the summer of 1966, the Chicago suburb of Waukegan erupted in racial violence after police arrested a black man for throwing a bottle in the street. Black ministers held a press conference to outline the grievances of black residents, which the ministers said spurred Waukegan’s “summer of racial heat.” Their primary grievance was lodged against Waukegan mayor, Robert Sabonjian Sr., who allowed his personal disdain of blacks to infiltrate the public sphere, according to the ministers. Mayor Sabonjian responded to the riots with a series of statements that further exacerbated racial tensions in Waukegan. When Sabonjian declared about blacks, “I love ‘em and I hate ‘em,” (“Assured Hostile Acts” 1966: 1), the local NAACP chapter responded by grouping Sabonjian with Ross Barnett, Orville Faubus, and George Wallace (“Sabonjian Sticks to His Blast” 1966: 3).

During the same summer, thirty miles south of Waukegan, the suburban Evanston elementary school district tackled on the most controversial topics of the modern Civil Rights Movement: school desegregation. The school district undertook integration of the all-black Foster School after district superintendent Dr. Ernest Wakefield shared his view
that “the best education in our American system arises when there is a wide diversity of races and creeds” (Banas 1966: 1). The school board adopted a revolutionary integration experiment advanced by Joseph Hill, the black principal of Foster School: instead of placing the responsibility for integration on black families, the district would open a new laboratory kindergarten center at Foster School and encourage white families to apply. There was overwhelming support for the plan within the Evanston community, and 163 white families applied for a kindergarten spot at the all-black school. Resident David Hacker summarized the sentiment of Evanston residents: “Any attempt to find a solution to modern problems will probably inconvenience some of us. But this is an important first step toward a total awareness of the problems of our times” (“First School Integration” 1966: 3).

The examples of race riots in Waukegan and school desegregation in Evanston provide evidence of the degree of black political incorporation in each city. An established literature describes political incorporation, or political empowerment, as the extent to which a group has achieved significant representation and influence in political decision-making (Browning et al. 1984; Bobo and Gilliam 1990). Largely a by-product of the modern Civil Rights Movement, the concept of political incorporation seeks to capture the moment when blacks formed a critical mass and inserted themselves into local political decision-making.

By juxtaposing race riots and school desegregation, we see key differences in black political power in Evanston and Waukegan, and these differences are particularly evident
in the civic fabric within the black community, local political leadership, and racial
dynamics.

- In terms of the black civic fabric, political demands in Waukegan were
  expressed by ministers, who are external to the local political structure; on
  the other hand, blacks in Evanston benefited by having an African-
  American leaders within the school district, Principal Joseph Hill, who
  advanced the black community’s plan for integration in the school district.

- Political leadership in Waukegan, exemplified by Mayor Robert Sabonjian
  Sr. in this example, opposed black political incorporation and was largely
  unwilling to address black demands. In Evanston, district superintendent
  Dr. Ernest Wakefield led the school integration effort in the city and
  remedied black concerns about unnecessary burden that school integration
  would place on black students.

- Racial dynamics in Waukegan were violent and repressive, as demonstrated
  by the riots, while resident David Hacker’s statement reveals that racial
  dynamics in Evanston were significantly more harmonious.

These examples of racial unrest in Waukegan and school desegregation in Evanston,
which I suggest are both representative of black politics in each city, reveal that blacks in
Waukegan and Evanston have not achieved similar levels of political incorporation.

This dissertation claims that, to understand why cities like Waukegan and
Evanston have not achieved similar levels of political incorporation, a study must
properly examine the sociopolitical context. In a study examining why blacks in New
York City failed to achieve political incorporation, John Mollenkopf (1986) specifically
called attention to the civic fabric, political leadership, and racial dynamics. I collectively
term these as the “sociopolitical context.” Following the lead of Mollenkopf’s work, this
dissertation argues that the result of political incorporation or political exclusion is not
just the result of distinctly political activity (i.e. protesting or voting). Instead, I suggest
that the path to incorporation or exclusion in a city was shaped by the particularities of
place, evidenced by the sociopolitical context. In other words, the concept of “sociopolitical context” seeks to account for the social and political environment in which struggles for incorporation are pursued, and this dissertation describes how sociopolitical contexts can facilitate incorporation, as in Evanston, while others can hinder incorporation, as in Waukegan.

The storyline for the numerous accounts of political incorporation is largely similar. A critical mass of black residents arrived in central cities as a result of the Great Migration, residential segregation facilitated the election of black representatives in these black wards, black political capacity and efficacy grew (particularly with the modern Civil Rights Movement), white residents abandoned the central city for new suburban hinterlands, and blacks in America’s central cities found themselves with the numerical strength and political will to elect black mayors and transform black inclusion in local politics. I challenge that the current literature accurately represents a similar path to political incorporation taken in the nation’s largest cities in which black political incorporation indeed has resulted. Yet, we have little knowledge about the process of political incorporation in the vast majority of American cities: those that are not central cities and those that have failed to achieve black political incorporation. It is precisely this variation that I seek to capture by using the cases of Evanston and Waukegan.

The cases of Evanston and Waukegan represent opposite racial conditions and opposite lived political realities for blacks in two otherwise comparable cities. At every historical node, Waukegan and Evanston have been centers of black life in the Chicago metropolitan region. The first black residents in both cities in 1870 predate the Great
Migration, and blacks arrived in Evanston and Waukegan as both laborers and members of an intellectual and professional class. By 2000, one in five residents in both Evanston and Waukegan was black. Yet the different outcomes—political incorporation in Evanston and political exclusion in Waukegan—reveal that the paths that cities take toward (or away from) political incorporation are shaped by far more than a critical mass of blacks residents and their will to achieve incorporation.

1.1 A Brief History of Black Political Incorporation

Prior to 1967, no major American city had elected a black mayor (Hula and Jackson-Elmoore 2001). A history of contestation between blacks and whites and black exclusion from local political representation, resources, and participation serve as a backdrop to black demands for the reallocation of power from whites to blacks (Keiser 1993). Despite the large number of blacks who flooded central cities in the Northeast, Midwest, and West during the great migrations, racial discrimination and a minority population without the numbers or resources to overcome this discrimination locked blacks out of meaningful political power in urban areas. Though blacks engaged in neighborhood politics at the block and ward levels, there neither opportunity for influential office-holding nor the power to create an equal distribution of resources. The only knowledge that blacks retained of the local political structure was that they were not included in it; racism fermented political distrust and little optimism for political or economic equality.
Black demands for equal rights, resources, and representation prior to and during the modern Civil Rights Movement accelerated the process of black political incorporation (Browning et al. 1984). New residential settlement patterns and advances in race relations, civil rights legislation, and federal programs set the stage for the political incorporation of urban blacks beginning in the 1960s. Blacks engaged in demand-protest mobilizations, particularly in cities with large black populations, and blacks sought to focus public attention on racial disparities in urban leadership. Incorporation logically resulted from these demand-protest mobilizations with the successful mayoral campaigns in 1967 of Carl Stokes in Cleveland and Richard Hatcher in Gary. By 1994, black mayors had governed many of the largest cities in the U.S. (Gilliam 1996). At the turn of the century, twenty of the fifty largest cities had been governed by a black mayor (Hula and Jackson-Elmoore 2001). The capture of offices with political decision-making and high level benefits signified black empowerment, or black political incorporation (Keiser 1993).

1.2 A Results-Oriented Literature

Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) provided the seminal theory on political incorporation, and they suggested that political incorporation followed a pathway from mobilization to descriptive representation, to policy responsiveness, and to full political incorporation (which is described as equality or dominance in the governing coalition). They described their research as building a theory that could be applied to and tested in many cities.
We did not expect to generalize the particulars of our ten cities to others, but we did try to cast our concepts and fundamental relationships at a sufficiently general level to encompass a wide variety of cities, and we hoped that the application of our framework to other cities would suggest ways in which it would be extended or altered (Browning et al. 1986: 576).

Yet, I contend that the central works that compose the political incorporation literature have accomplished the opposite: they provide single case studies of black mayoralties that significantly account for the rise of black political power in these cities but do little in the way of “extend[ing] or alter[ing]” political incorporation theory or building a comprehensive theory that could be used to understand the incorporation process in multiple cities. I suggest that what we currently have, therefore, is a results-oriented literature that, first, largely focuses on the results rather than the path and, second, focuses on the results in specific cities rather than how (and why) the path and results are similar or dissimilar across cities.

The use of two suburbs as the cases for this dissertation is purposeful. I contend that current studies of political incorporation are limiting because they focus on the rise of black mayoralties in central cities, and I find this problematic because central cities tend to be similar jurisdictions. In general, central cities tend to share characteristics, and there is little variation in the sociopolitical context in these cases. This means that the cases used to construct political incorporation theory account for a narrow sociopolitical context. The minimum variation between the sociopolitical contexts in these cities means that we have little theoretical (rather than descriptive) insight, outside of Mollenkopf’s (1986) contribution, into how sociopolitical context leads a black electorate to political incorporation or political exclusion.
1.3 Central Questions and Contributions to the Literature

Because the current literature focuses on cities where black mayors have been elected, I find that there is a significant piece of the puzzle missing in political incorporation theory, and that piece is an analysis of cities where incorporation has not resulted or has been weak. What could cause incorporation to escape suburbs like Waukegan or central cities like Milwaukee, despite their histories of demand-protest mobilizations for black political empowerment? I suggest that the answer to this question lies within the sociopolitical context of these cities.

Contrary to the single case focus of the current literature, I use the cases of Evanston and Waukegan to provide an initial theory that there are commonalities in the sociopolitical context of cities that have achieved incorporation and commonalities in cities that have not achieved incorporation. Political incorporation theory has experienced a resurgence with questions of where the “prize” went for black communities that achieved political incorporation, and with this resurgence, like Browning, Marshall, and Tabb’s (1984) call for a deeper political incorporation theory, I also call for studies that interrogate black communities that have failed to achieve political incorporation. I seek to contribute to a deeper political incorporation theory this context-oriented theory that sheds light on the obstacles to incorporation and reveals how local context facilitates or hinders black political power.

Later in this chapter, I describe Browning, Marshall, and Tabb’s (1984) model of the path to political incorporation, which suggests that black communities begin with mobilization for political power, realize the election of black descriptive representatives
in the second phase, achieve policy responsiveness in the third phase, and finally arrive at the penultimate fourth phase of full political incorporation. This dissertation builds upon the Browning, Marshall, and Tabb model by demonstrating that the evolution of this path is dependent upon the local sociopolitical context. This dissertation centrally asks: how does local sociopolitical context determine the path that each city takes? I study local sociopolitical context by looking at the civic fabric in the black community, political leadership, and racial dynamics. In some cases, the sociopolitical context facilitates black political incorporation and, in other cases, it hinders incorporation. This research seeks to model how sociopolitical context can lead a city down the path to either political incorporation or political exclusion. Thus, in order to develop this context-oriented theory of political incorporation, I examine the sociopolitical contexts that led to political incorporation in Evanston and political exclusion in Waukegan.

I also shape the theoretical framework for this research through John Mollenkopf’s (1986) work that used an anomalous New York City to convey the point that the specificities of place matter more to political incorporation than Browning, Marshall, and Tabb initially recognized in their model. The model advanced by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb demonstrates that cities and their black populations do not spontaneously arrive at black political incorporation. Cities must gradually work through the phases of mobilization, descriptive representation, policy responsiveness, and then work to sustain the final phase of full political incorporation. But, what propels them to this desired endpoint? This dissertation argues, like Mollenkopf, that the answer is sociopolitical context. In Mollenkopf’s (1986) work, New York City had a large black population, a long and
sophisticated history of political engagement, and the presence of a liberal white coalition. But, at the time, blacks in New York City had not achieved political incorporation, and there were few substantive policies aimed at blacks. John Mollenkopf contended that the black civic fabric, political leadership, and racial dynamics, rather than merely the size of the black population, determine the possibilities for incorporation in a city. Mollenkopf suggested that these contextual factors determine whether (and how) a city moves through Browning, Marshall, and Tabb’s four phases of political incorporation.

Thus, this dissertation seeks to contribute to the current political incorporation literature an expanded understanding, beyond of the size of the black population, of the necessary conditions for incorporation to occur. Having a large black population is treated as both a necessary and sufficient precondition for political incorporation to result. In other words, the literature assumes that when the black population reaches a majority or near majority, incorporation will logically result. For example, Behr (2002) notes that the growth in black population in central cities in the 1970s and 1980s made the election of black mayors possible. Yet not all central cities fit this model. New Orleans, for example, was nearly one-third African-American in 1970 as the African-American population increased by 75 percent from 1960. Yet, in 1970, 90 percent of this growing black population elected Moon Landrieu, a white man, as the city’s mayor. New Orleans did not elect its first black mayor until 1977, well after the end of the Civil Rights Era. The case of New Orleans, like the case of Waukegan, demonstrates that some cities
with significant black populations have yet to achieve black political incorporation, while other cities without significant black populations have.

In sum, to understand why Evanston achieved African-American political incorporation while blacks in Waukegan experienced political exclusion, this research examines the sociopolitical context. I define sociopolitical context as consisting of the civic fabric in the black community, political leadership, and local racial dynamics in each city. I derived these three categories from the conditions included in Mollenkopf's (1986) study, which included local political culture, the relationship between blacks and Latinos, size of the black population, presence of white liberalism, and avenues for cooperation and collaboration. I find that the framework of the phases of incorporation advanced by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) and the framework of sociopolitical context advanced by Mollenkopf (1986) are valuable to this research in Evanston and Waukegan. The next two sections of this chapter address how I apply these frameworks to develop a context-oriented theory of political incorporation.

1.4 The Process-Oriented Theory of Political Incorporation

Though studies of black political incorporation largely focus on the elections of black mayors and the results of political incorporation, the seminal theory of black

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1 Mollenkopf's study of New York City determined that there were significant differences between New York City and the California cities included in Browning, Marshall, and Tabb's study. The local political culture was machine in New York City and reform in California. In California, black political incorporation strengthened Latino incorporation while, in New York City, blacks and Latinos failed to support each other's political advancement. Unlike the cities in California, local white liberalism was atrophied in New York City where liberal whites were powerless outsiders. Finally, in New York City, there was no institutional mechanism to facilitate cooperation or dialogue and, therefore, there was no structure for incorporation efforts to congeal.
political incorporation advanced by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) is a process-oriented theory. Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) mark the process of political incorporation using four phases: mobilization, descriptive representation, policy responsiveness, and full political incorporation. The completion of each of these phases marks that a city is one step closer to achieving the final phase of full political incorporation. This dissertation seeks to reveal how sociopolitical context—specifically, civic fabric, political leadership, and racial dynamics—can either push a city through the phases of political incorporation or halt progress toward full political incorporation. In other words, the concept of sociopolitical context does not just describe the passive environment of a city. This research suggests that the sociopolitical context directly and significantly impacts the process of political incorporation and determines whether or not cities will move at each phase toward the next step of incorporation.

The potentiality of moving to either the next phase of incorporation or to a dead end represents what I term the “forks in the road” of the political incorporation process. The process of political incorporation in a particular city encounters many forks in the road—one road inching toward incorporation and the other sending the city on a detour.

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2 Robert Dahl (1961) similarly advanced three stages of incorporation using the example of the inclusion of European ethnic groups in city politics, and his theory reveals the increasingly tenuous nature of ethnic politics with each successive stage. In this first stage, because of shared cultural identification and socioeconomic homogeneity, members of particular ethnic groups displayed similar voting behavior and, with sufficient numerical strength, they elected a few members of their particular group into political office. This is comparable to Browning, Marshall, and Tabb’s (1984) first stage of descriptive representation. In the second stage, the proportion of that group within the city’s population increases and their socioeconomic status increases. This means that they are able to elect additional officials from their group, and they have the financial resources to influence local politics in other ways (comparable to the second stage of policy responsiveness for Browning, Marshall, and Tabb). Finally, as time progressed, the group shed the primacy of their ethnic identity, they no longer voted as an ethnic bloc, and their socioeconomic interests predominated. But their broad-based, non-ethnic appeals meant that their interests were aligned with the city’s interests (making ethnic appeals unnecessary)—a sign of full political incorporation.
that lengthens the process or, in some cases, leads to a dead end. I seek to build upon the process-oriented theory of political incorporation with a context-oriented theory. A context-oriented theory is not merely concerned with reconstructing the sociopolitical context by retelling historical events. Instead, I take Browning, Marshall, and Tabb’s process-oriented theory and assert that we can use local sociopolitical context to determine how historical events push a city forward or backward at each fork in the road in the incorporation process.

Figure 1 provides a representation of the phases of political incorporation. In red, I highlight the forks in the road that advance or halt the incorporation process, as well as the two possible outcomes at each fork in the road. In Chapter 7, I conclude the dissertation by mapping Evanston and Waukegan onto this model in order to demonstrate how sociopolitical context serves as the engine for the process of political incorporation.
The first phase accounts for demand-protest mobilizations and the bulk of the work that cities accomplish in laying the foundation for incorporation. The mobilization phase accounts for the migration of blacks into the city and their desire to have a share of political power in the city. During the mobilization phase, blacks formed organizations and coalitions that sought to spread this desire for political power throughout the black population. As a result, the black community worked to build an electoral base, and these electoral mobilizations sought to elect descriptive representatives in the second phase.

The second phase, descriptive representation, accounts for the presence of political officials who are descriptively similar, in terms of shared racial identity, to their constituents. At the very foundation of descriptive representation is the belief that shared racial identity has political currency. It is not just that the black electorate will support any black candidate (Dovi 2002). Instead, it is the belief that shared racial heritage yields common experiences, beliefs, and attitudes that cause black candidates and the black electorate to believe that they can create a mutually beneficial relationship through electoral politics. It is important to note, though, that descriptive representation does not mark the presence of black power or influence over local politics. It simply means that there is an elected official who “looks like” a large proportion of the electorate. This descriptive representative cannot advance the interests of the black community if he or she does not possess power within the governing coalition.

Descriptive representatives have gained a degree of political power when, in the third phase, they are able to advance policies in the interest of their constituents. In
order to convince other elected officials to adopt these policies, descriptive representatives must be successful at framing black interests in alignment with the interests of the city (Peterson 1981). This is often difficult to accomplish because the interests of the black community—lessening socioeconomic disparities and resource inequities between blacks and whites (Karnig and Welch 1980)—are often at odds with narrowly-constructed city interests and limited resources availability (Peterson 1981). Local governments may counteract attempts at policy responsiveness by offering limited resources that provide a bandage for larger racial inequities in the distribution of resources. These small carrots may temporarily silence local blacks and, thereby, mask persistent political disempowerment. Revealing the tenuous nature of struggles for incorporation, a government that is able to co-opt a descriptive representative by “buying them out” with these limited resources ends the process of political incorporation and results in no or weak incorporation.

The penultimate fourth stage is the achievement of full political incorporation. Political incorporation does not describe a moment when blacks are involved in local politics, but instead a system in which a city honors the need to recognize the interests of the black community (in other words, aligns black interests with city interests) and blacks have permanent and significant influence and authority over many spheres of local affairs. By doing so, local politics is restructured—black interests are municipal interests and municipal interests are black interests even when governing regimes change. Though the “prizes” of political incorporation are highly coveted, the process of achieving incorporation can be tenuous. The path to political incorporation requires group interest
formation, strategic maneuvering, racial solidarity, coalition-building, and civic engagement and political participation—each of which are difficult to organize and build among large populations. When a city is unable to sustain full political incorporation, it drops back to the first, second, or third phases and travels this path to full incorporation again.

While each of these phases in a city is a signal of black political power, they do not denote black political empowerment until this comprehensive (and complex) final stage of full political incorporation. Analyses of political incorporation must reveal this degree of complexity because black struggles for political power are subject to back-door maneuvering and racially-based power dynamics. In other words, the presence of a black political official taken at face value may be labeled “descriptive representation” when a closer analysis may reveal that dynamics of co-optation and tokenism at the hands of non-black officials—which are antithetical to political incorporation—are at play. Chapter 7 returns to this process-oriented model to demonstrate how these sociopolitical contexts pushed Evanston forward to incorporation and halted the incorporation process in Waukegan. The next section describes the concept of sociopolitical context and how I suggest it impacts the paths outlined in this section.

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3 There is a subtle but important difference between black political power and black political empowerment. Power connotes the ability to control or influence; it is what one possesses in the political sphere. Empowerment connotes the ability to act; it is the way one is and acts in the political sphere. Black political power is often described as something that is given to blacks by whites. Black political empowerment describes the ability for blacks to cultivate power from within their community and to act upon that power. This distinction is particularly important to the conclusions that this research draws in Chapter 7.
1.5 Concept Mapping Sociopolitical Context

I use the tool of concept mapping, as described by Joseph Maxwell (1996) to explain precisely what I think is happening in Evanston and Waukegan and to depict how I define sociopolitical context and how sociopolitical context pushes the process of political incorporation forward and backward. Echoing the framework advanced by John Mollenkopf (1986), I assert that the sociopolitical context in a given city is defined by the civic fabric, political culture and leadership, and racial dynamics. I then outline the specific concepts that I use to examine political culture, civic fabric, and racial dynamics in Evanston and Waukegan. I believe these concepts tell the story of what is happening in these cases.

Defining these three domains and their related concepts is a linear way of depicting what is actually the dynamic, interrelated social and political environment in a city. Chapters 4 through 6 reveal the dynamism of these concepts and how they actually play out in a city and impact incorporation. An appropriate concept map for this research would likely have connections drawn between a number of concepts—for example, depicting that racial group conflict can build intraracial coalitions or that descriptive representation is optimally coupled with substantive representation, which together can lead to the alignment of black interests and city interests—eliding the web of connections that actually form the sociopolitical context.

I find the concept map tool limited in that it fails to provide the level of detail that demonstrates what these concepts "look" like in cities that have achieved incorporation.
Figure 2. Concept Map of Sociopolitical Context
and in cities that have not. In other words, it is not that national organizations simply facilitate or hinder incorporation. This section provides a narrative that seeks to capture the nuances that are missing from the concept map, and Table I provides the categories that I have assigned to the configurations of these concepts that can facilitate or hinder incorporation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table I. Possible Configurations of Sociopolitical Context</th>
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<tr>
<td>Facilitates Incorporation</td>
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<td>Thin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hinders Incorporation</td>
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1.5.1 Civic Fabric

This dissertation suggests that the concepts outlined in the map shape the civic fabric, and the particular configurations of the civic fabric in a city can either result in a “thick” civic fabric or a “thin” civic fabric—a thick civic fabric being beneficial to cities in the pursuit of black political incorporation. In this research, I demonstrate that Evanston featured a thick civic fabric, and Waukegan featured a thin civic fabric; I believe this is an important part of the story of political incorporation in Evanston and political exclusion in Waukegan. In a thick civic fabric, there is collaboration, partnership, and successful attempts at common goal formation across civic organizations centered in the black community. Similarly, there is collaboration, partnership, and attempts at common

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4 This dissertation borrows the definition of “civic fabric” from Douglas Rae’s (2003) concept of “civic fauna.” Section 4.2 provides an additional, extensive discussion of civic fabric, particularly in relation to Rae’s work.
goal formation among civic organizations across causes/issues and racial groups. Additionally, there are high levels of black civic engagement in both socially and politically oriented organizations. Cities with a thick civic fabric will have a strong network of grassroots organizations that benefit from local knowledge, self-determination, and highly active membership. This network does not preclude the presence of national organizations that complement the work of grassroots organizations. In these cities, community members actively pursue cross-racial coalition building and recognize the value of intraracial coalition building. Similarly, the construction of racial solidarity among blacks is valued, as well as the usage of civic organizations as avenues to create and sustain sentiments of solidarity.

Conversely, in cities with a thin civic fabric, there are siloed civic organizations centered in the black community and siloed civic organizations across causes/issues and racial/ethnic groups. These cities will have low levels of black civic engagement in politically oriented organizations, even if there are high levels of black engagement in social organizations. A lack of grassroots organizations or weak ties between those that do exist means that there is a tendency to primarily work through national organizations with large but inactive memberships and a weak locally-focused strategy. Many cities with a thin civic fabric are limited by the presence of contentious racial dynamics, which makes cross-racial coalition building difficult and costly, and siloed civic organizations and clear limits on black political power make intraracial coalition building equally unlikely. Even the construction of racial solidarity among blacks is valued, but a lack of
consensus on how to formulate solidarity and, at the extreme, despair or skepticism on whether it is even possible.

1.5.2 **Racial Dynamics**

This research will also demonstrate that the racial dynamics in Evanston and Waukegan significantly differ. I suggest that some cities, like Evanston, can exhibit favorable racial dynamics, while other cities like, Waukegan, exhibit contentious racial dynamics. Racial dynamics in a city impacts how receptive citizens and political officials will be to black political empowerment. When there are favorable racial dynamics, there is active work to remedy persistent racial group conflict, particularly marked by interracial efforts, and historic and continued efforts to limit the effects of systemic racism. While acts of individual racial hostility are possible, they are often isolated, and vocalized negative perceptions of outgroups are largely taboo. Some communities with favorable racial dynamics achieve interracial trust, but even when they fail to, there remains a mutual desire by all sides to achieve interracial trust. Evanston largely benefited from the absence of other racial/ethnic minority groups, but we might expect that in cities with favorable racial dynamics, when there are multiple minority groups present, there is the development of a partnership between groups for shared political power.

In cities with contentious racial dynamics, there is persistent and unresolvable racial group conflict, particularly in the form of racial violence, discrimination, segregation, antagonism, and hostility. These cities, like Waukegan, experience
widespread acts of individual racial hostility and negative perceptions of outgroups. Beyond individual racial hostility, there is typically evidence of systemic racism that infiltrates the political and policy arenas and pervasively limits the life chances of blacks in institutions such as housing, schools, employment, and justice. Despite the magnitude of racial hostility, these cities typically dismiss discussions of interracial trust, and calls for interracial trust are particularly supplanted by advocacy of race-neutral discussions and relationships. Finally, when there is a significant presence of multiple minority groups (such as the large black and Latino populations in Waukegan), there is selective allocation of power to one group at the expense of others, and the benefits of this power outweigh the costs of pursuing a cross-minority coalition.

1.5.3 Political Culture

Finally, this research will demonstrate that attempts at political incorporation in Evanston benefited from an open and liberal political culture, while attempts in Waukegan were hindered by a closed and conservative political culture. The next chapter, which provides the literature review, provides a discussion of open and closed political cultures, as I believe that the idea of political culture singularly captures the differences in political culture between Evanston and Waukegan. In an open political culture, there are high levels of civic capital; expressed values of participatory democracy with mechanisms for citizen participation in local politics; and an open willingness to seriously consider the interests of the black community as aligned with the city's interests. Conversely, in closed political cultures, there are low levels of civic capital;
expressed values of participatory democracy but with few mechanisms for black participation in local politics, in particular; and the tendency to refute presentations of black interests and to suppress and replace black interests with city interests.

There is a relationship between whether or not a city has favorable racial dynamics and whether or not the city has an open political culture. In racial terms, in an open political culture, there is cross-minority trust or neutrality, the presence of liberal white voters and elites who are willing to champion black political power, and racially vigilant black political leadership that actively voices black concerns/interests and advocates for black political power. I find that favorable racial dynamics and an open political culture in Evanston were mutually complementary. In Waukegan, contentious racial dynamics and a closed political culture laid the foundation for competition between racial/ethnic minority groups in the political sphere, coupled with selective, preferential treatment by majority groups; the presence of conservative white voters and elites who expressed ambivalence or active opposition to black political power; and the absence of black descriptive representation completely, or the presence of black descriptive representation with the absence of black substantive representation.

1.6 Hypotheses

This dissertation research tests four hypotheses about the factors that shape the process of political incorporation. These four hypotheses seek to account for the factors that contour the local sociopolitical context and determine whether or not political incorporation is achieved. These hypotheses are largely shaped by the theoretical
framework presented by John Mollenkopf (1986), and they are informed by the current literature on political incorporation.

**Table II. Hypotheses**

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<thead>
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<th>Hypotheses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>There is a relationship between the significant presence of another minority group and the difficulty of the path toward black political incorporation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Blacks in cities with developed “civic fauna” will have more successful efforts at achieving incorporation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The presence of a cohort of white liberals, including residents and elected officials, is central to the election of black candidates and generalized support of efforts by local blacks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The relationship between the size of the black population and the achievement of black political incorporation is weak.</td>
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First, there is a relationship between the significant presence of another minority group and the difficulty of the path toward black political incorporation. This hypothesis is rooted in a literature that evaluates political competition between minority groups, especially blacks and Latinos. In particular, Bobo and Hutchings (1996) explain that because blacks and Latinos feel that their racial/ethnic group is oppressed in society, they are more likely to view members of other racial/ethnic groups as threats. This fuels competitions between the groups for political resources and power. This competition is less fierce between blacks and recent Latino immigrants and even more pronounced when both groups believed they have staked their claim for political power through longevity in the city.
The greater the size of the other minority group and the longer their residence in the city, the less likely that blacks will achieve incorporation. This is because of increased competition, the inability or unwillingness to ally with Latinos for shared political power and resources, and a “divide and conquer” strategy that consistently grants political power to one group at the expense of the other. This will be especially true in smaller cities, rather than central cities, in which there are fewer opportunities for descriptive representatives and fewer resources for which the groups compete.

Political incorporation theory suggests that blacks, regardless of status, support a common liberal agenda, and it is the ability to coalesce around this common agenda that allows blacks to realize political power. While important, political incorporation is not only an interracial redistribution of power. The path to political incorporation can also be affected by local intraracial and cross-minority relationships. Zoltan Hajnal (2007) highlights that the incorporation of blacks has been understood through an interracial framework that does not necessarily fit all cases. I suggest that the process of political incorporation is impacted by three categories of racial dynamics: interracial (between blacks and whites), intraracial (between blacks), and cross-minority (between blacks and Latinos).

In particular, by focusing on the election of black mayors, the political incorporation literature conflates cohesive voting behavior with overall racial solidarity. But divisions within the black community pose significant challenges to political incorporation. For example, Zoltan Hajnal (2007) explains that economic diversity leads to political divisions as the black middle class becomes more conservative. An
examination of intraracial dynamics demonstrates that local dialogue about political incorporation reveals differences between middle class and poor blacks, and these differences might trouble the path to political incorporation.

Even once blacks attain political power, Cathy Cohen (1999) suggests that the marginalization of less well-off blacks by the black middle class may mean that the less well-off do not receive the resources and skills that will facilitate their participation and allow them to reap the benefits of incorporation. In addition, cross-minority relationships do not always result in the “rainbow coalition” that Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) explain helped facilitate black political incorporation in California. Mollenkopf (1986) finds that competition between blacks and Latinos inhibited political incorporation in New York City. McClain and Tauber (1998) confirm that the prospects for the formation of Black and Latino political coalitions continue to be problematic and they predict that socioeconomic and political competition between blacks and Latinos will continue to intensify.

Second, blacks in cities with a developed civic fabric will have more successful efforts of achieving political incorporation. Douglas Rae (2003) suggests that civic organizations—including religious congregations, athletic clubs, and schools—are the places where people create social capital, which includes community feelings of trust and connectedness. This civic fauna is a valuable part of governance because these organizations both serve city residents and are led by residents. Further, a thick civic fabric is valuable for a process like black political incorporation that redistributes power
from whites to blacks as it “allows people to engage with one another and to build trust across lines of difference” (Rae 2003: 204).

Orum and Gramlich (1999) add the concept of civic capital to the social capital literature. While social capital recognizes interpersonal relationships, it provides a thin description of communities. Civic capital suggests that some cities create more favorable environments for their residents. I find the concept of civic capital valuable to this dissertation research. In this research, if a city has structures for blacks to connect with each other and for blacks to connect with other people, then the process of political incorporation will be less contentious. Though the concept of social capital differentiates between the ability for it to “bond similar people together” and “bridge groups of different people” (Rae 2003: 182), building both this interracial and intraracial social capital is integral to the process of incorporation.

Third, the current literature articulates that the presence of a cohort of white liberals is central to the election of black officials. For example, the support of white “Lakefront Liberals” provided the votes necessary for Harold Washington to win his mayoral campaign in Chicago (Grimshaw 1992). I hypothesize that if white liberalism is present in a broader context than just elections, then black political incorporation will result. A liberal culture, particularly important in residents and political leadership, gives purchasing power to black political incorporation. The redistribution of political power is at odds with a conservative local sociopolitical culture. Local liberalism or conservatism are determined by the local history, economy, institutions, and the tone set by political officials. This local culture is significant because it is the context in which blacks pursue
political incorporation. Attempts at redistributing political power will align with an open/liberal culture, while these attempts are a threat to a closed, conservative political culture.

Finally, I also hypothesize that the relationship between the size of the black population and black political incorporation is relatively weak. As this chapter has outlined, the current literature presents the idea that a majority or near-majority black population is central to black political incorporation. Using the case of Evanston, this research demonstrates that cities without a majority-black population can achieve political incorporation. Using the case of Waukegan, this research also demonstrates that cities with black populations significant enough to achieve incorporation still may not. In fact, I hypothesize that of the measures discussed in these four hypotheses, the size of the black population is the weakest indicator of incorporation.

1.7 Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation sheds light on how sociopolitical context influences whether incorporation happens. Looking past Browning, Marshall, and Tabb’s (1984) model of the phases of incorporation, the current literature pays little generalized attention to incorporation as a process and how this process is similar or dissimilar across cities. Instead, this literature largely focuses its studies on the results of incorporation and the rise of black mayors in particular cities. Since this literature selects cities in which incorporation has been achieved, we know little about cities that have not achieved incorporation—even when they possess the characteristics of cities that do. I find the
achievement of political incorporation to be context-specific, and the differences between these contexts results in three key findings, outlined in Table III.

This dissertation provides a significant contribution to how we study political incorporation. After the rise of political incorporation as a significant area of study in black politics and urban politics, political scientists began to conduct case studies of cities that have achieved incorporation and outline the results in each city. I seek to return to Browning, Marshall, and Tabb’s original focus and use the cases of Evanston and Waukegan to build upon a broader political incorporation theory, rather than conducting an historical analysis particular to Evanston or Waukegan. This dissertation provides two major contributions to the current literature. First, all cities with significant black populations do not achieve political incorporation. Because the current literature selects cities that have achieved incorporation as cases, we know little about cities (central cities and the multitude of suburbs) where incorporation has not resulted—especially those

### Table III. Key Findings

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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>There is a difference in the local sociopolitical contexts in Evanston and Waukegan. These contexts explain why Evanston has achieved incorporation and Waukegan has not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The path to political incorporation is not paved by direct political acts or elections, but the environment in which incorporation is pursued.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The model of political incorporation should not be a garbage can model. There are some aspects of the sociopolitical context that are more closely related to incorporation than others: civic fabric and opportunities for civic engagement, local political culture and leadership, and local racial climate.</td>
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cities with significant black populations. Second, we know little about what makes the wheels of incorporation turn, even in cities where it has been achieved. When the current literature studies cities in which incorporation has resulted, few of these works seek to contribute to a generalizable theory of incorporation. This research seeks to add complexity to the political incorporation literature, reveal that context shapes the path to incorporation significantly more than the current literature suggests, and present the idea that cities with similar contexts take similar paths to incorporation. This research can lead to additional studies of cities that test both the Browning, Marshall, and Tabb theory, as they originally called, and the idea of the current research that context impacts incorporation.

In Chapter Two, I explore the literature on political incorporation and its focus on the results of incorporation rather than the sociopolitical context that cultivates incorporation. In Chapter Three, I describe the research methods used in this dissertation. Qualitative methods, including interviews, focus groups, and focus group participant questionnaires, allow residents and officials to reconstruct their experiences on the path to incorporation. These methods are used to supplement the historical data and document analysis that this research will employ to reconstruct the histories of Evanston and Waukegan. This chapter also briefly presents the histories of Evanston and Waukegan, with the starting point that political incorporation has resulted in Evanston.
and political exclusion has resulted in Waukegan. Despite being demographically similar cities, a comparative view of the local histories will reveal stark differences.

Chapter Four describes the civic fabric of the black community in each city. Blacks unite and engage in politics through local organizations, and these organizations initiate claims for political incorporation. Thus if opportunities for civic engagement are minimal or ineffective, appeals for incorporation are weak. Chapter Five contrasts the political culture and leadership in Evanston and Waukegan. Examinations of political leadership, particularly the presence of a black mayor, dominate the political incorporation literature. In particular, this chapter will describe the political cultures in Evanston and Waukegan and contrast the two mayors who epitomize the tradition of political leadership in each city, Mayor Robert Sabonjian in Waukegan and Mayor Lorraine Morton in Evanston. In Chapter Five, I present the local racial climate in each city. There are three aspects to the local racial climate: interracial (the racial dynamics between blacks and whites), intraracial (the solidity of the relationship between blacks in order to collectively vie for incorporation), and cross-minority (the degree of competition between blacks and Latinos, in particular, for resources). Local racial dynamics are a part of the local sociopolitical context, and these dynamics particularly play a profound role in shaping the path to incorporation.

Chapter Seven provides the conclusion to the dissertation. In sum, this dissertation discovers important processes, relationships, and questions about African-

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5 In other words, this dissertation does not discuss whether political incorporation has happened in each city or not. Chapter 3 outlines the history of each city, including evidence of political incorporation in Evanston and political exclusion in Waukegan. This dissertation then adopts the task of understanding how the local sociopolitical context has resulted in these two realities.
American political incorporation. Given the historical, single case studies of cities and mayoralities that dominate the contemporary black, urban politics literature, this dissertation rediscovers the process of political incorporation developed by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984). Their theory suggests that there is a common structure that unites these disparate case studies, and that structure is a process of incorporation that moves all cities from mobilization to descriptive representation, to policy responsiveness, and to full incorporation. I maintain that, with the succession of black mayoralities, studies of black political incorporation moved from testing or applying the seminal theory to maintaining pace with a flourishing population of black mayors. I believe a return to process is especially valuable given growing questions of “where went the spoils of black political incorporation?”

This research further illuminates that, if we return to the original theory of the phases of incorporation, we must understand how cities travel through these phases. I demonstrate that certain cities have contexts that are conducive to the realization of each of these phases, while other cities do not. The black politics literature has a legacy of focusing on both political and extrapoliitical actors, but this research takes a macro-level approach, looking beyond particular elites, activists, and organizations, to suggest that cities themselves have cultures that are open or closed to minority political incorporation.

This dissertation also raises two questions that may be valuable to future research. Much of the attention to the rise of black political power has focused outside of the black community—on white liberalism or the black/brown coalition. I ask whether these are in fact the trump card for black incorporation or whether, instead, it is a sagacious coalition
of black actors that play above both nonblack allies and competitors. Perhaps the most important question this research raises is about cities that have not achieved black political incorporation. What are we to make of cities like Milwaukee or Norfolk where full black political incorporation has languished since the great migrations? What about the cities that were featured in the great studies of black mayoralties that have not sustained incorporation? What were the shifts in the local context that made these cities unable to sustain black political power? How will we account for increased black suburbanization and the replication of struggles for black political empowerment in suburbia? Despite its historic perspective, this dissertation suggests that a return to political incorporation studies will be fundamental to understanding local black politics in the future.
Though the concepts associated with political incorporation—racial politics, representation, power, and influence—have evolved over time within the political science literature, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) tied them together and introduced the seminal theory in their work, *Protest Is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics*. Rooted in the modern Civil Rights Movement, political incorporation theory describes the political conditions that help usher in black political power. A group is said to be politically incorporated in a city when there is a presence of descriptive representatives on governing bodies, policies and resources that particularly respond to the interests of that community, and a substantial influence on local political decision-making (Browning et al. 1984). In short, empowered blacks have representation, influence, resources, and power.

But, political incorporation is not measured by a moment when blacks “arrive”—black political empowerment requires consistent inclusion in local affairs over a significant period of time, permanent redistribution of resources toward the black community, and substantial influence over these local affairs given their proportion in the local population. As this dissertation contends, the outcome of political empowerment, or full political incorporation, is directly and continually influenced by the sociopolitical context of the city. One of the assumptions of this dissertation is that sociopolitical context is shaped by the civic fabric, political culture, and racial dynamics in a city, and certain configurations within this context (thick civic fabric, open political culture and
leadership, and favorable racial dynamics) are necessary to advance the process of political incorporation.

When the current literature does offer insight into the process of political incorporation, it largely focuses on the specifically political maneuvering that accompanies struggles for incorporation. Indeed, this literature review demonstrates that the dominant themes in the black political incorporation literature are squarely political, and this chapter discusses these themes of descriptive representation, coalition building, elitism, and pluralism. I find discussions of these themes to be rigorous and valuable for understanding black political incorporation. But, I believe that the black political incorporation literature should undertake what Almond and Verba (1963) describe as studies of “the political culture of democracy and the social structures and processes that sustain it” (p. 1). It would be a distortion of the current literature to say that social structures and processes are entirely excluded. But, while the social context provides the passive background and the political context is the main character in the current literature, this dissertation presents both the social and political contexts as main characters that help determine whether political incorporation will occur.

2.1 Political Participation

An extensive literature examines the political participation of blacks, and it casts a wide net by examining a variety of political activities in which blacks participate as evidence of political participation. This is largely because initial examinations of black political participation narrowly focused on voting behavior after the passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 and, chronicling lower-than-expected voter turnout, drew the conclusion that blacks do not participate in politics to the same degree as whites (Leighley 1995). By using a more expansive definition of political participation, and concluding that blacks do indeed participate in politics, this literature began to look at how blacks participate in politics, the issues that most drive them to participate, the types of candidates that they tend to support, and the impact of this participation on the political arena (Orum 1966; Lipsky 1968; Olsen 1970; Danigelis 1978; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Leighley 1995; Harris et al. 2005).

The political incorporation literature constructs black political participation to be the spark that starts the process of incorporation. This literature focuses on demand-protest mobilizations, as a particular form of black political participation, during the modern Civil Rights Movement as the catalyst for the incorporation process. Given the emphasis on the modern Civil Rights Movement, there is a false understanding that protest politics was sufficient for blacks to gain political positions. This is not the case.

The achievement of full political incorporation required extensive political participation in many venues, including recruiting and grooming optimal black candidates, organizing blacks to vote, back-door maneuvering that “determined” black candidates (so as not to split the black vote), and intraracial and interracial coalition building (Browning et al. 1984). The ultimate idea, however, is that this organizing and participation will not always be necessary; when blacks achieve full political incorporation, it is expected that their interests become so entwined with the city’s interests and the governing regime so aware of the concerns of the black electorate that
their issue positions will always be represented in government (by both black and non-black representatives).

What motivates black to participate? In short, socioeconomic status, race consciousness, sociopolitical context, the presence of black candidates, and messages from local institutions each prime black political participation (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Tate 1993; Spence and McClerking 2010). While research shows that blacks of all income and education levels participate in politics equal to whites, education and income do help explain the particular types of activities in which individual blacks participate. For example, voting is a behavior more typical of middle-class blacks than lower income blacks, but lower-income blacks are likely to participate in politics through local institutions, like the black church.

The sociopolitical context in which one lives encourages participation. Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) argue that competition over scarce resources encourages outgroup fear and political participation in order for individuals to protect their interests. Thus, political interest and engagement are a response to the local political environment (Gay 2001). A city’s social and economic composition strongly influences the likelihood that its residents will participate in local civic affairs (Oliver 1999). The number of blacks residing in the city is also an important factor. The principle of “critical mass” suggests that as minorities reached a threshold of numerical representation, they believed that they had the numerical strength necessary to elect black candidates (Tate 2004). As the black population increased to majority-status in many central cities, the numerical strength of the black community galvanized black political participation, including
developing strategies, mobilizing voters, developing leadership potential, and increasing the supply of qualified candidates (Marschall and Ruhil 2006).

