Reintegration of Former Soldiers of the Haitian Armed Forces

BY
NIXON MOMBRUN CAMILIENT
B.A., Université d’Etat d’Haïti, 1997
M.A., University of Illinois at Chicago, 2003

THESIS
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Defense Committee:
John Hagedorn, Chair and advisor, Department of Criminology, Law and Justice
Matthew Lippman, Department of Criminology, Law and Justice
Lisa Frohmann, Department of Criminology, Law and Justice
Maurice Geiger, Rural Justice Center
Gregory Beckett, University of Chicago
This thesis is dedicated to my dear mother, Lorsa Mombrun. Without your courage and determination, I may not have gone any further than elementary school. I still remember you teaching me how to read and count. I also remember the long years of high school in Port-au-Prince when we survived by the grace of God. You made me happen. You will always be my hero. *Lapli oubyen soley, ou pral lekol. Gras Bondye sìfì pou nou.*
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DRP</td>
<td>Demobilization and Reintegration Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAd’H</td>
<td>Forces Armées d’Haïti (Haitian Armed Forces)</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration (OIM in French)</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>International Peace Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>Mission des Nations Unies pour Stabiliser Haïti (Mission of the United Nations to Stabilize Haiti)</td>
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<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office of Transitional Initiatives</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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SUMMARY

A research was conducted about problems with the reintegration of former soldiers of the Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H) following their demobilization in 1994. In dialogue with the literature, the research assessed three main variables measuring reintegration, namely 1) employment status, 2) ties to former commanders, and 3) stake in the political process. Besides using informal conversations and written documents, the researcher interviewed a sample of 32 demobilized soldiers to uncover the different ways they responded to their demobilization and reintegrated into civilian life.

The research found that former soldiers were largely unemployed or underemployed. Demobilized soldiers did not maintain significant ties with their former commanders. Consequently, former commanders did not provide them with organizational leadership or financial support. The interviews reveal that demobilized soldiers did not endorse their demobilization and reintegration; instead, they maintain a very strong military outlook.

There exist networks of communication that allow FAd’H to maintain a military identity, some forms of organization and sustain hope of resuming their military career. In addition, the demobilization and reintegration program (DRP) that was implemented to facilitate the reintegration of soldiers as civilians was at best ineffective for long term reintegration of FAd’H. This failure of the DRP to have a long term positive impact raises serious questions about theories and implementation of Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR).

Overall, this research establishes that the government should officially retire all FAd’H with a financial settlement and a legally binding agreement. This would address the grievances of demobilized soldiers and cut the risk of spoilage activities by taking away the legitimacy of their grievances. Then, the constitutional issue must be addressed by either amending the
constitution (Article 276-2) to abolish FAd’H or by recruiting a new generation of soldiers. This would delegitimize any future use of the name of FAd’H by illegal armed groups.
I. INTRODUCTION

In this dissertation, I study problems with the reintegration of former soldiers of the Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H) following their demobilization in 1994. Narrowly, I investigate the different ways former Haitian soldiers responded to their demobilization and reintegrated into civilian life. A sample of 32 demobilized soldiers participated in semi-structured interviews focusing on three main variables measuring reintegration, namely 1) employment status, 2) ties to former commanders, and 3) stake in the political process.

I found that FAd’H did not embrace demobilization and reintegration; instead, they advocate and pursue remobilization more for economic than ideological reasons. I did not find evidence of an organized conspiracy to spoil peace and derail the democratic process; rather, there exist networks of communication that allows FAd’H to maintain a military identity and sustain hope of resuming their military career. In addition, the demobilization and reintegration program (DRP) that was implemented to facilitate the reintegration of soldiers as civilians was at best ineffective for long term reintegration of FAd’H. This failure of the DRP to have a long term positive impact raises serious questions about theories and implementation of Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR).

In the end, the research establishes that the government should officially retire all FAd’H with a financial settlement and a legally binding agreement. This would address the grievances of demobilized soldiers and reduce the risk of spoiling behavior by taking away the legitimacy of their grievances. Then, the constitutional issue must be addressed by either amending the constitution (Article 276-2) to abolish FAd’H or by recruiting a new generation of soldiers to restore the institution. This would delegitimize any future use of the name of FAd’H by illegal armed groups.
I.1 Relevance of the research

This research participates in the current debates about security sector reform and the rule of law in Haiti.\(^1\) On one side, proponents of reinstatement of FAd’H argue remobilization as the missing link to solve problems of law and order in Haiti.\(^2\) On the other side, opponents refer to the repressive history of the institution and the cost associated with rebuilding a modern military force. These debates are criminological in nature because they largely revolve around traditional criminological themes such as policing, public safety, law and order. They are also relevant to criminology because they cover issues fundamentally at the core of post-modern criminology such as law and society, illegal armed groups, non-state actors, human rights and state violence\(^3\).