Increased socioeconomic status leads to greater political participation, because resources and skills like, time, money, and knowledge, make political participation more convenient. The socioeconomic status model of participation once dominated explanations of the sources of political participation, contending that income, education, and social status are the best predictors of political participation (Verba and Nie 1972). Lindquist (1964) explains that the business and professional classes dominated local politics, particularly in terms of office-holding. He elaborated: “[L]ocal government, insofar as office-holding is concerned, is an upper-class prerogative that is shared only sparingly with the lower classes, in highly restricted categories of participation” (Lindquist 1964, 610). With upper-class representatives, citizens with high socioeconomic status saw their interests articulated in the political sphere. As a result, they became more likely to find political participation meaningful and, thus, their political engagement has increased historically. This has not been the case for those of lower socioeconomic status.

Psychological characteristics such as political efficacy and awareness lead to higher political participation. Beliefs about political interest, political efficacy, trust in government, and civic duty influence participation. Black political participation is not necessarily based on whether blacks objectively value the political process. Instead, blacks (like all other groups) value the political process when they believe that their participation can result in meaningful change. For all voters, the feeling of influencing
the outcome of the political process is more rewarding than the feeling of mere participation (Jones 1978). This calculus of participation versus abstention is particularly employed by minority groups who find their status as numerical minorities an initial impediment to meaningful change. Numerical and symbolic status as minorities causes them to feel that they have less capacity to influence political leadership than whites, leading to lower levels of political efficacy and trust (Emig et al. 1996).

One of the most common predictors of political participation for blacks is feelings of racial solidarity (Ellison and London 1992). In high empowerment areas, the ability to realize a common racial agenda motivates participation. Participation is highest among blacks with a strong sense of group identity or consciousness (Ellison and London 1992; Hero and Campbell 1996; Lien et al. 2001). Group solidarity is less salient for voting, but partially explains high minority participation in collective efforts like rallying, campaign volunteering, and petition signing. Participation because of a common racial agenda is further aided by the presence of descriptive representatives. Descriptive representatives increase group pride. As descriptive representation builds group pride, it pulls minorities

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6The centrality of racial solidarity to black political participation appears to either be decreasing, or its value has been overestimated in the black politics literature. Harris, Sinclair-Chapman, and McKenzie (2005) explain that blacks are becoming more disparate politically, demographically, economically, and socially (Harris et al. 2005), and high race consciousness is more likely to influence political participation in blacks with lower socioeconomic status than higher status blacks. In fact, Huckfeldt (1979) asserts that higher status people seek to incorporate other higher status people, while at the same time excluding those of lower socioeconomic status. As unequal circumstances and unequal treatment grows, a participation gap increases, and poorer blacks have less incentive, desire, or means to political participation. In other words, the key impediment to full political incorporation is espoused by the social isolation thesis: growing class differences among blacks undermines the civic and political life of black communities (Harris et al. 2005). We underestimate the internal differences within black communities that lead to disunity, low mobilization, and failed incorporation. Jackson (1987) concludes that black political cohesion is tenuous.
into the political process (Gay 2001; Gilliam and Kaufmann 1998). The presence of group pride raises the likelihood of participation in all forms. It is not just mere race consciousness, but the magnification of race in the political sphere that encourages minority participation. Black consciousness must be politicized—racial identity and the potential advancement of racial issues must provide a basis for electability—in order for group mobilization and cohesion to occur (Jackson 1987).

With the increased political efficacy that resulted from victorious elections and the realization that blacks could actually influence the political process, blacks participated in local affairs in a variety of venues. Their participation was within three broad categories: actual acts of political participation, like office-holding, voting, petition-signing, and agenda-setting; access to political resources, such as funding for community programs and employment opportunities in the local public sector; and symbolic inclusion in politics, which is the feeling of being associated with those in power and the feeling that one has the ability to influence political outcomes. Status as minorities, coupled with black electoral victories, galvanized black political participation, including developing strategies, mobilizing voters, developing leadership potential, and increasing the supply of qualified candidates (Marschall and Ruhil 2006).

Though the initial victories of political incorporation in the 1960s exploded black political participation, Gilliam and Kaufmann (1998) suggest that blacks continue to out-participate all racial groups, even after they have won local political battles. Bobo and Gilliam (1990) elaborate:

Studies of sociopolitical participation based on data from the late 1950s and into the 1960s found that blacks participated less than whites, [but] the
significance of race for sociopolitical behavior has evidently changed. On the one hand, we find that blacks generally participate at the same rate as whites of comparable socioeconomic status. [B]lacks are more active than comparable whites in areas of high black empowerment (emphasis added; p. 387–388).

In these “high empowerment areas,” there are a few impediments to political participation and thus high participation rates, sufficient descriptive representatives, minority access to resources and the material benefits of political participation, and high levels of political trust and efficacy. Minority residents of high empowerment areas feel more positive about municipal government and are, therefore, more likely to become engaged in other methods of political participation outside of just voting (Emig et al. 1996; Gilliam 1996; Gilliam and Kaufmann 1998). As blacks elected descriptive representatives and advanced through the process of political incorporation, their political participation and interest in local affairs peaked, and their incorporation became a political asset.

Black political participation is particularly induced by the presence of black candidates. Because black political participation increases with the presence of black candidates, we know that feelings of racial solidarity cause blacks to increase their political behavior in support of these black candidates. In fact, feelings of race consciousness can be so compelling that blacks often direct their political behavior toward fulfilling their “racial interests,” rather than their “class interests.” The presence of black political candidates also enhances the attitudinal dimension of black political behavior; the presence of black candidates enhances feelings of political trust and efficacy, which compel blacks to participate in politics. Bobo and Gilliam (1990) explain
that blacks who live in high-empowerment areas participate at greater levels than their white counterparts in the city. Spence and McClerking (2010) explain that this initial spark of participation early in the process of political incorporation may not be sustained when full political incorporation is achieved:

African Americans in cities with long-term Black mayoral control are less likely to engage in a range of political activities compared with those individuals in Black mayoral cities with shorter durations. However, they also suggest that residents living in cities characterized by short-term Black mayoral control are more likely to participate than residents living in non-Black-led cities. Similarly, we found that the size of a city’s Black population positively spurs Black political participation (p. 923).

The presence of a significant black population is particularly important because as the size of the black population increases, so does the number of black institutions, and these institutions are critical to black political participation. Black institutions have historically focused on the living conditions of blacks and providing opportunities for them to improve their life chances. In an era of black disenfranchisement, these institutions met the needs and interests of blacks when local governing bodies refused to. Blacks generally demonstrate a high degree of participation in a number of black institutions. As a result, studies of black political incorporation necessitate an examination of the local civic fabric, particularly in the black community, to understand how blacks mobilization for incorporation. Even in cities with high black empowerment, these institutions remain the primary mechanism for black political participation.

Examinations of the sociopolitical context in high empowerment cities reveal a web of black institutions that share membership, are motivated by common goals, and support each other’s efforts. In order to achieve full political incorporation, black
institutions in these cities worked (perhaps not by design) simultaneously to cater to the needs of the black community and ease the fears of the white community. Some organizations, such as the black church and grassroots organizations, were able to focus on the needs of the black community. Because their work was typically outside of the purview of white officials and residents, they also provided political messages to frame the political beliefs of the black community and coordinated political activity that organized blacks. Because whites were typically not members of these institutions, black strategies for political incorporation largely remained secret and secure from outside infiltration or co-optation.

These black institutions wrote the “hidden transcript” for black political participation. At the same time, organizations like the NAACP and black businesses worked at the forefront of black politics; they often framed black concerns in “safe” language, building coalitions with local whites was often a part of their missions, and they provided the community leadership that typically negotiated with whites. The complexity of the civic fabric in the black community is one of the central determinants of whether a city has the sociopolitical context to support political incorporation (Jennings 2001).

2.2 Coalition Formation

Hacker (1992) explains that black and white Americans live in two different worlds, and the failure to find common ground between these groups is because racial divides have caused them to develop two different views of the world. There are significant
differences between the daily realities and life chances of blacks, including disparities in educational attainment, income, occupational class, homeownership, and health status to name a few (for a comprehensive overview, see Wilson 1978). As a result, the political priorities and interests of blacks significantly differ from whites (see Sigelman and Welch 1991; Tate 1993; Dawson 1994; Hoschchild 1995; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Schuman et al. 1997). Blacks are also overwhelmingly more likely to express liberal ideologies, while whites are likely to express either a liberal or a conservative ideology (Abrahamson et al. 1994). This means that blacks and whites significantly differ in both the interests and the ideology that are at the basis of coalition building.

But, given the growth of Latino populations in American cities, the black/white divide is not the only significant divide that hampers contemporary attempts at incorporation. A growing Latino population in Los Angeles eventually caused the former black—white coalition to disband: "With the emergence of Latinos, the types of available coalitions become more complex. [...] Since immigration provides a cross-cutting social challenge that makes Latinos more than simply an additive entrant in existing coalitions, we should consider two other possibilities. Latinos may find themselves opposed to African Americans but allied with liberal whites, as in the coalition against Proposition 187 in 1994 and in Antonio Villaraigosa’s campaign for mayor in 2001.” (Sonenshein 2004: p. 55). In Philadelphia, it was precisely this pandering to Latino voters that provided the basis of a black—Latino coalition and saw the election of the city’s first black mayor, Wilson Goode, in 1983.
The presence of more than one minority group in a particular city often leads to the errant assumption that shared non-white identity and perhaps political exclusion (though not always the case) is a sufficient basis for coalition building. A lack of knowledge about the particular interests of minority groups, as well as a lack of knowledge about ingrained mistrust and fear of competition, has led many to believe that there is a pot of gold at the end “rainbow coalition.” While there is evidence of coalition building between blacks and other groups, a lack of analysis of cities in which incorporation has not been achieved means that we do not know whether the number of cities where there have been biracial coalitions indeed outweighs the number of cities in which biracial coalitions have not resulted. Further, given the tenuous nature of multiracial politics, we do not know [as Sonenshein (1994) illuminates] how many cities have been unable to sustain black political incorporation, in part, because of the changing nature of biracial coalitions.

In addition to perceived cultural differences, a host of political factors related to the sociopolitical context—“the nature of governing institutions, the size of local bureaucracies, the presence of grassroots political organizations, the character of local leadership, the economic structure of a given community, its fiscal health and prosperity, and levels of minority incorporation” (Kaufmann 2004: p. 11)—means that there are increased chances for in-group/out-group distinctions to be made and, therefore, heightened racial conflict. Karen Kaufmann further explains the importance of sociopolitical context to local political affairs:

[Group-based conflict over power and material resources is more common in the domain of local politics than it is in the national realm. [...] The
extent to which racial or ethnic identities become politically salient vis-à-vis other political identities is a function of the political context. When the political context is fraught with intergroup tensions, electoral cleavages are likely to form around these rivalries. In the absence or diminution of such discord, traditional partisan and ideological identities are likely to be salient and highly related to local vote choice (p. 11).

The larger the size of each racial/ethnic group population in a city, the more this in-group/out-group threat increases; this is particularly true when there are significant black and Latino populations in a city.

A number of scholars cite examples of issues salient to blacks and Latinos in which each group differs in their issue position. For example, Cohen (1982) notes that Latinos believed the disproportionate employment of blacks in municipal positions meant that affirmative action advantaged blacks but disadvantaged Latinos, and Falcon (1988) highlights that blacks feared that bilingual programs in schools would take money from programs that traditionally aided black students. Whether real or perceived, minority groups typically operate under the assumption that there are limited resources reserved for the types of redistributive, social service concerns that are often common to minority groups; given that these groups have historically operated in resource-starved communities, the need for these resources (and power over their distribution) means that oppositional politics has real purchasing power.

Particularly in cities where black groups lack the numerical strength to elect black candidates at will, coalition-building is key to starting and advancing the incorporation process. Case studies of cities in which blacks have achieved political incorporation typically find that their work to form a coalition with other minority groups and liberal
whites is key to helping coalition members gain political office. Rodney Hero (1992) explains that the three types of coalitions that have historically formed in order to elect black officials:

Minority mayoral candidates have employed several different strategies based on these conditions. [There are] three kinds of coalitions between minority and white voters: the “conservative coalition,” the “independent power politics” approach, and the “liberal coalition.” The conservative coalition links the minority community with powerful white business and financial interests. In independent-power politics, the backing of white voters is either not needed to secure a majority or is seemingly impossible to obtain. The liberal coalition seeks to unite ethnic—racial minorities with low-income whites, labor unions, and white or Anglo liberals from the business and professional world (p. 117).

Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) highlighted the central roles of coalitions in attempts for political incorporation in several cities in California. Given the racial/ethnic diversity in this region, coalition-building was particularly important for blacks who were not a majority of the population in any of the cities. While coalition-building on the basis of race/ethnicity may not be valuable in majority or near-majority black cities, blacks in the numerical minority in a city are rarely able to achieve even the first stage of political incorporation—descriptive representation—without building cross-racial coalitions.

As a result, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb note that the size of the black population and common interests between blacks and other minority groups were important factors in determining whether each city achieved incorporation. This does not mean that blacks can dismiss whites as potential coalition partners. A number of works highlight that in Chicago, for example, the city’s first black mayor, Harold Washington, would not have gained power without coalitions with Latinos and liberal
whites (Grimshaw 1992; Bennett 1993; Pinderhughes 2002). Thus, there are several factors that determine the possibilities for coalition-building in a city: the electorate must consist of a significant number of racial/ethnic minorities, minority groups and liberal whites must be able to find commonalities between their interests so that these interests can serve as the common ground for their coalitions, and the presence of a significant number of white liberals who are not just sympathetic to the concerns of the minority voting bloc but who are also willing to engage in the political behavior necessary to realize full political incorporation.

One of the central debates resulting from Browning, Marshall, and Tabb’s (1984) was whether the ten northern California cities included in their study were such outliers that the results could not be generalized to other cities. The question was whether the diversity of these California cities, in terms of the population of blacks, Latinos, Asian-Americans, and a substantial number of liberal whites, meant they were able to achieve political incorporation much more easily than most American cities. This spawned a number of works that examined political incorporation and the possibilities for coalition building in other cities.

Raphael Sonenshein (1994) provided one of the first responses to this question in his study of coalition formation in Los Angeles. In many ways, Los Angeles was the antithesis of the California cities included in Browning, Marshall, and Tabb’s work; Los Angeles was significantly larger, home to a well-developed and powerful conservative population, and had a more extensive history of racial conflict between all racial/ethnic groups (cross-minority and white-minority conflict). Yet Sonenshein found that, despite
the conservative tradition in Los Angeles, black political incorporation in Los Angeles and in other cities was consistently facilitated by a small group of liberal whites: “Despite the great variety of political situations from city to city, the white base for black politics seems to be highly consistent. Those whites who have supported black mayoral candidates have tended to be young, Democratic, well educated, liberal on social issues, and sympathetic to liberal reform” (p. 10).

But it’s not that blacks were simply able to gain liberal white support by appealing to their conscience. “Racial attitudes structure political choices. A racial conservative is highly unlikely to join a biracial coalition, especially if one of the coalition’s explicit goals is African-American political incorporation. Shifting interests are unlikely to shake that basic view of the world” (p. 10). Instead, in a conservative-dominated political environment, blacks and liberal whites were able to form a biracial coalition based on a non-racial common interest: “[T]he Los Angeles biracial coalition was an alliance of leaders with shared philosophies and equal status engaged in a common activity—the search for political power. In the context of shared political interests, the combination was extremely potent” (p. 9; emphasis added). Sonenshein essentially suggests that ideology draws liberal whites into the coalition, but it is interests that sustain their participation in the coalition.

Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton (1967) also contend that similar interests, not shared liberal ideology, is the basis for biracial coalitions. To them, politics is a material struggle, not an ideological struggle, and otherwise different groups would not find themselves in an electoral coalition based on moral sentiments about equity and
fairness: “[W]e believe that political relations are based on self-interest: benefits to be gained and losses to be avoided. For the most part, man's politics is determined by his evaluation of material good and evil. Politics results from a conflict of interests, not consciences” (p. 75). If politics is fundamentally a struggle about ‘who gets what,’ then a group that is not getting what it wants could not remain satisfied in an ideologically-based coalition. Carmichael and Hamilton suggest that the marriage of two groups in a coalition is predicated upon each group having a firm understanding of its own goals in the political arena. Thus, the conditions that they outline as requisite for coalition-building—self-interest formation, determining the optimal coalition partner, independence from the other coalition partner, and specific and identifiable goals—are less about the strength of the coalition than the independent strength of each coalition partner (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967). Carmichael and Hamilton’s theory largely forms the basis for the conclusions that this dissertation draws.

Though several works produce examples of biracial coalitions (for examples, see Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Grimshaw 1992; Keiser 2002; Sonenshein 2004), John Mollenkopf’s (1986) analysis demonstrates that there are important exceptions to the cases and theory presented in the political incorporation literature. Mollenkopf provides an enlightening summary of the sociopolitical context of racial dynamics, particularly between blacks and Latinos, in New York City:

[B]lack and Hispanic political mobilization have often worked at cross purposes in New York City. While Browning, Marshall, and Tabb note tensions between the groups in the California cities, they conclude that black incorporation strengthened Hispanic incorporation. No such result has occurred in New York. The small relative size of the black population contributes to this tension. On its own, the black community is simply not
large enough to cause the kind of breakthrough that took place in Chicago, Detroit, or Atlanta. But the division between blacks and Hispanics, and indeed between ethnic factions within these groups, runs far deeper. Blacks and Hispanics do not support each other at the polls. An attempt to select a consensus minority challenger to Mayor Koch in the last election foundered because when no strong black candidate agreed to run, the established Harlem [black] leadership would not support Hispanic leader Herman Badillo. Black leaders think they have an historic and political claim to lead any minority coalition, while Puerto Rican leaders think blacks have always put them at the end of the line. Given that half of New York City’s Hispanics identified themselves as white in the last census and only ten percent as black...the road toward an effective black-Hispanic alliance is something of a minefield (p. 593-594).

Mollenkopf suggests that racial divides between racial/ethnic groups, even minority groups, may be too deep for the promise of political power to overcome.

2.3 Descriptive Representation

One of the most evaluated prizes of political incorporation is the election of black mayors. Black mayors are expected to directly legislate better outcomes for blacks through substantive policies (Behr 2002; Spence et al. 2009) and more responsive leadership (Mollenkopf 1986). There is an enhanced expectation of policy responsiveness from black administrations, and black office-holding is seen as necessary to advancing a black policy agenda (Gilliam and Kaufmann 1998; Gay 2001). The presence of a black mayor also has the greatest impact on the redistribution of resources toward blacks. This is largely because the power for mayors to allocate resources, appoint officials and other personnel, and maintain a broad reach on local affairs has increased (Eisinger 1982; Marschall and Ruhil 2006). But, meaningful political incorporation must extend beyond a descriptive politics of recognition. As a result, black officials accepted the charge of
meaningfully representing black interests by converting these interests into a black urban agenda with realizable policy goals (Jones 1978). Voters place increased pressure on descriptive representatives to realize group interests, and the effectiveness of descriptive representatives is the hinge upon which minority political participation turns.

Black mayors, as descriptive representatives, confer a number of benefits to their black constituencies. Black representation leads to more progressive legislation and greater political participation (Gay 2001). At all levels, the electoral campaigns of descriptive representatives serve to prime minority voter participation (Gay 2001; Gilliam and Kaufmann 1998). Local politics provide a greater opportunity for political engagement, and as minorities are visibly incorporated into local political structures, they become more engaged in local politics outside of just voting (Gilliam and Kaufmann 1998). Blacks in empowered cities were more politically engaged; had higher levels of political trust, efficacy, and knowledge; and felt more positively about municipal government (Gilliam 1996; Gilliam and Kaufmann 1998; Spence et al. 2009). The presence of black candidates and black officials sends a message to disengaged blacks that the system no longer has to be stacked against them. In fact, blacks become more politically engaged as they are visibly incorporated into local political structures and, once engaged, out-participate all groups (Gilliam and Kaufmann 1998). As black representation pulls the entire black community into the political process, it provides a gauge for local-level black fortunes (Eisinger 1982; Gay 2001). In short, political incorporation determines the presence of representation on racially specific issues, the chances for upward mobility, the magnitude of black political participation and the overall racial climate, opportunities
for municipal employment, and equally distributed city services and community
resources. Additionally, black office-holding fosters confidence in other, non-black
elected officials, as voters believe their descriptive representative will bring others into a
coalition and secure minority interests; this increases the perception of a great minority
influence in politics (Gay 2001).

The primacy of racial identity is strong in black communities, and the election of a
minority and the material benefits that such election might bring, encourages minority
participation in voting, petition-signing, rallying, and campaign volunteering. The
election of black candidates is as material to black communities as it is symbolic; we
should not minimize the ability for symbolic politics to pull minorities into politics. The
belief that racial group interests are primary over individual interests, and the realization
of these interests, encourages voter turnout for blacks (Gilliam 1996; Gilliam and
Kaufmann 1998).

Descriptive representation is likely to be the primary factor associated with
political incorporation. This is because of the predominant belief that black
representatives are the only representatives that can carry forward the interests of their
black constituents in governing bodies. Descriptive representatives are believed to share
these interests with their constituents because of shared racial identity, and given both
inattention to these interests in the past and their shared valuation of these interests,
they are expected to herald black interests in city government.

The descriptive representation literature implicitly assumes that descriptive
representatives have the power to change the political system to recognize black
interests. At the basis of the idea is Michael Dawson’s (1994) concept of the black utility heuristic. The black utility heuristic suggests that “the more one believes one's own life chances are linked to those of blacks as a group, the more one will consider racial group interests in evaluating alternative political choices” (Dawson 1994: p. 75). The linkage of black life chances—or common fate—means that the life chances of individual blacks are relevant to the entire group; as a result, blacks use events in the lives of other blacks as a proxy of what can happen in their own life, and they vote for descriptive representatives, believing that these representatives will govern in their best interests given this common fate. Black elected officials are believed to use this black utility heuristic to determine the issues most pertinent in the black community and weigh in on the side most beneficial to them (McClerking 2001). Whether black elected officials consciously tap into this black utility heuristic remains to be seen. However, we do know that there are indeed a common set of issues for which black elected officials almost universally advocate (Dawson 1994).

Given Paul Peterson’s (1981) theory in *City Limits* about the limited capabilities of cities, mayors and other elected officials, regardless of racial/ethnic identity, are constrained in their ability to act. In addition to the limited capacity to act, black mayors in particular face additional challenges, and these challenges make it particularly difficult for black representatives to live up to the promises associated with their descriptive representation (Nelson and Meranto 1977; Eisinger 1982; Thompson 2005). “Black mayoral administrations will face much more severe constraints than those encountered by other ethnic administrations on their ability to respond effectively to the pressing
needs of the black community” (Nelson and Meranto 1977: p. 335). Principles of racial solidarity often constrain black elected officials, because they are expected to simultaneously legislate based on the interests of their black constituents while advocating for policies in the interest of the city; these are often at odds with each other, and black elected officials find themselves in a conundrum as they are held accountable by black residents in particular and the city as a whole. Thompson (2005) explains the dilemma for black officials:

Gilliam and Kaufmann attribute the drop [in black voter turnout] to blacks’ “frustration over local government’s inability to improve the relative status of blacks.” The initial election of black mayors boosted blacks’ interest and political participation in [Cleveland, Atlanta, and Los Angeles], but that interest declined because, so they suggest, with, “each iteration of the empowerment life cycle, the consequential symbolic effect [of electing a black mayor] is not likely to be as robust or durable over time” (p. 47).

When descriptive representatives began to win unprecedented local elections, political science scholars directed their intention toward the type of cities that they were typically called to lead. Blacks were most likely to come to political power in already declining cities. These cities were typically riddled by crime; decreasing tax bases with the flight of the black middle class and white businesses to surrounding suburbs; and the resulting concentration of black, low-income residents that led to heightened racial hostility and the need for increased social service programs and their associated costs to the city (Preston 1976; Nelson and Meranto 1977; Foster 1978; Keller 1978; Nelson 1978; Eisinger 1982; Kraus 2001). The burden of representation is more debilitating for black mayors than it is for white mayors. Because cities cannot afford to pursue redistributive policies, black mayors face the challenge of balancing the expectations of their
constituents (which often means redistributive policies for this low-income population) with the reality that their city typically lacks the resources to adequately provide education, housing, public health, and welfare (Peterson 1981). Black descriptive representatives who do act to address the needs of their poor constituents usually pay an electoral cost. Thompson (2005) describes the cost that former mayor David Dinkins paid in New York City:

The black civic organizations that helped elect Dinkins pressured him to be accountable to his largely low-income constituents. He did so by challenging the conservative policy orientation of the city council, by creating a civic coalition to organize community residents and to run candidates against council opponents, and by taking creative administrative steps to organize poor black voters. These moves led to a conservative white backlash and to sharp debates over the legitimacy of ideological frames that demonize poor blacks and Latinos. A profound racial divide persisted in the city long after Dinkins’ loss to Rudolph Giuliani in his reelection bid in 1993 (p. x).

As a result, black mayors are typically unable to fill promises made to black constituents during the election campaigns, or they fail to even promise representation and perpetuate a governing system that ignores the interests of black constituents (which is particularly contrary to the principles of representation given that blacks are often the majority of the electorate in these cities).

Some scholars warn, however, that descriptive representatives never even set out to fulfill these promises in the first place. The problem is that support for black electoral candidates is most often concentrated in the poor segment of the black population; black elected officials portend to equalize the system and recognize the need for resources concentrated in the poorest areas of town. But the poor often lack the resources and
political knowledge to mobilize based on these interests and, without the presence of an organized contingent of black organizations and leaders who advocate for the black poor, accountability to the black poor could easily be dismissed by black officials as an empty threat. In Atlanta, black leaders were able to advance conservative policies that did not benefit the poor because the city’s black poor lacked the organization and resources to hold black officials accountable (Stone 1989). In Baltimore, Kurt Schmoke was supported by black voters because of his promises of school reform, but in office, this reform actually meant conservative measures like school privatization; only because of a network of black political organizations were Schmoke’s conservative efforts blocked (Orr 1999). Adolph Reed (1999) contends that black elected officials were unable to meet the needs of the black poor because they were actually meeting the needs of the black middle-class and other upper-strata residents through a corporate-centered, “urban regime” strategy.

The new black elite’s political capacity, however, presumed acceptance of overarching programmatic frameworks and priorities for governance and administration—a larger system of political rationality—defined by the pro-growth, pro-business interests that reproduce entrenched patterns of racialized inequality. These commitments constrain elite responsiveness to “grassroots” concerns and initiatives, typically by inducing elites to convert those concerns into forms that fit them into—or at least pose no threat to—the imperatives of those larger pro-business, pro-growth priorities (p. 5).

In other words, the class-based interests of these officials and their middle-class constituents overrode claims for representation by the black poor based on shared group identity. In some cases, black representatives pandered to the black electorate based on shared racial identity, while advocating policies that advanced the interests of the white business community at the expense of the black electorate.
With greater interest in municipal government, greater participation in local politics, and the presence of sympathetic officials, blacks are able to set the local political agenda and reap the benefits of political incorporation. In addition to descriptive representation as mayors and elected officials on city councils and school boards (Hula and Jackson-Elmoore 2001; Marschall and Ruhil 2006), the benefits of political incorporation include minority appointments to commissions (Browning et al. 1984); inclusion in biracial or multiracial coalitions (Marschall and Ruhil 2006); increased black employment in the municipal or school workforce (Browning et al. 1984; Haynes 2001; Behr 2002; Johnson 2002); increased responsiveness to minority concerns through welfare expenditures and expanded city services (Karnig and Welch 1980; Pelissero et al. 2000; Haynes 2001); redistribution of government expenditures, public services, minority business development and educational policies to blacks (Browning et al. 1984; Gilliam 1996); school integration and policies that target black student achievement (Haynes 2001; Johnson 2002); police reforms (Browning et al. 1984); programs to expand home ownership and subsidized housing (Haynes 2001); and a “black space” marked by social solidarity, community identity, and common history (Haynes 2001). Marschall and Ruhil (2007) add that the benefits of black political incorporation are not just material. Blacks exhibit more positive evaluations of government services, policies, and living conditions when they have black representation.
2.4 From Elitism to Pluralism

At the core of political incorporation theory is a reshuffling of the locus of power in cities. Before the development of political incorporation theory, the elitist and pluralist schools of theory in political science undertook the need to recognize where power lies in communities. In short, political incorporation theory suggests that cities traditionally act within an elitist framework, but that it is pluralism that will allow minority groups to gain entrée into local politics.

The elitist school says that power and decision-making in cities is controlled by a small group of individuals—typically restricted to business owners, who have economic power, and civic leaders, who have governing power. Members of this governing inner-circle are connected through tightly controlled networks, and their dominance is embedded in local institutions that, consciously or unconsciously, reinforce their authority. Whereas residents believe that the business of the city is controlled by their elected officials, elitism suggests that, behind the scenes, the interests of the city are determined by this small circle of local elites. Elected officials, whether within this circle or not, are merely present to carry out the imperative of these elites; they are likely to support business elites if they advocate for a policy agenda, but even if they oppose this imperative, they do not have sufficient power to counteract elite control. What makes elite theory groundbreaking is that this small circle is not just involved with major development projects in the city; their influence over city affairs runs from these major projects down to routine decision-making.
One of the most central works from the elite school is Floyd Hunter’s (1963) *Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers*. In this case study of Atlanta, Hunter describes how decisions were made in the city with a focus on the interests of the business and civic elite, rather than the interests of the city’s residents. In Atlanta (and other cities), elitism was about control—the ability for elites to control the content of the local agenda, control the governing actions of local officials, and control the masses by demonstrating their leadership power. In a later study of Atlanta, Clarence Stone (2008) explains: “Mayors and other public officials managed conflict, timed proposals, and shaped issues in a way that was to the advantage of the city’s business community. [If] one is to fully understand the scope and nature of the urban democracy, one must come to grips with the propensity of elected officials to be drawn into a governing arrangement with members of the upper strata, especially the business community.” (p. 16).

There are two key groups in the real governing coalition, according to elite theory. First, business elites enter the governing coalition because they successfully frame their corporate interests in a way that aligns them with the interests of the city. City officials buy into this because they believe the economic health and development of their city depends upon appeasing these corporate interests. This is typically done by bringing business elites into the governing coalition (Peterson 1981). As they are drawn into the governing coalition, business leaders are able to control decision-making as elected officials continually seek to appease them and maintain their business within the city. Elitism never truly operates upon the interests of the city—corporate elites work to fulfill the needs of their businesses and elected officials appease them in exchange for campaign
contributions and other financial perks. Soon, business leaders are able to stretch their “interests” into additional areas—for example, the schools available to the children of their employees, the roads upon which they travel, the development of other businesses, recreation and entertainment opportunities in the city—and they are able to control local politics far beyond initially necessary.

Elected officials are the second members within the elitist governing coalition. Because these coalitions are likely to “get things done” and because of the support of business elites, elected officials within the coalition are often able to gain reelection by displaying the productivity of the governing coalition. This gives elected officials significant support among the electorate, and the electorate’s beliefs about the successes of the governing coalition allows its power to be continually reinforced. But there is a hierarchy within elitism and, according to Hunter (1963), business elites always maintain an upper-hand over civic leaders because they have unparalleled access to financial resources that allow them to control elected officials. Because the ruling elites are typically wealthy and powerful, elite control fails to recognize the interests of disenfranchised groups, like blacks.

Cities governed in the elite tradition are usually biased against minority residents. There are rarely minority members within the elite governing coalition, the interests of minority groups are rarely represented within these coalitions, and minority groups typically lack the power and influence to call the attention of the governing coalition to their interests (Hero 1992). Racial disparities in socioeconomic status and inequities in the distribution of resources means that minority groups are unable to “buy into” the
governing coalition. Simply stated, money is power in the elitism school, and for the upper-classes, money is available in many spheres, flexible, and seemingly endless (Dahl 1982). Clarence Stone (2008) explains the undue influence of the upper-classes in local politics:

> Once the highly visible election campaign is over, officials display a marked preference for involving upper-strata interests in planning and formulating policy proposals. For instance, a reanalysis of 32 case studies found that business contacts began earlier and took a more intimate (low-visibility) form that did the contacts of other groups with these same public officials. Coalition formation in governing, especially the early and low-visibility phase of consultation and support-building, thus tends to have a class character not evident in other phases of politics. In a similar vein, there are indications that mayors elected with strong lower-strata support nevertheless feel constrained to form policy alliances with business interests. Officials regardless of electoral base appear to be drawn by the unequal distribution of material, organizational, and cultural resources to favor working closely and intimately with the upper strata. (p. 50).

Business elites and their upper-class constituents often have the money to influence political activities and accomplish certain activities that adhere to their interests within the city, and the concentration of wealth within the upper-classes means that they have enough money to essentially outbid the interests of other groups. The political advantage of upper-class groups—in terms of money and governing power—is often insurmountable for racial/ethnic minorities.

While much of the debate in the political science literature involves whether cities are in fact led in the tradition of elitism or in pluralism, pluralism represents what how

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7 Indeed, Dahl (1961) presents his study of pluralism in New Haven, Connecticut to demonstrate that all cities are not ruled through an elitist framework. Dahl points to several different groups that were influential in local politics to demonstrate that local politics is controlled through many different networks. These groups often have competing interests, and policies are a reflection of which groups have dominant influence in the sphere of a particular policy.
scholars of political incorporation think that cities ought to be governed\textsuperscript{8,9}. Pluralism differs from elitism in a number of key ways. First, elitism reflects a closed political system, but pluralism accounts for an open system in which all have the chance to meaningfully influence local politics. Pluralism suggests that power is concentrated within a number of local networks, and these networks can include racial/ethnic minorities. Any of these networks can influence local decision-making given the right strategy, the optimal use of resources, and the ability to obtain broad-based support for their agenda. Given the level playing field in pluralist cities, this strategy is key. While there may be financial resource disparities among these groups, there are a number of other resources that can compensate for it—such as numerical strength, sympathetic elected officials, existing policies, and relationships with community institutions and local businesses. Any of these resources can be used to give a group influence in particular areas of local decision-making.

Pluralism recognizes that minority groups should have access to local decision-making structures and, with this foundation, political incorporation secures power in local government. Access does not equal power, but in a truly pluralist government, this should not matter. There is no concentration of power in particular networks, so there should be no concern about one group having undue influence at the expense of others. All groups have access to power, and they participate in an equal struggle for power and

\textsuperscript{8} Still, some offer critiques of pluralism and argue that it is not the ideal governing arrangement (particularly for racial ethnic minorities) that Dahl (1961) suggests.

\textsuperscript{9} Adolph Reed (1999) argues that elitism is reality and pluralism is still a dream for blacks: “By the mid-1970s, therefore, the contours of what would be the new regime of race relations management in American politics were already clearly delineated in Atlanta. The imagery of populist, participatory action that had grounded black radical discourse lost its critical power in a context in which popular participation collapsed into ratification of elite-driven agendas” (p. 4).
influence. Given overlapping interests among groups in a city, groups should form coalitions to realize their common interests. This coalition-building across groups and across issues increasingly diminishes the chance for one particular group to dominate local decision-making (Banfield and Wilson 1966; Dahl 1982). Also because of the multiplicity of issues of interest in a city a group that has failed to achieve influence in one particular area is sure to gain influence in another. Once a group attains influence, the effect is cumulative, and they can continue to build upon it in other areas. The appeal of pluralism is that it is rooted in fairness, equality, inclusion, and the diversity of groups and interests in a given city. All groups have equal access to the political arena, and their success is completely dependent upon their ability to develop the best strategy to gain power and influence.

Some scholars like Omi and Winant (1994) and Hero (1992) contend that pluralism does not take into account a history of political exclusion of racial/ethnic minorities that is not easily overcome with a “level playing field.” The unique realities of these groups, and a history of steadfast commitment to their exclusion, means that racial/ethnic minorities do not participate in networks equal to majority groups. They suggest that there is likely no strategy that is innovative enough nor a use of resources that is crafty enough to overcome local political systems that are tipped to advantage majority groups. This literature explains that the reality is that racial/ethnic minority groups do indeed have fewer resources and little power to convince a previously exclusionary system to finally recognize their demands (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Piven and Cloward 1979; McAdam 1982).
The political incorporation literature concludes that while racial/ethnic minority groups are able to build group cohesion, develop leaders, creatively manipulate resources, and actively participate in politics, these are all internal factors that do not overcome the oppositional power of external factors that are out of their control. This dissertation suggests that, while minority groups cannot completely overcome oppositional powers within the sociopolitical context, political incorporation theory must still emphasize [in the same vein as Carmichael and Hamilton (1967)] that a high degree of coalescing must happen within minority communities in order to then overcome barriers within the sociopolitical context.
3. CASE STUDIES AND RESEARCH METHODS

The results-oriented focus of the political incorporation literature largely dictates the cases this literature studies and the methods it employs. For example, when the current literature focuses on political leadership as a component of political incorporation, it typically uses central city cases and historical analyses to account for the rise of black political power. Or, when this literature examines the attitudinal effects of black political incorporation, it usually engages large survey data sets that measure political trust and efficacy in cities where blacks have come to power. There are few studies that use qualitative methods to study political incorporation, but those that do usually provide a comprehensive, historical analysis that is focused on the results of political incorporation (for examples, see Orr 1999; Haynes 2001; Johnson 2002).

3.1 Overview of Research Plan

The design of this research is a result of intentional decisions that I made based on knowledge acquired from the methodological literature and my initial studies of the histories of Evanston and Waukegan. I developed a research plan that flowed from the theoretical framework (Marshall and Rossman 1989)—with a focus on describing the sociopolitical context and explaining the path to incorporation—and provided data to respond to the questions that guide this research. I employed multimethod research in order to maximize the possibilities that I thoroughly and accurately reconstructed the
sociopolitical context of each city and their respective paths to incorporation. These methods include:

- Overall, qualitative methods allowed me to uncover the reasons that residents constructed to account for incorporation or exclusion. This perspective from the “front lines,” rather than my own interpretation from historical documents, created an authentic picture of black politics in the research sites and helped secure the validity of my findings (Maxwell 1996). Further, by allowing participants to independently relay their perspectives, their dialogue confirmed that sociopolitical context was a valid and valuable causal force in the study of political incorporation.

- Similarly, open-ended, in-depth interviews allowed residents to lay the terrain of their city without prejudice. When asked to describe struggles for black political power in their city, participants were open to discuss events that they judged most pivotal and to create the themes and categories of analysis that best described the city to them. After the focus groups, these interviews were used to help confirm the actors and events that I found most influential.

- Elite interviews were used to provide an insider, City Hall perspective. They were helpful in revealing the spoken and unspoken strategy of City Hall. Additionally, they provided a unique perspective that reconciled the demands presented by residents with the response that was given by the local government. They often held a perspective that residents lacked.

- Focus groups facilitated a dialogue between residents that resurrected their memory, discussed particular events at length, challenged interpretations offered in historical documents, and with the wisdom of time, offered a rich explanation of each city’s path to incorporation. Focus groups were particularly helpful for ensuring the accuracy of the research, still honoring individual perspectives but ensuring the facts and varied perspectives were accurately described.

- Questionnaires were used to uncover attitudes and beliefs and measure how much they were held in common across each city. Questionnaires at the beginning of each focus group provided an additional data source and a way to gain knowledge from each participant despite their level of participation in each focus group.

- Finally, historical documents were used to account for the events and individuals who shaped the path to incorporation. Historical documents were used both to provide examples that helped explain the cases of Evanston and Waukegan, and they were used to complement data gathered during focus groups and interviews.
The qualitative strategy of the study fits within the research traditions of urban politics and black politics. Using the voice of communities and presenting the research through their voice is central to “truth-telling” in these areas of study. I employed a multimethod strategy to ensure this “truth-telling” and to accurately construct the path to political incorporation, correctly assert the significance of sociopolitical context, and to be able to precisely explain the effects of the context on the phenomena of incorporation and exclusion.

Overall, this dissertation serves as an example of explanatory research. This research centrally studies the phenomena of black political incorporation and black political exclusion. Instead of centrally engaging in historical research as much of the current literature exploring the phenomena of incorporation and exclusion does, this dissertation seeks to explain how Evanston and Waukegan arrived at these respective outcomes. As this chapter outlines, this research seeks to make a case for the forces that lead to incorporation and exclusion. Thus, my definition of sociopolitical context includes three plausible causal forces—civic fabric, political culture and leadership, and racial dynamics—that I believe may shape the phenomena of incorporation and exclusion.

To fully account for the effect of these three causal forces on the phenomena across decades of agitation for incorporation, I paid particular attention to the multiplicity of events and the diversity of beliefs that were related to black politics in Evanston and Waukegan. Thus, the basis for the conclusions that this research draws stems from examples from each city and dialogue with and between residents. Through
extensive and less extensive examples and across a variety of sectors of city life, this research seeks to reconstruct the causal networks shaping incorporation and exclusion (Marshall and Rossman 1989). Further, these examples collective demonstrate that the sociopolitical context envelopes the path to incorporation and continually and consistently shape the phenomena that this research studies.

Also, where appropriate, this research seeks to draw connections across the causal forces of the civic fabric, political culture and leadership, and racial dynamics. This dissertation seeks to avoid linearity and demonstrate that there are interaction effects between the forces to create a dynamic sociopolitical context. Finally, to optimize the explanatory power of this research, the descriptions of the civic fabric, political culture and leadership, and racial dynamics rely heavily on the current literature, in addition to events and the attitudes and beliefs of residents. I find that the literature related to the causal forces verifies the value of these events to a generalized theory of political incorporation. In sum, I sought to recount the events, beliefs, and attitudes that shape the sociopolitical context and explain how these forces shape the outcomes of incorporation and exclusion.

My research strategy was to use a comparative multisite case study. I presumed that we could not fully understand the pathway to incorporation by solely examining the positive case. We can only confirm the causal forces that do indeed facilitate incorporation if we see that these forces are absent in cities that have resulted in exclusion. I found it important to select two geographically and demographically similar case sites in order to isolate the effects of these causal forces. I also found it important to
select case sites that were representative of other cases in the larger class of cities and suburbs in order to present a theory that could be applicable to this larger class rather than to Evanston and Waukegan alone. In other words, I examine Evanston and Waukegan as a sample of cities that have experienced incorporation or exclusion. With each example, this dissertation seeks to draw back from the particularities of place to how these examples represent larger, significant issues (Marshall and Rossman 1989). For example, the extensive discussion of church activism in Evanston and church quietism in Waukegan seeks to specifically describe how activist churches contributed to a thick civic fabric that nurtured incorporation in Evanston and how quietist churches contributed to a thin civic fabric that hindered incorporation in Waukegan. But these examples also seek to make a broader point—a key part of a civic fabric is the presence of a number of organizations that make political incorporation part of their mission. These examples should be viewed as broader theories about the causal factors that affect incorporation, and each chapter seeks to outline these broader theories that result from the examples.

I engaged in a specific strategy to select the sites for this research. I initially chose to use suburban cases over central city cases. As explained earlier, there is little variability in central city cases, especially within black communities and even across geographic regions. I presumed that if I wanted to illuminate context as a causal force that I would need to select the class of cities that exhibit high variability in their contexts, which is the suburban class. Thus, this research is not specifically about black suburban
political incorporation, and I draw conclusions and suggestions for future research that apply to both the suburban and central city case\textsuperscript{10}.

Next, I selected the Chicago metropolitan region as the broader research site. Because I intended to select cities with long histories of black residence in order to capture an extended path to incorporation (rather than more recent black suburbs in which the path to incorporation began in the 1980s and 1990s), I thought that Chicago’s receipt of significant numbers of blacks during the great migrations would benefit research that seeks to adopt an historical perspective. I then used the Encyclopedia of Chicago and the U.S. Census to develop a list of Chicago suburbs and the size of their black populations since the earliest Census recordings. Many of these cities had a lack of black residents or unsustained spurts of black residence; these cities were eliminated. A number of suburbs had large black populations but, again, these were more recent, and these cities were eliminated as well.

The Chicago suburbs with the longest standing black populations were Aurora, Batavia, Broadview, Chicago Heights, Elgin, Evanston, Forest Park, Harvey, Joliet, Maywood, North Chicago, Phoenix, Summit, and Waukegan. I then examined demographic and socioeconomic data on each city, read local histories from newspapers, and examined the racial composition of the current government in order to label each

\textsuperscript{10}I do not use the suburban case to propose that there are differences in political incorporation between city and suburb. In fact, I would argue quite the opposite. By selecting two suburbs, my research demonstrates that suburbs are valid cases for the study of political incorporation. An important narrative that the literature misses is that the period of black migration to suburbs mirrors that of central cities, with the first wave of black suburbanization happening in 1910. Thus, many of the historical dynamics that affected the allocation of black political power in central cities are also seen in suburbs. The 2010 Census revealed that the majority of blacks in large metropolitan areas live in the suburbs, not the central city. This places this dissertation on the cutting edge of underdeveloped studies of black politics in suburbs alongside the central city case.
city as an “incorporation” city or an “exclusion” city. I also gauged which cities had the most primary and secondary source material available in order to facilitate a detailed analysis; some cities, like Joliet and Waukegan, lend themselves to an extensive historical analysis, while there was a dearth of information on cities like Batavia and Phoenix. I finally selected Evanston and Waukegan as two cities with extensively recorded outcomes, demographically comparable black populations, and different phenomena of incorporation in Evanston and exclusion in Waukegan. To be sure, there are differences between these cities, but the degree of their similarities helps illuminate forces like those in the sociopolitical context and limit the impact of socioeconomic forces like class differences.

The methodology for this dissertation is designed under the premise that a context-oriented theory of political incorporation necessitates qualitative methods. I found qualitative methods to be most appropriate for studying the phenomena of political incorporation and exclusion. The central paradigm in qualitative research is that individuals assign meanings to phenomena as they live in their worlds, and qualitative researchers study how people interpret their lived experiences, describe their worlds, and give meaning to their experiences. I primarily chose qualitative methods because qualitative methods allow the researcher to explain phenomena under study using the meanings that those most close to the phenomena ascribe to them. Qualitative methods allow the research to understand how people ascribe meanings and make sense of their world and their experiences in it. This is important because this research is able to provide interpretations of the path to political incorporation from those who directly
participated in it. In order to fully reconstruct the path to political incorporation in Evanston and Waukegan, qualitative research allows a multi-method approach that uses many tools to fully explain the phenomena in question. This chapter fully describes the tools undertaken in this research. Because this research began with little knowledge of the path to political incorporation in Evanston and Waukegan, except for the outcomes, this research was exploratory, and qualitative methods worked to its benefit. Through the participants, qualitative researchers are exposed to multiple, emergent themes, and through an interactive approach in which the researcher can probe, clarify, and verify, the researcher is able to cull dominant themes from the data. A case study is an approach to conducting qualitative research, and the case study approach allowed this dissertation to explain the effect of context on the path that cities take to incorporation.

I find qualitative researcher to be a particularly helpful strategy because context is a core value in qualitative research. Qualitative research presumes that individuals develop meaning of their world from not only their own knowledge but also the context of their environment. By conducting research in natural settings—for example, in the monthly meetings of civil rights organizations—this research benefited from engaging participants in a discussion of incorporation in the very context in which they pursued incorporation. The result was a natural flow of ideas, revelation of tensions and controversies, and a collective perspective to reconstruct the role of the organization in mobilizing for incorporation. Qualitative research is an interactive approach that allows for the interpretation of the participants, rather than the interpretations of the researcher in quantitative approaches. As a researcher, I was able to process data as I collected it,
weighing meanings against data I already collected, obtaining background information and alternative explanations of secondary sources, and seeking a consensus that the path that I was reconstructing was accurate. My goal was not for participants to share interpretations of events—indeed, the variation in interpretations helped reveal when multiple strategies along the path converged or diverged. But my goal was to accurately describe decades of history, and I sought consensus from participants to ensure that their collective memories of particular events aligned. Finally, given the lack of knowledge on the effect of sociopolitical context on the path to incorporation, I used inductive data analysis to determine the broad themes that might apply to Evanston, Waukegan, and other cities (Elo and Kyngas 2007).

The research plan used a snowball sampling approach. I began by seeking to contact individuals in Evanston and Waukegan from a list of local actors that I developed from newspaper accounts in each city. A few of these actors were already known to me or connected to me through mutual acquaintances. I was able to make contact with others via their telephone book listing, and some I was unable to make contact with. I informed them of the study during my initial contact, hoping to both garner their interest in a preliminary interview and willingness to offer the names and phone numbers of other residents so I could build a list of potential participants. The research plan guaranteed participants’ privacy by offering them the ability to only participate in one-on-one interviews rather than larger focus group sessions and assigning aliases to participants. Without any incentives, some participants were unwilling to publicly air sentiments about black politics in their city, but the offer of anonymity eased their concerns about
being exposed for the beliefs they closely held about many individuals and organizations in the city. It was important for me to enter my interactions with participants with the principal of neutrality. I failed to exercise judgments of Evanston and Waukegan, and I openly accepted the interpretations of participants in the respect of “every answer is correct.” I found that participants who were receptive to the research were able to galvanize new participants. Participants in both Evanston and Waukegan commented that this research benefited them by providing them with a setting to reflect on struggles for incorporation and learn from their successes and mistakes with hindsight.

I conducted preliminary in-person, in-depth interviews with the first four “key players” in each city who were willing to participate. These interviews were quite open-ended and allowed the interviewee to become acclimated with my research style and trust my knowledge about black politics in their city and in general. These interviews helped reveal themes that would be discussed during future research steps. They also gave me access to one participant’s extensive personal archival collection of Waukegan history. In sum, the purpose of the brief preliminary interviews was to introduce myself and my research style to participants, gain a list of recommended participants, generate excitement about discussing black politics in each city, pilot predetermined focus group topics, and ascertain new focus group and interview topics.

Perhaps the most challenging part of the research plan was focus groups conducted in Evanston and Waukegan. From my analysis of historical documents in both cities, as well as the findings of the black politics and urban politics literatures, I determined that there were five key categories of actors: activists, educators, civil rights
organization members, ordinary residents, and political elites. My intention was that all
actors in Evanston and Waukegan would either specifically fit in the categories of
activists, educators, and civil rights organizations, which I found to be particularly
influential on the path to political incorporation, and, if not, they could participate as
residents. To encourage their full participation, I reserved my interactions with political
elites to interviews, and I invited activists, educators, civil rights organization members,
and ordinary residents to participate in focus groups. I allowed a maximum of seven
people to participate in each focus group, yielding a potential maximum of 56
participants. A total of 47 people participated in the focus groups. I helped encourage
participation by holding focus groups during organization meeting times or arranging
focus groups after school district professional development sessions for educators.
Though I was unable to hold continuous focus groups until I reached a point of
saturation, I was able to judge the success of the focus groups after they were complete. I
determined that the, by the end of each focus group session, each group began to
reiterate topics that had been discussed earlier in the section. Additionally, the focus
groups collectively discussed the vast majority of events that dominated my historical
research in each city. I also determined that the focus groups discussed common themes
and events, and this point of consensus around important events (along with the various
perspectives on these events) was equally important to me as the saturation point.

Finally, I conducted post-group interviews with eight participants who had not
participated in the pre-focus group interviews. I requested the participation of those who
had been most vocal in their focus group session. Post-focus group interviews were used
to clarify and elaborate on topics discussed during the focus group. Additionally, I interviewed three current and former political officials in each city.

I collected all data via audio recordings and note-taking. I attempted to develop an unintrusive data collection strategy in order to avoid distraction away from the phenomena being discussed and to encourage the full participation of all participants. With transcriptions from the interviews and focus groups, I first labeled the dialogue whether it applied to the causal forces of the civic fabric, political culture and leadership, or racial dynamics. In some cases, the dialogue fit in more than one category. I did the same with my notes from the historical document analysis and my tabulation of results from the questionnaire. I then conducted a content analysis within each of these causal forces, labeling the common categories and themes and denoting patterns. These themes formed the basis for the structure and content of each chapter.

This chapter provides the model that this dissertation uses to develop a context-oriented theory of political incorporation, including the hypotheses that this research tests and the methods used to accurately assess the impact of sociopolitical context on incorporation efforts. The next sections provide a more detailed accounting of the research plan. The first section of this chapter presents how this research seeks to revise the current model of political incorporation that was presented in Chapter 1. The second section presents the hypotheses, which stem from the proposed revision of the current incorporation model. This research has been designed to test these hypotheses and determine which fit within a revised incorporation model. The third section of this chapter details the research design, including the research methods that were used and
the data that were collected to explain similarities and differences in the political incorporation processes in Evanston and Waukegan. The fourth section of this chapter provides an overview of the cases used in this research, Evanston and Waukegan, and explains the value of the suburban case to political incorporation research.

In short, this dissertation analyzes the path to political incorporation in Evanston and Waukegan using primary and secondary sources and focus groups and interviews with residents, educators, activists, civic organization members and political elites. These methods are used to detail the impact of the causal forces of the civic fabric, political leadership, and racial dynamics—put together, the sociopolitical context—on the path to political incorporation.

3.2 **Revising the Political Incorporation Model**

This dissertation focuses on the process of political incorporation—whether incorporation is inevitable for cities with significant black populations and how the local sociopolitical context causes some cities to achieve incorporation while other cities do not. The central purpose of this research is to develop a model of political incorporation and therefore, necessarily, a focus on the process of incorporation rather than the results.

The black political incorporation literature describes a political climate in which blacks maintained significant leadership positions, meaningful influence over local policymaking, and direct influence over the quality of life among the black electorate. But, political incorporation does not arrive when the first black mayor does. Instead, political incorporation is a process, and a context-oriented theory accounts for many
moments when black successively demonstrated consistent influence in the key policymaking functions of the city.

This study seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the effects of sociopolitical context on political incorporation and, therefore, this study pays attention to the local social and historical factors that impact incorporation. It is important to note that we should understand how these factors play out both within black communities and in relation to other communities in the city. The model of political incorporation proposed by this dissertation considers several variables, outlined in Table IV.

This list demonstrates that the depth of the sociopolitical context has greater bearing on whether incorporation is achieved than the size of the black population or the socioeconomic status of the black population—the two dominant variables in the political incorporation literature. In examining the degree of political incorporation in Evanston and Waukegan, the political incorporation model does not take into account, as strongly as the current literature, black electoral strength based on group demographic factors and socioeconomic resources. Instead, this model seeks to detail the more complex processes within the black community that facilitate or hinder black political incorporation. Further, the current political incorporation model treats group demographic factors and socioeconomic resources as inert factors that indirectly shape the political sphere and affect political incorporation by proxy. The model of political incorporation presented in this dissertation treats political incorporation as an active process that is directly impacted by the factors outlined above. In other words, these factors do not just shape the environment in which political incorporation independently
happens; instead, these factors have a direct, measurable impact that determines the path to political incorporation.

Table IV. Key Factors in the Model of Political Incorporation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>The demographic makeup of all residents and, in particular, black residents. This includes education, income, occupation, etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group Organizational Resources</td>
<td>The presence of local organizations whose efforts work toward incorporation and who maintain the resources to organize and advance a variety of incorporation efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Trust</td>
<td>High levels of political trust across racial lines and high levels of political efficacy amongst members of the black community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Political Culture</td>
<td>The presence of a liberal political culture that expressly embraces and values political equality, particularly along racial lines, including local white support for racial equality and civil rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition-Building</td>
<td>The ability for blacks to form successful electoral and governing coalitions within the black community and to maintain key positions in interracial political coalitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Fabric</td>
<td>Opportunities for civic engagement and avenues for cooperation and collaboration, particularly in multiracial settings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Organization</td>
<td>The organization of the black community and the ability to organize formal efforts that focus black attention on local issues as well as issue-oriented temporary organizations with the fluidity to demand governmental responsiveness when appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Leadership</td>
<td>The presence of political leadership that embraces, encourages, and cultivates black political incorporation. The presence of descriptive representatives is valuable as long as they are active participants in the incorporation process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3 Research Design

This dissertation uses qualitative methods, in particular a case study approach, to evaluate the process of political incorporation. A case study is a detailed, comprehensive examination of a social phenomenon through qualitative methods (Feagin et al. 1991). The case study approach is an accepted and widely used research method in the social sciences and in political science in particular. This research will use the comparative case study framework in contrasting the paths to political incorporation in Evanston and Waukegan. By starting with these cases and their known outcomes and then moving backward to understand the causes of these outcomes, this dissertation research will adopt a causes-of-effects approach (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). Further, the research will adopt the framework of case study research: it will study a single social phenomenon, black political incorporation, by examining a variety of causally relevant factors. Through the causes-of-effects approach, this research seeks to understand the factors that are sufficient for producing the effects of political incorporation.

Orum, Feagin, and Sjoberg (1991) provide a typology of case studies, and this research in part will exemplify one of these types: a social history of a group or collectivity. This research will uncover the past experience of blacks in Evanston and Waukegan and seek to elicit observations and perceptions that can elucidate the experience of blacks in other similar cities. Orum, Feagin, and Sjoberg (1991) further outline the qualities of a good case study, and each of these qualities is addressed in this research.
3.3.1 Reconstructing Past Events

This dissertation uses both primary and secondary accounts of Evanston and Waukegan history to reconstruct the process of political incorporation in each city. Because Evanston and Waukegan were early suburbs, they have long, well-documented histories. Many political events in both cities have been covered by Chicago and suburban media. The Chicago Tribune began covering the history of Evanston in 1898 and Waukegan in 1902. Though coverage of local black affairs in the newspaper is not as extensive, coverage of black affairs in Evanston began in 1903 and in Waukegan in 1915. In some cases, the Chicago Defender provides coverage specifically about black life in each city. The content of these media are used to provide a framework for their respective local histories.

But media accounts cannot tell the entire story. Interviews and focus groups with residents, educators, activists, local civil rights organization members, and current and former political elites help interpret these local histories, reconstruct the sociopolitical context in which these histories unfolded, and understand the events that shaped the path to incorporation. The data gathered from the focus groups and interviews will allow a real-life reconstruction of these events. Together, data gathered from the two methods also allow this research to recreate the path as residents themselves understand and recall it.

In order to reconstruct the past in each city, this research begins by collecting historical data and documents and examining secondary sources. Historical data will
provide background knowledge about each case. Census data and other statistical data will be used to describe each case, including demographic changes in the population. Newspapers, including Waukegan’s News-Sun, Evanston Review, Chicago Tribune, and Chicago Sun-Times, periodicals, books, and manuscripts help reconstruct the history of each case and establish the critical events along the path to incorporation. This research will also seek primary sources of information. These may include advertisements for marches during the Civil Rights era, internal memos from their organization, local planning or policy documents that are produced by the city, or informational booklets produced by local historical societies (Shorefront and the Evanston Historical Society in Evanston and the Waukegan Historical Society). The text of these sources, in addition to the historical data, will provide background knowledge of people and events that will help frame participants’ knowledge of people and events.

3.3.2 Understanding Social Interactions and Networks

Orum, Feagin, and Sjoberg (1991) explain that a case study provides a holistic, comprehensive view of the cases by gathering data on the social interactions and networks in each case. These interactions and networks help reveal the beliefs that were supportive or unsupportive of incorporation and the decisions that facilitated or hindered incorporation. They elaborate that a good case study provides a comprehensive view of actors’ motives that led to the particular outcomes in each case.

This dissertation uses three methods—semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and surveys—in order to understand the social networks that were formed along the path
to incorporation, as well as the decisions and motives that guided this path. Interviews and focus groups were conducted with five groups of actors in each city: residents, educators, activists, local civil rights organization members, and political officials. The interviews and focus groups helped discern information about the people involved in the incorporation process, the actual process that served to redistribute political power to blacks, as well as to reconstruct the sociopolitical context in which this process unfolded. In short, these research participants give meaning to local events. Interviews and focus groups are also used to validate data collected through primary and secondary sources and vice versa.

To recruit research participants, I employed a number of methods. During my preliminary research in Evanston and Waukegan, I developed a list of important actors from newspaper and other historical accounts of black politics in Evanston. When the study commenced, I reached out to these actors through their telephone book listing or through individuals who maintained contact with these important actors. When I made contact with these actors, I solicited their interest in the study and I asked them if they knew how to contact other actors on the list, as well as to recommend other members of their community to participate in the research study. In most cases, these individuals agreed to participate in the study, and the study began with preliminary interviews with them. Once enough participants were accrued using snowball sampling, I held four focus groups in each city. A focus group methodology was used to help develop a rich collective memory and enhance the reliability of data collected in secondary sources and in interviews. Table V details selected focus group questions. First, I used pre-focus
group interviews to help elicit additional focus group participants, as well as post-focus group interviews to gather additional information about events and topics that were discussed during the focus group. Interviews were also separately conducted with key community leaders and business officials who did not want to be included in a focus group session.

Focus groups use interviewing techniques in a group environment to elicit more information than in individual interviews and that can be validated in a group setting. Individual interviews provide a more inviting setting for participants. Participants help each other remember past events and validate the particularities of these events, the group encourages the expression and discussion of ideas, and all members of the group are encouraged to participate (Frey and Fontana 1993). When focus groups consist of individuals familiar with each other or with similar backgrounds or interests, then the barriers that might prevent people unfamiliar with each other from full participation are eradicated. Channels of communication are open, and participants can voice their views and opinions in a trusting atmosphere that is free from concerns about retribution or broken confidentiality (Morgan and Krueger 1993). Focus groups are particularly helpful because they encourage individuals to discuss issues that are complex and controversial, as well as events in which consensus is needed in understanding precipitating factors.

Focus group participants also completed a survey prior to the beginning of the focus group. This survey, modeled after the 1968 Detroit Area Study on political
# Table V. Focus Group Topics and Sample Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introductory Questions</th>
<th>Reasons for Living in [City]</th>
<th>Local Racial Climate</th>
<th>Local History</th>
<th>Civic Fabric</th>
<th>Political Leadership</th>
<th>Ideal City Exercise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How long have you lived in [city]?</td>
<td>When did your family first move to [city]? What made them move here?</td>
<td>How welcoming do you think [city] is for blacks?</td>
<td>What roles have blacks played in the history of [city]?</td>
<td>Are there organizations or other opportunities for blacks to get involved here?</td>
<td>Who would you say are the black political leaders in [city]? How powerful are they?</td>
<td>Think about an “ideal” city for blacks live in. Now think about [city]. Do you think these words describe [city]. Why or why not?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Describe [city]. What do you think [city] is known as to outsiders?</td>
<td>Where else were you or your family thinking of moving? How are they similar or different?</td>
<td>Have whites supported blacks in [city]?</td>
<td>How important have local politics and government been in the lives of blacks?</td>
<td>Which organizations do you think are most influential? Why?</td>
<td>Have whites or other racial/ethnic groups been supportive of black leadership here?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the things that you like most about living in [city]?</td>
<td>What made you pick [city]?</td>
<td>Would you say [city] is liberal or conservative when it comes to supporting blacks?</td>
<td>Do you think that blacks in [city] have political power?</td>
<td>How do these organizations get involved in local politics?</td>
<td>I would like to discuss one of the past mayors here [Lorraine Morton or Robert Sabonjian]. How would you describe him/her?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>What is the relationship between blacks and Latinos in [city]?</td>
<td>What moments or events, in your opinion, demonstrate that blacks do have political power? Which ones demonstrate that blacks do not have political power?</td>
<td>How have these organizations improved the lives of blacks in [city]?</td>
<td>What relationship did s/he have with local blacks?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Do Latinos support black political power? Do blacks support Latino political power?</td>
<td>Of all the events we have discussed, what do you think has been the single most important events for blacks in [city]?</td>
<td></td>
<td>We often say that mayors have the power to do things for residents—give them jobs, make sure their neighborhoods are clean, and help them get involved in local politics. Did [Mayor's name] do these things for blacks in [city]?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Let’s talk about some defining moments of his/her time as mayor.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
participation, covers three topics: civic and political engagement, racial group identity, and experiences in the city. The survey asked participants about their involvement in local and national organizations focused on the conditions of blacks, as well as local organizations that might influence local decision-making. Participants were asked about their self-efficacy in the city individually and in their organizations. Participants were also asked how proximate their beliefs and opinions are to blacks locally and nationally. Finally, participants will be questioned about any encounters with racial discrimination in their city. The purpose of the survey was to have additional evidence that verifies the outcomes of each city in the process of political incorporation. Focus group participants often err on the side of homogeneity, or the desire to appear in agreement with or similar to other focus group participants. Therefore, the focus group participant survey elicits additional insights that participants may not express in the context of the group.

3.3.3 Locating Patterns

Orum, Feagin, and Sjoberg (1991) further suggest that a good case study is not only able to reconstruct past events, but it is also able to critically interpret these events and discover patterns in the history. The case study is able to account for changes in social life over time. The path that each case takes will follow a pattern, and a good case study is able to outline the pattern—events and their expected outcomes—for each case. Not only does this help uncover the historical dimension of a phenomenon, but it also forms a basis for understanding future events.
The path and patterns of social life, as Orum, Feagin, and Sjoberg (1991) outline, is at the very heart of this research. This research uses data gathered in the first two steps to reconstruct the path that each city took toward incorporation using the three stages presented by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1986). In locating patterns, this research looks at the factors that continually made incremental progress, or the events that repeatedly closed the door, to incorporation. In contrasting the two cases, it was important to examine how the path to incorporation in one case converged or diverged with the other case at particular points in history. The essence of reconstructing social life, locating patterns, and uncovering the historical dimension is finding each case’s path to political incorporation.

3.3.4 Generating Theory

Ultimately, the proposed research seeks to accomplish the final quality of a good case study by generating an innovative theory about political incorporation. This research presents a deeper understanding of political incorporation—one that theorizes about the impact of the sociopolitical context on whether incorporation happens. Perhaps the most innovative contribution of this research is an understanding of the local context that fails to encourage incorporation. Orum, Feagin, and Sjoberg (1991) support that the study of a deviant case, like Waukegan, will provide a greater understanding of how the process of political incorporation works. By using a comparative framework, this research generates a theory that, when applied to other cases, seeks particular patterns in
the paths that cities take toward incorporation. Chapter 7 applies this understanding of the impact of sociopolitical context on political incorporation in three additional cities.

3.4 Selecting the Suburban Case

The current literature illuminates the process of black political incorporation by using central city cases, particularly focusing on the redistribution of political power after blacks concentrated in urban areas at the mid-twentieth century. This literature follows the tendency in the larger black politics literature to trace black political power through a black—urban/white—suburban paradigm. With increasing black outmigration and the proliferation of “black suburbs,” there is a new locus of black power, and many of the struggles for political incorporation are played out in the suburbs. This dissertation does not use the suburban case to propose that there is an inherent difference between political incorporation in central cities and in suburbs. By selecting Evanston and Waukegan, this dissertation demonstrates that suburbs are valid cases for the study of political incorporation, and the suburban case has as much explanatory power as the urban case. There are two main reasons why suburbs like Evanston and Waukegan can contribute significantly to the political incorporation literature.

First, blacks have been moving to metropolitan suburbs in large numbers for several decades. Similar to the concentration of blacks in urban areas, blacks are more likely to live in suburbs with a significant black population (Dawkins 2004; Ascher and Branch-Smith 2005; Hanlon et al. 2006; Clark 2007). In 2000, the average black suburbanite lived in a neighborhood that was 46 percent black (Katz et al. 2005).
Regardless of socioeconomic status, suburban blacks are not likely to move into predominantly white tracts (South and Crowder 1998; McArdle 2002; Lacy 2004; Logan et al. 2004). Thus, the urban model of political incorporation misses suburbs with significant black populations who experience the same struggle for political power.

Second, suburbs (by nature) demonstrate a variability that can serve to highlight the impact of different sociopolitical contexts on the incorporation process. Suburbs have distinct social cultures from the city and even cultures that vary between individual suburbs; they demonstrate highly variable population demographics and degrees of racial separation; they often continue to demonstrate pervasive attitudes about race and class; they are fragmented and have highly variable political structures; they have differing possibilities for political incorporation and different degrees of political incorporation; they differ in the adoption of liberal or conservative policy stances; and they have diverse opportunities for political participation and community leadership. Regardless of the type of suburb, a study of black political incorporation is significant given the high rates of political participation among blacks and the highest rates of political engagement found in suburbia overall (Oliver 2001).

Just as in central cities, lack of incorporation—or highly variable incorporation—may have serious consequences for a growing suburban black population. Political incorporation determines the presence of representation on racially specific issues, the chances for upward mobility, the magnitude of black political participation and the overall racial climate, opportunities for municipal employment, and equally distributed city services and community resources. Thus, this dissertation asserts that contemporary
studies of black political empowerment can successfully apply a traditionally urban analysis to suburbs and expand our understanding of incorporation

While political science has done a phenomenal job of charting black involvement in urban politics since their migration from the South to Northern cities, the literature as a whole insufficiently charts the successive waves of black migration out of the city into the suburbs. Local politics and the black quest for political power continue to be constructed through the lens of urban politics. Even when the suburban black population has increased at the expense of the urban black population, the field of political science has minimized the significance of this demographic change to our understanding of minority political incorporation.

It is important to note that the period of black migration to suburbs mirrors that of central cities and, therefore, many of the historical dynamics that affected the allocation of black political power in central cities are also seen in suburbs. Beginning in 1910, the mass arrival of blacks in Northern metropolitan areas sparked the first wave of black suburbanization. These early black suburbanites arrived from the south and settled at the outskirts of Northern towns. In these more rural areas, they built their own homes, grew gardens and kept livestock, and traveled down unpaved roads. From 1910 to 1940, the number of black suburbanites grew by 365,000, and suburbanites accounted for 15 percent of the metropolitan black population growth (Wiese 2005). During the Second Great Migration from 1940 to 1970, more than five million blacks from the South flooded the North in search of skilled industrial jobs and other employment opportunities. Despite the focus on blacks living and working in the central cities of the North, many
migrants gained employment in suburban industries and as domestics in suburban homes. By 1950, 1.5 million blacks lived in suburbs—20 percent of all metropolitan blacks (Wiese 2000). Towards the end of the first wave of black suburbanization in the 1960s, the quality of life in the black suburb vastly improved. With stable blue collar employment, increased income, and pathways to homeownership like the GI Bill, private developers began to market enclaves of single family homes solely to blacks—among them Hanford Village (Columbus, Ohio), Pontchartrain Park (New Orleans), and Berkely Square (Las Vegas).

The second wave of black suburbanization, from the 1970s to the mid-1990s, ushered in the most substantial acceleration in the growth of the black population in American suburbs. In just the first decade of this period, the number of black suburbanites increased by 1,163,300—a 34 percent increase (Lake and Cutter 1980). Three factors facilitated this outmigration of blacks from the city into the suburbs: precedence, civil rights, and prosperity. The precedence of the first wave of black suburbanization tempered negative reactions to new black suburbanites and provided a space for their arrival. The typical new black suburbanite during the second wave was not a racial pioneer; they moved into spaces already established by the first wave. Of the twenty-five most rapidly growing black suburbs in the 1960s, about twenty of them contained or lay adjacent to a black community established in the first wave (Wiese 2005). Second, civil rights legislation facilitated the expansion of blacks into suburban areas. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 opened public schools and colleges to black students; blacks gained access to homeownership resources as government agencies receiving federal funding could no
longer discriminate on the basis of race; and employers could no longer discriminate racially in their hiring and firing decisions. Further, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 outlawed discrimination in all steps of home leasing and purchasing. Third, blacks attained the most significant increases in educational attainment, professional status, and income from the 1970s to the mid-1990s. During the 1960s, the proportion of blacks among white collar workers nearly doubled from 13 percent to 25 percent and, as a result, the median household income for blacks increased by 55 percent during this decade. By the 1970s, one third of blacks had attained middle class status, and they finally had the means to fulfill their desires for better housing, neighborhoods, public services, and educational opportunities (Lake and Cutter 1980). The momentum of the second wave picked up as blacks made even greater gains: between 1970 and 1980, the number of black college students doubled to over one million and the number of black professional and managerial workers tripled (Lake and Cutter 1980). By 1990, over one-third of blacks lived in suburbs (Christensen and Levinson 2003). Given the tendency of blacks to move into majority-black suburbs, the second wave of black suburbanization facilitated the political incorporation of suburban blacks, particularly with black political officials serving as descriptive representatives.

### 3.5 An Overview of Evanston and Waukegan

This dissertation uses a comparative case study of Evanston, Illinois and Waukegan, Illinois—two Chicago suburbs. Waukegan and Evanston provide prime examples of the political incorporation process. Despite their similarities, Evanston and
Waukegan have vastly different sociopolitical contexts, opposite paths to incorporation, and different resulting levels of black political incorporation. By seemingly holding the similar demographic variables constant, a comparison of Evanston and Waukegan amplifies how sociopolitical context—in particular, civic fabric, political leadership, and racial dynamics—determines the path that cities take toward incorporation.

As one of the largest cities in America, Chicago has served as a key field site for many studies of politics. One of the most popular destinations for the six million blacks who migrated from the South from 1910 to 1970, Chicago has historically been the most prominent site for the study of urban, black politics. These studies of black politics in Chicago have documented early black involvement in Chicago’s political machine, the political strength of the city’s black population that helped elect black and white political figures, and the early appointment of blacks to positions in city government. Some of the most lauded contemporary studies of blacks in Chicago build their work upon the experience of inner-city blacks, for example, Sudhir Venkatesh’s (2002) examination of crime and poverty using inner-city Chicago and Mary Pattillo’s (2000) purposeful focus on middle-class blacks living in the inner city. This project seeks to correct this overrepresentation by making the fight for incorporation by suburban blacks equally valid—and, perhaps, even more revealing—to the study of politics, blacks, and even urban studies.

The suburbs of Chicago in general provide many examples of the history and outcomes of black suburbanization. Blacks have been documented as residents in Chicago’s suburbs since 1870 when, even in the 1990s, blacks were largely locked out of
the suburbs of cities like Milwaukee, Detroit, and Cleveland. While blacks live in suburbs throughout the nation, blacks in Chicago’s suburbs have particularly enhanced their role in local politics because of geographic clustering.

The black population in Chicago’s suburbs continued to grow into the twenty-first century. Since 2000, the population living in Chicago is declining and this is, in part, because of the number of blacks who are out-migrating from the city. New black residents are contributing to the population growth in suburban Cook County; the black population in suburban Cook County increased by ten percent, just as the white population living in the suburbs of Cook County declined by eight percent. Johnson (2007) adds: “For blacks and the Other group, age-specific migration gains are greatest in the 30’s. In this regard, the significant gains among all minority groups over 30 and the influx of minority children would suggest suburban Cook is gaining minority families” (p. 15). These demographic trends in the metropolitan area suggest that Chicago suburbs are gaining middle-aged blacks with families, two demographic groups who might be highly likely to insert themselves in local politics. Blacks are also contributing to significant population gains in fringe suburbs, and these suburbs at the outskirts of the metropolitan area saw a 25 percent increase in their black population.

Though part of the suburban class, the history of blacks in both Evanston and in Waukegan more closely mirrors the history of blacks in northern central cities. The post-Civil Rights era is typically associated with black outmigration from city to suburb. But, Evanston and Waukegan can trace the arrival of black residents to more than one hundred years earlier. Therefore, the stage for political incorporation in most central
cities—and in suburbs like Evanston and Waukegan—was set far earlier than the current literature examines. Though black history in Evanston and Waukegan shares many similarities, we can trace variations in their political incorporation processes back to key differences in their early histories.

3.5.1 Similarities between Evanston and Waukegan

The similarities between Evanston and Waukegan mainly lie in their respective demographic compositions. Table VI provides a demographic comparison of both cities. Waukegan and Evanston are both located in the northern part of the Chicago metropolitan region. Evanston is ten miles north of the downtown Chicago Loop, and Waukegan is twenty-four miles north of Evanston. Compared to the larger class of suburbs, Evanston and Waukegan both have a large number of residents: nearly 75,000 in Evanston and nearly 90,000 in Waukegan. Waukegan and Evanston are not majority or near-majority black cities; their populations are both nearly one-quarter black. This does not mean that black residence in Waukegan or Evanston is a new phenomenon. Evanston and Waukegan have two of the longest standing black populations in the Chicago metropolitan area, having lived in Evanston since 1855 and in Waukegan since 1870.

Overall, there are some demographic differences between Evanston and Waukegan. For example, Evanston's general population has significantly higher educational attainment than in Waukegan. Sixty-four percent of Evanston residents possess at least a bachelor's degree, while 15 percent of Waukegan residents are bachelor's
degree holders. Additionally, the median family income in Evanston ($103,620) is nearly double that of Waukegan ($55,373). But, the black populations within these cities are strikingly similar. Table VII provides a demographic comparison of the black population in both cities.

Table VI. Total Population Demographics for Evanston and Waukegan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Evanston</th>
<th>Waukegan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>74,239</td>
<td>87,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent white</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent black</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Hispanic/Latino (of any race)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of households with children under 18 years old</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of married couple households</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of female householders with no husband present</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average household size</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average family size</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median age</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median household income</td>
<td>$69,303</td>
<td>$42,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median family income</td>
<td>$102,258</td>
<td>$47,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent population living below poverty level</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The black populations in both cities share many demographic characteristics. Just over three-quarters of blacks in each city have earned at least a high school diploma or
GED: 78 percent in Evanston and 75 percent in Waukegan. Though the median family income in Evanston is high, the black population is considerably less well-off than its fellow Evanstonians: at the median, black families earn $46,582 in Evanston and $38,168 in Waukegan. About one-third of blacks in Evanston (34%) and Waukegan (31%) are not in the labor force. Despite these demographic similarities, the histories of Evanston and

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<th>Table VII. Black Population Demographics for Evanston and Waukegan</th>
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<td>Percent population living below poverty level</td>
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Waukegan reveal many differences in their social and political culture, political leadership, and the degree to which each city has achieved political incorporation.

3.5.2 Political Incorporation in Evanston

In its early history, Evanston was a religious community and prided itself upon being a learned community. Evanston has served as home to a number of colleges and universities, including Northwestern University, and blacks were included in this intellectual community. As early as 1898, Dr. William Garnett served as the city’s first black dentist. Garnett is one example of the highly educated, well-off black community that has resided in Evanston. Not all blacks were wealthy, but even black domestics in Evanston still thought of themselves as better than Chicago blacks (Interview with Karen Thomas, 2010). As a result, the black community in Evanston was socioeconomically diverse. A staunchly Republican community, Evanston displayed racially liberal sentiments from its strong support of the Abolitionist movement in the late 1850s. This history helped breed black community leaders, including Edwin Jourdain Jr. who was elected as the city’s first black alderman in 1931 and Eugene Beck who was elected as the city’s second black alderman in 1947 and served as alderman for 22 years. The black intellectual and professional community in Evanston flourished with institutions like the Emerson Street YMCA which served the city’s black community from 1914 to 1969. Blacks in Evanston experienced a highly engaged local political culture.

This political and community leadership helped Evanston’s black community begin to move through the stages of political incorporation—descriptive representation,
allocation of resources to the black community, and inclusion in local decision-making—in the 1950s and 1960s. The city continued to cultivate a black intellectual class and black community leadership. Joseph Hill, the black principal of Foster School, pioneered the school district’s voluntary integration plan in 1963 by bussing white students into the black school. Hill went on to become superintendent of the school district in 1983. Though in its past Evanston maintained separate facilities, the city targeted resources for the black community established on the city’s west side, including new schools and new recreation centers.

By 1980, Evanston began to solidify black political incorporation. In 1993, the city elected its first black mayor, gathering the support of both blacks and whites. The election of Lorraine Morton followed the election of black aldermen for sixty years. In other words, even in its early years, black Evanstonians could rely on descriptive representation. In addition to political leadership, blacks have played a key role in local school governance. The city has had black school board members, a black elementary school superintendent in the elementary district, and a black assistant school superintendent in the high school district. Black political power stretched from more traditional signifiers like descriptive representation to new signifiers, including the adoption of an Afrocentric curriculum in one of the largely black elementary schools and the ability to swing the vote in the 2008 mayoral election to a white candidate, Elizabeth Tisdahl, after Lorraine Morton retired.
3.5.3 **Political Exclusion in Waukegan**

Despite the demographic similarities between the two cities, Waukegan’s history and path to black political incorporation is quite different from Evanston. Waukegan began as a port city for shipments of produce and grain to Chicago. Waukegan was home to diverse industries including ship and wagon building, flour milling, sheep raising, pork packing, dairying, and malt liquor brewing. The creation of the Union Pacific Railroad (Illinois Parallel Railroad) with a stop in Waukegan made the city a manufacturing center and it was soon home to large industrial corporations like Outboard Marine Corporation, Johns Manville, U.S. Sugar Refinery, Washburn and Moen Wire Mill (U.S. Steel Corporation), U.S. Starch Works, Thomas Brass and Iron Works, Abbott Laboratories, and National Gypsum. It was an industrial community and everyone was largely focused on blue-collar work, including its black residents. Though some blacks worked in the homes of wealthy whites on the city’s east side, blacks largely worked as laborers in the local factories and lived in the city’s Frog Island neighborhood. The blue-collar culture in Waukegan harvested little interest or opportunities for engagement in local politics.

The political leadership of the city especially did not give blacks the opportunity to engage in local politics. During the Civil Rights Movement, blacks marched alone to give attention to local racial issues. A conservative mayor who was unsympathetic to the plight of blacks, Robert Sabonjian Sr., reigned from 1957 to 1989. Sabonjian is notorious for saying about blacks: “I love ‘em and I hate ‘em” (9/21/1966). During this period, the city had no descriptive representation except for the co-opted leadership of Alderman Robert Evans, who served as Sabonjian’s right hand man during his mayoral tenure.
Sabonjian successfully built a conservative local political culture that ignored black concerns and nurtured racial hostility. The mayor single-handedly locked blacks out of political inclusion, and the black experience in Waukegan grew violent and repressive, including race rioting in 1966.

The relationship between blacks and the local political structure was clearly hostile and oppositional. Mayor Sabonjian, an Armenian immigrant and former boxer, fashioned himself as a no-nonsense mayor, but black residents felt this was a disguise for his true feelings about blacks. In the days following the riots, Sabonjian—rather than spearheading an effort toward addressing human relations in Waukegan—placed the responsibility for quelling black concerns on the local NAACP chapter. In fact, the mayor suggested that the Waukegan NAACP chapter was responsible for the race riots: “Evidently the NAACP is not really interested in the advancement of the colored people. It did nothing whatsoever to ease the situation or to assist in any matter. I can see no relation between civil rights and incineration of innocent children and a mother and other people burned by Molotov cocktails” (“Police Seal Off Waukegan Riot Area” 1966, 1).

In his battle with the NAACP, Sabonjian’s comments about Waukegan blacks grew increasingly inflammatory. As blacks rioted out of anger about real local concerns, the mayor debased them to “local hopheads, narcotic addicts, drunkards, and just plain scum” (“Police Seal Off Waukegan Riot Area” 1966, 1). After the riots, Sabonjian ordered a 7:30 PM curfew and, after a third night of violence, warned outsiders to stay out of the city. Sabonjian dared residents to defy his orders:

If they want more trouble, they’ll get it back by the shovel full. We have many fine Negro families in the community but these undesirables are
causing all to forfeit gains in their efforts to attain civil rights.” Sabonjian continued to take care in distinguishing between the rioters and other blacks in Waukegan, but with underhanded language that questioned the citizenship, humanity, and fortitude of rioters: “I won’t retract my statements. I keep pounding on the fact that the majority of Waukegan Negroes are magnificent people who are excellent examples of law abiding citizens. A larger percentage of Negroes in Waukegan are homeowners than in any other city and they are proud of the homes they bought and paid for themselves. My caustic attitude is directed against those shiftless bums who are troublemakers and haven’t got the pride to settle down and behave like first class citizens” (“Sabonjian Sticks to His Blast at Rioters” 1966, 3).

Sabonjian’s attitude was clearly caustic: “I get hot. Each Negro is trying to be another Dr. Martin Luther King, a national leader. Everybody wants to be the chief. They ought to be pulling together. They don’t do a damn thing to help their own people. A lot of the Negroes here have big lovely homes, but do they help at the mission? Are you kidding?” (“Sabonjian Sticks to His Blast at Rioters” 1966, 3).

The NAACP chapter called a meeting with the mayor and community leaders. The larger guise was to address the recent riots, but the NAACP in actuality was in search of an apology from Sabonjian for his inflammatory comments. The NAACP also wanted the mayor to withdraw an ordinance limiting civil rights demonstrations to protesters without a criminal background who preregister with police. After Mayor Sabonjian refused to apologize and reiterated his allegation that the NAACP was responsible for the disorder, twenty-five members of the NAACP chapter walked out of the meeting and declared that they would defy Sabonjian’s order. Three days later, more than two hundred civil rights protestors marched through the city’s central business district. The
relationship between Mayor Robert Sabonjian and the city’s blacks continued to grow sour.

By 1980, the black population continued to grow, but even with this increasing black electorate, the experience of blacks in Waukegan did not improve. Blacks were excluded from municipal employment and, for example, protested on several occasions the exclusion of blacks from employment in local construction projects. Even after the racial heat of the Civil Rights Movement, blacks still felt under attack by Waukegan police after they shot and killed two black teenagers in separate incidents and arrived to arrest black candidates at a local Democratic Party selection committee meeting. In every measure of political incorporation, we see little evidence of black political power. Even the example of Alderman Robert Evans shows that, when blacks appeared to receive power, it was typically symbolic rather than meaningful representation of power. Meanwhile, a longstanding Puerto Rican population and a growing Mexican immigrant population were incorporated into local politics, and Latinos in Waukegan attained political power at the expense of black political power.

Blacks in Waukegan point to the tenure of Sabonjian, particularly the race riots, as the epitome of his mayoralty. Many find that the exclusion of blacks then reverberates in the city’s political affairs today. Though the tone of his mayoralty is significantly different, blacks point to the election of Mayor Robert Sabonjian Jr.’s son, Robert Sabonjian Jr., as the city’s current mayor as an example of continued admiration in the city for Mayor Sabonjian Sr. and his policies.
In January 1970, Camille Taylor and Anna Magloire, each woman dressed in red, met Sharon Rivers at her home on the north side of Waukegan to travel together to a dinner in celebration of Delta Sigma Theta sorority’s Founders Day. Sharon Rivers and Anna Magloire were lifelong residents of Waukegan, and Camille Taylor took up residence in Waukegan after graduating from Fisk University and obtaining employment in a local corporation. Each of the women became members of the sorority during college, but when they settled in Waukegan after graduating, there was no alumnae chapter in the area for them to join despite the number of Delta Sigma Theta members residing in Waukegan.