Prior to their demobilization, FAd’H soldiers were the most visible manifestation of state power in Haiti. They were responsible for all aspects of national security and public safety, including military, police and prisons. They were not only a legal institution; they were what Haitians call ‘leta’ (the state). FAd’H violence was justice (extrajudicial) and, therefore, was without legal appeal (Trouillot, 1990). However, after demobilization, demobilized members of FAd’H and their supporters use the letters of Haitian Constitution of 1987 to challenge the illegal

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\(^2\) Toussaint and his students summarized the main arguments regarding the restoration of the Haitian military, as presented in the Haitian media (Toussaint, 2007).

\(^3\) During the 2006 presidential address of the American Society of Criminology, Gary Lafree (2007) stressed the importance of criminology in nurturing democratic and non-authoritarian regimes. Along those lines, Kennedy and Shirley plead for a concentration of academic criminology in the area of public security, which is distinct from current emphasis on policing, corrections, the administration of justice and the causes of criminal behavior. Other researchers highlight the shortcomings of mainstream criminology and produce interdisciplinary works which venture in areas traditionally neglected by criminologists such as genocides and human rights (Lippman, 1998), colonization and slavery (Morrison, 2006; Agozino, 2003), globalization and political violence (Friedman, 2003; Ruggiero, 2006), and social exclusion and gentrification (Hagedorn 2007).
character of their demobilization and the dismantlement of the institution (Toussaint, 2007; Pieriche, 2006).  

Beyond the constitutional argument, many people call for the reinstatement of FAd’H to support the Haitian National Police (PNH) with the tasks of public safety and national security. This function is explicit in the Haitian Constitution of 1987. They argue that the PNH is too weak and poorly trained to effectively guarantee in the country (Toussaint, 2007). PNH replaced FAd’H in 1995, but its weaknesses were exposed when armed rebels forced them to abandon many towns between November 2003 and February 2004 (Beckett, 2008). Between 2002 and 2006, large areas of Port-au-Prince (like Bel-air, Martissant, Cite Soleil) escaped the control of PNH and fell under the control of armed bands. Following the departure of Aristide in February 2004, public safety progressively improved with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) backing PNH (Dupuy, 2007; Beckett, 2008). Since then, the UN has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to assist and professionalize PNH. The UN Security Council and the Haitian authorities are aware that the departure of UN forces will create a huge security gap in Haiti, which can derail human security and democratic governance. In 2005, the commission created by the interim government of Gerard Latortue recommended the restoration of FAd’H in anticipation of the departure of the UN troops.  

4 The dismantlement of FAd’H was achieved through a presidential decree and the Haitian Constitution has not been amended to abolish the Haitian military. Despite their history of coup d’état, FAd’H became defenders of the Haitian constitution after demobilization using the rhetoric of the law to challenge their status and justify their grievances and actions. This is what Hirsh and Lazarus-Black (1994:1) characterized as using of the rhetoric of the law to reshape “oppressive states of being”.  

5 For more info, please refer to the Haitian Constitution of 1987, Art 263-268.  

6 Kennedy and Shirley (2005) insist on the importance for criminologists to study public security as a distinctive component of criminology. This is because of the close links between public security, crime and democratic governance.  

7 Rapport Final de la Commission Citoyenne de Réflexion sur les forces Armées. (Unpublished document containing the recommendation of the presidential commission in favor of restoring FAd’H). The commission
created another commission to work on the same question; this commission also recommended the reinstatement of FAd’H. The current president (Michel Martelly), who promised to bring back FAd’H during the presidential campaign, affirmed that he would keep this promise during his term as president.8

However, despite the support of the Haitian parliament and some important sectors of Haitian society, many people object to a reinstatement of FAd’H because of their involvement in violence and political repression in Haiti (Farmer, 1994; Dumas, 1996; Toussaint, 2007). Throughout Haitian history, soldiers have perpetrated repression and violence against political opponents (Abbott, 1988; Fatton, 2001; Trouillot, 1986; Turner, 1990). Their involvement in coups d’état and coup d’état attempts between 1986 and 1994 illustrates an institution which did not tolerate democratic governance.9

As a state institution, FAd’H offered to the dominant classes an instrument to organize violence against the underprivileged of Haitian society (Toussaint, 2007; Trouillot, 1986; Fatton, 2001; Laguerre, 1993). For many opponents to the reinstatement of FAd’H, former soldiers have systematically participated in organized efforts to spoil democratic governance.10 For example, they allege that demobilized FAd’H are involved in common crimes such as kidnappings, drug trafficking, home invasions, rape, murders, etc… even after disarmament and demobilization.11