On that day, all three women piled into Rivers’ 1967 Lincoln Continental and traveled down Green Bay Road to the Founders Day dinner being held by their alumnae chapter: the Evanston-North Shore chapter. The Evanston-North Shore alumnae chapter was created twenty year prior, and since its inception, many of its members were actually Waukegan residents who had no true "home" chapter to join. During the hour-long ride to Evanston, Magloire reflected on a community forum that the Evanston chapter sponsored the previous year. The forum addressed a number of pertinent issues in the Evanston community, including hiring black officers in the police force, the progress of
school desegregation, and the need for greater recreational opportunities for local black youth.

During an extended discussion about the relationship of the Evanston Police Department to the black community, Magloire recalled an Evanston community member express that "at least our problems are not as bad as Negroes in Waukegan" (personal interview, September 21, 2010). Some members of the crowd nodded their heads in agreement, while others seemed to shake their heads in disbelief at the racial strife that loomed in Waukegan. At that moment, Anna Magloire felt an overwhelming sense that she was a traitor to her black neighbors in Waukegan. As she actively engaged in the discussion at the forum and volunteered to work on committees with others to address black concerns in Evanston, there was no comparable effort in Waukegan—and no Waukegan chapter of the sorority to mirror the work that the Evanston-North Shore Chapter was performing in its own community.

Camille Taylor agreed with Anna Magloire. Taylor lamented that all of their volunteer time, fundraising and donations, and payment of dues helped serve a community—for example, in the form of scholarships for Evanston Township High School graduates, playing bid whist with elderly Evanston residents, and supporting and mentoring foster children in Evanston—of which neither was truly a part (personal interview, October 5, 2010). Rivers, Taylor, and Magloire began to quietly share their concerns with six other Waukegan residents who participated in the Evanston-North Shore chapter. They were cautious to not make others feel that they were not dedicated to helping any black community, but they recalled a keen feeling that Waukegan was too
similar to Evanston to not see the same efforts in their own community. Taylor expressed that, because black civic organizations on Chicago's North Shore were concentrated in Evanston (and not Waukegan), Evanston benefitted from decades of service by Waukegan residents. A number of Waukegan residents were members of black fraternities and sororities, and all of them participated in the Evanston chapter of their respective organizations because there was no Waukegan chapter. Because much of the effort toward black racial advancement was concentrated in local organizations, like fraternity and sorority alumni chapters, the undeveloped civic fabric in Waukegan meant that blacks had fewer opportunities to unite, strategize, and act on local concerns. In 1979, 31 years after the creation of the Evanston-North Shore Delta Sigma Theta alumnae chapter, Anna Magloire, Sharon Rivers, Camille Taylor, and fifteen other Waukegan residents created the organization's alumnae chapter in Waukegan.

4.1 Chapter Overview

The story shared by Camille Taylor and Anna Magloire provides a direct juxtaposition of the civic fabric within the black communities of Evanston and Waukegan. This example helps illuminate the relationship between the phases of political incorporation and the sociopolitical context: Blacks in Evanston had access to a variety of organizations and institutions, which were used to develop black political strength, while those organizations were slow to develop in Waukegan. This meant that blacks in Evanston had a civic fabric that could support and articulate demands for political power, and they were prepared to articulate common demands for descriptive
representation phase early in the city’s history. The lack of pivotal organizations in Waukegan’s black community, such as fraternities and sororities, meant that the black community belatedly articulated demands for political power, if at all.

During a time of heightened racial concerns in each city, a thin civic fabric caused black concerns in Waukegan to languish while a thick civic fabric meant blacks in Evanston actively congregated, discussed, and worked toward resolutions. The difference is no small factor in the process of political incorporation. Black social and political organizations have both historically adopted a political identity, and their work within the black community and in the city as a whole provides the space for incorporation struggles. Successful attempts at political incorporation require organization and unification of the black community, and the civic fabric provides the glue that holds the black community together during this process.

Incorporation is naturally a political struggle, and the civic fabric must be woven to support agitation, demand-protest mobilizations, and coalition-building. Thus, this dissertation contends that the right “kind” of civic fabric is central to incorporation. We can trace political exclusion in Waukegan and political incorporation in Evanston to the particular kind of civic fabric in each city’s black community. To be sure, there is a sense of community among blacks in Evanston and in Waukegan. Ties between black residents in each city are well-developed, but how these ties are used to advance the process of political incorporation varies in key ways. The key differences are listed in Table VIII. In sum, the sociopolitical context in Evanston features a well-developed, multidimensional fabric of black institutions that strived for political incorporation in a number of venues.
A thin civic fabric in Waukegan created social ties between blacks but failed to cultivate the type of institutional structures and activities necessary for incorporation.

### Table VIII. Key Differences in the Black Civic Fabric in Evanston and Waukegan

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<td>1.</td>
<td>Black social cohesion predominates in Waukegan, while blacks in Evanston experienced political cohesion.</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Blacks in Evanston struggled for incorporation through temporary, issue-based, grassroots organizations that facilitated more fluid political work. The political activity in Waukegan was determined by county-oriented, nationally-based political organizations like the NAACP.</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Political activity in each city adopted a different tone, as blacks in Evanston were more likely to issue demands, while black politics in Waukegan was more complacent.</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>The black community eventually stretched its civic fabric to incorporate whites and formulated multiracial coalitions, while more stringent racial dynamics in Waukegan hindered an inclusive civic fabric.</td>
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### 4.2 Civic Fabric as the Engine for Black Political Incorporation

First, it is important to understand why an analysis of the civic fabric is crucial to our understanding of the path that cities take toward incorporation. An underlying assumption in this research is that a thick civic fabric is central to governance in any city, and a thick black civic fabric is particularly vital to black political incorporation. The former point is adopted from Douglas Rae's (2001) concept of "civic fauna." First, Rae presents the concept of urbanism, which is "patterns of private conduct and decision-making that make the successful governance of cities possible, even when city government is fairly weak" (xiii), and one of the central features of urbanism is a dense civic fauna. Rae cites a number of values of a dense civic fauna of local organizations to
governance: these community organizations serve the interests of citizens; build trust, loyalty, and a connection to the city; structure the social organization of the city; and allow citizens to participate in self-governance. Rae argues that city government is a weak player in the exchange of power in cities, and we must look to governance and the role of the civic fabric in allocating community power. This is why this research advocates for a greater context beyond the affairs of City Hall to understand black political incorporation.

To the latter point, beyond the broader civic fabric, this research is guided by the belief that the black civic fabric is particularly central to the achievement of black political incorporation. This is primarily because the methods of black political participation differ significantly from whites. Much of the early political science literature concluded that blacks failed to participate in local and national political life because this literature used more traditional forms, like voting, attending a political event, or writing a letter to a political representative to measure black political participation (for an example of this traditional view, see Verba and Nie 1972). Using this definition of political participation, scholars determined that black political participation was at a level significantly lower than other racial/ethnic groups.

Yet as blacks began to coalesce in local social and political organizations during the Civil Rights Movement, political scientists revisited their characterization of black political participation. The traditional view would have rendered meaningless common activities in black communities during the Movement, like protest activity or even the importance of recreational organizations for promoting racial solidarity. The prevalence
of these activities, and the fact that they produced tangible results, meant that the unique form of black participation was valuable in the political sphere. It became clear that blacks did indeed participate in politics, but their methods of participation were more "soft" forms as members of civic organizations, organizers and participants in protests, and volunteers in local community activities.

When we control for socioeconomic status and accept this broadened definition of participation, we find that blacks participate in politics considerably more than whites, and blacks who demonstrate high levels of race-consciousness participate far more than those who do not. Blacks are able to participate at such high levels, in spite of their political and resource disadvantages, through the utilization of group-based political resources. These resources include the development and maintenance of a racial ideology that encourages political action, as well as membership in local and national social and political organizations (Tate 1993). Shingles (1981) cites a number of community activities in which blacks participated, particularly during the modern Civil Rights Movement, including community action programs, civil rights organizations, block associations, neighborhood development projects, tenant associations, and PTA and related neighborhood school groups. Blacks tend to participate in politics throughout the course of their lives by their involvement in fundamentally non-political institutions.

Because the web of governance extends beyond city government and because blacks participate in politics and strive for political power primarily through civic organizations, a "thick" civic fabric is critical to the process of political incorporation. In other words, if we are to look for the engine that propels the process of black political
incorporation, we should look at black civic life. Black institutions, such as community organizations, voluntary associations, and churches, nurture the habits and values that give rise to black social capital (Putnam 1995; Brehm and Rahn 1997). Because blacks focus their political activity in these types of institutions, then it is within these institutions that struggles for political incorporation are likely to be played out. If the black community in a city has a thin civic fabric, then it lacks one of the key mechanisms through which demands for political incorporation can be organized and articulated. The next section explains that civic organizations build black political cohesion; through a thick black civic fabric, blacks are able to build trust, develop a common strategy, and unite to demand political power.

4.3 Civic Organizations Build Black Political Cohesion

There are both individual-level and community-level benefits to civic engagement. The skills that blacks learn through their involvement in local affairs are vital on the road to political participation. Participating in civic organizations and interacting with others for a cause broader than one's own personal interests pushes people to transition from self-regarding to community-regarding behavior.  

For example, Tina Bledsoe explains her decision to run for a local school board position in Waukegan because of her concern about the well-being of others in her community:  

I knew it was a long shot. Here I was this little guy—or girl—with no money. Nobody really knew me except for the principal and some teachers at my son's school. But how could I not? I really wanted to try to do something for people in the city that I have come to love. I come from a big city and my folks didn't get involved in too much of anything political. My uncle used to say politics was 'a rich man's game'—rich in time to waste. But then you come to Waukegan and that small town feel pulls you in—like 'oh, so this is what you do when you go to the suburbs.' You know, you wonder whether your kid is learning, but then you get to know his friends and you start saying 'I want to know that little Johnny is learning too.' Or, you know from the paper that the mayor or your alderman are thinking about...
Civic engagement does not always have to be political. Evanston residents Iva Bell and Eleanor Swift said that, even as children, their participation in recreational activities with their neighborhood playmates and classmates connected them to the city and built strong ties between each other. Bell questioned, “You think we were gonna grow up with [Mayor] Lorraine [Morton] all the way up to now and not vote for her? We danced together...went to church together. We know her. Why would you want a stranger in charge over where you live?” (focus group, November 6, 2011). These connections among familiar faces encourage civic engagement and create a tightly-knit civic fabric.

Members of civic associations are more politically active, more informed about politics, more sanguine about their ability to affect political life, have higher levels of political trust and efficacy, and are more supportive of democratic norms (Stolle 2001). Membership in voluntary associations increases face-to-face interactions between people and creates a setting for the development of generalized trust12. Active participation encourages citizens to participate further, increases their knowledge about their community and its issues, and makes them more tolerant of and attached to their fellow

some new law and it really probably doesn’t affect you—like the Mexican who was protesting because he says he got pulled over by the cops illegally and now he is afraid he is going to get deported. I mean, really. That doesn’t affect me, but that man has a wife and kids...two or three kids. How are they going to make it without him? We got to do what’s best for our families. This place almost makes you care too much, because I really don’t have time to waste!” (personal interview, February 4, 2011)

Though Tina Bledsoe’s campaign was unsuccessful, she became a leader in several local civic organizations.

12 Stolle (1998) warns that that the possibility remains that people who are more trusting self-select into associations. Therefore, generalized trust may not be created by membership in civic associations. Stolle and Rochon (1998) add that membership in political associations, in particular, fail to encourage interpersonal trust, political trust and efficacy, tolerance, or optimism. The social capital literature largely counters this, stating that frequent participation by many members of the black community leads to social capital, a tight web of social interactions, and greater trust in one another
community members. (Stolle 2001; Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005)\textsuperscript{13}. Blacks develop their civic skills through participation in local organizations, and it is through these organizations that blacks agitate for political incorporation (Miller 2009). Thus, blacks receive their political socialization through local institutions. Political socialization refers to the way that society transmits its political culture from generation to generation. It may serve to preserve traditional political norms and institutions, or it can become a vehicle of political and social change. The following sections elaborate on the different ways that black institutions in Evanston and Waukegan participate in politics and politically socialize residents. With a broad focus on examples of churches, activists, social organizations, political organizations, grassroots organizations, and national organizations, these sections demonstrate that the organizations that composed the civic fabric in Evanston adopted an explicitly political identity, unlike the civic fabric in Waukegan. The resulting organized black civic fabric helped push the black community through the phases of black political incorporation in Evanston, while the disorganized black civic fabric kept Waukegan in the first mobilization phase.

4.4 Church Activism in Evanston and Quietism in Waukegan

The current black politics literature particularly highlights the black church as one of the organizations most central to black political socialization, and this research finds that differences in black churches in Evanston and Waukegan provide a representative example that helps demonstrate the thick civic fabric in Evanston and the thin civic fabric

\textsuperscript{13} Miller (2009) disagrees, stating that although high levels of generalized trust and community reciprocity are correlated with membership in most organizations, tolerance is not
in Waukegan. This example further demonstrates the political proclivities of a variety of civic organizations in Evanston, while civic organizations in Waukegan worked in line with their mission, which often was not political. As a result, the voice for black political incorporation was resounding in Evanston because it stemmed from political and non-political organizations, while political agitation in Waukegan was left to those organizations that squarely identified with the political sphere.

The case of the black church is particularly important because black churches are the longest standing and most consistently present organization in black communities. Black religion has been a spur to political action and local changes and, because of the protest nature of its ideology, it catalyzed the collective involvement of blacks in the modern Civil Rights Movement (Walton 1985; Harris 1994). In other words, black churches are the center of claims to political incorporation and are permanent fixtures in black communities throughout the process of political incorporation. Given the large number of blacks who attend church, and the presence of messages in church that directly relate to local black concerns, the black church is likely to spur black involvement in local political discussions.

But the cases of Evanston and Waukegan reveal that this is not always the case. Although religion draws people into a church, church attendance itself does not encourage political action. It is a particular type of church—activist churches—that provides an environment that fosters political participation. Only membership in a politically active church most consistently boosts black rates of political participation. Activist churches provide a structured setting in which citizens cultivate and nurture civic
skills, share political information, and coordinate political activities within the community (Harris 1994). But, not all black churches are activist churches and not all communities have activist churches present within their boundaries (Tate 1993). Adolph Reed Jr. explains that, in some communities, black churches can encourage political quietism among blacks, thereby suppressing mass activism among the church membership (Reed 1986). The cases of Evanston and Waukegan reveal that both scholars are likely to be right. Churches in each city play different political roles.

In Evanston, church leaders and their congregations tend to be politically engaged, especially in issues that directly affect the city’s black community. We see churches involved in small and large political battles, and they played a pivotal role in realizing and maintaining black political power in the city. Churches in Evanston contribute to a highly engaged sociopolitical context. It is important to note that churches did not just insert themselves in concerns about human or social services. Charles Taylor, an elder at an Evanston church explained:

Churches led the fight for Evanston to be governed for the people and by the people and not just for some of the people or one part of the city. We knew that if decisions were going to be made about us in the fifth ward, we had to be the one to make them. When we didn’t have blacks who were elected, our leaders were our pastors. There was no question in our minds about whether our pastors should be keeping politics and Christianity separate. I remember, we had a sermon long time ago where we talked about how our God is a political God. We knew that we couldn’t be good Christians if we didn’t have control over our lives so we could live the way we’re supposed to live. [...] That’s what Dr. King taught us too. So if we wanted power and a say over our neighborhoods, Evanston could be no different than Birmingham or Atlanta. Our pastors let us see that. (focus group, November 6, 2011).
Taylor’s comments reveal that Evanston, by and large, was a place where pastors and their flock saw that the marriage between politics and religion was necessary to gain political power and power over their community.

Thus, pastors in Evanston constructed a centrally political identity; in other words, when they became involved in local politics, they acted as both activists and pastors. This likely unintentional strategy helped them gain credibility and recognition in local affairs. When Evanston pastors addressed the City Council, they often did so with hundreds of members of their congregants and they spoke directly and strictly about politics—they displayed that they were a political, not a religious, force to be reckoned with.

Church pastors were frequent attendees at City Council meetings, and former alderman Bobby Smith offers that “they almost always had something to say and, out of respect, you couldn’t cut the reverend off. They usually gave us an earful” (personal interview, November 7, 2010). In Waukegan, however, though pastors and their churches did become involved in local politics, they engaged in religious talk within the political sphere. In other words, pastors in Evanston spoke a political language that had currency in the city’s governing chambers; pastors in Waukegan always presented a religious identity that appeared more as symbolism rather than political threat. A particular case in each city illuminates the point.

With a concentration of black churches in Evanston’s historically black 5th ward, church leadership was at the forefront of any efforts to redevelop the area, but they spoke as community leaders, not just church leaders. For example, when black former Alderman Joe Kent suggested during a City Council meeting that church leaders should
be doing more to minister to youth, Bishop Carlis Moody Sr., pastor of Faith Temple Baptist Church, countered that the pastors were willing and capable to lead the community instead of the aldermen: “[Kent] must remember that he is a part of the community. We elected him to guide us in some of these things. If he doesn’t do anything, then we will do what we can” (Claessens 1998).

In 1997, Reverend John F. Norwood of Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church led one hundred congregants and community members to address the City Council about plans to develop the Church Street and Dodge Avenue business area. Reverend Norwood argued before the council that any efforts to bring redevelopment to the area near the city’s downtown should take into account the desires and needs of the area’s indigenous, black residents. While saluting the efforts to revitalize the black neighborhood, Norwood offered that “any plan is doomed for failure if it doesn’t include the lives of our young people” (Seidenberg 1997). Similarly, when Alderman Joe Kent suggested that church leaders and members minister to young men standing on the street corner at night and encourage them to attend church, Reverend Michael Curry, pastor of First Church of God Christian Life Center said, “I often walk down to the corner of Dewey and Simpson and talk to the young men there about the appearance of standing on the corner as if they had nothing to do” (Claessens 1998). In a focus group, Christopher Youngblood, who would often join Reverend Curry in reaching out to young men in the city, said:

We really didn’t try to approach them like ‘I’m a pastor, or I go to church every week, I’m holy, and you need to get like me’. A lot of us used to be like them and we knew that wasn’t going to work. So, we came at them like ‘fellow black man,’ ‘classmate,’ ‘neighbor,’ ‘what are you going to do with your life?’ And it didn’t have to be about church. Don’t get me wrong, some pastors wanted it to be about church. But we came up with them so we knew that wouldn’t work. So when we
went out there once in a while, really, if you want to be real, it was never about church. It was always about what they were going to provide in a positive way to their community and how, as black men, they were supposed to be the ones leading their community, not just standing on the corner watching their community pass them by (focus group, November 6, 2011).

On the other hand, the primacy of religion to any political activity that involved the Waukegan ministers is evident in an example of a 1999 meeting of the county’s Democratic Party, during which police were called to remove black Democratic precinct committeemen from the meeting. Reverend Wade Stevenson, pastor of Gideon Missionary Baptist Church, said that local ministers met with some of the Democratic leaders to find a resolution to the confrontation at the meeting. Stevenson said that one of the Democratic leaders “looked me in the eyeball and said, ‘This is not a racial issue,’ he said. The remark reminded me of the Biblical account of the serpent that ‘slithered’ into the Garden of Eden. You know, Satan will lie to you. He’s the father of lies” (Zahorik 2005). Referring to the attempt by other blacks to remove black candidate Sharon Jones from the ballot, Reverend L.C. Luther of First Fellowship Baptist Church explained, “I’m sick, I’m the oldest pastor here, but I will not lay down...We need to stop selling ourselves out” (Zahorik 2005). Revered Arthur Gass, pastor of Zion Baptist Church added, “When you ask her to leave, you ask all of us to leave. We’re all God’s children. When you mess with one of the least [referring to biblical passage], you mess with all of us. The next time, they’ll think twice before they ask someone to leave. Upon this slate, we’re going to build this township and the gates of hell will not prevail against us. God gave Moses two lumps of silver for two trumpets, one for assembly and one for war. I knew it was time for war” (Zahorik 2005). These comments, offered by several Waukegan pastors,
demonstrate that the collective tone of their engagement in politics is religion. Rather than speaking directly about the politics of the situation, Waukegan ministers acted in political fora as religious leaders (and without the numerical strength of their respective congregations), and not as activists or community leaders. The way in which they presented their religious leadership made them unthreatening in the political sphere.

We also see that the way that pastors exercised their authority in both cities created a context that placed pressure onto whites to share political power in Evanston, but simultaneously allowed them to be dismissed in Waukegan because they failed to present themselves a unified force. The willingness of pastors in Evanston to engage in activism and unite with other black organizations produced clear consequences for the city if they failed to honor black efforts toward incorporation. In 1980, at the height of political incorporation and racial antagonism in the city, the Evanston high school district board eliminated the position of McKinley Nash, the assistant superintendent for educational services and the highest ranking black employee in the district. The hiring of Nash in 1970 was in response to demand-protest mobilizations for greater diversity among personnel at the high school, and blacks feared that whites thought they had ‘done enough’ for blacks and that black employee representation was no longer needed.

Reverend Hycel B. Taylor of Second Baptist Church organized a protest of eleven hundred

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This is not the lone example of religious talk in Waukegan’s political sphere. When the Waukegan City Council addressed plans for downtown revitalization, black church leaders worried that there were significant incentives directed toward attracting white businesses into the area, but that black businesses were not being offered the same concessions. This was particularly troubling for church leaders because black businesses historically maintained a strong presence in the downtown business district. Pastors frequently referred to biblical scripture about how the wealth of King Solomon, brought forth by God, allowed Jerusalem to surpass the wealth of the rest of the world—in other words, if the City of Waukegan would make concerted efforts to incorporate black businesses in downtown revitalization efforts, then their riches, ordained by God, would allow the wealth of the city of Waukegan to surpass all other cities (Bishop Frederick Marshall, personal interview, January 13, 2011).
blacks at the school board meeting as a show of support for Nash. The group prayed, sang, protested, and articulated their list of demands for three hours. Coleman Miller, president of the city’s NAACP chapter, announced that the NAACP was leading an effort in concert with Rev. Taylor. If Nash’s position was eliminated, the city’s black residents threatened to continuously picket outside of the high school building. Though Nash chose to resign to quell unrest in the city, the school board committed to Rev. Taylor’s primary demand—that the school board form a committee designed to hire more minorities in both teaching and administrative positions at the high school (Fieldman 1982; civil rights organization focus group, December 11, 2010).

On the other hand, the tendency for pastors in Waukegan to engage in more complacent tactics and maintain a consistently religious identity caused them to be an apolitical force that only provided leadership within the black community (and not outside of the black community). In addition to the county Democratic party controversy, the most prominent role played by Waukegan ministers was amidst the Waukegan race riot of 1966 (resident focus group, January 8, 2011). The ministers held a press conference to address the treatment of Waukegan residents by police during the riot, as well the grievances of residents regarding discrimination they faced while living in the city. Led by Reverend J.N. Lightfoot of Shiloh Baptist Church and Reverend H.J. Cooke of Gideon Baptist Church, the ministers, who rarely gathered to discuss a plan for local affairs, could not agree on what the resolution should be to the riots. While Mayor

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 Churches are typically instrumental in the election of black mayors (Tate 1993). Efforts of similar size were used to aid the election of Lorraine Morton as the city’s first African-American mayor in 1993, with Evanston churches organizing buses so that Evanston residents would vote in an African-American mayor (activist focus group, November 21, 2010).
Robert Sabonjian Sr. met with members of the North Shore Baptist Ministers alliance after the riots, he refused to honor their proposed solutions. The greatest concession that the ministers received was an agreement by Sabonjian to lift a curfew implemented in the aftermath of the riots. Rather than working with black community leaders, Sabonjian placed blame for the riots on them, and rather than address the concerns brought forth by the leaders, he called on black community leaders to “assume leadership to bring about the elimination of such acts in the future” (“Assured Hostile Acts Are Over,” 1966, 1). He added, “No concessions were made to anyone but an agreement was reached that we will negotiate in good faith at any time. If these demonstrators are genuinely sorry, then I might make a few concessions in a reasonable and honorable manner in behalf of the community” (“Assured Hostile Acts Are Over,” 1966, 1).

Sabonjian largely paid lip service to the demands of the ministers; he agreed to meet with city and racial leaders to discuss problems that led to the riots, but refused to take any action that they felt was meaningful to quell racial unrest in the city. The ministers did not act in concert with other black organizations in the city, and when the national NAACP ordered the Waukegan branch to cancel a march to City Hall, some residents were disappointed that local ministers did not organize the march themselves (civil rights organization focus group, February 9, 2011). Similarly, when Mayor Robert Sabonjian continually attacked the local NAACP chapter—even at a meeting with ministers present—the ministers said little to defend the organization.

You know, looking back, yeah, I see what you’re saying. The NAACP and the churches were involved with the riots, but they didn’t meet or come up with something, you know, to make the mayor work with them. I don’t know if one of them wanted all the attention or credit. I’m not sure if that’s it. They just didn’t
work together. Yes, we would sign each other’s petitions, we would go to meetings and see each other there. There were some conversations between us. We all went to church! But, you know, I think the NAACP wanted to do a little more than the ministers wanted to do. It’s like the NAACP was trying to be Malcolm and the churches wanted to be Dr. King (laughs). I went to Calvary Temple and I was involved with the NAACP and, now that I really think about it years later, we had the same goal but we weren’t as effective as we could have been, maybe, if we worked together better” (personal interview with Eleanor Holmes, September 9, 2010).

The role that churches adopted greatly contributed to political incorporation in Evanston and failed to stem political exclusion in Waukegan.

 Ministers in Evanston articulated to political officials their role as community leaders, engaged in demand-protest mobilizations, and presented themselves as a religious force to be reckoned with in the political sphere. Waukegan pastors united with each other (but not with their respective congregations), made demands of the mayor and other elected officials, but failed to articulate consequences and act upon them if those demands were not filled. Their presence at political meetings was typically by themselves, and not with a display of their followers, and political officials were able to isolate their demands as those of the pastors and not of the black community. Additionally, part of what makes the civic fabric thick in Evanston and thin in Waukegan is that religious leaders in Evanston always inserted themselves in local political affairs in concert with other non-religious black organizations (as the McKinley Nash example demonstrates), whereas the black civic fabric in Waukegan was not sufficiently organized to present a unified force (as the 1966 race riots example demonstrates). The basis for ministerial action in Evanston was racial solidarity, while the basis in Waukegan was religiosity.
The example of church activity in Waukegan and Evanston demonstrates that in Evanston, multiple actors and organizations, like churches, played a role in governance decisions, thereby placing blacks in the position to claim political power. In Waukegan, churches attempted to insert themselves in politics, but as religious institutions, and they often could not agree on a strategy for claiming political power. To provide a convincing argument, the next sections continue to reveal how the black civic fabric in Waukegan was unable to nurture or sustain demands for incorporation. This negatively impacted the community’s ability to engage in forceful mobilizations, groom and select descriptive representatives, and gain consensus on the policies that would best benefit the black community. The black civic fabric debilitated Waukegan's efforts at each fork in the road. We see the opposite in Evanston.

4.5 Activism and the Local Culture

Again, a thick civic fabric means that support for political incorporation came from a variety of sources. Thus, the burden for advancing incorporation lay with multiple individuals and organization, and this means a more concerted effort in cities with a thick civic fabric. The previous example showed that much of the demand for political incorporation filtered through churches in Evanston, whereas Waukegan churches largely abstained or voiced from a religious platform. The next example of activists demonstrates that Evanston’s black community had a sophisticated political network that was trained to put pressure on City Hall, while few blacks in Waukegan engaged in activist tactics (perhaps because of lack of training or fear of repression because of the closed political
culture). This means that if churches and activists help form a thick civic fabric that highly engages in governance outside of City Hall, Evanston had both churches and activists while Waukegan had neither. These examples, put together, reveal a thin civic fabric in Waukegan and a thick civic fabric in Evanston.

A lack of activist churches may reflect a local political culture that is unsupportive of activism in general. Though blacks have a higher propensity to participate in politics, not all blacks do in fact participate in politics, and not all blacks become sufficiently and actively engaged to be considered activists. To become an activist, one must have a perceived ability to be an activist, and people with more available resources such as free time and disposable income are less taxed by participation and are therefore more likely to become active (Miller 2009). But activism is not just a quality inherent to individuals; it is also a quality that is supported and encouraged by the local political environment. Clay Adams and Tammy Brown, two activists in Waukegan, discussed the difficulty they experienced in recruiting blacks in the city to be sufficiently actively engaged to the point of being activists (activist focus group, February 13, 2011). Tammy Brown concluded that, while some blacks in Waukegan are politically active and even more would like to be politically active, very few are interested in being labeled as activists (just as ministers displayed a reluctance to be perceived as political leaders).

Brown, who was familiar with political affairs in Evanston, concluded that Evanston has far more political activists than Waukegan, and she stated that affairs in Waukegan are significantly worse for blacks than in Evanston and that one would expect the number of activists in Waukegan to outweigh the number in Evanston. What could
be the cause of this disparity? Clay Adams suggested that being activists was contrary to the nature of blacks in Waukegan:

> When we came to Waukegan, we mainly came from the South--Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, the Carolinas. As time went on, we became closed. Nobody was really coming to Waukegan from the South anymore, or really anywhere else. When we came from the South, we were usually tired of race problems. We were trying to escape that life in the South, not repeat it. In Waukegan, we found good jobs, and we were finally able to live regular, peaceful lives. We were not going to cause trouble like blacks in Chicago, and we felt we finally lived in a place where we didn't have to participate in, you know, the real warfare that was going on. As time went on, we didn't grow up in Waukegan with parents who were involved in politics, and with good jobs, good homes, peaceful lives, who would want to take on the stress of being an activist? (activist focus group, February 13, 2011).

Adams theorized that Waukegan blacks and Evanston blacks during the pre-Civil Rights era both demonstrated low political activity. When Tammy Brown explained that Evanston had more activists than Waukegan, Adams interjected that activism in Evanston only arose after blacks relocated to the suburb from Chicago: "Activism was in the blood of blacks in Chicago. They all lived together in the same community, and they encouraged each other to be active. They saw black politicians living next door to them, and they made them get involved in politics. Harold Washington got elected because they were activists. Why would you think that when they moved to Evanston they would act any different?" (activist focus group, February 13, 2011).

The assessment of activism provided by Adams and Brown largely mirrors that provided by Evanston activist Jackie Hill. When asked what made her participate in a radical form of political activism in Evanston, Hill explained that those were the types of activities that she saw her parents involved in when she grew up in Chicago, radical protest activity shaped her college experience at Illinois State University, and she continued this activity when she returned home to Chicago. She explained that when
Evanston blacks paid attention to Chicago politics in the 1970s and 1980s, they saw activism at work, and when Harold Washington was elected, they saw the political results that black activism could produce. Jackie Hill explained how activism evolved in Evanston: "When we moved to Evanston from the city, we got really involved in the community. We expected a political atmosphere like Chicago, I think, and I think that if it wasn’t like that, we were automatically going to create it. When we joined organizations in Evanston, we rubbed off on blacks who were from Evanston. We revolutionized politics in Evanston. By the 1980s, radical activism was the way that we demanded political power in Evanston" (activist focus group, November 20, 2010).16

4.6 Social Engagement versus Political Engagement

Because the concept of civic fabric specifically connotes extensive participation in governance outside of City Hall, we can expect that high levels of political engagement, rather than social engagement, are important to a sociopolitical context that encourages incorporation. When civic organizations adopt a political identity, they create a space where residents develop expectations for descriptive representation, policy responsiveness, and full political incorporation, and they organize and strategize to meet these expectations. This is precisely what happened in Evanston. Civic organizations that primarily engage in social activity build social capital, but the concept of social

16 Hill’s chronology of black political activism in Evanston may not be entirely correct. Newspaper accounts of political affairs in Evanston reveal stories of activism much earlier than Hill relayed. Paula Wilcott also counters the suggestion that activism was not inherent to the city’s indigenous black population, stating that she was recruited to Evanston by a group of black leaders who became aware of her activist work in Baltimore and sought her out to conduct the same work in Evanston (personal interview, September 10, 2010).
capital is too thin to capture the political networks and efficacy that are necessary for incorporation. Social engagement builds social capital, but political engagement builds civic capital.

The examples in this section demonstrate that a political identity even filtered into recreational organizations in Evanston. Cultural activities, community discussions, and visits from prominent blacks cultivated political knowledge and efficacy, racial solidarity, and a desire to act in political leadership positions, particularly in a younger generation that eventually fomented demands for incorporation. Again, the tendency for a variety of organizations in Evanston to participate in the political sphere and build cohesion in the black community created a thick civic fabric and a context where black participation in politics was the norm.

Waukegan and Evanston both house a number of black-focused organizations, and these organizations offer a wide variety of activities for their members and residents. A survey of research participants demonstrates that they are involved in the civic life of their city. On average, research participants from Waukegan and Evanston each report being involved in about three organizations in their city. Their current involvement reports a wide variety of activities, both social and political. But, during the Civil Rights Movement at the height of struggles for political incorporation, two institutions served as centers of black political life in each city: the Emerson Street YMCA and the South Genesee Street YMCA in Waukegan. At the time, use of local YMCA facilities was segregated by race, and the Emerson Street YMCA and the South Genesee Street YMCA were created to serve the entire needs of the local black community in each city. Older
residents in each city distinctly recall the environment and activities offered by their local black YMCA.

There are some commonalities in this recollection between Evanston and Waukegan residents. Residents in each city spoke about activities for children, theatrical performances, tutoring, athletic events, writing and poetry clubs, youth conferences, arts and crafts for senior citizens, dance and music lessons, and job fairs. Wayne Thomas, a former school board member in Waukegan, fondly recalled the activities offered at the Waukegan YMCA branch:

I could not wait until school was out so that me and my buddies could rush over to the Y. My father was a driver and my mother was a cook and maid for Mr. Heinz [owner of a local industrial corporation], so we had to go to the Y after school because they didn't get home, you know, until after my mother was done serving their kids dinner. [...] That's where I learned to play basketball. I had more, tougher competition up on Genesee than I did when I played for the high school team. Boy, those guys could play. And the older men would not give us a break. They taught us how to be tough...not just how to be good ball players...but really how to hold our own. I think my dad was grateful for that, but it was hard for him to know that some other men played such an important role in my life, you know my growth, because he had to go work for these other people. But I'm not sure I would have stayed on the straight and narrow if we didn't have them. My little brother was a boy scout there. All the things that boy scouts learn..shoot, I didn't know how to do them, so I couldn't teach Willie...he got it all from them. I would get so mad when they went camping because I never went camping. Sometimes dad would take us fishing on the lake for a day, but Willie was gone for two days. That was like a vacation back then...gone from your family for two days! You thought you had died and become an adult. Yeah we spent more time up at the Y than we really did at home. Most of us would say that most of what we learned came from those days at the Y, wouldn't you say?” (political official focus group, March 6, 2011).

Vivian Lavalle agreed with Thomas:

We sure did! I came from a family that was, you know, up there. I guess you would call it middle class now. My father was a dentist, and we lived on a nicer side of town over by Sheridan. My parents tried to be careful about who we played with. I guess they didn't want some other kids rubbing off on us, you know. My mother was a housewife, so we weren't, you know, like Wayne, they didn't work long hours. But we still begged to go up to Genesee. I remember they had a
Valentine’s Day dance up there. Baby, I wanted to go so bad. My mother was not going to let her princess Vivian—“Vivienne” as she would say with a French accent—dance with those ‘questionables’ as she would call the Waukegan boys. Well I told my folks that my friend Inez’s parents were not letting her go to the dance either, so Inez was having a sleepover for all of us girls who couldn’t go. Well, you know, me and Inez were going to that dance. My parents thought I was at Inez’s house, and Inez’s parents thought she was at my house. Well, to make a long story short, I guess Inez’s mother called my house to check on her—we were too young to really think this thing through. Inez and I were standing outside of the Y with all of our friends after the dance...you know, we would hang out a little bit before we went home. We turned around and who was standing there? Mrs. Lavalle and Mrs. Cole! We about died. (laughter) My mother, she thought she was like Dorothy Dandridge, so here’s this pretty, petite woman...she about dragged me home. But we loved being at the Y so much that it was worth it. But we sure didn’t try that again!” (political official focus group, March 6, 2011).

Blacks from Evanston shared many of the same experiences when they visited the Emerson Street YMCA as Waukegan blacks. Research participants named a number of activities offered by the Emerson Street YMCA in Evanston, including film showings, a chorus, drum and bugle corps, games, boxing lessons, ping pong tournaments, and Sunday teas for young women and their mothers. Residents spoke at length about the black senior prom that was held at the YMCA, as black students were restricted from attending the white senior prom offered at Evanston Township High School. Though the senior prom at Evanston Township High School is now integrated, Michelle Marshfield elaborated that the black and white communities chose to continue the practice of race separated dances. “Black students at the high school, with some help of teachers and other staff, hold the Ebony Ball for juniors—like a junior prom—every year. It’s held off campus at a banquet hall and it’s entirely funded by students. It’s by invitation only, so the students who lead the planning would be very particular about which white students, if any, they would invite. I remember it being a debate every year that the black community and black students would still encourage a segregated dance, but it really was important among black kids and I think blacks who had been in Evanston because our parents who were from Evanston, like my mom, my mom encouraged me to go. She said it would be more fun than prom. I think, we didn’t feel that they should have to be the ones to abandon the dance that we were forced to have many years ago. I remember that when white kids would criticize Ebony Ball, black students would always bring up their Cotillion dance as an example of a white-segregated dance. Cotillion wasn’t segregated—at least on paper—I mean, really, Ebony Ball wasn’t either. But the Cotillion is sponsored by contributions of families of white girls in high school and those girls would be allowed to invite a certain number of guests. My bet is that they were particular about the black students, or how many black kids, they invited...because it never was a lot of us there anyway! Just a handful out of hundreds. But the white students always wanted to go
“Unforgettable: Memories of the Emerson Street Branch YMCA,” one resident recounted the value of the annual Father and Son Banquet to his relationship with his father: "The father and son banquet. That was so special. That I could go to a dinner with my dad...the banquet...I looked forward to that every year because all of us...all nine of us...I never had a chance to go to dinner with my dad because my dad couldn’t afford it. He was a domestic worker. But every year, to go to that dinner and sit there with my dad and my brother, my other two brothers at the time, and be with my dad and all the men. It was fantastic." 

Yet there is an element of activities discussed by visitors of the Emerson Street YMCA that was not shared with members of the South Genesee Street YMCA. In addition to the recreational and social activities that are common to both YMCAs, Evanston residents frequently referred to political activities in which they participated. The Emerson Street YMCA offered historical and pictorial exhibits of black heritage and culture; community/police workshops about local problems; guest speakers, like Robert C. Weaver, the first Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and the first black person to hold a cabinet-level position in the United States; discussions about local affairs or the black community, such as the relationship between the Church and the black community; hearings on local housing practices; discussions of world problems; and community meetings for local churches and organizations. Residents said that this exposure at an early age had a profound impact on their political and racial identity:

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8 http://www.kintera.org/site/c.rvlIlcNWJwe/b.5702961/k.B7BD/Media.htm
Ralph Bunche came to summer school at Northwestern and the Y was the only place that he could stay at that time. The other thing that impressed me so much, that I miss so much, was the mentorship in this community. You looked at them like a father figure. They not only talked the talk, but walked the walk. [...] They talked a lot about being kind to other people and doing things and service. Those values have lasted a lifetime.19

Eleanor Swift’s comments complement this recollection of racial identity and political identity development at the YMCA:

Local people, like Edwin Jourdain. He was our first black alderman in the city. He came to the Y. He was a part of the community, and he would talk to us about school and things going on in our neighborhoods and in the city. He didn’t just make laws or things of that nature. He would come talk to us. And even just seeing...imagine. Imagine you are a child in a time when you are told that you won’t be anything special or you see that it’s going to be really difficult for you to be and do what you want to do. But you get to see all these people, Ralph Bunche, Nat [King] Cole, and even the important people in your own backyard. Being somebody famous or really important doesn’t seem that impossible anymore. The Y let us see that, and the staff made us know that we were supposed to do good in our community from that young age forward (educator focus group, December 4, 2010).

This is in direct contrast to the emphasis on social and recreational activities and a minutia of political activities at the South Genesee Street YMCA, even when research participants were asked to report any activities that encouraged their political participation or addressed concerns of the black community. This is important because research participants were youth when they participated at the YMCA, and the YMCA activities sent an indirect message to them about the expectation of participation in political activities in their city. Indeed, many of the messages that the Emerson Street YMCA provided these children came true. A number of prominent local figures, like

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19 http://www.kintera.org/site/c.rvI1cNWjwE/b.5702961/k.B7BD/Media.htm
Mayor Lorraine Morton and Alderwoman Delores Holmes, were cited as active participants at the Emerson Street YMCA.

4.7 Grassroots Organizing versus National Directives

A thick civic fabric is also built by a configuration of national organizations and grassroots organizations that envision a common goal of black political incorporation. This section provides several examples of grassroots organizations and national organizations in Evanston and Waukegan. In Evanston, these organizations worked together and played a lasting role in electing descriptive representatives, advocating for policies in the interest of black residents, and pushing the city toward full incorporation. In Waukegan, the majority of political organizations were chapters of national organizations, and they were often directed by the imperatives of the national organization. Rather than outlining their own niche, as in Evanston, these organizations in Waukegan jockeyed for prominence. This lack of intraracial collaboration in Waukegan contributed to a thin civic fabric and the inability for the black community to articulate a common strategy for moving through the phases of incorporation.

One key difference is that the number of organizations, over time, that served Evanston's black community greatly outnumbers the organizations present in Waukegan, and struggles for political incorporation in Evanston were largely handled by a plethora of local grassroots organizations in the city. One of the vital qualities of Evanston's civic fabric was the fluidity of organizations in the city meant that organizations would crop up to address particular issues and dismantle once the organization achieved its desired
objectives. To more fluid, reactive organizations, the mark of membership is not the formal, dues-paying membership, but instead real participation in the organization. This fluidity also meant that people in Evanston could attach themselves to the local issues that were most central to their own interests. Evanston's black community is distinct from Waukegan's in that Evanston's black community developed a highly organized and sophisticated civic fabric. Marion Orr's (1999) description of highly developed black social capital in Baltimore provides a description applicable to cities like Evanston:

The presence of such an elaborately organized black community enabled the black leadership to develop a high level of social capital in the form of extensive social networks and civic organizations. The black community there has a long history of racial exclusion and segregation. In response to those experiences, it developed significant common bonds and important internal institutions to combat racial discrimination. Blacks during the early period had the community resources and leadership to form fraternal orders, literary associations, benevolent and mutual-aid societies, and private schools. Black churches were among the few stable and coherent institutions. Black church leadership played a significant role in fostering high levels of civic engagement devoted to protecting black interests. The black church—joined by the local NAACP and the black newspaper—played a crucial role in mobilizing the black community during the Civil Rights Movement (p. 40).

In comparison to Evanston, Waukegan residents cite few examples of local grassroots organizations that were indigenous to Waukegan and bore out of local issues. The city's Booker T. Washington Progressive Club focused on improving civic relationships, and the club sent care packages to servicemen during World War II, contributed to schools in the South and in Lake County, broadcast a radio show on WKRS radio in Waukegan, sponsored plays, and participated in parades. The club's activity was limited though, as its regional focus included southeastern Wisconsin and the northern Illinois suburbs, and it rarely became involved in local political affairs. Organizations in Waukegan, like the
Booker T. Washington Progressive Club, the Lake County Political Club, and the Black People's Congress, had few partners in the city.

The number of issues faced by blacks in Waukegan would get lost in the bureaucracy of large political organizations that dominated the city’s civic fabric. These large organizations paid attention to many issues, but their multiple foci meant that they never sufficiently handled any particular issue. Also, because the popularity of particular organizations may wax and wane, there was little consistent and concentrated effort on particular issues. These large organizations also tended to be branches of national organizations, like the NAACP and the Urban League, and their national focus often caused local concerns to be overlooked. A key example of this, as mentioned earlier, is when the national NAACP office canceled a march scheduled by the Waukegan branch of the NAACP in response to Mayor Robert Sabonjian’s handling of the 1966 race riots. Though the Waukegan branch saw a local need for the march, it acted at the behest of the national organization office that judged the march to be an unnecessary activist act and encouraged the Waukegan branch to negotiate with the mayor instead.

Large, national organizations in Waukegan often failed to possess the finesse that would allow them to focus organizational energy on single issues. Without an extensive fabric of local organizations, efforts in Waukegan were concentrated within the NAACP chapter. As a result, any unresolved disagreements in the organization resulted in larger schisms in the community. For example, in 1999, the Illinois NAACP office called for a

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20 In reality, amidst the Waukegan race riots, it was the national organization office—not local residents—that organized the activities of the Waukegan branch of the NAACP. The national organization found it necessary to organize meetings in the black community to ensure orderly and meaningful action to redress the community’s grievances (personal interview with Clay Adams, November 12, 2010).
new election of officers for the Lake County Branch of the NAACP (including Waukegan) after the losing opponent, Wadell Brooks, claimed that incumbent president Charles Bridgemon brought members of a predominantly white church to vote for him (Zahorik 1999). Brooks claimed a violation of the organization’s election rules, alleging that a great number of voters from the politically active Christian Fellowship Church were allowed to vote while nearly one hundred black voters were turned away; he felt that the church, a predominantly white organization, was attempting to control the NAACP, a black organization. Bridgemon countered that the NAACP was a civil rights organization—not a “black organization”; he said that its members have the right to vote regardless of their race and that the organization has always had white members. The dispute naturally spilled into discussions of the effectiveness of the organization. While Bridgemon asserted that the Lake County branch was active, with growing membership, an organized branch office, and a system for handling complaints about race-based local issues, Brooks responded: “Racism exists. There’s discrimination, but there’s no civil rights activity. They just haven’t tackled anything. The NAACP should take a more aggressive role” (Zahorik 1999: A1).

Brooks’ concern about the 1999 vote was not just that whites were voting in the NAACP, but that the large number of whites who were voting to control the organization were really never involved in the local chapter (while blacks who were involved were turned away from voting). More than a majority of the 175 votes cast were by members of the church. Reverend Peter Paine of Christian Fellowship Church said that about fifty church members, including him, belonged to the NAACP because they supported the
principles of the NAACP. Rev. Paine acknowledged that church members miss regular NAACP meetings, but he stated that so did most NAACP members, as only about 20 people—out of 500 members—attend chapter meetings (Zahorik 1999).

Through larger, national organizations like the NAACP, residents are able to claim membership and support for the ‘principles’ of the organization, but they are able to avoid investing the effort that is necessary to realize political incorporation. Putnam (1995) explains that for social capital to build within and across organizations, organizations must host active and involved membership. Formal, card-carrying membership may not accurately reflect actual involvement in community activities. An individual who claims to be involved in many community organizations may actually be active in none of them, and it is easier for residents to inactively free-ride their way through organization activities. There is a critical difference between going through the empty ritual of organization membership and participating in the real activities that build community power and affect local outcomes (Briggs 1998).

The most prominent black political organization in Waukegan, the NAACP branch, was limited in a number of ways from full involvement in struggles for political incorporation. First, the activities of the NAACP were rarely political in nature. The activities of the Waukegan branch included an incentive-based mentoring and tutoring program at Waukegan High School, a youth council and participation in the state and national ACT-SO academic and talent competition, summer block parties, scholarships for college-bound students, sponsorship of the Afro-Academic Olympics, seminars and
support for fatherless children, and solicitation of residents to participate in a class action lawsuit against mortgage lenders that was filed by the national office.

I think, if you ask most residents, we’re still trying to figure out what they do. They are a force in the city, we all know they exist. But are they really a threat? I don’t know about everybody else here, and sorry if I’m offending someone because I’m not really involved in the NAACP. This is just my perception. The NAACP here ain’t what it’s supposed to be. I don’t know much about the NAACP in other cities, maybe they are just like ours, but I know so many people who have problems with the police. My friend yesterday was just at my house saying that she can’t get her son’s school to follow his special education plan and that’s a violation. I mean, we have real problems here. Who can we really turn to to solve them? I wouldn’t think to call the NAACP (Sharita Cannon, resident focus group, January 8, 2011).

Resident Caren Lloyd responded to Sharita Cannon:

I don’t know if I would blame all that on the NAACP. There’s only so much they can do. They can’t be in the schools, and patrolling the neighborhood with the police, and cleaning up the block. I wouldn’t blame them for that. Maybe we have different definition of what it means to be involved in politics. They hold meetings for us to meet candidates when there’s an election. We got them to rename the school to Carmen-Buckner so that we could have a school named after a black person. If we are going to blame anybody, it should be the mayors and the aldermen, not the NAACP. (Caren Lloyd, resident focus group, January 8, 2011).

But, residents often referred to the city’s Latino population, saying that as blacks were attempting to decide whether they should get involved in local politics or not, Latinos inserted themselves in the political sphere without hesitation. For example, when the Ku Klux Klan planned a rally in Waukegan, the Mexican American Political Organization of Lake County organized with several of the area’s Latino leaders and Latino organizations in Chicago to counter-protest at the Klan rally. Lake County NAACP Branch President Charles Bridgemon stated the NAACP branch would not respond to the Klan rally: “I heard about, I thought about it, and now I’m going to forget about it” (Nelson 1998: A1).
While residents may disagree on the role and effectiveness of the NAACP chapter, they all agreed that the branch needed better visibility and broader membership.

The activity of the NAACP branch is also restricted by its focus on the entire Lake County region, rather than specifically on Waukegan. The Lake County Branch was created in 1997 after years of inactivity in the Waukegan Branch. Prior to 1997, the North Chicago branch focused on the activities of the city of North Chicago, but was accused of being inaccessible, inactive in local civil rights matters, and not open to addressing concerns in other cities in the region. In 1997, the North Shore Minister’s Alliance, political officials, and residents petitioned the national NAACP office to create a larger, regional, Lake County Branch. The new, proposed organized gathered names of 350 residents who were dissatisfied with the current NAACP branch. To stem this request, the North Chicago branch changed its name to the Lake County Branch.

But, the Lake County NAACP chapter has not had much success in juggling their accountability to residents in several cities in the Lake County region. Much of the energy and activities of the organization has focused on concerns in other cities, to the neglect of Waukegan, like ethical concerns about a large donation by a North Chicago alderman to the NAACP branch, charges of excessive force by North Chicago police officers, complaints by Zion residents that they were being discriminated in housing and by police, particularly because of their race and that they moved to Zion from Chicago, and allegations by Highland Park police officers of department-directed racial profiling. It appears that the Lake County NAACP branch did engage in political maneuvering, just not in Waukegan as much as in other cities. For example, the NAACP spearheaded in
effort in North Chicago that resulted in an agreement with the mayor and other city officials calling for the creation of a police advisory council, cultural sensitivity training for all police officers, the implementation of a transparent complaint process, monthly dissemination of a summary of citizen concerns, continued emphasis on recruitment of minority officers, monthly monitoring of traffic stops, bilingual interpretation services, and further community outreach (“Alleged police beating,” 2007: 5). In other words, it is not that the Lake County NAACP branch does not live up to its mission, but its regional focus does not give it the institutional capacity that is necessary to insert itself in Waukegan politics and jockey for black political incorporation in Waukegan.

It is not that these organizations are always ineffective. In cities like Waukegan, historic black organizations such as the Urban League and the NAACP successfully confronted employers, unions, and government agencies over issues of equal opportunity in the labor and housing markets and succeeded in expanding the horizons of opportunity for blacks (Sugrue 1996). But Katherine Tate (1993) notes that the black organizations that are seemingly the most active in local political activity are not traditional civil rights organizations, such as the NAACP, but rather ad hoc, grassroots organizations formed solely for the purpose of mobilizing blacks in the election of a black candidate or concerning a local issue\footnote{\textnormal{Even when Waukegan had grassroots organizations, they were largely ineffective and resorted to symbolic political gestures that did nothing to advance the process of political incorporation. The most prominent grassroots organization is Black Abolition Movement for the Mind, founded by Chris “Brotha” Blanks, a Waukegan activist. While we must maintain a broad definition of political participation when we study black political incorporation, Black Abolition Movement for the Mind demonstrates that in the absence of an expansive, multilayered civic fabric, particular grassroots organizations must engage a number of political tactics in order to be relevant in the local political sphere. Instead, Waukegan’s chief grassroots civil rights organization largely engages in protest mobilizations in the spirit of the Civil Rights Movement.}}. Robert Putnam (1995) adds that these larger,
traditional organizations are not continuously revitalized with new members. Instead, community members tend to look for new, innovative organizations in which they can actively participate; they are more likely to prefer claiming membership in these new organizations than the more traditional organizations that have been longstanding in their communities. Finally, Fung (2004) concludes that longstanding organizations can be paralyzed by equally longstanding divisions that have not been resolved. While advocates of participatory democracy suggest that the greatest threat to organizations lie outside of the organization, Fung (2004) argues that internal divisions among participants may paralyze the group or allow some to dominate. These groups tend to internally lean away from the equality for which they are fighting:

The backstage elements of community discourse (the hidden transcripts) are subject from within to shifting forces and patterns of social control. There are hierarchies, power shifts, and tensions within dominated groups—and of dominators among the dominated. Factions within these groups vie for greater influence over the groups’ front stage performances (Briggs 1998: 9).

These large organizations are also not likely to encourage the creation of smaller, more fluid organizations, and when these organizations attempt to develop, a conflictual relationship typically develops between the new and old organizations. Even in the

Movement. There are several examples to support this: Black Abolition Movement for the Mind gathered with black and Hispanic residents at City Hall to object to racial profiling by the city’s police department and presented signatures from eleven hundred Waukegan residents who claimed they had been profiled by the city’s police officers; a coalition between the Lake County chapter of the National Action Network resulted in the “Justice for All” march in Waukegan to address police shootings and killings of black residents, a culture of racial profiling, excessive force, and police brutality; a rally to organize residents against the city’s vehicle seizure ordinance, which opponents said targeted the poor and underprivileged; picketing a ten million dollar reconstruction of Sheridan Road on the city’s east side which did not employ any black construction workers; and a protest against Lake County State’s Attorney Michael Waller for not prosecuting police officers in the shooting deaths of young black men and the killing of a robber by a Waukegan store clerk. Without a presence of a black activist community, connections to the city’s nationally-based civil rights organization, and a targeted, multilayered approach to political engagement, the work of Black Abolition Movement for the Mind was unable to effectively advance political incorporation in Waukegan.
absence of conflict, highly structured, longstanding groups may be unmotivated to use innovative ideas to solve problems (Fung 2004). This sort of ambivalence created a political stability—a failure to agitate—that disadvantaged blacks in Waukegan. In Evanston, blacks were able to engage in a sort of triangulation that allowed the work of the local NAACP chapter to be complemented by a network of grassroots organizations that adopted prominent roles in addressing issue after issue in the black community. There are numerous examples of the work of these organizations, and their work in the city stretches from early attempts at political empowerment before and during the Civil Rights Movement to the present day.

For example, in 1968, twenty-five demonstrators from the Federation of Citizens for an Unsegregated Society, including thirteen blacks and twelve whites, picketed the high school, accusing the school board of holding secret meetings and hiring too few black teachers. Similarly, in 1970, the District 65 school board adopted three statements presented by representatives of the Evanston Black Caucus who seized the podium at the school board meeting. The demands by Russell Alexander, Ronald Scott Lee, and Iva Wells dealt with changing the process of integration within the school system. The Evanston Black Caucus was vocally supported by members of Concerned Black Parents in Evanston, who felt that the burden of school desegregation—particularly bussing—was placed on black students alone. They were also supported by the Evanston NAACP chapter, which filed a suit in federal court asking that Foster School be reopened in order to reduce this bussing burden. They also demanded that the board president replace the
head of the district’s community relations committee because of his perceived lack of commitment to black community concerns about the school district.

Evanston residents cite a plethora of grassroots organizations—Federation of Citizens for an Unsegregated City, Evanston Black Caucus, Concerned Black Parents in Evanston, West Side Community Council, Evanston Consolidated Community Organization, 8th Ward Empowerment Association, Citizens for District 65, and the Evanston Athletic Association, among others—as examples of how they were able to concentrate their efforts in particular areas or focus on single issues.

In some ways, we benefitted from anonymity. They didn’t really know who we were or that we even existed. We didn’t protest or march to the alderwoman’s house. And, if we did expose ourselves, we carefully the selected the one person that was going to carry our message back to the city. They never knew who was coming, and they never knew how many people were behind them. There was a lot of behind-the-scenes work...organizing, strategizing... making what appeared to be individual contacts. We would use our parents to build a one-on-one relationship with the principal, to really get to know them and get along with them. The principal would think ‘this is a really nice parent’ and start to talk to them more and more. But really we were planting seeds...we were building relationships of trust so that we could address problems with the education of our black children that seemed to be just regular conversations but were actually formally organized. We could never be misguided, because they never knew who all of us were (Paula Wilcott, activist focus group, November 20, 2010).

The activists agreed that this was the strategy that they collectively adopted in Evanston; they were familiar with each other and reported that together they often shuffled between organizations—selecting the right people to organize about a particular problem.

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22 For example, Roosevelt Alexander, a prominent alderman of the city’s 5th ward from 1970 to 1982 had also been a leader of the Evanston Black Caucus, the NAACP, and Citizens for District 65, an organization created to protest the firing of Gregory Coffin as superintendent of District 65. “We recognized that we each played a role in black politics. The NAACP was the "safe" organization. Of course, the majority of members were black but most people who thought of the NAACP think of it as this organization for blacks and whites. It won’t do too much... a few marches, maybe a few lawsuits. We channeled most of our more
The civic fabric in the black community reflects upon the spirit of collaboration and partnership within the black community and the propensity of organizations to open plans for agitation to other groups. Verba and Nie (1972) explain that those who participate in politics provide the opinions to which government responds. A thin, siloed civic fabric means that demands for political incorporation never move through the proper (or best) networks and gain momentum. A thin civic fabric also means that the civic fabric is not sophisticated enough to handle the front door negotiating and the backdoor maneuvering that is central to struggles for political incorporation.

4.8 Will Just Any Civic Fabric Do?

We can trace disparate political outcomes in Evanston and Waukegan, in part, to differences in black civic life in each city. Several works criticize the foundational social capital literature for using a simple accounting of the number of organizations in a city to measure the degree of social capital present in the city (for an example, see Fischer 2001). To understand whether the civic fabric is one that can facilitate the process of political incorporation, we must examine both the quantity and the quality of local organizations that address black affairs. The outcomes of political incorporation attempts in each city are reflective of the quality and characteristics of local black organizations. In other words, just any civic fabric will not be sufficient to advance political empowerment in each city.

direct, I guess you’d say radical, acts through the other organizations. But that doesn’t mean that we were against the NAACP. We were all a part of it all. We just knew that everybody had to play their position” (Renee Taylor, activist focus group, November 20, 2010).
Lower political participation and an inability to sufficiently insert blacks into the local political sphere in order to achieve incorporation in Waukegan is not a reflection of residents themselves; people participate in politics, not because of who they are, but because of the political choices they are offered (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba et al. 1995; Miller 2009). Without a network of black organizations that could transmit civic engagement and political information to black residents, blacks in Waukegan did not have spaces in which they could learn the value of political incorporation, nor did they have spaces in which they could discuss ongoing political concerns. Blacks in Waukegan lacked a variety of organizations that viewed incorporation as part of their mission; a combination of national and local organizations that could triangulate in their mobilizations for incorporation; and the ability to successfully form common goals and strategies between the existing organizations. Instead, it was these three key elements in the civic fabric that enabled incorporation in Evanston. Therefore, the thin civic fabric in Waukegan meant that the local sociopolitical context negatively influenced demands for political incorporation in the city.

The opposite case resulted in Evanston: a thick civic fabric continually turned the wheels of political incorporation. Black organizations mobilized early in the city’s history to support the election of black alderman as descriptive representatives. These aldermen advocated for revitalization of the black community, yielding new schools, roads, and community centers, among others. Black organizations pounded away, mobilizing, electing black officials, articulating their policy demands—over and over—until the city achieved full incorporation. Diminished political participation in Waukegan does not lie
within inherent, individual-level differences between blacks in Evanston and blacks in Waukegan. Instead, Waukegan’s thin civic fabric meant that the city had a sociopolitical context that was unable to nurture attempts at political incorporation. At every crisis point that could serve to unite blacks in their demands for political empowerment, there was no local civic fabric that nurtured these demands.

The lack of political incorporation in Waukegan became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Blacks who feel that the political system is not responsive or who are less trusting of government and government officials, like blacks in Waukegan, are less likely to participate than those who feel that the system is responsive and who are trusting of government (Tate 1993). Disaffected individuals who find the system unyielding to change, even in the face of collective demands, will not participate in local civic life (Miller et al. 1981). Those who are less likely to participate in the "soft" forms of political participation are less likely to participate in the more traditional forms of political participation, which also produce and sustain political incorporation (Tate 1993). On the other hand, the thick civic fabric in Evanston presented a number of choices that allowed blacks to actively participate in politics in the ways that best served them. The process of political incorporation in Evanston benefitted from a thick civic fabric that allowed demands for political incorporation to be channeled through an array of organizational networks that focused on politics in different arenas and using different tactics.

A thick civic fabric is central to the process of political incorporation, and highly engaged civic organizations propel the process of political incorporation forward. A thick civic fabric provides opportunities for blacks to strategize and act, and it cultivates local
black leadership. Black organizations can pool scarce resources, educate their members about political matters, and provide additional incentives and motivations for getting involved in politics (Tate 1993). This type of participation reinforces racial group consciousness, and racial group consciousness encourages continued black mobilizations and demands for political recognition (Miller et al. 1981).

If black organizations are present to build group consciousness, then they build a sociopolitical context in which blacks connect their interests to other blacks and recognize that their livelihood is inseparable from other blacks in their community. Group consciousness also leads to an increasingly politicized identity: blacks begin to blame inequalities in their community, not on individual failings, but on inequities in decision-making and access to resources—precisely the recognition that causes blacks to vie for incorporation. Believing that a change in the system is necessary to correct social and political inequities leads people to identify with groups and commit themselves and their resources to collective action in search of political empowerment (Miller et al. 1981).

4.9 Conclusion

Looking back to the context-oriented model proposed by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) and presented in Chapter 1, I find that as Evanston approached each fork in the road that could push it to the next phase of political incorporation, an organized black civic fabric helped propel Evanston through the phases of incorporation. Black organizations cultivated racial solidarity and expectations of political empowerment in the mobilization phase, helped elect descriptive representatives and strategize for
substantive representation in the representation phase, and coordinated activism and advocacy for particular policies in the policy responsiveness phase. Again, it was a thick civic fabric that directed Evanston at each fork in the road that could have advanced or halted incorporation. A disorganized black civic fabric in Waukegan, on the other hand, failed to make the black community successful in the mobilization phase. Black organizations were focused too broadly on county-level concerns, directed by national imperatives, untrained to adopt activist stances, and too risk-averse to issue political demands. As a result, the possibilities of black organizations participating in governance were deferred to an increasingly powerful city government.

The following chapter focuses on the next part of the sociopolitical context that this dissertation examines, local political leadership and culture. Similar to this chapter, the next chapter contends that an open political culture and liberal leadership in Evanston also carried the city through the phases of incorporation, while a closed political culture and conservative leadership in Waukegan, like the thin civic fabric, hindered any progress through the phases of incorporation.
5. PLURALIZED AND POLARIZED: POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE IN EVANSTON AND WAUKEGAN

In 1969, the Evanston elementary school board sought to find a replacement for embattled school superintendent, Dr. Gregory Coffin. Blacks in Evanston disagreed with the decision of the school board. They wished to retain Dr. Coffin because of his unwavering advocacy of honest conversations about race and racial integration and his support of school desegregation. Simply put, the city’s black community thought that Coffin’s focus on African-American students led to his demise. Indeed, support for Dr. Coffin was split along racial lines, as the all-white school board fired a superintendent overwhelmingly supported by the black community. While the school board denied that their decision was racially motivated, the black community felt that Dr. Coffin’s removal was a reflection of a school board that was not elected to represent the interests of the black community.

At that time, Evanston used a caucus system to elect school board candidates. Blacks charged that the caucus system was controlled by affluent, white conservatives from the north side of Evanston. In other words, the caucus system was controlled by whites to elect white candidates who would not support school leadership that vocally advocated for the city’s black community. There was only one black person on the caucus, Dr. Carl Cheeks. The caucus claimed, contrary to the city’s history, that those
from North Evanston were most active in city affairs, and therefore residents of the city’s north side had the most knowledge about local affairs and were best able to represent the interests of the city’s residents. Blacks wanted to retain Dr. Coffin because he supported school desegregation, and they did not support the caucus system because they felt they could only obtain seats on the school board if they were able to run their own candidates. Blacks in Evanston did not think they could change the caucus from within.

Evanston resident Russell Alexander helped create the city’s Black Caucus, which would insert the interests of the black community in the discussion about and replacement of Dr. Gregory Coffin. As the school board discussed the removal of Dr. Coffin from office, the Black Caucus, with Alexander at the helm, resorted to radical means. For example, when members of the Black Caucus discovered that board member Franklin Gagen lived in Williamsburg Village, an Evanston subdivision that had a restrictive covenant banning blacks from homeownership, members of the Black Caucus took the podium from Gagen at a school board meeting. When members of the Black Caucus took over a school board meeting at Chute Middle School, Russell Alexander was revered by the black community and hated and feared by whites. But it was not that Alexander was viewed as a radical outlier of the black community. He was a leader of the Black Caucus, the Evanston NAACP, and Citizens for District 65 which was created to protest the firing of Dr. Coffin. Alexander wasn’t an outlier of black politics in Evanston; he was black politics in Evanston (personal interview with Paula Wilcott, September 30, 2010).
With support from black residents and black businesses and organizations like the Ebony Bookstore and the Black Youth Council, at 28 years old, Alexander rose to political prominence in the black community after being elected alderman of the city's 5th ward—a ward evenly split among blacks and whites. When Alexander was elected, he stood outside Evanston's City Hall and shouted, "All power to the people in the people's building! We are going to have full recognition in this town now" ("Alexander on City Council," 1970: 10). Though Coffin left Evanston, in 1970, Alexander drafted an agreement by the city's elementary school district school board that blacks would be participants in policy-making by the school board. As a result of the agreement, black participants would be allowed a share of the responsibility when the school board made important decisions, such as a new superintendent to replace Coffin. A seven-member committee selected by the black community was put into place and participated equally with the school board. After Alexander was beaten twice by the Evanston police while serving as alderman, and while his family had nine confrontations with police since he advocated for a civilian review board, Alexander created the Coalition for Community Control of Police, which had 45 black and white members. He also won a lawsuit against the Evanston Police Department for harassment, and in 1973, the Evanston City Council limited "stop and frisk" rights of police officers, saying that police officers must be in danger of attack in order to stop and search civilians. A suspect having a criminal record or being in the vicinity of a crime was insufficient for police contact. Alexander served as alderman from 1970-1982. Alexander served within a long line of black aldermen in
Evanston who continued to represent the city’s black community, agitate the local political structure, and advance blacks in the process of political incorporation.

In a city with little black representation, like Waukegan, just one black political official can leave an indelible mark on the advancement of political incorporation. Alderman Robert Evans (1st ward) is thought to be the most prominent black alderman in Waukegan’s history. Evans was elected at the same time as another black alderman, Richard Nixon (5th ward), though Nixon served one term and Evans served for 18 years. Evans and Nixon were the only black aldermen present in Waukegan until 1987. Evans came from a Waukegan family that supported Sabonjian in his early political years, and when a vacancy opened on the City Council in 1969, Sabonjian appointed Evans to the position. In the 1971 election, when four white aldermen supported by Sabonjian were defeated, Evans and Nixon were the only two black candidates who ran, and the only two who won. But, in the City Council, Evans became Sabonjian’s right hand man; his loyalties to Sabonjian often meant that he legislated at the expense of the city’s black community. For example, Evans used a little-known and rarely-used Illinois state statute to target drug activity in the city’s black community (McClory 1974). The statute allowed anyone to petition the court alleging a drug offender without probable cause, and it permitted their unlimited detention without bail. The statute allowed unsworn and unsubstantiated accusations, it placed the burden of proof on the accused, and it required neither trial nor legal representation if the person failed a drug test. Evans activated the statute on the city’s black south side. The only person to use the statute was Evans; he petitioned the court to pick up several people, including an 18 year old Waukegan girl.
But Evans himself claimed that despite his prominent role, blacks like him in Waukegan were targeted by white officials. In 1987, he was charged with perjury in a paternity lawsuit, saying that it was difficult being the city’s only black elected official. He ran unsuccessfully for mayor. In 1988, he was solely targeted in a land buying scheme, though whites participated in the scheme with him. He used two cash payoffs to hide his secret ownership of properties bought by the city of Waukegan at inflated prices. The federal government charged that he engaged in a conspiracy to defraud the government. Additionally, in 1994, he was charged with participation in a voting fraud scheme. He got people to order absentee ballots, marked them himself, and turned them into county election authorities.

The stories of Russell Alexander in Evanston and Robert Evans in Waukegan are revealing because, arguably, the most valued outcome of political incorporation is the presence of descriptive representatives who are expected to lead with the best interests of their racial counterparts in mind. Descriptive representation is the presence in policymaking positions of individuals whose salient social characteristics reflect those in the constituency as a whole (Welch and Bledsoe 1988). But descriptive representatives are not just valuable for the results that they are able to produce. Rostenstone and Hansen (1983) explain that people are likely to participate in politics when political leaders, particularly those that share their political belief system, encourage them to take part in the local political sphere. Thus, when we focus on black political incorporation as a process, then we see that descriptive representatives are responsible for encouraging blacks to mobilize for incorporation, for placing blacks in a position to achieve increasing
political gains and representation and, thus, for moving them through the phases of policy responsiveness and full incorporation. In smaller cities, like suburbs, there are fewer chances for descriptive representation, and therefore, descriptive representatives who do come into power play a pivotal role in the political outcomes for African-Americans. Descriptive representatives often set the tone—in the case of Evanston, a radical representative shapes the framework of black political demands, and in the case of Waukegan, a co-opted representative works within an already closed system to further limit the opportunities for black incorporation.

Alderman Russell Alexander of Evanston and Alderman Robert Evans of Waukegan demonstrate that the local political system and even black representation in each city sits on opposite ends of the spectrum. This chapter details a true tale of two cities, both with political leadership and political culture that played a vital role in political incorporation—one with “pluralizing” strategies to increase black political power, and the other with a “polarizing” strategy that severely restricted black political power, particularly during the vital period of the Civil Rights Movement\(^\text{23}\).

5.1 The Framework of Open and Closed Civic Cultures

I find that Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) present a helpful framework of “civic culture” for understanding the differences in political culture and leadership in Evanston and Waukegan. According to Almond and Verba, a closed political culture blocks outsiders from entering the political system, while an open political culture offers

\(^{23}\) "Pluralized" and "polarized" cities yield different preferred strategies for obtaining political power and different evaluations of descriptive representatives (Levine 1974).
new groups the opportunity to influence decision-making. They term an open political culture as “civic culture”: a pluralistic culture based on communication, persuasion, consensus, and diversity where the previously excluded “can enter into politics, and in a process of trial and error, find the language in which to couch their demands and the means to make them effective” (p. 6). In this chapter, I seek to demonstrate that political leadership in Waukegan created a closed political culture, while the political leadership in Evanston created an open political culture.

Additionally, I find this framework valuable to tie political leadership together with the civic fabric discussed in the previous chapter. Almond and Verba (1963) explain that civic cultures exhibit civic cooperation, or the propensity to work with others with a specific goal of influencing the government. In cities with open political cultures, like Evanston, blacks are more likely to forge a thick civic fabric and work with others to demand empowerment. Why is this? Almond and Verba explain that the political culture is internalized and begins to reflect the psychological orientation of citizens toward their government. The propensity to form groups and cooperate with others are tied to how one has been socialized in their local political culture. In my estimation, this helps explain why blacks in Evanston had the motivation and validation, through an open political culture, to keep agitating for power, while the efforts of blacks in Waukegan were debilitating and eventually self-defeating. This chapter describes how Waukegan maintained a closed political system by manipulating co-opted black elites; opening the

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24 I also find this framework valuable because it demonstrates that civic fabric, political culture and leadership, and racial dynamics and entwined in the sociopolitical context, each having immeasurable impact on the other.
political system to Latinos at the expense of blacks; and demonstrating outward racial hostility toward black residents and leaders. In Evanston, both black and white leaders contributed to creating and maintaining an open political system by mobilizing resources to benefit blacks, aligning the interests of the black community with those of the city, and encouraging blacks to participate in civic cooperation. Though Evanston’s open culture did not always result in the multiracial alliances that many expected, the basic value of an open culture in Evanston created many avenues for blacks to pursue political power. The following sections describe the political culture and leadership in Waukegan and Evanston and demonstrate that Evanston was home to an open political culture, while Waukegan exhibited a closed political culture.

The concept of political culture has a significant impact on the model of political incorporation. An open political culture lowers the barriers to political incorporation, and it creates a terrain in which the black community can more easily move through the four phases of incorporation. Open and liberal political cultures are not without opposition to black political incorporation, but they create a civic environment that rationally expects the opportunity for political power to be allocated to all residents. Closed political cultures, on the other hand, create formidable obstacles for black communities moving through the phases of incorporation. In cities like Waukegan, a closed political culture without a thick civic fabric to overcome the obstacles and opposition created by the closed system virtually guarantees a lack of political incorporation.
5.2 Waukegan

In 2003, the Waukegan City Council welcomed its new elected officials into office amidst a theme of “Diversity.” Among the new officials was the city’s first African-American female Alderwoman Edie Newsome of the 5th ward. Alderman Rafael Rivera of the 7th ward applauded the vision of diversity that he saw on the City Council: “When you look at this council, it is a very diverse council, (and) we worked hard to make that happen. The city of Waukegan is a diversified city, and a wonderful example of what a community in Lake County should be” (Moran 2003). Rivera’s comments reflect a hasty judgment that the presence of black officials is a sign of political incorporation, which is particularly troublesome given the legacy of racial exclusion within the city’s political sphere. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) explain that power is not signaled by the mere election of descriptive representatives, but instead participation in decision-making that can only be analyzed after careful examination of a series of concrete decisions. An examination of the city’s political sphere, including decision-making, reveals that power does not lie within the city’s black community. The city’s political leadership—white, Latino, and black—contributed to a sociopolitical context that prioritized symbolic representation over full political incorporation. Table IX outlines the political realities in Waukegan that served as obstacles to political incorporation.

5.2.1 “It Takes More than a Whole Lot of Us”
Civil rights proponents expected that the significant presence of blacks in cities and their participation in elections would result in full citizenship rights (Lawson 1997), but the case of Waukegan reveals that having a significant percentage of black residents was an insufficient condition.

**Table IX. Key Impacts of Political Leadership on Black Political Incorporation in Waukegan**

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<th>Impact</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Having a high percentage of black residents was insufficient for electoral victories in the city.</td>
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<td>White voters expressed hostility toward black candidates and officials.</td>
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<td>White political leaders engaged in “tokenism,” often selecting a single black official for particular political roles and deeming that sufficient representation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>White political officials never determined that black political concerns were in the interest of the city.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black political officials experienced cooptation and alienation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The mayoral tenure of Robert Sabonjian effectively locked blacks out of political incorporation during a period of time significant to incorporation struggles.</td>
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for black electoral victories. As Karnig and Welch (1980) explain, a high percentage of black residents is probably an important, though not sufficient, condition for black electoral victories in local races. The size of the black population has a strong, negative effect on both white racial attitudes and white policy preferences. A higher percentage of blacks means greater antiblack effect, increased racial resentment, and a greater sense of racial group conflict (Hajnal 2001). Aside from increased racial hostility, Brenda Calvin
explains the number of forces that blacks encountered in local politics was often difficult to counteract:

There are so many powers-that-be that aren’t elected who control politics in this city. Those factory CEO’s get listened to more than us, and we can’t control anything about them. Yeah, they might come to us on issues that affect African-Americans specifically, like closing a school in a particular neighborhood, but in terms of the real policies that affect the whole city? Even when we do elect an African-American, they get sucked in—you know, the pressure is too great—they’re alone so they can’t really do too much anyway. It takes more than a whole lot of us to have a say in any city (political official focus group, March 6, 2011).

In Waukegan, the presence of a significant black population was also insufficient because it was offset by a significant Latino population. While minority communities united in some cities to realize political incorporation for both groups, in Waukegan, blacks and Latinos were pitted against each other.

They used the classic divide-and-conquer. Whites knew they had to join with someone because they were quickly becoming the minority. They didn’t choose us. I don’t know why. I think because they couldn’t manage us. We had been here too long. I think the Mexicans were new and they could control and, you know, manipulate them. Jobs, nice neighborhood, cars, and some little political roles if they promised to just go along (Ronnie Lloyd, activist focus group, February 13, 2011).

Wanda Watts added that Waukegan was more supportive of Latino political empowerment than black political empowerment, and this created disillusionment with local politics in the black community:

Look at how many Hispanic officials there are and have been. That’s not just because there are a lot of Hispanics here because then that means we should have a lot of aldermen too. They’re there because they were put there, not because they earned to be there. And we saw it wasn’t fair-and-square, we knew we weren’t going to get anywhere. So yeah, we pulled out. People stopped voting, stopped protesting, stopped putting pressure on them. That was a waste of time and energy to somebody with a 9-to-5. (Wanda Watts, activist focus group, Wanda Watts, February 13, 2011).

One source of black disempowerment might be that the arrival of increasing numbers of blacks into Waukegan during the Great Migration (as well as the Civil Rights Movement)
meant that the black population was increasing just as interracial tensions were in American cities (Biles 1992). Research participants expressed that the 1966 riots—a rare occurrence in suburban areas, even given the time period—made blacks “untouchables” in local politics. That stigma remained with the black population for decades and contributed to a sociopolitical context that treated blacks with hostility.

The sociopolitical context in Waukegan displayed hostility toward black residents, and black officials report feeling that they were treated as less than non-black officials. For example, Lake County Board member Angelo Kyle criticized Waukegan-based State Representative Eddie Washington for having “no working relationship” with the city. Though Kyle himself is black, Washington reported that his criticism was reflective of the sentiment he fielded as a black politician. Washington cited all of the local projects for which he received no credit, adding: “I get a black eye and the only reason I’ve got opposition—the only reason—is because I want to be somebody’s equal. I won’t go along just to get along” (Moran 2007). Similarly, when Reverend C.L. Fairchild ran for Mayor of Waukegan, he was taunted as a “criminal,” “a convicted felon,” and “the Rev. Felon” because of a felony conviction he received in the 1970s. George Goutanis, who was also running for mayor, said that Rev. Fairchild did not belong in politics: “A felon is a felon is a felon” (Moran 2002). Support for black candidates decreases in districts with large black populations because of white fears of black empowerment (O’Loughlin 1980).

Colburn and Adler (2001) account for hostility toward potential black political power in Waukegan, explaining that a sizeable segment of whites are hostile to black candidates and their black officials. Given the choice, the vast majority of Americans will
vote for a white candidate, even if it means switching parties (Colburn and Adler 2001; Hajnal 2001). Former county commissioner Allen Brown explained that black officials from Waukegan remained in the good graces of whites as long as they appeared both solely focused on black issues and in control of the black community: “If we had larger political aspirations, we were careful who we shared it with because we knew that stepping out of their lines meant political suicide for us” (personal interview, January 22, 2011).

Waukegan’s political context is one that devalues descriptive representation and black empowerment. The actions of Waukegan officials demonstrated a local political philosophy of control—black political officials’ control over black residents and white political officials’ control over black political officials. To accomplish this, whites either maintained leadership over black wards, and when no longer able to, they advanced what activist Chris Blanks called a “black puppet politician”—a token black official who could control and be controlled. This control allowed political leaders to temper opportunistic black officials and reduce calls for greater citizen participation and control (Briggs 1998).

Cheryl Walker-Hickman, a former candidate for city treasurer, explained that politics in Waukegan was not designed to provide minority representation:

This city’s government should reflect the make-up of our city. That concept...gave birth to the Waukegan coalition. The Waukegan Independent Coalition [an election slate] stands for inclusion. Our form of government will reach out to all. We will attempt to implement change. The Coalition stands for people coming together -- people of all races, ages, genders and backgrounds coming together to form a city government ... that will represent all people and not just a select few. The city government in place only represents the Caucasian community (Zahorik 2000).
Jack Potter, a former mayoral candidate and member of the slate added: “If there’s been inclusion, it’s been by accident or politics, not by design” (Zahorik 2000).

Indeed, white officials did not embrace or encourage political incorporation or descriptive representation. Responding to a statement that Waukegan government represents whites only, local official and future mayor Dan Drew replied: “That is ludicrous. We may not be diverse—we’re all three white haired Caucasian males—but we were voted in by a very diverse population” (Zahorik 2000). Similarly, Mayor Richard Hyde, speaking about the need to prepare more Latino officials for leadership positions said, “I’m not going to put anyone on a board just because they are black, white, or Hispanic, only qualified people” (Pagelow 2004). White Waukegan officials were accused of hoarding power, targeting token blacks for positions, and promulgating a closed culture that alienated black voters and kept them from forcing their way to political incorporation (activist focus group, February 13, 2011).

5.2.2 Are Black Concerns in the City’s Interest?

Cities have their own interests, and these interests are often represented by white officials and are contrary to the interests of the black community. Substantive representation means that the policies of the representative are in the interest of the represented (Welch and Bledsoe 1988), but white elites take for granted the need to take some notion of black interests into account when making public policy (Reed 1997). Political institutions do not handle explosive, conflictual issues well (Pinderhughes 1987), especially when they are perceived as favoring one group or another (Levine 1974).
Charles Taylor recounted the story of a white Waukegan School District administrator who sued the school district, charging that she was demoted to a lesser position because she is white, and the board members who voted against her are black. Taylor explained that race had nothing to do with her removal (“White people get the benefit of just not being competent”). He stated that board members felt that it was simply in the interests of the school district (educator focus group, October 28, 2010).

Indeed, politics functions through equal competing group interests (Pinderhughes 1987). But these interests are not always within the interests of the city. Policies and programs can be said to be in the interest of cities whenever the policies maintain or enhance the economic position, social prestige, or political power of the city taken as a whole (Peterson 1981). In Waukegan, like in many other cities, a fundamental struggle for black politicians was framing issues that were of concern for blacks as issues that were in the interest of the city.

It seems minor, but one of our biggest problems was getting people to see how important the vehicle seizure law was to us. This was what seemed like a neutral political issue that actually was racially charged to us. African-Americans and Hispanics thought that the law targeted us. Whites thought it was just a regular law that couldn’t possibly have any drawbacks. The mayor said that its sole purpose was to ensure the safety of the roads. I don’t think they saw that it really wasn’t about the law for us. It was more about what African-Americans and Hispanics felt was regular attack by police on our communities. Sam Cunningham [a black alderman] said that we must learn to respect authority. It wasn’t about respecting authority! It was about the misuse of authority against us persistently and consistently. We just couldn’t explain that their ‘vital law’ was really targeting us, and we didn’t trust it (Clay Adams, activist focus group, February 13, 2011).

Within cities, there are diverse social roles, a multiplicity of interests, and the fluctuation of power relations from issue to issue (Greenstone and Peterson 1973; Peterson 1981). Blacks lacked the electoral strength to put their issues on the agenda, and political
exclusion was facilitated by a political sphere that consistently downgraded black interests.

Blacks were also often simply co-opted. Waukegan’s white elected officials were able to co-opt potential and existing black leadership very early in the city’s history. Again, if we concentrate our attention, not on the sources of power, but its exercise (Bachrach and Baratz 1962), then we see the election of officials such as Robert Evans—not as an example of political incorporation but instead an example of black political cooptation. In competitive cities, leaders of power-holding white factions may seek to bargain with black leaders and satisfy them with cooptative personal rewards (Keiser 1997).

Cooptation is rooted in Waukegan’s quasi-machine system of political patronage. Like in most cities, the first wave of black candidates was strenuously opposed by majorities of white voters, labor groups, and white businesses (Thompson 2005). Machine governments centralize influence in cities, and they receive a genuine support from poor whites and white ethnics (Banfield and Wilson 1966). As a city of working-class immigrants, Waukegan adopted the machine ethos.

Black political officials in Waukegan typically became clients of political machines, as they believed that service to the machine could benefit them. Black candidates promised to de-emphasize race, promote efficient government, and offer strategies to lure investors to strengthen downtown businesses and create jobs. These black leaders went out of their way to distance themselves from black radicalism or black civil rights era leaders (Thompson 2005). Black political organizations also often became sub-machines
to larger white machines. Blacks found that they could not produce economic benefits for themselves similar to those the machine once offered, without making the commitment of political energy and loyalty that machine organizations required (Eisinger 1979). Blacks received some recognition and rewards for their contributions, but they remained subservient to the white machine. Moreover, blacks did not benefit as much as European ethnics from their machine connections—in the case of Waukegan, the greatest benefit went to Armenian immigrants like mayors Robert Sabonjian and Jack Hoogasian. For many immigrant groups, the political machine provided one of the primary agents for socialization, a generous alternative source for social welfare, and an accessible avenue for upward social mobility. The machines routinely absorbed white ethnics into leadership positions, but black leaders continued to wield influence solely within the black community, if at all (Biles 1992). By co-opting black leadership, white leaders diminished black opportunities for participation in governing decisions and effectively disempowered Waukegan’s black community.

5.2.3 The Legacy of Robert Sabonjian

There are several examples of black co-optation in Waukegan, most of them centered during the mayoral tenure of Robert Sabonjian. Sabonjian is accused of single-handedly locking blacks out of political power in Waukegan by strategically giving power to particular blacks. Sabonjian often used Alderman Robert Evans as an example that he embraced the city’s black community and nurtured black political leadership, but
Sabonjian used Evans in a co-opted political role to control the community and amplify Sabonjian’s power over the community:

I’ve got a guy on my city council who I feel is worth 20 policemen. That’s Bobby Evans, the black alderman. Bobby and I understand each other. I never lie to him; he never lies to me. He doesn’t cross me, and I don’t cross him. But he goes down to these black neighborhoods and says: ‘Hey man cool it. That mayor is all right. He takes care of our people. He’s fair with us (Cross 1976: 69).

By controlling power in the city and serving as a strong mayor, he held great appeal over the black community when he appeared to be making concessions to the community (rather than distributing power and decision-making to them)\(^{25}\). For example, when the Lake County Urban League asked him for help in finding office space for the organization, Sabonjian negotiated the opportunity for them to occupy an abandoned office building for free. The Urban League thanked the mayor profusely, with Executive Director George Dillard calling Sabonjian, “the smartest man in Waukegan” (Cross 1976).

But though Sabonjian would get blacks what they wanted, he didn’t give them the power that they wanted. Sabonjian would often point to the “diversity” of the municipal workforce to explain that blacks had sufficient representation, resources, and political access in Waukegan:

I’ve got black girls in the traffic department, in the health department, in the building department...It isn’t tokenism. [...] Whatever you want, I’ve got ‘em. Because it’s easier for a black guy to go down and say ‘Look, man, you got a mess here, man, so clean it up.’ If a white guy goes in, a black guy resents whitey

\(^{25}\) Levine (1974) explains that in polarized communities, like Waukegan, domination becomes the most salient political goal and the hegemony of one group over the other is the likely outcome. Mayors who are able to skillfully mask this domination with examples of concessions and favors to the black community do receive black electoral support. In fact, many votes for Sabonjian came from the black community, though many suspected election fraud. When Sabonjian won 75 percent of the black vote, his opponent William Morris, said: “The guy who made a career as a public racist is getting black support” (Myers and Mahany 1985). While it is not clear whether Sabonjian indeed received that much electoral support, he made black voters to believe that his political tenure bettered the city’s black community. But Allen Brown likely summed up black views about Sabonjian being the lesser of two evils: “If it wasn’t him, it was another” (personal interview, January 22, 2011).
coming into his place. [...] This is the language of the streets. So if we’re enjoying a relatively good atmosphere in Waukegan, without the problems of riots and throwing rocks, it’s because there’s a spirit of trust within the ethnic community (Cross 1976: 67).

Sabonjian does not point out that, while he freely hired “black girls” in the city for secretarial or “black guys” for maintenance positions, aside from Alderman Evans, he never appointed blacks for positions in which they could exercise real power. Alderman Evans said he backed the mayor even when his relations with the black community had reached a low point, and agreed with the way that Sabonjian characterized the rioters—as “baseheads, winos, hopheads, and drunks”—a point of contention between Sabonjian and the city’s black community (Cross 1976). Even Alderman Evans would admit the pressure that is placed on a co-opted, token black official. An alderman for 18 years and an unsuccessful mayoral candidate, he was the city’s only black elected official until the late 1980s. Amidst the charges, Alderman Evans explained that his political path had been difficult as the city’s only black elected official.

Robert Sabonjian was supported by white residents, business and financial interests, and even black residents and officials in limiting black political empowerment. Sabonjian would frequently counter that he was attributed with more political power than he actually possessed. While officials often deny that they lack the authority to influence behavior and attitudes (Reed 1997), the example of Sabonjian reveals that political leadership greatly influences the quality of life in a city and resident feelings about their place within the larger political structure.

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26 Cole (1976) explains that Sabonjian may have truly believed that blacks were incorporated in local politics. He explains that white and black mayors differ in their perceptions of what constitutes adequate descriptive representation for blacks (Cole 1976).
Sabonjian’s mayoral tenure was one filled with conflict and disagreement, most often brought on by himself. For example, when defeated in election by candidate Bill Morris, Sabonjian left a picture of himself on the desk with a note to Morris: “Good luck, you Irish S.O.B” (McManus 1977). In other words, it was not just “political” in Waukegan, it was “personal,” and the Mayor craftily controlled power to locks blacks out of the political system. Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2004) explain that democracies are not designed to eliminate political conflict and disagreement, but public displays of intolerance, like those by Sabonjian, are symptomatic of a broader unwillingness to tolerate diverse voices within the political sphere. Comments by elites provide cues about how an issue connects with their personal beliefs, and the way that elites talk about issues affects how members of the public both evaluate and understand political topics. People interpret politics through frames used by elites. In the case of Mayor Sabonjian, his “shoot to kill” orders of black suspects, labeling of black residents as irresponsible, and role in a generally negative political climate provided cues that contributed to a racially hostile sociopolitical context. Elite-provided frames are successful in getting people to view political issues in certain ways because these frames resonate with the perspectives people already used to think and communicate about politics in their own lives. Messages sent by elites provide roadmaps that help residents make political judgments (Walsh 2004); therefore, black residents feared that Sabonjian’s politics continue to resonate in Waukegan today (resident focus group, January 8, 2011; civil rights organization focus group, February 9, 2011).
5.3 Evanston

Contrary to Waukegan, political leadership in Evanston consciously worked to craft a sociopolitical context that nurtured full political incorporation. Waukegan's political leaders effectively created barriers to political incorporation: they demonstrated hostility toward black residents and officials, willingly accepted co-optation as a means to personal political gain, failed to recognize commonalities between black interests and city interests, and selectively incorporated blacks into local politics. While it would be a mischaracterization of Evanston politics to say that white political leaders were always facilitators of black political incorporation, even with white opposition, black political leaders actively contributed to a sociopolitical context that constructed black political incorporation as requisite evidence of the city’s oft-touted diversity. Table V outlines the impacts that the city’s political leadership had on creating an environment that valued racial equity in the political sphere.

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<th>Table X. Key Impacts of Political Leadership on Black Political Incorporation in Evanston</th>
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<tr>
<td>Black officials ensured the organization and institutionalization of black interests. Once elected, they did not act separately from “the community.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political empowerment occurred early in the history of black Evanston, and residents and officials created an expectation of empowerment and worked to advance this legacy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black candidates projected a racially “safe” and “neutral” image, but catered to the concerns of black organizations and activists behind the scenes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Together, blacks and whites worked to cultivate trust across racial lines. This interracial trust ushered in the city’s first black mayor and even allowed blacks to coalesce behind her white successor.</td>
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5.3.1 Indigenous Black Officials Encourage Incorporation

The process of political incorporation begins much earlier than the appearance of the first black mayor. The path to political incorporation is built by successive victories of black officials. But for the path to political incorporation to advance, their election must be more than symbolism. Barnett and Hefner (1976) explain that symbolic power can create the illusion of empowerment, but political incorporation requires planning by black political officials for the black community. In other words, the fundamental objective of black political officials is to institutionalize the interests of the black community (Greenstone and Peterson 1973). Black political leadership, in particular, must be race-conscious, be connected to the community, nurture a political identity among residents, and actively advocate within the political arena for sustained black political empowerment.

Black political officials in Evanston successfully worked toward incorporation, unlike blacks in Waukegan, because their connections to the community allowed them to mobilize more resources and use their resources with more skill (see Stone 2001). Daniel Patrick Moynihan predicted that “very possibly the most important long run impact...of the 1960s will prove to have been the formation of an urban negro leadership echelon at just the time when the negro masses were verging toward extensive commitment to urban politics” (Eisinger 1978: 12). In Evanston, in fact, this leadership echelon and its expectations of black political empowerment formed even earlier than during the modern Civil Rights Movement.
With campaign aid from Dr. W.E.B. DuBois, students and faculty at Northwestern, and the city’s black community, Edwin Jourdain Jr. was elected as the city’s first black alderman in 1931. Jourdain won widespread appeal in Evanston, but his leadership was particularly coveted in the black community because of his defense of the community’s interest—even when other black leaders kowtowed to whites. For example, at an interracial meeting of local community leaders, Bessie Willis, a black community leader, advanced a resolution that would give current black residents better quality housing in the city, in exchange for their leadership in restricting future black migration into the city. Jourdain’s believed that the request for blacks to lead the effort used symbolic power to mask actual black disempowerment in the city. His comments reflect that his leadership in the black community was built upon a sense of racial solidarity:

The offer for a deal is an insult to any Colored man’s self-respect. Our people would rather do without the housing project than to accept it on the terms of such a deal. No other group in Evanston would even be asked to accept local improvements for the group now living here, in return for agreeing to bar any more from coming. Surveys prove that better housing is badly needed. If our people cannot get support for improved housing on the grounds of ordinary decency and humanity, without entering into a deal like this, then you can keep your support. Colored people in Evanston are not going on record as drawing the line on other Race people, in exchange for better advantages for themselves. They ought not to be asked to do so (“Hat-In-Hand Group”, February 2, 1935: 13).

Jourdain continued to cultivate a sociopolitical context of equitable treatment of blacks and whites. He secured defeat of a rule forbidding mixed-race baseball games on city-owned diamonds, ended a system of background checks for black applicants to lifeguard positions, lobbied the school board for the employment of more black teachers, secured funding for a recreation center for blacks in the city’s 5th ward, sponsored legislation
blacking pamphlets and printed materials that were objectionable to blacks, fought to end racial restrictive covenants, abolished the blacks-only section in city movie theaters, and worked with the mayor to end segregation at city beaches.

To institutionalize black interests, black political officials were able to align the interests of the black community with the interests of the city; they possessed real power, and they used it to specifically serve the black community. In the 1990s, black community groups initiated plans to revitalize the Church Street—Dodge Avenue area of the 5th ward. The Church—Dodge area was key to the black community and the city because it was the commercial hub of the black community, the intersection that housed the city’s high school, in close proximity to the city’s growing downtown, but recently the location of much of the city’s crime and deterioration. In other words, the Church—Dodge area was a location of interest for both blacks and whites in Evanston, and black aldermen led the effort to open discussions between black community organizations and government officials about a Tax Increment Financing (TIF) district in the area. Rather than respond to a TIF request from a developer, black aldermen in the city were able to institutionalize the community’s request for a TIF district. As 5th ward Alderwoman Delores Holmes explained: “Usually developers come forth asking for (TIF) assistance. This TIF district has grown from the community” (Berkowitz 2005). Black political officials demonstrated their power and the community’s power by directing the attention of the city council to a previously-ignored area of the city.

The fight for the Church-Dodge TIF district was fundamentally a struggle for the equitable distribution of power and resources (one of the stages of political
incorporation) in the city. Black 2nd ward Alderman Lionel Jean-Baptiste further elaborated that “he council leadership for the past 15 years, or even longer, has seen downtown as the priority. That legacy has been their baby. My sense is, we have to be more equitable and direct some resources to benefit the part of town that has been neglected” (Berkowitz 2005). Though Eisinger (1978) says that no single organization or experience emerges as the clearly dominant preparatory ground for black political officials, in Evanston, in the 1930s, Alderman Jourdain created a community structure that expected that black community leaders would come from the 5th ward, and community institutions within the 5th ward served as a breeding ground for these leaders.

5.3.2 Collective Agitation for Incorporation

Blacks in Evanston created a sociopolitical environment that accepted participatory democracy and allowed blacks to exercise their collective voice and influence (Fung 2004). A spirit of discontent about local inequities encouraged blacks to become involved in local affairs, and blacks became an active and viable political force in the city. Though Evanston elected a black mayor, the sociopolitical context that nurtured political incorporation was actually cultivated by a wider range of political actors. As Nelson and Meranto (1977) explain, black mayors are pressured by expectation of high performance, but on the other hand, handicapped in their ability to live up to these expectations by social, economic, and political factors that rob them of the resources and power they need to be successful in their roles (Nelson and Meranto 1977).
If constraints on black mayoral leadership are to be overcome, the major emphasis must be placed on the mobilization of the political resources—including people—of the black community. Thus, the pivotal base of power lies within the black community. The challenge for the black community in Evanston was to develop strategies for eventual control of black neighborhoods to work productively for their residents (Barnett and Hefner 1976). When blacks finally did gain political power in Evanston, they did so by asserting their racial distinctiveness and the collective needs derived from that distinctiveness (see Pinderhughes 1987).

Black political leaders were particularly concerned about the relationship between police and the city’s black residents. For example, in 1970, three Evanston aldermen warned that the suburb’s police department was losing support of the city’s black population. Black alderman Roosevelt Alexander charged that police were insensitive to blacks and sprayed pepper spray on fourteen black youths after a minor scuffle. He urged that blacks be given community control of police and that there be at least fifty percent black representation on the police policy board. Black alderwoman Edna Summers warned that the city’s black community had a fear of the police. She complained that there wasn’t even a token black person in the police department. White Alderman Michael Schlitz warned that they city was “perilously close to not having the consent of the governed in sections of the city” (Reiss 1973).

Discontent spread to members of the police department. In 1972, black Evanston police complained of unfair treatment by the suburb’s Civil Service Commission (Sluis 1972). Black police alleged that there was an absence of black officials in the Internal
Investigations Section, a failure to equalize exceptionally high or low evaluation marks by an officer's superiors, failure to provide candidates with clear guidelines about the promotions process, and unfair treatment for the department’s only black sergeant in consideration for the rank of lieutenant. Mayor Edgar Vanneman Jr. expressed disappointment that the police brought their complaint to state and federal equal employment commissions instead of to the city’s Human Relations Commission and threatened to disband the Human Relations Commission if it was not going to be used. The police, led by Alderman Roosevelt Alexander, refused to take their complaints to the Human Relations Commission because they did not think a city agency could properly evaluate a city department.

In 1974, all twenty-black Evanston Policemen filed suit in Federal District Court accusing the department of practicing racial and gender discrimination in its hiring, promoting, and disciplinary practices ("20 black Evanston cops file federal bias suit," September 21, 1974: 7)\textsuperscript{27}. Captain William Logan contended that he was denied permission to attend Northwestern University’s Traffic Institute because he was black.

\textsuperscript{27} The Evanston police and fire departments were the subjects of several EEOC complaints and race-based lawsuits. Subsequent to the 1974 lawsuit, in 1975, white Evanston policemen argued that, in preparing to settle a lawsuit brought by black police officers, the city was going to practice reverse discrimination. The white police feared that the city and black policemen were going to sign an agreement under which black policemen would be hired and promoted on a different basis than whites. In 1976, the City of Evanston was sued in Federal District Court for discriminating against three black police sergeants who did not place in the top ten in a promotional exam. The Equal Employment Opportunities Commission joined in the suit, charging that Evanston failed to live up to a 1975 agreement that it would promote a qualified black to the rank of lieutenant. In 1980, Sanders Hicks became the acting chief of the city’s Fire Department, and he then promoted to captain three black firefighters whom the former chief refused to upgrade because they were given a blacks-only captain’s exam. Glen Ayers, the former chief, was fired after refusing to obey an order to promote three of the seven black firemen who took the exam. Five black firemen had complained to the EEOC that they had suffered discrimination in a 1977 promotion exam. The EEOC found no fault with the city’s promotion procedure but still wanted the complainants upgraded in rank immediately. Instead, the city held an exam for seven of the fourteen blacks in the 113-member department.
Officer Andrew Rodez, who held a Masters degree, was denied promotion to Lieutenant because he was told he was not sufficiently articulate. Officer James Edwards said that his first police assignment was as a garbage man.

Black agitation was also particularly focused in the schools, especially in the push to reopen a fifth ward neighborhood school after the last school was closed when the District started its voluntary desegregation plan. While white council members said that consideration of a new school should consider the needs of all Evanston school children, School Board member Hecky Powell said that it must focus on children in the 5th ward and parents who did not want their children bussed: “This is not a race issue, but it could become a race issue if board members string people along. That’s when racial grievances start to come out. ‘They’ve done it to us again.’ It could become a white-black deal when what we are talking about is green” (Berkowitz 2002). Members of the black community took Powell’s remarks as a realistic assessment of the hurdles that would have to be mounted to bring the school to fruition. Alderman Lionel Jean-Baptiste of the 2nd ward added, “We now need to talk about the political will of our community. What will it take to move them? We need to look at student achievement and what we can do with what we have. We need better bussing. We need after-school programs for kids that are not achieving. Just because you put up brick and mortar doesn’t mean we are going to achieve.” Blacks in Evanston were very clear about their demands for a school in the 5th ward, and Hecky Powell’s comment reflects that blacks believed the school must be conceived to meet the specific needs of black children in the 5th ward. In order to do this, the black community in Evanston believed that if a school in the city’s 5th ward was to
come to fruition, it would have to be championed by the black community. Similarly, when black Evanston police filed discrimination lawsuits in federal court, they averted the system set in place by the city of Evanston because they believed that this system would not seriously consider their concerns. In other words, blacks in Evanston felt that they could only trust their own racial community to realize their interests. It is clear that, despite the city’s racially liberal image, the process of political incorporation was continually crippled by a lack of interracial trust.

5.3.3 Failures in Interracial Support

During the process of political incorporation, political leadership must foster trust across racial lines—enough trust for white residents to support black candidates without feeling threatened. Though the emergence of descriptive representatives can be attributed more to the growth in black population than the receptivity of white voters, black leaders are most effective when they are able to mobilize black and white voters and build multiracial coalitions (Hahn, Klingman, and Pachon 1976). Though many blacks and some whites together supported the mayoral candidacies of Lorraine Morton, overall black political leaders in Evanston have not been as successful at building broad-based interracial support28. But their strategic command of the black community, and

28 The city’s political arena has not entirely featured racial divisiveness. As early as the 1930s, an article in the Chicago Defender newspaper explains that part of Edwin Jourdain Jr.’s success was due to his appeal to both blacks and whites: “Mr. Jourdain’s election tears the politics of the Fifth Ward of Evanston into many pieces. He stood in the Fifth Ward and reached over into Northwestern University. He spoke Race but demonstrated to the highest citizenship of Evanston all the qualities of preparation. And so while members of his Race in his Ward and City were asking of the time, white Evanston discovered his availability. In his announcements and addresses Mr. Jourdain was good in English but better in respectability. He loved his Race, of course, but his city and state were also on his mind. His own Race found him interesting but his enlightened white fellow citizens, anxious themselves to approve the worth of a young man, found him irresistible.” (“Alderman Jourdain,” Chicago Defender, 4/18/1931). Later, the Chicago Defender elaborated: “The election of Jourdain to the city council in Evanston is proof of what can be done where a person has
the support of an active coalition of liberal whites, largely compensated for any cross-racial divides. Indeed, full political incorporation does not require the support of all whites, but instead simply sufficient support of blacks and whites to help realize black political power. In the case of Evanston, demands and maneuvering for political incorporation was so well-strategized and directed by the black community, that the need for interracial support in order to achieve incorporation was not as extensive as the political incorporation suggests.

Early in the city’s political life, black leaders in Evanston were able to attain “augmented legitimacy,” which is the improved ability to deliver black votes and a greater ability to capture white electoral support as well (Keiser 1997). For example, in addition to his initial election, interracial support sustained Edwin Jourdain Jr.’s tenure in Evanston. For example, in 1932, just after gaining his aldermanic seat, Jourdain was dismissed from the city council after allegations of voting irregularities. White professors and students from Northwestern picketed city hall to aid his candidacy against Peter Jans. Jans was the white alderman who Jourdain unseated in 1931. Jans made the voting irregularity allegations and replaced Jourdain on the council after he was removed. The Chicago Defender chronicled that Northwestern faculty released statements in support of Jourdain, and Northwestern students waited in line outside of City Hall overnight so that Jourdain’s name would be first on the election ballot. Whites and blacks in Evanston qualification and courage. The fact that Jourdain’s campaign was carried on intensively by his white friends and neighbors as well as those of his own Race, and that the candidates who opposed him were white, was also significant. Character, courage, determination, and ability are the points that count these days, and the person who possesses these will win no matter what his color or where he takes up his residence. A dark man has just as much change to get ahead in a mixed neighborhood as in any other neighborhood if he has within him the prerequisites to success” (“Jourdain to Take Aldermanic Seat,” The Chicago Defender, 4/18/1931, pg. 13).
supported Jourdain because they felt the political maneuvering by Jans against Jourdain defied the eight years of electoral support that black residents gave to Jans (“Jourdain to Take Aldermanic Seat,” 1931.

As the process of political incorporation progressed, though, black political officials and community residents in Evanston were more likely to cite cross-racial power struggles than their ability to build links between black residents and white officials.

Have we made it? In no way would I say that we’ve made it. The city puts up, you know, projects this image of being the ebony and ivory haven of America, but that’s a farce. Hook, line, and sinker. That’s how you reel people into the city. Sell them this image of multiracial America. But for the people like us who are really on the ground doing the work, they want people to think they are accepting of all people, but they bring those same old biases with them when they cross Howard Street [entering into Evanston from the Chicago-Evanston border]. All that’s here on the North Side, Grant, Isabella, Central [streets on the north side of Evanston] are white folks who wish they were in Highland Park but could only afford to live with us. (Richard Johnson, activist focus group, November 20, 2010).

Mark Thomas, a former school board member, adds:

There were times I would look at the building and make sure that it said ‘City of Evanston.’ The way they were talking, I could have sworn I was in Berwyn or Cicero. We worked just like the old politicians would. Talking to them before an issue came up, making sure we had their vote, trying to convince them. Let them get in that board room and they saw they were on the black side of the debate. They would switch their vote up quick! Of course there were whites here and there that generally you could rely on—or at least they were straight up with you. But we never had a real partnership with whites. They sided with us when they wanted to, so we relied on ourselves and simply had to do what we had to (personal interview, September 24, 2010).

Research participants and news sources provide evidence of a number of examples when black community concerns failed to gain the support of white officials. For example, the
City Council forced the resignation of black police chief Gerald Cooper, who received the support of the black community. White council members had asked the city manager to review complaints involving the leadership and judgment of Cooper. Though Cooper maintained the support of Mayor Lorraine Morton, given the council-manager form of government, the city manager (who was white) investigated the complaints and forced the resignation of the police chief against the mayor (who was black). Reverend John Norwood addressed the city council, reflecting perceptions with the black community of a conspiracy:

> It seems that there is a covert operation of some people who get everything they want, while others are denied what they want. The appearance is that the mayor, whose influence used to mean something, apparently has no influence anymore or someone has denied her the opportunity to make a judgment to those she represents. I’m tired of fighting subtle racism. We will not allow this kind of thing to ever happen again (Berkowitz and Seidenberg 1996).

Blacks said that white officials tended to act like blacks were incompetent and incapable of doing their job: “If we did what they wanted us to do, we were their go-to people for black issues. But if we spoke up for the community that elected us, which is exactly what they were doing, right, then our intelligence and ability to do our job was questioned” (Mary Hampton, political official focus group, Evanston political official focus group, February 25, 2011). Similarly, the first black superintendent of the Evanston high school district, Dr. Margaret Labat, resigned amidst charges by the city’s black leaders that she endured harassment and intervention from school board members. They said the board inserted itself into the day-to-day operations of the school and frequently overruled her authority (Taylor 1979).
Relations between blacks and whites frequently grew hostile and contentious, especially when blacks felt that white opposition was rooted in race.

We’re going through this thing now. The African-American community wants the school system to rename Haven Middle School after Lorraine Morton [former mayor and former principal of Haven School]. Now all of a sudden, white folk who moved to Evanston four and five years ago are jumping up, ‘But what about Oscar Haven’s contribution to public school education in Evanston?’ They didn’t know who the hell an Oscar Haven was until we requested that they put a black woman’s name on that building. There are times when you can accept their opposition. But when you know it’s about race and nothing else, you can’t accept that! (Iva Bell, resident focus group, November 6, 2010).

Relations black and white elected officials was often tense and oppositional, which particularly caused blacks to retreat within their own community to get things done. For example, in 1970, the City Council approved a fair housing ordinance that required real estate dealers and agents to keep record of the racial identity of all persons seeking housing in the city. Supporters said that it would allay black fears of racial steering and improve the image of Evanston by showing that a majority of whites supported integration. Discussion about the ordinance became heated, as some white council members expressed that blacks were asking real estate dealers to do more work than their jobs required. After black alderman Russell Alexander cursed twice during a discussion of the ordinance, one member of the City Council reminded him that there were rules of decorum. Alexander countered: “No one has to tell me how I’m going to conduct myself. If I have to jump on this desk and scream and holler to get what the black people of this town deserve, I’ll do it!” (Yabush 1970).

Blacks were able to overcome the potential disempowerment of interracial divides, simply by supporting each other and remaining focused on the interests of the black
community. This does not mean that blacks were always on the same side of an issue. Black aldermen frequently sat within both the majority and minority voting blocs. But, they often provided the voice for the city’s black community no matter where they sat. As Evanston officials explored legislation that would require young men to wear their pants at waist height or face indecency citations, black residents grew concerned that the ordinance targeted black men, and that this contemporary style of dress was of no real concern to the city or its affairs. Alderman Lionel Jean-Baptiste responded to the ordinance on behalf of the city’s black community, arguing that criminal actions which would disproportionately target black youth should not be the primary focus of the Human Services Committee. Jean-Baptiste suggested that the conversation reflected a greater need for cross-racial conversations—in this case, about shaping youth behavior—rather than passing ordinances that target black youth (Seidenberg 2010). Even when District 65 School Board member and restaurateur Hecky Powell called multiracial students “mutts” and further exacerbated the resulting controversy about his comments by creating a “Mutt Special” at his barbecue restaurant, black leaders purposely chose to remain silent. Research participants explained that while they did not find Powell’s comments to be “smart,” they knew that whites would use the issue to divide them and alienate Powell, who had been an outspoken and vital member of the school board (educator focus group, December 4, 2010). While Evanston typically projects an image as a multiracial bastion, black research participants suggested that the city’s diversity was more about “image” than “action.”
The consistent strand across the examples cited in each of the focus groups was that blacks relied on each other to create black political incorporation in Evanston. We might say that white support was considered to be a bonus, rather than a necessity. In Evanston, the achievement of political incorporation was less about cross-racial coalition-building, then it was about blacks strategizing to gain power on their own, and reflecting the fluidity of the black civic fabric, then bringing supportive whites into their plans as needed. Black political leadership did not serve to create these coalitions, but instead to represent the interests of the black community. With a lack of trust across racial lines in the political spheres of both Evanston and Waukegan, Evanston blacks were organized enough to retreat within their own community and strategize for incorporation, while blacks in Waukegan were too disorganized to counter racial hostility and political exclusion. With co-opted political leadership in Waukegan, there were few black political officials to counter racial opposition in Waukegan politics. With a reliance on the city’s black community, black political officials in Evanston only relied on their white counterparts as needed.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter provided a number of examples as evidence that a closed political culture in Waukegan created a sociopolitical context that inhibited black political incorporation while an open political culture in Evanston created a context that encouraged incorporation. These respective political cultures remained consistent throughout the history of each city, and they set an early precedent in the pre-
incorporation phase for how City Hall in each city would receive demands for black political power. Ironically, in Waukegan, it was this very closed culture that brought the appointment of co-opted black alderman, Robert Evans. His appointment was a means to use him to keep the system closed to black demands, and Evans helped push the city back at the fork in the road leading to policy responsiveness. But Alderman Evans did not act alone, and he was merely a pawn in a closed culture and machine system that thrived when it controlled, manipulated, or blocked outsiders. On the other hand, displaying an open political culture was valued in the liberal bastion of Evanston. This openness, coupled with a valuing of racial liberalism, meant that Evanston blacks were socialized in a civic culture that opened the door to incorporation (or, at least, a culture that did not slam the door shut when blacks opened it). In other words, the civic culture made black Evanstonians value congregating and strategizing for incorporation, and the open political culture decreased the costs and lowered the barriers in the pre-incorporation phase. As blacks pushed toward descriptive representation, the advocacy of black political leadership sustained demands for incorporation in the political sphere. This leadership advocated for policies in the interest of the black community and pushed Evanston through the policy responsiveness phase toward incorporation.

In the next chapter, I discuss the final aspect of the sociopolitical context, local racial dynamics. In line with this chapter, Chapter 6 demonstrates that Waukegan's closed political culture and its racially hostile environment were mutually reinforcing. In Waukegan, hostility toward blacks encouraged a closed political culture that kept blacks as outsiders, and the closed political culture encouraged Waukegan residents to continue
to treat blacks as outsiders. Conversely, in Evanston, racial liberalism created an open political culture that brought blacks into the fold of politics, and the open political culture minimized the costs for those advocating for black political empowerment. Relating back to Chapter 4, liberal racial dynamics in Evanston helped blacks and non-blacks coalesce in favor of political incorporation, while conservative racial dynamics kept blacks in Waukegan from allying with whites or Latinos to strengthen their incorporation attempts.
6. FOR US, BY US: DO BLACKS NEED OTHER GROUPS TO ACHIEVE INCORPORATION?

The Fifth Grade Spelling Bee at Oakton Elementary School in Evanston was one of the most anticipated events of the 1990-1991 school year. As the predominantly black fifth graders prepared to matriculate into one of the city’s middle schools, they viewed the Spelling Bee as the event that crowned the school’s best student. Each fifth grade classroom held its own Spelling Bee in the first round of competition, and the winners from each classroom competed in the second, school championship round. The prizes for the winner were coveted by the students. Principal Clara Campbell showed the students a prize wrapped in shiny silver wrapping paper that would be given to the winner. She added that the school champion would compete in the district championship round with the winner from each elementary school. Faith Calvin recalled when she won the Fifth Grade Spelling Bee that year: “I could never forget when I won. I still remember what I was wearing! Our teachers set up chairs and all the fifth graders gathered in the hallway for the Spelling Bee. When I won, they started cheering and clapping and giving me hugs. My classmates did victory dances at the students from the other classes. That is still one of my shining moments” (personal interview, September 8, 2010). Chaperoned by the school’s nurse, Calvin traveled to a local church to compete in the District Spelling Bee the following week. Looking back on it, this was probably a bigger deal in other ways. Of course, I didn’t know then what the outcome was going to be. Back then, it was
just about a spelling bee. But now I think that situation had race written all over it. I mean, I was a black girl from ‘the black school’ living in a black neighborhood. I competed against mostly black students at Oakton for a prize offered by my black principal. When I won, our school’s black nurse drove me to the Spelling Bee to compete against all white fifth graders. And all of this in a city that was experiencing some growing pains because all of these black people, like my parents, were moving into the city from Chicago and moving into neighborhoods that didn’t really have black people then. We weren’t just going to the west side anymore. We were turning all-white blocks into no-white blocks. For the kids, it was just fun, but I think it was about something more for the adults. That reality for black people at Oakton and in the school district is very clear to me now (personal interview, September 8, 2010).

At the Spelling Bee, the eighth graders from the city’s middle schools first competed against each other. After the final eighth graders spelled the last word correctly, the church erupted in cheers, and the winner was recognized as the district Eighth Grade Spelling Bee champion. The fifth graders sat nervously; it was now their turn. Faith Calvin spelled word-after-word correctly, confident after having intently studied the fifth grade spelling word list for months. When she spelled the final word correctly against the last fifth grader, the school nurse began to cheer: “I remember Ms. Johnson cheering and the other teachers looking on proudly. I couldn’t wait to go back and celebrate at Oakton” (personal interview, September 8, 2010).
All of a sudden, Mr. Nixon [Roger Nixon, the district’s curriculum director and sponsor of the Spelling Bee] interrupted: “It’s not over yet.” Ms. Johnson, who chaperoned the fifth grade winner from Oakton every year replied, “What do you mean it’s not over?” “She hasn’t won yet,” said Mr. Nixon, “She has to win against the eighth grader.” Ms. Johnson jumped up and grabbed Faith’s coat and hat, “This is not fair. These are not the rules that you read at the beginning of the Spelling Bee. The eighth graders clearly have their winner. This is not how we, or you, have ever done the Spelling Bee!” Faith remembered that the mood in the church turned somber, but as the adults argued, she kept thinking about the prize that awaited her in Mrs. Campbell’s office and how all of her classmates cheered her on as she left the school for the Spelling Bee. Faith’s quiet voice peeked out over the commotion: “Ms. Johnson, I can do it. I know how to spell.” The Spelling Bee continued with Faith Calvin, a fifth grader, competing against a white eighth grade student.

Mr. Nixon only used the eighth grade spelling list, which had words that I had never seen before. But I spelled every word right, and the boy spelled every word right. Finally, we got to the word ‘helipad,’ and I spelled it wrong. It was the boy’s turn to spell it, and he spelled it wrong—exactly the way I had spelled it! I was relieved. But then Mr. Nixon gave him a hint. He changed the way he pronounced helipad from a long ‘e’ vowel to a short ‘e’ vowel, and then he said ‘helipad, like helicopter.’ And then he gave the boy a second chance to spell the word correctly. Ms. Johnson really grabbed my coat and my arm that time and stormed out of the church. She was hot that they cheated me. I was sad that I spelled the word incorrectly. I still didn’t get that it was unfair, and I certainly didn’t get that it was because I’m black (personal interview, September 8, 2010).
Teachers and administrators from Oakton School, black parents and members of local black organizations, and Faith’s parents all engaged in a letter-writing campaign against Mr. Nixon and the unfair administration of the Spelling Bee. But rather than award Faith Calvin recognition even as just the fifth grade champion, the school district canceled any future spelling bee events. Faith asked the principal if she could still have the prize since she won against the fifth graders. Mrs. Campbell replied, “I know it was unfair. But you still should have beaten the eighth grader.” Faith said that Mrs. Campbell’s response formed her racialized world view at that moment: “My parents used that situation to teach me that everyone would not like me or treat me fairly because I am black. And they understood why Mrs. Campbell did not give me the prize. The lesson from all of them was: the deck will be stacked against you here and elsewhere because you are black, and you had better win even when it’s not fair” (personal interview, September 8, 2010).

But Calvin’s world view on race was not entirely formed by the Spelling Bee. In 2004, Calvin and her husband purchased a home in Waukegan, hoping to live within a diverse community, but priced out of their desired Evanston neighborhood. Given that blacks and Latinos in Waukegan share neighborhoods, this diversity was not difficult to find. But, in a variety of local venues, Faith Calvin said that she experienced “the dark side of diversity.” She reported several instances of conflict between her family and the Mexican-American family next door, beginning with accusations of a stolen football. The conflict quickly grew threatening:
I got home one day and their friend was parked blocking my driveway. Knowing the history between us, I very politely asked them to move the car. Next thing I know, the twenty year old daughter is in my face cursing me out. Her boyfriend starting using all sorts of derogatory language against me. I felt threatened and my husband was not home, so I called the police. The boyfriend had a warrant so they arrested him. Big mistake. I swear people would drive past my house looking at it. They would start to do things to intimidate me. I won't let my son play outside of our house because I don't feel we're safe. We put our house up for sale, but it won't sell, so we're just going to walk away from it and try over somewhere else. [...] I don’t use that situation to judge all Hispanics, but I do know that blacks and Hispanics in Waukegan are uncomfortable with each other. I experienced it at my home, me and other parents have talked about how we see it at his school. I thought diversity was important, but now I have to be very specific about how that diversity works. Our next city will not be like Evanston or Waukegan I don’t think, but I don’t even know if that dream city exists.” (personal interview, September 8, 2010).

6.1 Chapter Overview

Faith Calvin’s experiences in Evanston and Waukegan provide a glimpse into the racial dynamics that shape the sociopolitical context in each city. The political incorporation literature anticipates that there will be racial tensions in any city where blacks are in pursuit of political incorporation. But this literature concludes that these racial hostilities must transform into positive interracial racial dynamics so that blacks can build coalitions with Latinos and whites. The political incorporation literature suggests that these cross-racial coalitions are necessary for full political incorporation. In other words, this literature says that blacks, on their own, cannot gain political power. The literature concludes that there must be positive social relations between blacks and other groups in order to build cross-racial coalitions. Further, in cities where blacks and
other groups are able to build an electoral coalition, blacks will achieve incorporation. Where they are not able to build coalitions, incorporation will not result.

But this literature places more focus on the coalition-building process and the results of cross-racial coalitions than the local racial dynamics that set the stage for conversations about cross-racial coalitions to even occur. The cases of Waukegan and Evanston in this chapter reveal that there is greater complexity to racial dynamics and coalition building than this literature reveals. If we provided a similar, surface-level examination of Evanston and Waukegan, we would simply say that blacks in Evanston coalesced with whites and blacks in Waukegan failed to build a coalition with anyone.

But, while accurate, this does not tell the entire story. I suggest, as Hamilton and Carmichael (1967) do, that coalition-building is primarily about the racial dynamics within the black community, and secondarily about dynamics with other groups. The propensity for coalition-building is shaped by racial dynamics (intraracial and interracial) within the sociopolitical context, and we must pay attention to these racial dynamics before we even start to look for evidence of coalition-building. This point highlights the focus on results in the political incorporation literature, rather than a focus on sociopolitical context.

The case of Waukegan shows that black communities that are unable to organize themselves, and therefore unable to articulate shared goals and an accepted strategy to reach these goals, are unable to take the next step of organizing for political power with other racial groups. In Waukegan, some blacks did partner with some other groups, but these partnerships were viewed by other blacks as power-grabbing, inopportune, and
The central point in Waukegan is that indeed blacks need support from whites and Latinos in order to achieve incorporation. But, they actually need themselves more. In Waukegan, the fatal wound to political incorporation was not racial hostility by whites or ambivalence by Latinos; it was the inability (or unwillingness) for whites and Latinos to find inroads into a fragmented black power structure. Even the most optimal local racial dynamics cannot set the stage for political incorporation if blacks have not worked together to structure their demands for incorporation. The case of Waukegan shows that blacks do not need other groups for political incorporation if they have not built the very elements of coalition-building—trust, goal formation, and strategy development—within their own group.

Further, in a different way, the case of Evanston reveals that perhaps too much emphasis is placed on coalition-building in the political incorporation literature and not on the significant strides toward incorporation that blacks can accomplish on their own. While the political incorporation literature emphasizes a racially liberal atmosphere as a precondition for coalition building—liberal in the form of whites being “conscience stricken” (Gleason 2005)—the case of Evanston demonstrates that political incorporation is less about what whites allow and more about what blacks are able to demand, strategize, and accomplish on their own. This is because blacks in Evanston were still unlikely to trust whites, even when they did appear to be sympathetic to black concerns. Blacks in Evanston perceived that their successes were the result of selectively manipulated networks with whites. As Betty Smith summarized about Evanston:

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29 The example from Chapter 4 of the split in the NAACP over votes by white church members reveals this point.
We did it on our own, but we let them think they helped so they could continue to feel that Evanston was their racial utopia and they helped those poor, you know. They wanted to seem better than other white folk. They wanted to justify living in Evanston. ‘I want my children to grow up in a diverse place. I have black friends.’ They didn’t really care about any of this, but they had to seem like they did. So, they were very careful about how they treated us and our issues. So, they would open the door for us a little bit, and we would come in and just bust it wide open (activist focus group, November 20, 2010).

Blacks in Evanston believed that they city’s racially liberal image was a ruse for whites in Evanston to feel moral and just; continued injustices in the city, for blacks, meant that whites did not really want to usher in an era of political incorporation in the city. Therefore, as several blacks from Evanston explained, they appealed to the city’s desired liberal image, all the while strategizing across black groups and residents about how they would gain political power on their own. If this strategy involved coalitions with whites, they were loosely constructed partnerships to achieve incremental gains.

Table XI details the local racial dynamics that facilitated incorporation in Evanston, but failed to conceive political incorporation in Waukegan. This chapter discusses several components of racial dynamics: residential segregation, individual hostility and systemic racism, interracial contact, common goal formation, racial solidarity, and cross-minority competition. Racial residential segregation is evident in Evanston and Waukegan into the 21st century. The lines of black and white neighborhoods are more clearly delineated in Evanston, and this segregation helped cultivate strong racial identity and solidarity in Evanston. In Waukegan, black migration into white ethnic neighborhoods resulted in more overt racial hostility. At the end of the
20th century, the increased residence of Latino immigrants in previously black neighborhoods added another layer to racial hostility and conflict in the city. While blacks exhibit high civic engagement in both cities, these opportunities for interracial contact (and resulting prejudice reduction and coalition formation) are hampered by longstanding feels of mutual racial distrust and individual and systemic racism. As a result, blacks in Evanston and Waukegan are unlikely to seek or accept coalition building as critical to the incorporation process, even when coalition formation is possible.

Table XI. Key Impacts of Racial Dynamics on Black Political Incorporation in Evanston

1. Neither Evanston nor Waukegan has particularly integrated neighborhoods. In fact, Evanston’s black population is more segregated than Waukegan’s, but this segregation contributed to racial solidarity in Evanston. Spaces shared by blacks and Latinos in Waukegan led to increased racial hostilities between the two groups.

2. Blacks in Evanston felt that whites were not racially liberal in earnest, but that whites kept racial dynamics less hostile so the city could maintain its liberal image.

3. Blacks in neither Waukegan nor Evanston felt that they needed whites, they did not feel that they were partners, and they did not believe there were common goals between the two groups. In Evanston, blacks expressed distrust of whites and, in Waukegan, blacks expressed disillusionment because of political exclusion.

Much of this is reflected in bodies of knowledge outside of the political incorporation literature that account for the role of racial dynamics in the local sociopolitical context. The examples of Evanston, Waukegan, and other cities show that race operates differently in cities based on differing local sociopolitical contexts (DeLeon
and Naff 2004). Iris Marion Young (1990) explains that, given the demographic diversity in many cities, we might expect these cities to encourage social relations across groups. But instead, social relations in cities tend to affirm group differences. Many believe that racial/ethnic diversity in cities has caused a deterioration in the quality of life in these cities, and so there is sharp racial/ethnic polarization on issues that affect minority groups (Sears et al. 1999). This mean that much-coveted diversity is often hampered by histories and continued realities of privilege and oppression, and a diverse sociopolitical context is not a benefit to struggles for incorporation if these struggles are marred by histories of social injustice. Relevant to the question about whether blacks need other groups to achieve incorporation, Young (1990) further explains that we should focus on the ability for each group to have an independent and equal voice, especially given the problems that group differences pose to coalition-building.

6.2 Residential Segregation

Historically, blacks inhabited cities plagued by racial residential segregation and poor housing conditions. Interracial hostilities between blacks and whites in cities typically began with residential segregation (Rex et al. 1967). Continued segregation of blacks in resource-starved neighborhoods exacerbated relations between blacks and whites. Blacks took note of local racial inequalities as new white residents were given preference for housing in other neighborhoods while blacks were continually locked into segregated spaces. Whites typically had a discriminatory reaction to the presence of blacks, particularly as blacks demanded equity in housing opportunity and conditions.
Thomas Sugrue (1996) explains that one of the most visible and intractable signals of racial inequality in a city is the presence of segregated neighborhoods. Blacks viewed residential segregation as a sign of hostile racial dynamics and the presence of systemic racism in the city. As a result, the sociopolitical context in many cities with significant black populations is characterized by racial conflict.

The cases of Waukegan and Evanston demonstrate that segregated housing patterns—blacks living on Evanston’s west side and on Waukegan’s south side—have not eased and have only been replicated in different parts of each city. Given the sociopolitical context in each city and given their respective histories of race relations—in particular, conservatism in Waukegan and progressivism in Evanston—one might expect greater residential integration in Evanston than in Waukegan today.

But historic patterns of residential segregation are not easily overturned. Figures 3 and 4 show that the primary location of black residence in Evanston and Waukegan is precisely in the area where blacks first settled in each city in the early 1900s. In 2000, the south side of Waukegan was over 50 percent black, and the west side of Evanston was over 80 percent black. In Waukegan, blacks have branched out to an increased number of neighborhoods in the city’s center and along the lake, and these neighborhoods were 20 to 30 percent black in 2000. In Evanston, blacks have branched out to fewer neighborhoods, but within these neighborhoods, their populations are concentrated (on average, about 50 percent black). Whereas the black population in Waukegan is dispersed throughout the city, moving north, east, and even west from the initial south side core, the black population in Evanston largely dispersed south from the west side
core. Simply put, in Evanston, neighborhoods are either black or they are white. Using terminology provided by Taeuber and Taeuber (1965) blacks neighborhoods in Evanston have historically been divided between the “dark ghetto” and the “gilded ghetto,” and they are surrounded by the “white noose.”

In Waukegan, there is greater diversity within neighborhoods, and these diverse neighborhoods are spread across the city. Waukegan benefited from continued annexation of outlying rural areas into the twentieth century that allowed whites to successively move out of the center of the city into these new, outlying areas. As whites left these areas, more homes became available for blacks outside of the city’s south side. This eased the pressures of segregation. Evanston’s fixed, compact boundaries reinforced segregation. As Taeuber and Taeuber (1965) explain, as neighborhoods in Waukegan reached their racial tipping point, the city pushed for expansion into outlying rural areas and white residents were able to flee into these new neighborhoods, somewhat easing black/white racial hostility and they reside in large numbers in precisely the same neighborhoods as blacks. While the Latino population is small in the south side core, Latinos are present in the central and eastern neighborhoods in the city. In these neighborhoods, black compose about 20 to 30 percent of the population, and Latinos compose about 30 to 60 percent of the population. In Evanston, Latinos are most present in the same neighborhoods as blacks, but these neighborhoods are 50 to 80 percent black, but only 7 to 15 percent Latino. While the political incorporation literature constructs the presence of a Latino population as an avenue to incorporation, Waukegan (like many other cities) has seen the significant presence of blacks and Latinos as a source
of racial strife. This is particularly exacerbated in Waukegan because blacks and Latinos share the same residential space. The last section of this chapter returns to the impacts of residential segregation on political incorporation in each city. In Waukegan, initial black migration into the city created persistent hostility between blacks and whites, and the presence of blacks and Latinos, particularly in the same space, further increased racial hostility and decreased the chances for a black/Latino coalition. In Evanston, segregated residential spaces facilitated the development of a strong racial identity for residents and a deep sense of racial solidarity and intraracial trust. In sum, residential segregation in Evanston and Waukegan has a lasting impact on the racial dynamics of each city and created sociopolitical contexts that differentially impacted struggles for political incorporation.

6.3 Individual Racism and Hostility

Blacks typically sought to push the boundaries of racial residential segregation, and this caused many whites to respond with hostility and attempts to gain firmer controls over the city. As blacks increased their demands for equal treatment, whites felt threatened and reacted defensively to protect their racial privileges (Gleason 2001). A number of scholars explain that white racial hostilities are typically rooted in fear. The presence of blacks appeared to threaten whites’ image of the city and a vision for the city that excluded blacks. This fear, when put into action, reinforced the subordinate social, economic, and political status of blacks (Pain 2001).
Figure 3. Black Residential Segregation in Waukegan


Figure 4. Black Residential Segregation in Evanston

Figure 5. Latino Residential Segregation in Waukegan


Figure 6. Latino Residential Segregation in Evanston

One example in Waukegan demonstrates how the arrival of blacks caused whites to act out of hostility and racial fears. In 1967, the federal government filed a lawsuit against the Glen Flora Village Apartments, charging that they refused to rent apartments to blacks. Donald Olsen, the manager, and Marilyn Sheerlinck, the office staff, discriminated against blacks by refusing to show them apartments (Mount 1967). The black apartment seekers were told that apartments were not available because of their race and because of community resistance to residential integration. Sheerlinck warned a white tenant to not bring another black friend to the complex to visit.

Veteran John Williamson recalled that blacks stationed at Great Lakes naval training station had trouble locating apartments to rent in the area, even when the Navy referred them to Waukegan because they assumed the large black population would make it easy to find residence there (personal interview, December 28, 2010). Williamson recalled that black navy men could locate housing in rooming houses on the city’s south side, but given their service to the country, the housing did not match the quality of housing they felt they deserved. Williamson suggested that Glen Flora Village Apartments was not the only discriminatory complex and that some navy men who did rent homes in Waukegan neighborhoods were made uncomfortable enough to leave. In settling the lawsuit, Glen Flora Village Apartments agreed to actively seek and rent to black tenants. As the black population in Waukegan increased, so did black allegations of housing discrimination. In 1972, the city of Waukegan annexed surrounding rural lands,
and an explosion in housing developments in those new areas allowed whites residents to flee increasingly-black spaces in the city.

As the Waukegan example shows, blacks in Evanston and Waukegan report experiencing racism and hostility in their city. The degree of racial hostility in Waukegan far exceeded that in Evanston, though. High levels of individual racial hostility meant that there was little support for mobilization for political power, descriptive representation, policy responsiveness, or full incorporation in Waukegan, and individual whites worked in unison with racially conservative political leadership to block black demands for incorporation. White racial hostility intimidated potential black candidates for office and articulated a political voice that advocated for policies that were unresponsive (or in open opposition to) to the interests of the black community. In addition to Mayor Robert Sabonjian Sr.’s “shoot to kill” order and other hostilities toward the black community, blacks in Waukegan experienced insidious acts like a Ku Klux Klan march and several cross burnings on the lawns of prominent blacks, including the director of the South Genessee Street YMCA. These examples served to intimidate blacks from fully agitating for political incorporation in Waukegan and severely limit or halt their progress through the phases of incorporation.

Those things leave an image in your mind that doesn’t go away. I can’t even describe the fear that I had as a child in Waukegan. That I could experience violence or such painful hatred over something that I could not control. We never knew who carried out those attacks. As a child...to this day...I look at white people sometimes, “Could it have been you? How do you really feel about blacks?” There were never exceptions to the rule. The message we got was “We don’t want you
here, and we’ll do anything to keep you out.” I still think about that living here (personal interview with Bobby Smith, November 7, 2010.

Blacks in each city report, though, that the amount of individual racism and hostility they experience in their city has significantly diminished. Though research participants from both cities still report experiences with racial discrimination, the consensus in both cities was that they experienced far fewer moments of individual, overt white racism. Research participants were asked whether they felt they experienced specific discriminatory situations in their city because of their race. There were slight differences in each city. Blacks in Evanston were more likely to report that they were unfairly fired, not hired, or denied a promotion because of their race (27%) and unfairly prevented from moving into a neighborhood in the city because a landlord or realtor refused to rent to them (8%). Blacks in Waukegan were more likely to report that their neighbors made life difficult because of their race (22%) and that they received a subpar quality of services compared to what they thought whites received based on their race (17%). These results are relative though, and they reveal that levels of racial discrimination in each city are lower than their historic levels.

30 Schuman et al. (1997) provide research documenting that, since 1997, fewer whites agree with statements that blacks are less intelligent or hardworking than whites, and fewer reported that they object to integrated neighborhoods or integrated social relations. Whites have become much less likely to display acceptance of racial segregation or to believe in white supremacy (Sigelman and Welch 1991). At the same time, and reflective of the statements by research participants, fewer whites also acknowledge that blacks are adversely affected by persistent discrimination (Schuman et al. 1997). Sigelman and Welch (1991) add that white prejudice against blacks has not disappeared, and a significant number of whites still would not welcome blacks into their homes, neighborhoods, or families. Many whites do not display signs of overt expressions of racism, but they still value, in action, social distance from blacks (Sigelman and Welch 1991).

31 This doesn’t diminish some residents’ perceptions of increased covert racism in their city. For some, this was more difficult to counter than overt racism, because they had little knowledge about which behaviors or local political activity were actually rooted in racism. Some expressed that they would rather live with clear individual hostilities than uncertain examples of systemic racism within city government.
Additionally blacks were asked about how they thought whites perceived them. There were significant differences between both cities. In Waukegan, just over 80 percent of research participants believed that “white people want to keep black people down.” This result is likely reflective of the lack of political incorporation in the city. Blacks used the political sphere, not individual white attitudes or beliefs, as the primary example that whites were engaged in a larger mission to keep blacks “in their place” in the city. In Evanston, on the other hand, two-thirds of blacks believed that “White people don’t care one way or another [about blacks].” Blacks in both cities were unlikely to believe that “white people believe blacks should get a better break,” and the low percentage of blacks who selected that statement is likely to be far lower than what whites in either city would have expected. Figure 7 provides a comparison of both cities.

Figure 7. Black Perceptions of How Whites View Blacks
The sociopolitical contexts in both Evanston and in Waukegan historically contained instances of individual racism and white hostility toward blacks. This hostility was particularly evident during black struggles for political power at the national level, and hostile acts were used at the local level to deter black demands for political incorporation. Thomas Sugrue (1996) explains that any city with a significant black population in which blacks asserted their rights to equal opportunity and political power have evidence of racial hostility. In both Waukegan and Evanston, black pressures for political incorporation made group boundaries clear, made group identities salient, and increased discrimination against them (Gurin et al. 1999).

The hostilities experienced by blacks in both cities surely spilled into the political arena. When members of dominant groups are threatened, they typically engage in various behaviors that enhance and further the racial power hierarchy in order to preserve their dominance. “Holding the privileged position of having institutions generally function in their behalf has kept members of dominant groups from learning how to negotiate conflicts based on the claims of different groups” (Gurin et al. 1999: 140) This means that whites with power created policies and practices, consciously or unconsciously, to maintain white control over local government. A heightened level of hostility, particularly in Waukegan, was sure to have an impact on their propensity to redistribute political power to blacks. Though blacks in Evanston and Waukegan report diminished levels of hostility, they are likely to still experience resistance and competition.

\[32\text{ Though it is impossible to know his motive for changing the rules of the Spelling Bee, the example of Roger Nixon in the introduction to this chapter demonstrates that personal biases can potentially have divisive consequences in the public arena.}\]
due to socialization during the 1960s and other times of racial threat. This hostility, in the form of personal prejudice or policies with biased intents or consequences, are likely to spill over into the political arena (Sears et al. 1999).

6.4 Interracial Contact

In cities void of significant interracial contact, blacks and whites largely live in two separate worlds (Allen, Brown, and Dawson 1989). Regardless of any racially liberal images that a city may project, white hostility toward blacks is present in any city where there is a significant black population (Welch 2001); the variation is in the degree, not the presence, of racial hostility. High levels of hostility and prejudice deeply impact the political process. Walsh (2007) explains that a lack of reciprocity and cooperation across racial lines threatens to undermine the stability of local democracies.

But, prior research indicates that when people of different races have frequent contact with members of another race, their hostile feelings toward the race often decrease. Interaction between people of different racial backgrounds is what is needed to reduce prejudice. These interactions have the ability to reduce group stereotypes, reduce hostility, increase cross-racial trust, improve cross-racial communication, and enhance understanding across racial boundaries. In accordance with the idea that personal prejudices impact the public sphere, whites who have regular exposure to blacks

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33 We witnessed this precise instability in race riots during the modern Civil Rights Movement.

34 The primary place for this interracial contact to occur is in neighborhoods, but segregated neighborhoods, like in Evanston and in Waukegan, lessen the potential for these contacts (Welch 2001). There are other places within cities where interracial contact can occur, including in the work place, in civic activities, and other regular daily interactions.
are less likely to express anti-black attitudes, and they are less likely to convert prejudicial attitudes toward blacks into anti-black policy attitudes (Welch 2001).

But not just any cross-racial contact is sufficient for reducing prejudice, and the goal of cross-racial contact in the political incorporation process is not to reduce prejudice, after all. The goal of cross-racial contact is to create white responsiveness to black concerns; decreased racial prejudice should enhance understandings of black concerns. When people work interdependently with people from other racial groups, they learn to the take on the role of others and view the world from their perspective (Walsh 2004). By participating in organizations across racial lines, parallel empathy will result, and parallel empathy will aroused feelings of injustice among whites, and feelings among blacks that this injustice can be corrected (Walsh 2004). Whites will be less likely to believe that the political reality for blacks is a result of negative traits inherent to blacks, and blacks will be less likely to believe that whites seek to perpetuate discrimination at the local level. Together, whites can understand issues that are important to blacks (and the stance of blacks on these issues) and blacks can trust whites enough to partner with them. The expectation is that this will increase political trust and provide for a fair distribution of political power to blacks, which places cities along the path to black political incorporation.

The problem, though, is getting from a point of racial distance and hostility to meaningful interracial contact. It appears that blacks in neither Evanston nor Waukegan have accomplished this transition in large scale. Certainly in each city there is substantial opportunity for interracial contact in one's daily activities. But if it is meaningful contact,
such as participation on diverse governing bodies or within diverse organizations that do significant work on black concerns, that helps build coalitions and advance political incorporation, research participants report little participation in these groups. Organizing about local or specifically black concerns largely occurs in racial silos. For black participants (and likely whites as well), worship, education, neighborhood and recreational activities, community and civil rights organizing, fraternity and sorority membership, and charity work all happen within same-race groups. Participants in both cities report high levels of involvement in organizations and high levels of work on black concerns in these organizations, but given their racial composition, they are more likely to build racial solidarity than interracial coalitions.

Research participants were asked if they were involved in two or more organizations in their city. This question sought to measure generalized participation, so their participation could have been in religious institutions, schools, civic organizations, recreational bodies, or fraternities and sororities. Participants in both cities report high local participation, including 89 percent of Waukegan residents and 88 percent of Evanston residents. Residents were similarly likely to hold leadership positions, serve on a committee, or help organize meetings in each of these bodies, including 87 percent of Waukegan residents and 89 percent of Evanston residents. While residents in each city were not likely to contribute money to these groups (39 percent in Waukegan and 44 percent in Evanston), they did report high levels of activity within these organizations: within the last year, all Waukegan residents and 96 percent of Evanston residents reported that they were at least somewhat active in these organizations.
The survey instrument also asked participants how often these groups discuss and attempt to influence decision-making on community issues that affect blacks in their city. Though we do not know precisely which organizations research participants were thinking of when they answered the question, Evanston residents reported higher organizational activity about issues that affect blacks than in Waukegan. In Evanston, 87 percent of participants reported that these groups at least sometimes discuss community issues that affect blacks in Evanston, compared to 72 percent of participants in Waukegan.

The greatest difference between the two cities is in the level of influence over decision-making on community issues that affect blacks. While 67 percent of Evanston residents reported that these groups “often” or “sometimes” attempted to influence decision-making on issues that affect blacks, just 41 percent of Waukegan groups do. More specifically, while 22 percent of Evanston residents reported “often,” only 7 percent of Waukegan residents did so. Figures 8 and 9 detail the results. It is not clear what the racial composition of these organizations is, though. If these organizations are majority-black organizations, which would be reflective of the tendency to participate in same-race groups, then the results show that blacks in Evanston were more likely to work within black organizations to address the concerns of the black community. If these organizations tend to be cross-racial organizations, then the results demonstrate that blacks in Evanston are more likely to participate in cross-racial conversations about the concerns of the black community.
But, a particular kind of contact is necessary to reduce prejudice because contact can just as easily exacerbate conflict as it can minimize it. As Hewstone and Brown (1986) explain: “Contact and perceived social climate tend to reinforce each other when their influence operates in the same direction, and to cancel each other out when their influence works in the opposite direction” (8). Steps toward bridging social contact are often devalued by blacks because of an increasingly superficial bent in conversations across racial lines—for example, local and national efforts to encourage conversations across racial lines without engaging in a systemic examination of how racism affects
representation and decision-making at the local level (Reed 1997). Solutions to conflicts over race and ethnicity depend on working across contested boundaries in everyday life and on building bridging social capital (Nelson et al. 2004). Bridging social capital, which is built by working together on organizations, allows common goals to be developed across racial lines. These common goals are the basis for coalition building. Accordingly, many scholars claim that interracial contact allows blacks and whites to develop common goals that can form the basis for political action (Walsh 2004).

6.5 Common Goals

The positive effects of intergroup contact occur only in situations where there is equal group status within the situation, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and the support of political officials. In order to build bridging social capital and develop common goals, both groups must expect and perceive equal status, because there are negative effects from contact with outgroup members of lower status (Hewstone and Brown 1986). Prejudice reduction through interracial contact requires an active, goal-oriented effort. Cross-racial coalition members must need each other in order to achieve their goal.

The formation of common goals is difficult because blacks often live in the world of the “ruled” and whites typically live in the world of the “rulers” (Parenti 1978). Given the disproportionate distribution of political power toward whites in Evanston and Waukegan, there are few interests common to both blacks and whites in which whites, in particular, need coalitions with blacks to accomplish. In other words, blacks in Evanston
and Waukegan each perceive their goal as “obtaining political power,” and this goal could not be held in common with whites because obtaining political power for blacks meant taking away political power from whites.

While there may be lesser goals held by blacks, for example, naming schools after local black leaders or increasing municipal positions for blacks, these incremental goals are often subject to co-optation and less likely to result in overall political power. So even though blacks and whites may be able to find commonality in these particular goals, blacks in Evanston and Waukegan perceived that their overall goal of shared governance across racial lines is not (and could not be) shared by whites. This is because blacks believed that whites in both cities had disproportionate influence over local government that was coveted by whites.

Tables XII and XIII detail the amount of influence that blacks believed other groups possessed over their community in Evanston and Waukegan. Blacks and whites in both cities believe that businesses and corporations, whites, and local government officials have too much influence over black concerns, and they both believe that middle class blacks and poor blacks have too little influence. Similarly, while blacks in Evanston were most likely to believe that the Evanston City Council and the elementary and high school district school boards pay little or no attention to improving the lives of black people, blacks in Waukegan were even more likely to believe that no political officials or bodies are concerned with improving the lives of blacks in Waukegan. Tables XIV and XV also detail black perceptions of how interested different actors were in improving the lives of blacks. Each of these tables reveals little cross-racial trust, perceptions by blacks
in each city that they did not hold sufficient political power or decision-making over their
lives in the city, and little expectation by blacks in each city that whites shared an interest
in “black concerns.” In other words, blacks in both Evanston and Waukegan did not see
that blacks and whites were acting with common goals in the political arena.

Table XII. Perceptions of Influence over Black Concerns in Evanston

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Too much influence</th>
<th>Just about the right amount of influence</th>
<th>Too little influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper income blacks</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class blacks</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor blacks</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businesses and corporations</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government officials</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table XIII. Perceptions of Influence over Black Concerns in Waukegan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Too much influence</th>
<th>Just about the right amount of influence</th>
<th>Too little influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper income blacks</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class blacks</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor blacks</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businesses and corporations</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government officials</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What can we make of an emphasis in the literature on cross-racial coalition building and the formation of common goals across racial lines, when blacks in neither Evanston or Waukegan report that these elements were in place in their cities? Carmichael and Hamilton (1967) warn that the emphasis in the literature is not reflective of how struggles for black political incorporation actually play out in cities. They contend that this is
because coalition-building is misleading across racial lines and perceived “common goals” almost always disadvantage blacks and advantage whites. They counter the view that the best, or only, way for black people to achieve political incorporation is by forming coalitions with white liberals and other sympathetic, non-black groups. They suggest that no common goals can be formed between the “politically and economically secure” (whites) and the “politically and economically insecure” (blacks).

When whites do join coalitions, the political and economic interests causing them to do so clearly further disadvantage blacks, and their method of entering the coalition is cooptation. Blacks in Waukegan and Evanston appear to agree with Carmichael and Hamilton (1967): blacks in Evanston claim that they enter into selective, manipulative coalitions with whites but largely demand for political incorporation within their own organizations, and blacks in Waukegan distrust whites enough, and racial hostility from whites is sufficient enough to prevent coalition formation from even happening.

Indeed, the method for developing common goals that is outlined in the literature seems impossible given actual local realities. In order for common goals to be attained, there must be a local structure by which cross-racial groups can work together. This must occur in an environment devoid of intergroup competition (Hewstone and Brown 1986). The already-lofty goal of social harmony is necessary for common goals to be developed. Blacks, who value racial community, must believe that this racial community identity will not be threatened or weakened by partnering with whites and other groups. Parenti (1978) warns that we must guard against the association of class-based or race-based values to the common goals that cross-racial groups develop. Dawson (2001) asks:
“Do blacks and whites share common beliefs, speak the same political language, have common understandings of the same events, and share conceptual categories of politics? Further, when blacks and whites debate politics, do they mean the same thing even when they use the same language?” (3). Without a shared understanding of commonly experienced political events, blacks and others could reach very different conclusions and trigger different political responses.

Blacks in Evanston and Waukegan both report an inability to partner with whites and develop the common goals that are necessary to the incorporation process. In Evanston, black distrust of whites was sufficient to cause blacks to retreat into their own community in order to achieve political incorporation. White hostility toward blacks was sufficient to cause neither group to trust each other in Waukegan. The next section outlines the only recourse available to blacks in both communities. Blacks in Evanston were able to rely on racial solidarity to achieve incorporation. Blacks in Waukegan, too disorganized to rely on solidarity, unsuccessfully attempted to enter into coalitions with Latinos.

6.6 Racial Identity and Solidarity

Key events along the path to political incorporation in Evanston demonstrate that strong racial identity and feelings of solidarity in the black community were key parts of the city’s sociopolitical context. Black research participants strongly attributed their successes along the path to political incorporation to the cohesiveness of the black community and their collective work toward the common goal of incorporation. Allen,
Dawson, and Brown (1989) explain that differing world views and segregation have increased the salience of black racial identity in the political arena. They theorize that blacks, in large part, share a racial belief system that structures how they view the world and how they process and draw conclusions about information that affects them. Politics is central to the formation of a racial group identity. Some assume that because people are black, in this case, that they automatically identify and feel a connection toward other blacks. Conover (1984) explains that this is not the case. Because individuals are not born with an awareness of their racial identity nor a sense of attachment to the group, it is typically political events that successively develop or suddenly spark racial group identity and solidarity.

One might then question about Evanston and Waukegan why blacks in Waukegan do not have the stronger sense of racial group solidarity because of the heightened level of racial hostility and political exclusion in the city. Indeed, Conover says that when political rhetoric and issues within a city contain references to particular groups, it is more likely that those group identities will impact one’s perception of political events. But the point in Waukegan is that while blacks may have had a strong sense of racial identity, their sense of solidarity (and acts of solidarity) with their community was low.

Respondents in both cities largely believe that their feelings and ideas are proximate to blacks in America and in their city. Ninety-one percent of Waukegan participants thought their ideas and feelings were at least “fairly close” to blacks in America, as well as 94 percent of blacks in Evanston. Residents in Waukegan reported slightly lower feelings about the proximity of their ideas and feelings to blacks in the city.
(89 percent in Waukegan versus 94 percent in Evanston). But, again, what turns sentiments of solidarity into action is the black civic fabric. A thin civic fabric in a black community, like in Waukegan, means fewer chances to engage in the type of activities that cultivate racial solidarity.

One of the most fundamental tests of feelings of solidarity in a city, rather than just affect, is the connections between blacks across class lines. The literature suggests that as the socioeconomic status of blacks increases, their sense of racial solidarity decreases. They suggest that higher status blacks are less likely to believe in separation from white society, more affectively distant from other blacks, are less likely to participate in racially-focused activities (including attending black churches and following black media), and are more likely to have a positive image of the race rather than feelings of closeness to the black community (Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989). Thus, feelings of racial solidarity can only be strong when they are able to overcome class differences. In terms of this research, we see that blacks in Evanston have more racial affect across class lines than in Waukegan. Research participants were asked to respond to several statements that measured their connection to other blacks, particularly on substantive issues. Table XVI details the results.

The results show that blacks in Evanston are more likely to recognize the plight of poor blacks and advocate for them, even when they do not share the same socioeconomic status. Blacks in Evanston are also more likely to believe that all blacks are not treated fairly and equally in the city, and they expect that the city should do more for blacks. Feelings about racial identity expressed by black research participants are more
proximate to each other than in Waukegan. This lends credence to higher levels of racial solidarity in Evanston.

![Table XVI. Affect Toward Other Blacks in Evanston and Waukegan](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Evanston</th>
<th>Waukegan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The system in [city] prevents poor blacks from getting their fair share, such as better jobs and more money.</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is my responsibility to help improve the well-being of poor blacks in [city].</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle and upper class blacks in [city] try to keep poor blacks down.</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If poor blacks in [city] would only try harder, they would be just as well off as middle or upper class blacks.</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[City] should work harder to include poor blacks in local political decision-making.</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generations of discrimination in [city] have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks in the city to work their way out of the lower class.</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks get less than they deserve in [city].</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Today, there is a lot of discrimination against blacks in [city].</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government officials in [city] usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a black person.</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The natural resulting question, then, is whether the sense of racial solidarity among blacks in Evanston should be used in the political arena. Again, blacks can feel a connection to other blacks and have a positive image of their racial brethren, but that does not mean that they believe that they are able to use these racial connections to gain political power. In other words, a city where blacks feel connected to each other does not
mean that blacks also feel that they have the political will to collectively advance their interests. This bears out in the results for three separate statements that research participants in Evanston and Waukegan reported their agreement with. Figures 10, 11, and 12 demonstrate that blacks in Evanston were more likely than blacks in Waukegan to believe that their racial solidarity could positively influence local decision-making. In sum, Evanston residents reported the greatest perceptions of individual influence over local decision-making, the greatest feelings of black influence over local decision-making, but the lowest levels of satisfaction with the amount of influence that blacks actually do have.

How can we explain higher levels of racial solidarity and black political efficacy in Evanston when we might expect that low levels of racial hostility and a racially liberal image meant that blacks would not have to unite as much as they actually did? Orr’s (1999) description of Baltimore mirrors Evanston: “Baltimore has never been an icon of the Civil Rights Movement, nor does it have a wretched history of racial violence. Compared with comparable cities, blacks have fared relatively well. Baltimore’s race relations were always considered relatively moderate. There is a strong black network of teachers, ministers, and social activists. The black leadership class in the city has deep roots in all levels of the black community. There is a bond of personalism that links and nurtures these relationships.” Demo and Hughes (1990). Thus, these bonds of personalism are key to political action based on racial solidarity. If a city does not have a thick black civic fabric to cultivate these bonds of personalism, then feelings of racial
solidarity are displaced toward a generalized or national sense of black community, rather than localized feelings of solidarity. Even under the worst conditions, feelings of racial

**Figure 10. Perceptions of Black Political Efficacy**

*Percent agreeing with the statement, "By working together, black people in [city] can influence decisions that affect their community."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Waukegan</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evanston</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 11. Satisfaction with Black Political Efficacy**

*Percent agreeing with the statement, "I am satisfied with the amount of influence blacks have over decisions that affect them in [city]."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Waukegan</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evanston</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 12. Perceptions of Individual Political Efficacy**

*Percent agreeing with the statement, "I can influence decisions that affect my community."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Waukegan</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evanston</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
solidarity and shared plight cannot translate into political action without a strong network within the black community.

6.7 Black and Latino Competition

We might also expect racial solidarity in Waukegan to grow because of intense competition between blacks and Latinos for power, resources, and recognition. Many American cities do not have sociopolitical contexts with low competition from other groups, like in Evanston. Struggles for political incorporation must increasingly take other groups into account who are vying for their own incorporation (Pinderhughes 2002). The early political incorporation literature theorized that the presence of other minority groups would aid blacks, but this is no longer the case. When Latinos began to participate in politics, they typically used coalitions with blacks as their own entry into politics. By the 1980s, both groups found it increasingly difficult to develop common goals and strategies and, today, blacks and Latinos are more likely to engage in political conflict than political coalitions (Pinderhughes 2002).

Some scholars claim that conflict between blacks and Latinos is a disguise for persistent resources inequities and power-grabbing that is being done behind the scenes by whites. Betancur and Gills (2000) suggest that the election of descriptive representatives from both communities has created short-term improvements, but few stable redistributions of power. They further explain that coalition-building between blacks and Latinos suffers from “external forces pushing them to compete against each
other for a fixed set of resources and opportunities” (4). Clarence Paltrow shares this perception in the case of Waukegan:

We were all getting stepped on. It’s not like whites were treating us good and them bad or vice versa. Those whites and Armenians were dogging all of us. That should have been reason enough for us to work together—against them. But you know, they don’t like us period. How else can you explain it? They had every reason to go along with us. Instead, whites got them when they first got here. They did it to us too. A little house, a little job, a little money, a little education. The white man reminded them, “Look at all we did for you.” They bought their vote, that’s what I say. And look, right along with that little job and little money, they got a little alderman, a little power, and look who is still running the whole operation. Not them” (resident focus group, January 8, 2011).

It is safe to say that Waukegan’s Latino community had a stronger sense of racial community, and this allowed them to coalesce in the political sphere to a greater extent than blacks. Paltrow’s comment may prove to be correct, particularly considering Latino support for white mayoral candidate, Robert Sabonjian Jr., in 2009. Waukegan’s Latino community flexed their political muscle to elect Robert Sabonjian Jr. for mayor, over black 1st ward alderman, Sam Cunningham and Latino descriptive representative, Jose Guzman. Their political activity was spurred by former mayor Richard Hyde’s advocacy of a vehicle seizure ordinance that blacks and Latinos both claimed disproportionately affected them. But almost all of the political activity done in response to the ordinance, including campaigning for Mayor Sabonjian, was done by Latinos. The Latino vote was the deciding factor in the election. Jose Luis Zavala, owner of El Chapala Restaurant (Sabonjian’s campaign headquarters), explained: “He couldn’t have won without [the
Latino vote]. We had a meeting with Sabonjian. We asked him, ‘Are we on your agenda or not?’ We have a lot of votes” (Pagelow 2009). Mayor Sabonjian reported that the Latino vote was a “huge factor” in his win: “This changes the political dynamic of Waukegan forever. This was a different level. I think the Hispanic population wasn’t as organized and driven four years ago. This was the opportunity for Latinos to say enough is enough. They’re flexing their political muscle” (Pagelow 2009).

The case may be that Latinos in Waukegan are no further along the path to political incorporation than blacks. Some research participants pointed to a near majority Latino population, a city that has only had white mayors, and the continued exclusion of a significant and long-standing black population as signs that whites had successfully co-opted each of the minority groups in the city. While black dissatisfaction is high, blacks in Waukegan expressed feelings that they had moved far off the path to political incorporation:

What makes it so unfair is that we never had a chance. I could see if we squandered a golden opportunity. I know some of you disagree, but I say we tried our hardest, and we’re going to keep trying. But I think they said that we are 80 percent Latino if you could illegal immigrants. I have two friends moving to Zion and Wheeling. They say the schools are just all Hispanic kids, and they think the teachers spend too long on language. I mean, if there really are that few of us left, our time has come and gone in Waukegan (Sharita Cannon, resident focus group, January 8, 2011).

Indeed, there are increasing divisions even within the black community. While 98 percent of the black vote in Evanston was directed toward Lorraine Morton’s election, the black vote in Waukegan in the 2009 election was nearly evenly split between Robert
Sabonjian Jr. and black alderman, Sam Cunningham. With racial solidarity, but without political efficacy and shared strategies and goals, and increasingly without numerical strength, a changing sociopolitical context in Waukegan will make the path to black political incorporation increasingly difficult.

6.8 Conclusion

This chapter argued that local racial dynamics act as a factor determining which fork in the road to political incorporation that cities will travel down. Two racial dynamics in Waukegan were pivotal in the city’s path to incorporation: white racial hostility and Latino competition. White racial hostility, particularly given a politically active white population, intimidated blacks at every fork, and whites viewed Latinos as a safer group to advocate for incorporation. Though white hostility and the co-optation of Alderman Robert Evans pushed blacks to a single example of descriptive representation, continued racial hostility and Latino competition meant that blacks went the route of low policy responsiveness at the fork in the road. On the other hand, in Evanston, a lack of ethnic competition and bouts of full white support and limited white resistance allowed the city to advocate for black descriptive representatives, policies that would respond to the interests of the black community, and resource allocation to the black community in order to live up to its liberal/open political culture. The open political culture in Evanston was supported by favorable racial dynamics that either fully supported or lowered the barriers to black political incorporation.
7. CONCLUSION

7.1 Recalling the Purpose of the Dissertation

What are the different paths that cities take toward incorporation? How do contextual characteristics determine the path that each city takes? How do local racial dynamics mediate the sociopolitical context in which incorporation is pursued?

This dissertation allows us to better understand the factors that affect political incorporation by incorporating a comprehensive analysis of the causal forces in the local sociopolitical context. These forces shape the atmosphere in which political incorporation is pursued, and they directly shape how incorporation is pursued. I advanced four hypotheses. I hypothesized that there is a relationship between the significant presence of another minority group and the difficulty of the path toward black political incorporation. I expected that blacks in cities with developed civic fabric would have more successful efforts at achieving incorporation. I also expected that the presence of a cohort of white liberals, including residents and elected officials, is central to the election of black candidates and generalized support of efforts by local blacks. Finally, I hypothesized that the relationship between the size of the black population and the achievement of black political incorporation is weak. In other words, the size of the black
population is not as important as other factors, like the civic fabric, political leadership, and local racial dynamics. My overall thesis was: place matters.

7.2 The Path to Political Incorporation

This research began with two similar cities, Evanston and Waukegan. Because of the size of their respective black populations (about one-quarter black) and the length of their residence in the city (over a century), one would expect that the black community in each city would hold a significant amount of political power. Indeed, the political incorporation literature follows this line of thinking when it focuses on cities that have achieved incorporation, thereby missing the number of cities where incorporation is expected but absent. Outside of Browning, Marshall, and Tabb’s (1984) initial theory, the political incorporation literature tends to treat black political power as spontaneous. The literature tends to focus on the election of black officials, particularly mayors, and it primarily focuses on the local realities that affected these particular electoral competitions. In other words, this literature focuses on political power in a few decades, blind to the impact of a century of black residence in the city. This research demonstrates that cities do take different paths toward incorporation, all of them striving for black political empowerment, but not all of them reaching the finish line.

I suggest that the numerous studies that compose the black political incorporation literature have tangentially focused away from Browning, Marshall, and Tabb’s (1984) seminal theory. Again, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, following Robert Dahl’s (1961) theory of ethnic political incorporation, advance four stages that mark the political
incorporation process. Attention to these four stages—mobilization, descriptive representation, policy responsiveness, and full political incorporation—will tell us the different paths that cities take toward incorporation. I suggest that the evolution of this path is impacted by the sociopolitical context.

Every stage of the incorporation process is continually and directly impacted by the sociopolitical context. In general, local racial dynamics tell us the degree of racial hostility that will attempt to halt the process, as well as the presence of racial understanding that will advance the process. While the political incorporation literature does pay some attention to local racial dynamics in the election of black officials, this dissertation makes the point that (a) local racial dynamics should also be able to account for cases of political incorporation and exclusion, and (b) local racial dynamics should also be used to explain the *entire* process—beginning with mobilization and through full political incorporation. The civic fabric, particularly in the black community, tells us how organized blacks are to structure their demands for incorporation. While the current literature examines the black civic fabric, particularly in terms of organizing and support for black electoral gains, this literature takes a close look at the black civic fabric to see whether it can guide blacks through the incorporation process. A thin black civic fabric means that blacks may not even have the support to begin mobilizing for incorporation, let alone reach full political incorporation. Finally, the literature looks at the effect of political culture and leadership on the interests and needs of the black community, but it rarely determines whether political leadership cultivates a local environment that is receptive to the incorporation process. Similar to the civic fabric, political leadership has
the ability to halt, co-opt, advance, or prevent the incorporation process, and they most
directly shape a sociopolitical context that is either receptive of or in opposition to
demands for incorporation.

This research demonstrates that Evanston and Waukegan indeed have taken
different paths toward incorporation. Figure 12 depicts the path for both Evanston and
Waukegan. It is clear that Waukegan did not advance as far through the four stages of
incorporation. Even before blacks reached the first step of mobilization, struggles for
incorporation were negatively impacted by white racial hostility (local racial dynamics), a
closed political culture that sought to control the allocation of political power, and the
disorganization and in-fighting of black organizations (civic fabric). Blacks were able to
advance into the first stage of descriptive representation when Alderman Robert Evans
was appointed by Mayor Robert Sabonjian Sr. (political leadership), but the result was co-
optation. Further attempts at descriptive representation were limited by co-optative
political leadership, a disorganized black civic fabric, and competition from Latino
residents. All of this within a racially conservative political culture that failed to align the
black interest of political power with the city’s interests.

As shown in Figure 12, one of the keys to full black political incorporation in
Evanston was the black civic fabric. The city’s black civic fabric was strong enough to
counter any external forces in the sociopolitical context that threatened incorporation,
and the city’s highly touted liberal image served to limit the external forces that were
explicitly opposed to black political empowerment. The organization of the black
community, no competition from other ethnic groups, and white sympathy helped realize
Figure 13. The Path to Political Incorporation in Evanston and Waukegan

Evanston is pushed forward to full incorporation by the advocacy of black elites, an organized black civic fabric, limited white resistance, and low racial/ethnic competition.

Waukegan engages in mobilizations that are fragmented because of a thin civic fabric and with little interracial support because of a closed political culture and poor racial dynamics.

Evanston gains voice through their mobilizations due to a cohesive black civic fabric and an open political culture and positive racial dynamics that seek to preserve the city’s liberal image.

Waukegan is pushed forward to descriptive representation by a closed political culture and white hostility.

Evanston is pushed forward to descriptive representation by an open political culture and no ethnic competition.

Waukegan is halted by co-opted political leadership, Latino competition, continued racial hostility, and a disorganized black civic fabric.

Policy Responsiveness

Mobilization

Descriptive Representation

Sustaining Incorporation

High

Full Incorporation

Low

Presence

Absence

Evanston

Waukegan
the first stage of descriptive representation. At each successive stage, black political leadership expected and groomed future descriptive representatives, and black organizations supported them in elections and in support for their policy stances. The organization of the black community—the tight connection between all black organizations and black political leaders—was the engine that propelled blacks through the incorporation process. For blacks in Evanston, the key was not the presence of whites in electoral coalitions, but instead a racially liberal political culture and image that made whites less resistant to black political power and no competition from other racial/ethnic groups. This is key: in Evanston, it was not the presence of a liberal white coalition but instead the absence of white racial hostility. This racially liberal political culture indeed brought whites to support the mayoralty of Lorraine Morton. But if we look at the sum total of activity toward incorporation, without emphasizing descriptive representation, we see that the black community accomplished a great deal on their own. One of the key lessons that this research seeks to contribute to the urban politics and black politics literatures is that political incorporation is perhaps more greatly determined by factors in the sociopolitical context that are internal to the black community than the external factors. Even when the external factors grew formidable, the internal factors should have served as a protective shield for incorporation efforts (as they did in Evanston).

7.3 Hypotheses

The results of this research directly respond to the hypotheses I advanced in the first chapter. The results reveal that the process of political incorporation was both more
complex than I initially expected and more controlled by the black community than other external groups or factors. This does not diminish the substantial impact that these external factors can and do have; it simply means that black communities are more able to control the process of political incorporation than previously theorized.

Certainly in a city with a super-majority of black residents, we would see a strong relationship between the size of the black population and the achievement of black political incorporation. But given that the country’s black population is distributed in a wider variety of cities than central cities, we should use a wider variety of cities to understand incorporation. Evanston and Waukegan are typical of many American cities, and the fact that Evanston has achieved incorporation and Waukegan has not demonstrates that there must be more to political incorporation than the presence of many black residents. We cannot comfortably say that the size of the black population is positively correlated with the achievement of black political incorporation, either. Looking at cities like Evanston and Waukegan with significant numerical strength, we see that black numerical strength is just one amongst a myriad of factors that are related to political incorporation. As this chapter later demonstrates, there are a number of cities with sizeable black populations that have not achieved political incorporation. Given this, the current political incorporation literature may overestimate the relationship between the size of the black population and the achievement of political incorporation.

The political incorporation literature focuses a great deal on competition between blacks and Latinos. This research confirms the initial hypothesis that there is a relationship between the significant presence of another minority group and the difficulty
of the path toward black political incorporation, but this is only to a limited extent. While few Mexican railroad workers lived in Waukegan in the 1900s, Waukegan’s Latino population only surpassed the city’s black population in 1990 when Latinos composed 23 percent of city residents. Even in the 1980s, there were few Latinos living in Waukegan. This means that the presence of a Latino population explains contemporary failures at political incorporation in the last twenty years, but it does little to explain the absence of black political incorporation over the last 140 years of black residence in the city. But if we do focus on contemporary black politics in Waukegan, we see that Latinos made greater strides toward their own political incorporation than blacks were able to. It is clear that as long as blacks and whites predominated in the city, it was easier for whites to ignore any demands for black political power. In the 1990s, when the city’s Latino population exploded, two growing racial/ethnic minority groups that composed 43 percent of the population presented a threat to white political power. With greater power and more access to resources, and given a fragmented black civic fabric, it was far easier for whites to subsume Latinos in their political organizations than for blacks and Latinos to organize for and endure the lengthy process of coalition-building. It was far easier for whites to co-opt and silence Latinos before they voiced demands for incorporation than to fulfill black demands for political power.

From 1990 onward, the presence of a burgeoning Latino population and their entry into a white/Latino governing coalition severely constrained black attempts at incorporation. Outside of the political arena, a growing Latino population moving into previously all-black neighborhoods heightened racial tensions between the two
populations. Even if Latinos had not so quickly partnered with whites, perceptions that Latinos would exacerbate conditions in already resource-starved neighborhoods created poor intraminority racial dynamics. These racial tensions created fears of a zero sum game, and blacks and Latinos sought to gain political power at the expense of the other. Oppositely, the absence of another sizeable racial/ethnic minority group in Evanston meant that the city’s black population had fewer external barriers to incorporation.

Perhaps the most significant finding in this research is the partially confirmed hypothesis that blacks in cities with developed civic fabric will have more successful efforts at achieving incorporation. This result is significant for several reasons. First, the hypothesis was not confirmed in terms of the overall civic fabric in the city. I expected that blacks in Evanston achieved political incorporation because there were more civic organizations in the city, and participation in these organizations increased opportunities for interaction between blacks and whites, thereby increased interracial trust, and resulted in interracial electoral coalitions.

The reality is that the number of civic organizations in Evanston and Waukegan is comparable and blacks in each city report comparable levels of civic engagement, so it is not that there are fewer opportunities for blacks and whites to react. But blacks and whites are more likely to participate in civic organizations with their racial counterparts, and that means that political activity is largely channeled through same-race groups. As a result, there are fewer opportunities for meaningful cross-racial contact and, therefore, little interracial trust built in the political arena. Thus, the overall civic fabric and
meaningful interaction with whites cannot explain the variation in political incorporation in Evanston and in Waukegan.

Second, what really mattered to political incorporation were the characteristics of the black civic fabric in each city. In Evanston, the black civic fabric was structured and cohesive. In Waukegan, it was fragmented and disorganized. Blacks in Evanston benefited from temporary, issue-oriented organizations that focused their strategy on particular issues in order to achieve incremental gains. In Waukegan, these organizations were national, and their local activity was greatly determined by national directives. The number of organizations in Evanston meant that there were more actors involved, and their participation in many organizations over time meant that black political activity was directed by a closely knit group of actors. In Waukegan, few organizations meant more inactive members and greater jostling for control among the active members. These factions disabled black struggles for political power before any opposition could. The result was that when opposition did indeed arise, blacks in Evanston were more capable of recognizing it and strategizing against it. Blacks in Waukegan, on the other hand, allowed this opposition to reify these factions, as this opposition almost always uses a divide-and-conquer strategy that employed some blacks to counter the efforts of others. Unlike the current literature, this research emphasizes the power within the black community to achieve political incorporation.

Finally, the political incorporation literature particularly emphasizes the need for black communities to coalesce with liberal whites in order to realize the election of black representatives. I followed this theory by hypothesizing that a coalition of white liberals
ushered in black elected officials in Evanston, and a lack thereof explained failures at political incorporation in Waukegan. But, focus groups and interviews, particularly with Evanston residents, reveal that this may not be quite the case. Blacks in both cities were more likely to discuss racially liberal or conservative “environments.” In other words, few references were made to the support of liberal white individuals or particular acts of opposition or hostility. Instead, the focus was the local racial environment in which struggles for incorporation played out. Blacks in Evanston were more likely to mention the city’s racially liberal image as a condition aiding black political empowerment than individual actors, interracial coalitions, or events where interracial trust was developed. Certainly some liberal whites championed black efforts and voted for black candidates; this research does not diminish the presence or importance of these acts. What this research does do is amplify the role of a racially liberal sociopolitical context in facilitating black political incorporation.

I assert that a coalition with liberal whites is one way to achieve descriptive representation, but as Carmichael and Hamilton (1967) and Peterson (1981) highlight, this coalition becomes tenuous as we move toward policy responsiveness because black interests are rarely conceived within the city’s interest. Blacks in Evanston found another route to political incorporation, through solidarity and insularity, complemented by a racially liberal political culture (which was a coveted image for the city). Certainly blacks in Waukegan were unable to benefit from this back-door route to incorporation. They had neither a racially liberal sociopolitical context nor connections to a cohort of white
liberals. What they did have—racingly conservative context, residents, and political leadership—led to co-optation over incorporation.

7.4 Is Waukegan an Outlier?

Given that the case of Evanston appears to align more closely with struggles for black empowerment in other cities, and given the focus in the current literature on cities that have achieved incorporation, one might question whether Waukegan is an outlier. The answer is no; there appear to be several other cases of cities with sizeable black populations that have not achieved incorporation. While understanding the level of political incorporation would require research comparable to this dissertation, preliminary examinations reveal limited political incorporation and several traits within their sociopolitical contexts that may explain why blacks have not achieved full political incorporation. It is not easily possible to know how many similar cases there are, but this section profiles a few.

7.4.1 Disempowering Racial Dynamics in Hawthorne, California

One of the main critiques of Browning, Marshall, and Tabb’s (1984) theory of incorporation was that it used ten cities in California to describe black political empowerment, but the political culture of cities in California tend to differ significantly from the rest of American cities (and, therefore, other cities may not be as capable of achieving incorporation as cities in California). But the case of Hawthorne, California
reveals that cities in California do experience the same challenges to political incorporation as other American cities.

Blacks began moving into Hawthorne, California in large number in the 1960s, but the city has not moved past descriptive representation. Its progress through the descriptive representation stage is even low, with a history of few black elected officials. Despite a 39 percent black population in 2000, the city currently has one white mayor, a Latino mayor pro-tem, two Latino council members, and one white council member; the city has not had a black descriptive representative in over two decades. The prospect of political incorporation in Hawthorne is particular impeded by poor black/white, black/Latino, and black/Asian-American racial dynamics in the city.

In 1988, a coalition of black police officers, including officers from Hawthorne, filed lawsuits against law enforcement agencies in each of their cities, saying they had been the victims of racial bias and harassment. In the same year, one of these officers, Sergeant Don Jackson was videotaped during a sting operation that he helped stage to prove that blacks in Hawthorne were routinely harassed by police. Jackson had six black youths and other witnesses stand on a brightly lit corner to bait police officers. He caught police verbally harassing the youth, and Jackson was arrested for obstructing a police investigation when he attempted to intercede. One year later, Jackson was beaten by a white police officer during another anti-racism sting; the videotape of the event aired on national television. Jackson stated, “The same departments that don’t want blacks working there will abuse blacks when they see them on the streets” (Black Cop Says Tape Shows Racist Abuse 1989, 8B). Though some dismissed Jackson’s antics as sensationalist,
problems with an overwhelmingly white police force and the black community persisted in Hawthorne. In 1989, police stopped and killed a black man who was suspected of robbery; they claimed that they mistook the victim for the description of a Latino man sought in a robbery (Lawsuit Blames Deputy 1990, A3). The police force soon diversified by adding Latino police officers to the force, but poor racial dynamics persisted. In 2004, the City of Hawthorne settled a lawsuit with Gardena City Councilman Steve Bradford, who sued in federal court claiming that racial bias prompted Hawthorne police to illegally stop and arrest him. Bradford was black and the offers were Latino (Hawthorne Settles Suit with Gardena Official 2004, A6).

Black residents reported that they experienced harassment and victimization by Latino and Asian-American residents. In 1991, black leaders boycotted a Korean-owned convenience store after the owner beat a 12 year old black girl that he suspected of shoplifting (Altman 1991). The owner chased the girl three blocks, tackled her, and beat her. Protestors demonstrated outside of the store to discourage shoppers from patronizing the business. The District Attorney’s office filed six misdemeanor charges against the store owner, including a grand theft charge for taking the girl’s shoes (the store owner was eventually acquitted of all charges). In 2001, two black men were shot outside of an apartment building by suspect Latino gang members, in what police called another incident of Latino-on-black violence in the community (Altman 2001). The victims were not gang members. Black residents in the area had repeatedly fallen victim to Latino gang members, as Latino gangs were upset by increasing black residents in predominantly Latino neighborhoods.
Cross-racial tensions also pervaded the school system, particularly beginning in the 1990s when the majority of the district’s teachers were white, the superintendent and both high school principals were black, and the board of education was composed of four Latinos and one white council member. Allegations of racial inequality have plagued the school district since this period. The black school board president and candidate for re-election accused a white opponent of spreading racist allegations about her. Superintendent McKinley Nash (from the Evanston school protest discussed in Chapter 4) rebuked a white teachers’ union leader for an alleged racial slur. A white teacher sued Nash and a black principal, accusing them of racial and religious discrimination. A black high school principal accused the white teachers’ union chief of treating her unfairly because of her race. Black parents accused the Latino-majority school board of attempting to co-opt them by creating a group called the Black Heritage Association, which was really a Latino-run organization that attempted to silence the concerns of black residents (Black Heritage Association does not Promote Racism 1989, A4).

The racial tensions have spilled over into the student population. In 1991, Hawthorne High School was closed for a day after the first rash of fistfights between black and Latino students. In 1996, a plan to close Leuzinger High School to avert racial violence backfired when a group of fighting students spilled into the street, resulting in the shooting of a student. More than thirty students were arrested, and three black students faced expulsion for assaulting a Latino student. In 2000, a race-fueled brawl between black and Latino students resulted in 15 arrests and 22 suspensions. Feeling that the school board and city officials were not acting sufficiently to quell the disturbances,
the County Board of Supervisors commissioned the help of the Commission on Human
Relations to alleviate racial tensions at all of the city’s schools. The Commission on
Human Relations found that what may begin as a conflict between two gang members of
different races would set the stage for non-gang members to get involved and for a “race-
hate” element to predominate over gang rivalry (Cohen 2000).

7.4.2 Signs of Co-optation by Political Leadership in Country Club Hills, Illinois

When looking for evidence of political incorporation, many will point to the
presence of black school board members, aldermen, and other black officials and declare
that political incorporation has been achieved. But, again, as Bachrach and Baratz (1962)
remind us, power is designated by act, not mere presence. Though the Chicago suburb of
Country Club Hills is 92 percent black and has several black aldermen and elected
officials, some claim that black political power in the city is co-opted by a long-standing
white mayor and a white city clerk. Country Club Hills itself is a relatively new suburb
(incorporated in 1957). In 1965, the city had one black family, and nine black residents by
1973. In 1979, the South Suburban Housing Center worked to open housing opportunities
in other suburbs, like Country Club Hills, to black home buyers. The work of the South
Suburban Housing Center proved successful, as the city grew from less than one percent
black in 1970, to 12 percent black in 1980, 57 percent black in 1990, and 92 percent black in
2000.

But the city experienced many racial struggles between blacks and whites during
the process. These struggles primarily played out in the schools, as the case of
Hawthorne demonstrates. In 1972, School District 144, which included Country Club Hills, was sued for discrimination in its desegregation plan. The plaintiffs charged that the plan favored white children and penalized black children by having three hundred black children bussed out of their community into predominantly white schools. While the school district had over three thousand white students, only 130 participated in the bussing program. Like many schools during that era, Hillcrest High School in Country Club hills faced numerous physical fights between black and white students. In 1973, fifty white students dressed in white t-shirts with 'KKK' written on them stormed into the cafeteria yelling obscenities and throwing chairs at black students. Fighting erupted between the students, and less than three minutes into the fray, the white students were back in their classrooms and the black students were locked in the cafeteria. Black residents suspected that the protest was planned by white students in their parents. The predominantly white teaching staff threatened to boycott classes if the sixty black students suspended for the cafeteria fight were allowed to return to classes at the school; in a compromise, sixteen of the black students were expelled, 44 black students were suspended, and 9 white students were suspended.

Mayor Dwight Welch was elected in 1987, when the city was half black and half white. At the end of the twentieth century, race became a focal point of the mayoral elections. Two of Welch’s black opponents called for descriptive representation, saying that the mayor of the suburb should reflect the heritage of its constituents. One opponent, Steven Burris, asked, “Why do we need a white mayor, a white city clerk, a white treasurer, and a white finance director controlling African-American money? I’m
not campaigning on being an African-American. I’m campaigning on being a more qualified person that reflects the makeup of the city” (Bowean 2007). The other opponent, Michael Holmes, added, “We’re simply saying African-Americans can control their own destiny. In this particular town, there’s always been a race issue. People feel they don’t have a choice in the matter, and they live under the illusion that they have no options. Now that’s being challenged” (Bowean 2007). They also pointed to allegations that Welch used a racial slur, said that his opponents were getting “schooled by the master” upon re-election, and feelings that he disrespected black residents by keeping a portrait of generals of the Confederate Army hanging in his office (Schorsch 2007). Though Welch said that he was proud of the suburb’s racial diversity, some black residents pointed to his actions and the fact that all of the city’s mayorally-appointed political officials were white as evidence that blacks in the city had numerical strength but little political power.

7.4.3 Overwhelming Barriers to Black Political Incorporation in Milwaukee

Despite being a major central city, the lack of black political incorporation in Milwaukee has largely been missed by the current literature because of its focus on cities that have achieved incorporation. Like Waukegan, Milwaukee is a closed political culture, and the barriers to black political incorporation have appeared insurmountable throughout history. Milwaukee has experienced tense black/white racial dynamics, particularly since the city experienced rioting in the summer of 1967. Blacks and whites demonstrated different perceptions of the basis for the riots (Slesinger 1968). The
majority of whites thought that only a small number of Milwaukee blacks were in sympathy with the riots, while more blacks indeed were in sympathy. This is because blacks perceived that there was greater relative deprivation (in terms of jobs, income, and equal pay), and therefore blacks had to go a greater distance (hence, rioting) to equalize the disparity. Blacks said the riots were caused by inequities in housing, jobs, education, poverty, and poor relations with the white establishment—or issues relating to their differential status in Milwaukee. They demonstrated low levels of political efficacy and high levels of mistrust of public officials, political cynicism, and political alienation. Whites, on the other hand, cited a breakdown in social control, like a failure to control children and rebelliousness in youth. They also thought that outsiders were the rioters, rather than actually blacks from Milwaukee. In a later riot on the city’s south side, whites chanted, “We want slaves!” and attacked open housing marchers (Aukofer 1968). The level of white racial hostility was particularly high in Milwaukee, the racially conservative political culture was pervasive, and together they presented a formidable challenge for blacks to overcome.

As Allen, Brown, and Dawson (1989), blacks and whites in Milwaukee lived in two separate worlds during the Civil Rights Movement. Overall, 78 percent of whites said that Milwaukee blacks were treated fairly, compared to 30 percent of blacks. The disparities in perceptions of racial inequality are clear in several issues during that era, but they are perhaps made most clear in citizen perceptions of the police. In a survey conducted by Slesinger (1968), respondents were asked whether they thought particular behaviors by the police happened “frequently.”
Table XVII.
Black and White Perceptions of Frequent Police Maltreatment in Milwaukee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inner city blacks</th>
<th>Whites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insults/Lack of respect</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frisking/Unnecessary search of persons</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stopping and unnecessary search of cars</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnecessary force in arrests</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beating people up</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnecessary home searches</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The reason why Milwaukee should draw the attention of the political incorporation literature is because the realities for blacks in Milwaukee and the divides between blacks and whites are among the greatest in U.S. central cities. In a 1973 survey of Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Kansas City (Kansas), Kansas City (Missouri), Milwaukee, and Nashville, Milwaukee had the highest citizen satisfaction among whites and the second lowest dissatisfaction among blacks (Schmandt and Rose 1972). The overall difference in attitudes between blacks and whites was greatest in Milwaukee. Blacks expressed less favorable views about the political process, because blacks in Milwaukee live in greater isolation from government—in terms of representation and responsiveness—than whites. Blacks reported fewer contacts with government agencies and were less satisfied when they did have these contacts. Milwaukee is a classic case of
the inability to align black interests with white interests or the interests of the city. Blacks and whites were asked whether they favored increased spending in selected areas, and their “interests” widely differed. While blacks and whites were likely to select the same areas as priorities in the cities, blacks were much more likely to favor increased spending in these areas. Therefore, as blacks demanded that elected officials address areas that particularly plagued the black community, like low-cost housing, code enforcement, and medical care, whites were likely to see deficiencies in these areas but significantly more unlikely to favor political action in these areas.

Table XVIII.
Differences in Black and White Preferences for Increased Spending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Whites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code Enforcement</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-cost housing</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street lighting</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical care</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Public Transportation</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The black community was unable to use ties between local organizations and a comprehensive strategy to overcome this racially conservative sociopolitical context. There were a number of organizations working toward black progress during the Civil
Rights Movement. For example, as early as the 1930s, the Milwaukee Urban League pushed for jobs for black teachers, and they were successful by the 1960s (Dougherty 2004). But activism in the black community was largely split between the “old guard” and “new guard” activists like Lloyd Barbee. Barbee launched a movement against segregated education in the 1960s and is credited with single-handedly turning Milwaukee blacks from spectators, as the old-guard encouraged, to agitators (Dougherty 2004).

Barbee and the new civil rights activists organized themselves outside of the domain of the black community’s traditional leadership. For example, they organized the Wisconsin state NAACP chapter to address concerns of black Milwaukeeans instead of navigating through the local Milwaukee chapter. Dougherty (2004) recounts a 1961 confrontation about the NAACP’s limited response to school desegregation in Milwaukee between Barbee and Clarence Parrish, the Milwaukee NAACP chapter president:

The two black lawyers clashed in an argument about civil rights goals and strategies. “Don’t you know that most of our members are teachers,” Parish reportedly told Barbee, “and Superintendent Vincent is hiring more of us now.” “That’s accommodation,” Barbee objected. […] “You’re an idealist,” Parrish shot back, “You should be more practical.” […] Thus two competing visions of civil rights for Milwaukee, shaped by different generations of racial ideology and lived experience, met in a head-on collision” (p. 81).

Parrish largely separated from himself from black concerns in Milwaukee, believing that the city did not have a major racial problem, but instead an economic problem35. There were black officials in the city, but they largely engaged in accommodationist politics. In 1962, Vel Phillips was the lone black city council member. After resistance from whites, Parrish was largely disconnected from the concerns of the black community. As a lawyer, he gained the financial capacity and status in the 1960s to purchase a home in an all-white neighborhood in the city, and his children attended all-white schools (Dougherty 2004).
Phillips dropped her demands for school desegregation, claiming that her main focus was actually housing. After black State Assemblyman Isaac Coggs declared that “the school segregation system in Milwaukee is no better than in Mississippi,” pressure from the white power structure caused Coggs to clarify that blacks were indeed equal with whites during the Civil Rights Movement, but his concern was that they might not be equal in the future (Dougherty 2004: p. 81). Washington and Oliver (1976) further explain why blacks were unable to successfully move through the stages of political incorporation, beginning with descriptive representation:

> In reality, blacks are even more poorly represented than the above data indicate. There are two major reasons for this. First, according to Negro decision-makers, blacks who are appointed to decision-making positions are those best known to, and have the widest acceptance in, the white community. A second related factor is that those few blacks who are known and acceptable to white decision-makers tend to be appointed to a larger number of positions than their white peers. Thus, a limited number of blacks tend to be repeatedly used and reused as representatives of the black community (p. 86).

Neither side in the city’s black establishment was willing to abandon their strategy, and relations between the two sides grew sufficiently contentious that neither was willing to compromise. Dougherty (2004) explains that black Milwaukee became the leading example of “institutional powerlessness” in the 1960s (pg. 77).

Struggles for political incorporation in Milwaukee continue to the present day. Isabel Wilkerson (1991) documented the problems that particularly plagued the city’s black community as the rest of the city was experiencing an urban renaissance. The transition from a manufacturing economy to a globally-focused economy devastated poor black neighborhoods, and black joblessness was five times the rate of whites. Whites
were more likely to have seniority in the manufacturing plants, and those who were laid off were more likely to gain employment in new sectors. As a result, more than half of all black Milwaukeeans received a form of public assistance and the city had one of the highest black unemployment rates in the city. Democratic state representative Annette Polly Williams explained, “Black people see one thing, whites see another. We are not included in this new prosperity. The struggle is, how do we fit into the new order?” Mayor John Norquist pledge to diversify the municipal workforce by hiring more black department heads, but blacks felt his efforts were a small patch on a much larger problem of black unemployment throughout the city. In 2009, the unemployment rate for blacks in Milwaukee, 22 percent, surpassed the black unemployment rate for any other city; nearly one out of two black men in the city were unemployed (Thompson 2009).

These brief summaries of historical and current conditions in Hawthorne, Country Club Hills, and Milwaukee demonstrate that the reality of “black cities, white mayors” is distributed across the country in different types of cities. The case of Hawthorne demonstrates that conservative racial politics do inhibit black political incorporation in Californian cities, and these local racial dynamics have grown increasingly worse between blacks and other minority groups. In Country Club Hills, an overwhelmingly black suburb experiences some degree of black descriptive representation, but some black residents claim that it is selective and determined by a white mayor that refuses to create a space for the full political incorporation of blacks. The case of Milwaukee demonstrates that all central cities have not shared the experiences of political incorporation that are outlined in many of the case studies in the political incorporation literature. The
obstacles in Milwaukee are numerous—including black economic deprivation, divisions between black community leadership, white racial hostility and a racially conservative culture, and the location of black and white Milwaukeeans in two separate worlds (geographically and figuratively)—and they leave blacks in Milwaukee in precisely the same early descriptive representation stage as blacks in Waukegan.

7.5 Theoretical Contributions: A Different Type of Coalition Politics

This dissertation provides one of the first examinations of the effect of sociopolitical context on struggles for black political incorporation. The intent of this dissertation was to generate a theory that would be useful in understanding how the path to political incorporation is directly shaped by local sociopolitical context. This research used a city that had achieved political incorporation, Evanston, and compared it with a similar city that had not achieved incorporation, Waukegan. I do not expect that the particularities of each city will be generalizable to others, though we do see similar events in Waukegan and Hawthorne (poor relations between blacks and Latinos and the obstacles to black/brown coalitions), Waukegan and Country Club Hills (co-optation by white political leaders and the selective appointment of black political officials), and Waukegan and Milwaukee (rioting, white racial hostility, and debilitating divisions within the black community). However, this research is not focused on the particular examples within each city but instead the fundamental lesson that, in all cities, place matters.

This theory of black political incorporation links the events in a city’s political sphere to its sociopolitical context, namely its civic fabric, political leadership, and racial
dynamics. As simple as it may appear, studies of political incorporation have almost solely situated themselves within the political sphere, failing to realize that the apparently non-political has stark consequences in the political sphere. It is clear that the sociopolitical context in Evanston situated blacks significantly more strongly for incorporation than in Waukegan. We can trace this to key differences in the sociopolitical context: strong black civic fabric in Evanston, weak black civic fabric in Waukegan; empowering political leadership in Evanston, disempowering political leadership in Waukegan; and peaceful racial dynamics in Evanston, hostile racial dynamics in Waukegan. Given these differences, I assert that a single element present in Evanston, if present in Waukegan, could have positioned blacks for more competitive demands for political incorporation. The key to higher levels of incorporation in Evanston was not coalition but solidarity: high black participation in a closely-knit network of issue-oriented groups, national civil rights organizations, black political leaders, and grassroots activists created an insular strategy that protected community demands for incorporation and produced greater success at representation and responsiveness than the self-limiting negotiation and compromise of coalition politics. One might counter that the uphill climb to political incorporation was easier in Evanston because of the presence of a liberal political culture, not the close ties between the black community, and that blacks in any city with positive racial dynamics will fare better than blacks in cities with negative racial dynamics. Citing Killian and Grigg’s *Racial Crisis in America*, Carmichael and Hamilton (1967) explain that no city can sustain struggles for black political incorporation, whether with a racially liberal or conservative sociopolitical
context, without an organized black community. They explain that even white liberalism is incapable of comprehending the inequities faced by blacks, and it is blacks who must usher in full political incorporation, independent of the local racial climate.

...most white Americans, even those white leaders who attempt to communicate and cooperate with their Negro counterparts, do not see racial inequality in the same way that the Negro does. The white person, no matter how liberal he may be, exists in the cocoon of a white-dominated society. Living in a white residential area, sending his children to white schools, moving in exclusively white social circles, he must exert a special effort to expose himself to the actual conditions under which large numbers of Negroes live. Even when such exposure occurs, his perception is likely to be superficial and distorted. [...] Even more, he does not perceive the subjective inequalities inherent in the system of segregation because he does not experience them daily as a Negro does. Simply stated, the white American lives almost all his life in a white world. The Negro American lives a large part of his life in a white world also, but in a world in which he is stigmatized (p. 61).

It is not that Waukegan should have achieved political incorporation regardless of its disempowering sociopolitical context, but we cannot expect Waukegan to achieve incorporation without primarily having a closely knit black civic fabric. This is the most crucial factor in the sociopolitical context to the achievement of political incorporation. In other words, this dissertation demonstrates that race matters, too. Blacks are not able to achieve high levels of incorporation by coalescing with whites until they have developed their own internal coalition of black actors to carry out a formally or informally developed strategy for political incorporation. This is a different type of “coalition politics” than the political incorporation literature discusses, but I conclude that the outcome of intraracial coalition politics has more explanatory power in political incorporation literature than cross-racial coalition politics.
Thus, this research finds that the black civic fabric within the local sociopolitical context matters more to the political incorporation process than political leadership or local racial dynamics. At every node among this path to incorporation that serves as an obstacle, it is the black community that develops a strategy to carry them closer toward incorporation. And, at every node that nurtures black political incorporation, it is the black community that cultivates intraracial and cross-racial relationships to build allies in the process. On the path to political incorporation, it is less about what whites can do for blacks than it is about the opportunities that blacks can create for themselves. Indeed, the promise of full political incorporation is that blacks, on their own, are self-actualizing and empowered to act within the political sphere.
CITED LITERATURE


APPENDIX A

IRB Approval

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
AT CHICAGO

Office for the Protection of Research Subjects (OPRS)
Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research (MC 672)
203 Administrative Office Building
1737 West Polk Street
Chicago, Illinois 60612-7227

Approval Notice
Initial Review (Response To Modifications)

September 13, 2010

Maya Evans, MA
Political Science
Political Science
1007 W Harrison Street, M/C 276
Chicago, IL 60612
Phone: (312) 413-3434

RE: Protocol # 2010-0466
“The Path to Political Incorporation: Place and Race Matter”

Dear Ms. Evans:

Your Initial Review application (Response To Modifications) was reviewed and approved by the Expedited review process on September 2, 2010. You may now begin your research.

Please note the following information about your approved research protocol:

Protocol Approval Period: September 2, 2010 - September 1, 2011
Approved Subject Enrollment #: 62
Additional Determinations for Research Involving Minors: These determinations have not been made for this study since it has not been approved for enrollment of minors.
Performance Site: UIC
Sponsor: None
Research Protocol:
   a) The Path to Political Incorporation: Place and Race Matter; Version 2; 08/24/2010
Recruitment Materials:
Informed Consents:

b) A waiver of informed consent has been granted under 45 CFR 46.116(d) for recruitment/eligibility purposes only (minimal risk, written consent will be obtained at enrollment)

Your research meets the criteria for expedited review as defined in 45 CFR 46.110(b)(1) under the following specific categories:

(6) Collection of data from voice, video, digital, or image recordings made for research purposes., (7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including but not limited to research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies.

Please note the Review History of this submission:

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<tr>
<th>Receipt Date</th>
<th>Submission Type</th>
<th>Review Process</th>
<th>Review Date</th>
<th>Review Action</th>
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<tr>
<td>05/20/2010</td>
<td>Initial Review</td>
<td>Expedited</td>
<td>06/03/2010</td>
<td>Modifications Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/27/2010</td>
<td>Response To Modifications</td>
<td>Expedited</td>
<td>09/02/2010</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Please remember to:

→ Use your research protocol number (2010-0466) on any documents or correspondence with the IRB concerning your research protocol.

→ Review and comply with all requirements on the enclosure, "UIC Investigator Responsibilities, Protection of Human Research Subjects"

Please note that the UIC IRB has the prerogative and authority to ask further questions, seek additional information, require further modifications, or monitor the conduct of your research and the consent process.

Please be aware that if the scope of work in the grant/project changes, the
protocol must be amended and approved by the UIC IRB before the initiation of the change.

We wish you the best as you conduct your research. If you have any questions or need further help, please contact OPRS at (312) 996-1711 or me at (312) 996-2014. Please send any correspondence about this protocol to OPRS at 203 AOB, M/C 672.

Sincerely,

Sandra Costello
Assistant Director, IRB # 2
Office for the Protection of Research Subjects

Enclosures:

1. UIC Investigator Responsibilities, Protection of Human Research Subjects
2. Informed Consent Document:
   a) Informed Consent; Version 2; 08/24/2010
3. Recruiting Materials:
   a) Evanston Recruitment Letter; Version 2; 09/13/2010
   b) Waukegan Recruitment Letter; Version 2; 09/13/2010
   c) Personal Telephone Conversation Script; Version 2; 09/13/2010
   d) Personal Telephone Message Script; Version 2; 09/13/2010
   e) Snowball Telephone Conversation Script; Version 2; 09/13/2010
   f) Snowball Telephone Message Script; Version 2; 09/13/2010

cc: Dick W. Simpson, Political Science, M/C 276
    Dennis Judd, Political Science, M/C 276
Approval Notice
Continuing Review (Response To Modifications)

November 2, 2011

Maya Evans, MA
Political Science
1007 W Harrison Street, M/C 276
Chicago, IL 60612
Phone: (312) 413-3434

RE: Protocol # 2010-0466
“The Path to Political Incorporation: Place and Race Matter”

Dear Ms. Evans:

Please note that this research did not have Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval from midnight September 1, 2011 until November 2, 2011.

Your Continuing Review (Response To Modifications) was reviewed and approved by Members of IRB #2 by the Expedited review process on November 2, 2011. You may now continue your research.

Please note the following information about your approved research protocol:

Protocol Approval Period: November 2, 2011 - October 31, 2012
Approved Subject Enrollment #: 62 (47 subjects enrolled; subject enrollment closed)
Additional Determinations for Research Involving Minors: These determinations have not been made for this study since it has not been approved for enrollment of minors.
Performance Sites: UIC
Sponsor: None
Research Protocol(s):
   b) The Path to Political Incorporation: Place and Race Matter; Version 2; 08/24/2010
Recruitment Material(s): N/A – Research limited data analysis only
Informed Consent(s): N/A – Research limited data analysis only

Your research continues to meet the criteria for expedited review as defined in 45 CFR 46.110(b)(1) under the following specific categories:

(6) Collection of data from voice, video, digital, or image recordings made for research purposes., (7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including but not limited to research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies.

Please note the Review History of this submission:
Please remember to:

→ Use your **research protocol number** (2010-0466) on any documents or correspondence with the IRB concerning your research protocol.

→ Review and comply with all requirements on the enclosure, "**UIC Investigator Responsibilities, Protection of Human Research Subjects**"

Please note that the UIC IRB has the prerogative and authority to ask further questions, seek additional information, require further modifications, or monitor the conduct of your research and the consent process.

Please be aware that if the scope of work in the grant/project changes, the protocol must be amended and approved by the UIC IRB before the initiation of the change.

We wish you the best as you conduct your research. If you have any questions or need further help, please contact OPRS at (312) 996-1711 or me at (312) 355-2939. Please send any correspondence about this protocol to OPRS at 203 AOB, M/C 672.

Sincerely,

Jewell Hamilton, MSW
IRB Coordinator, IRB # 2
Office for the Protection of Research Subjects

Enclosure(s):

**4. UIC Investigator Responsibilities, Protection of Human Research Subjects**

cc: Dick W. Simpson, Political Science, M/C 276
Dennis Judd, Faculty Sponsor, Political Science, M/C 276
APPENDIX B

Focus Group Interviews
Discussion Guide

NOTES FOR THE MODERATOR ARE IN CAPS

Introduction

- Welcome everyone
- Introductions
- Statement of purpose for focus group

I am interested in hearing about your experiences living in [Evanston/Waukegan]. I am holding a number of focus groups with residents, educators, activists, and members of civil rights organizations, and will use what you tell me to help my research on blacks and politics in [Evanston/Waukegan].

- I’ll be taping the group so I can remember what you said, but I won’t use any real names or identify you.

- Guidelines we’ll follow during conversation
  
  o There are no right or wrong answers;
  o You don’t need to speak in order or talk about every topic we discuss;
  o Sometimes exchanges get excited—please try not to jump in;
  o One person will speak at a time;
  o I may need to step in and redirect our conversation because time is limited;
  o My role today is to moderate the focus group, not to actually participate in the conversation;
  o Micah is here to take some notes about our discussion. No names will be used; results will be summarized in general terms only.

- Do you have any questions before we begin?
Warm-up

Let's begin with an easy question. How long have you lived in [Evanston/Waukegan]?

Describe [Evanston/Waukegan]. What do you think [Evanston/Waukegan] is known as?

What are the things that you like most about living in [Evanston/Waukegan]?

Reasons for Living in [Evanston/Waukegan]

Some of you have lived in [Evanston/Waukegan] for most or all of your life, while others of you moved here as adults. For those of you who have been here for most of your lives, take a moment to think about your family and who first moved to [Evanston/Waukegan].

When did they first move to [Evanston/Waukegan]?

What made them move here?

Now, for those of you who moved here as adults, think back to when you were deciding to move.

Where else were you thinking of moving?

What made you pick [Evanston/Waukegan]? PROBE FOR RACIAL DIVERSITY/LARGE NUMBER OF BLACK RESIDENTS

Local Racial Climate

How welcoming do you think [Evanston/Waukegan] is for blacks?

Have you or someone you know experienced incidents of discrimination?

Have whites supported blacks in [Evanston/Waukegan]?

Would you say [Evanston/Waukegan] is liberal or conservative when it comes to supporting blacks?

What is the relationship between blacks and Latinos in [Evanston/Waukegan]?
Do you think Latinos play a role in local politics?

Do Latinos support black political power? Do blacks support Latino political power?

**History of [Evanston/Waukegan]**

I’d like to discuss the history of [Evanston/Waukegan], particularly the history of blacks here.

What roles have blacks played in [Evanston/Waukegan] history?

How important have local politics and government been in the lives of [Evanston/Waukegan] blacks?

Do you think that blacks in [Evanston/Waukegan] have political power?

What moments or events, to you, demonstrate that blacks do have political power?

What moments or events demonstrate that blacks do not have political power?

Of all of the events that we have discussed, what do you think has been the single most important event for blacks in [Evanston/Waukegan]?

**Civic Fabric**

Are there organizations or other opportunities for blacks to get involved in [Evanston/Waukegan]?

What organizations are you involved in here?

How did you first get involved?

Which organizations do you think are most influential? Why?

How do these organizations get involved in local politics?

How have these organizations improved the lives of blacks in [Evanston/Waukegan]?

**Political Leadership**
Next, I’d like to talk about the political leadership in [Evanston/Waukegan]. Who would you say are black political leaders?

How powerful are they?

How have whites or other groups in [Evanston/Waukegan] supported black political leaders?

Would you say it’s been difficult for blacks to gain political power?

I would like to discuss one of [Evanston/Waukegan]’s past mayors, [Lorraine Morton/Robert Sabonjian]. How would you describe her?

What relationship did she have with local blacks?

We often say that mayors have the power to do things for residents—give them jobs, make sure their neighborhoods are clean, help them get involved in local politics. Did [Lorraine Morton/Robert Sabonjian] do these things for blacks in [Evanston/Waukegan]? PROBE FOR CULTIVATING MORE BLACK LEADERSHIP, BLACK REPRESENTATION

Let’s talk about some defining moments of her time as mayor.

What do you think [Lorraine Morton/Robert Sabonjian] could have done better?

IF ADDITIONAL TIME, DO IDEAL CITY CARDS EXERCISE.

Think about an “ideal” city for blacks to live in. I’m giving each of you a card. Take a couple minutes and write down the words you’d use to describe an ideal city. Don’t put your name on the card. GIVE A FEW MINUTES.

What words did you write? GO AROUND THE TABLE AND ASK EACH PERSON TO READ ONE WORD UNTIL ALL WORDS HAVE BEEN READ. ASK IF OTHERS HAVE WRITTEN DOWN ANY OF THE WORDS ALREADY READ. THEN USE YOUR JUDGMENT ABOUT WHICH WORDS TO PROBE AND ASK WHY THAT WORD WAS CHOSEN AND WHETHER OTHERS IN THE GROUP AGREE.

Now think about [Evanston/Waukegan]. Do these words describe [Evanston/Waukegan]? Why or why not?

**Summary and Wrap-up**
• Suppose you had one minute to describe black political power in [Evanston/Waukegan]. What would you say?

• MODERATOR GIVES 2-3 MINUTE SUMMARY. Then ask: “Is this an adequate summary?” “How well does this capture what was said here?”

• Have we missed anything?

## Closing

• Your responses remain anonymous.

• I may be contacting some of you for a brief follow-up interview. But for everyone, if you think of something I forgot to say, feel free to call or email me.

• Do you have any questions?

   THANK EVERYONE FOR PARTICIPATING.
NOTES FOR THE INTERVIEWER ARE IN CAPS

- Welcome
- Introductions (interviewer and interviewee)
- Statement of purpose for interview

I am interested in hearing about your experiences living in [Evanston/Waukegan]. I am holding a number of interviews with residents in [Evanston/Waukegan], and then I will be holding focus groups with residents, educators, activists, and members of civil rights organizations. The information that you provide in this interview, and any people that you can recommend for an interview or to participate in a focus group, will greatly help my research on blacks and politics in [Evanston/Waukegan].

- I'll be taping the interview so I can remember what you said, but I won't use any real names or identify you.
- Do you have any questions before we begin?

I WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN BY LEARNING YOUR EXPERIENCES AND IMPRESSIONS OF EVANSTON.

- If I was new to the Chicago area and had not heard of [Evanston/Waukegan] before, how would you describe it?
- Would you describe [Evanston/Waukegan] as a liberal town or a conservative town? PROBE FOR EXPLANATION/DEFINITION.
- Would you say that [Evanston/Waukegan] is a university town? IF SO, CONTINUE WITH THIS QUESTION. Do you think being a university town affects race relations here? PROBE.
- Were you living here during the Civil Rights Movement? What was [Evanston/Waukegan] like at that time?
- Is there anything else that you know about the history of blacks here?
I’D LIKE TO TALK A BIT ABOUT RACE RELATIONS IN EVANSTON.

- What is the relationship like between blacks and whites here?
- What is the relationship between blacks and Latinos?

FINALLY, I’D LIKE TO TALK ABOUT BLACK POLITICS AND BLACK POLITICAL POWER.

- When did blacks first start seeking political power in [Evanston/Waukegan]?
- I am very interested in your impressions of political leaders here. Are you familiar with [Lorraine Morton/Robert Sabonjian]? How would you describe his relationship with blacks here?
- Are there other black leaders that you think have been important in city politics?
- Have blacks been successful in their attempts at getting power? Do you think blacks in [Evanston/Waukegan] have power?
- I’d like to know if you think blacks need more, or less, or if they have just the right amount of the following things:
  - Black political officials
  - Black teachers
  - Black school board members
  - Black principals in schools
  - Jobs in local government
  - Community centers in black neighborhoods
  - Services in their neighborhoods, like street sweeping, repaving streets, new street lighting.
- I’d like to name a few cities. Tell me what you know about the experiences of blacks in these cities, especially how much political power they have. If you don’t know anything about that city, tell me that as well.
  - Chicago
  - Harvey
  - Joliet
  - Waukegan
• Do you know of any other city residents who might be willing to participate in a group discussion or an interview about this topic?
APPENDIX D

Focus Group Participant Survey

The Path to Political Incorporation: Place Matters

Focus Group Participant Survey

This survey is being conducted for a research study about African-American political power, “The Path to Political Incorporation: Place and Race Matters,” a dissertation study of black political power in your city. This dissertation research is being conducted by Maya Evans, Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science department at the University of Illinois at Chicago.

Your perceptions, as reported in this survey, will be used to understand the social, economic, and political conditions in [Evanston/Waukegan], particularly for blacks. Your insights are very important. There are no right or wrong answers. Your responses will remain confidential and anonymous. All responses will be reported in totals and not identified with any particular person.

1. Are there any groups in your neighborhood in [Evanston/Waukegan], such as block clubs, community associations, or social clubs?

   □ 1. Yes
   □ 2. No (if “no,” skip to question 2)
   □ 3. Don’t know (if “don’t know,” skip to question 2)

   1a. Are you currently involved in any of these groups?

      □ 1. Yes  □ 2. No

2. Do you belong to any national groups or organizations that are working to improve the conditions of black people?

   □ 1. Yes
   □ 2. No
3. Do you belong to any local groups or organizations that are working to improve the conditions of black people?

☐ 1. Yes
☐ 2. No

4. Are you involved in two or more organizations in [Evanston/Waukegan]? (i.e. religious, schools, neighborhood, civic, community, recreational, civil rights, race/ethnic, fraternal, charity, etc.)

☐ 1. Yes
☐ 2. No (if “no,” skip to question 5)

4a. In the past 12 months, have you served on a committee, helped organize meetings, or served in a position of leadership in any of these organizations?

☐ 1. Yes
☐ 2. No

4b. On average, in the past 12 months, how active have you been in these organizations?

☐ 1. Very active
☐ 2. Somewhat active
☐ 3. Not active

4c. In the past 12 months, have you contributed money to any of these groups?

☐ 1. Yes
☐ 2. No

4d. On average, how often do these groups discuss community issues that affect blacks in [Evanston/Waukegan]?

☐ 1. Often
☐ 2. Sometimes
☐ 3. Rarely
4e. On average, how often do these groups try to influence decision-making on community issues that affect blacks in [Evanston/Waukegan]?

- Often
- Sometimes
- Rarely
- Never
- Not applicable

5. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree strongly</th>
<th>Agree somewhat</th>
<th>Disagree somewhat</th>
<th>Disagree strongly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. I can influence decisions that affect my community.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. By working together, black people in [Evanston/Waukegan] can influence decisions that affect their community.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. I am satisfied with the amount of influence blacks have over decisions that affect them in [Evanston/Waukegan].</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. During the past 12 months, have you participated in any of the following activities in [Evanston/Waukegan]? (Please check all that apply.)

- Did work for a political party, a candidate, or some organization concerned with a community issue or problem.
- Contacted to contribute money to a candidate, a political party, or to a group concerned with a community issue or problem.
- Asked to attend a meeting about some community issue or problem.
- Contacted to take part in a rally or protest about some community issue or problem.
- Asked to complain to a business or corporation, or take part in a boycott, because of a community issue or problem.
7. How much influence does each group have over political and economic decisions in [Evanston/Waukegan]?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Too much influence</th>
<th>Just about the right amount of influence</th>
<th>Too little influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Upper income blacks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Middle class blacks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Poor blacks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Businesses and corporations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Whites</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Local government officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. How much attention do the following people pay to improving the lives of blacks in [Evanston/Waukegan]?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A lot of attention</th>
<th>Some attention</th>
<th>Not much attention</th>
<th>No attention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. The mayor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. [Evanston/Waukegan] City Council</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Elementary school board</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. High School school board</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Civil rights organizations like the local NAACP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Local activist groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. In general, about how close to black people in America do you believe your ideas and feelings about things are?

- 1 Very close
- 2 Fairly close
- 3 Not too close
- 4 Not close at all
10. In general, about how close to black people in [Evanston/Waukegan] do you believe your ideas and feelings about things are?

☐ 1 Very close
☐ 2 Fairly close
☐ 3 Not too close
☐ 4 Not close at all

11. Please indicate how close you believe your ideas and feelings about things are to each of the following groups in [Evanston/Waukegan].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Very close</th>
<th>Fairly close</th>
<th>Not too close</th>
<th>Not close at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Poor blacks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Religious, church-going blacks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Black community activists</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Blacks in local civil rights organizations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Young blacks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Upper income blacks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Working class blacks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Black elected officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Older blacks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Black professionals (i.e. doctors, lawyers, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree strongly</th>
<th>Agree somewhat</th>
<th>Disagree somewhat</th>
<th>Disagree strongly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. The system in [Evanston/Waukegan] prevents poor blacks from getting their fair share, such as better jobs and more money.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. It is my responsibility to help improve the well-being of poor blacks in [Evanston/Waukegan].</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Middle and upper class blacks in [Evanston/Waukegan] try to keep poor blacks down.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. If poor blacks in [Evanston/Waukegan] would only try harder, they would be just as well off as middle or upper class blacks.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. [Evanston/Waukegan] should work harder to include poor blacks in local political decision-making.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Generations of discrimination in [Evanston/Waukegan] have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks in the city to work their way out of the lower class.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Blacks get less than they deserve in [Evanston/Waukegan].</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Today, there is a lot of discrimination against blacks in [Evanston/Waukegan].</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Government officials in [Evanston/Waukegan] usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a black person.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13. In your judgment, have you ever been unfairly fired, not been hired, or unfairly denied a promotion for a job in [Evanston/Waukegan] because of your race?
   - Yes
   - No (if “no,” skip to question 14)

   13a. When was the last time this happened? _________ (year)

   13b. Approximately how many times has this happened in your lifetime in [Evanston/Waukegan]? _______

14. In your judgment, have you ever been unfairly prevented from moving into a neighborhood in [Evanston/Waukegan] because the landlord or realtor refused to sell or rent you a house or apartment because of your race?
   - Yes
   - No (if “no,” skip to question 15)

   15a. When was the last time this happened? _________ (year)

   15b. Approximately how many times has this happened in your lifetime in [Evanston/Waukegan]? _______

16. In your judgment, have you ever moved into a neighborhood in [Evanston/Waukegan] where neighbors made life difficult for you or your family because of your race?
   - Yes
   - No (if “no,” skip to question 17)

   16a. When was the last time this happened? _________ (year)
16b. Approximately how many times has this happened in your lifetime in [Evanston/Waukegan]? ______

17. In your judgment have you ever been unfairly denied a loan from a bank in [Evanston/Waukegan] because of your race?

☐ 1 Yes
☐ 2 No (if “no,” skip to question 18)

17a. When was the last time this happened? _______(year)

17b. Approximately how many times has this happened in your lifetime in [Evanston/Waukegan]? ______

18. In your judgment, have you ever received services in [Evanston/Waukegan] from someone such as a plumber or a mechanic that was worse than what other people get because of your race?

☐ 1 Yes
☐ 2 No (if “no,” skip to question 19)

18a. When was the last time this happened? _______(year)

18b. Approximately how many times has this happened in your lifetime in [Evanston/Waukegan]? ______

19. In your day-to-day life in [Evanston/Waukegan], how often do you think the following things happened to you because of your race?
20. Which statement best describes how you think white people in your city view blacks?
   □ 1. White people believe blacks should get a better break.
   □ 2. White people want to keep blacks down.
   □ 3. White people don’t care one way or another.

21. During the last 10-15 years, has there been a lot of progress in getting rid of racial discrimination in [Evanston/Waukegan]?
   □ 1. A lot of progress
   □ 2. Not much real change
   □ 3. [Evanston/Waukegan] has not had a problem with racial discrimination.
# VITA

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