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Related to the above argument is the claim that FAd’H has merely been a tool in the hands of global interests (Farmer, 1994; Fatton, 2001; Beckett, 2008). This argument asserts that FAd’H leaders work as death squads for those interests (Campbell and Brenner, 2000; Nairn, 1994 and 1995). Even after its dismantlement, such interests continue to use former FAd’H soldiers and officers to disrupt the democratic process and maintain the status quo (Dupuy, 2007). For example, former President Aristide and his supporters claim that the rebellion that led to his overthrow was funded by interests in the United States of America (Beckett, 2008).

Finally, although illegal armed groups (gangs, death squads, outfits and mafias) exist in many countries and sometimes across countries, they do not always threaten constitutional order to the same extent as more politically oriented organizations like terrorists or anti-government militias. For nearly two hundred years, FAd’H had absolute control over public safety and national security in Haiti (Trouillot, 1990; Dumas, 1996). Their members are not some kind of underclass or part of a deviant subculture lacking positive role models. As a group, FAd’H has the capability to be a political actor with specific demands, goals and strategies. This is why it is necessary to conduct research that recognizes their unique perspectives on their reintegration, security and governance.

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13 Some research finds evidence of illegal armed groups’ involvement in political activities (Hagedorn, 2001; Klein et al., 2001). However, most of these groups do not challenge the state and its political regime. When armed groups challenge constitutional order, they reject the current legal system and threaten to replace it through violent means. Such is the case of revolutionary armies and national liberation armies.
I.2 Statement of the Problem

This research was constructed around the assumptions that the reintegration of demobilized FA\'d'H members failed to materialize within the framework of the Demobilization and Reintegration Program (DRP). Over a two-year period, the demobilization and reintegration program attempted to structure the transition of demobilized soldiers to civilian life by providing them with training, toolkits, financial support and employment referrals (Dworken et al., 1997; Mendelson-Forman, 2006). If successful, demobilized soldiers would reject their military culture and pursue full reintegration as civilians. My research proposal suggested that demobilized FA\'d'H soldiers find the idea of remobilization financially attractive because of the dismal state of the Haitian job market;\(^\text{15}\) while some of them believe that remobilization may help to improve public safety and national security in a democratic Haiti, others may be spoilers who reject democratic governance and civilian rules altogether.

Therefore, I advanced that demobilized FA\'d'H members maintained the capability to threaten constitutional order and regional stability as evidenced in their role in overthrowing former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2004 (Dupuy, 2007; Beckett, 2008). Because of the United Nations support for DDR, this outcome would have important consequences for the UN strategy of DDR (Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration) in post-conflict societies (Potanin, 2003; Knight, 2008).

\(^{14}\) I struggle to come up with a proper title for this section. In my proposal, I labeled it “hypothesis” because it was about my research assumptions. But, my research is not exactly about hypothesis testing. I also considered other titles such as: argument and problematic. Finally, I settle for “statement of the problem” because it allows me to air my assumptions prior to collecting my data without suggesting any adherence to a positivist approach.

I.3 Organization of the Thesis

This dissertation is framed around nine chapters. Chapter One introduces the reader to the dissertation focusing on its importance for the actors involved in governance and security in Haiti. I also expose the assumptions of the research expressing skepticism about the successful reintegration of FAd’H as civilians.

In chapter II, I lay out a brief history of the military of Haiti from the first steps of the country as an independent nation to the present days. I describe how Haiti became an independent country following a successful uprising of slaves against the colonial powers of Europe (France, Spain and England). As the only successful slave revolution in history and the second independent country in the Americas, it was important to maintain a large and strong military throughout the 19th century to protect the country against any colonial powers. With the American occupation (1915-1934), that army was dismantled and replaced by a smaller military, which later became the Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H). Within a few years of its creation, FAd’H morphed itself as arbitrator of political power in Haiti until its demobilization in 1994.

Chapter III outlines the literature on DDR. Specifically, I look at theoretical and methodological developments in the field. I define the key concepts used in this research mainly demobilization, disarmament and reintegration. I try to address the theoretical issues relevant to my research while offering an overview of the sticking points in the field, in particular the issues related to successful reintegration of former combatants. In terms of methodology, I present the four major approaches to DDR research. Finally, I outline how my dissertation fits in the literature and contributes to the field.

Chapter IV details the methodology used in this research. The first section delineates the three main questions of my inquiry relating to employment status of ex-Fad’H soldiers, their
relations with former commanders of Fad'H and their investment in the political process. In the next three sections, I discuss access to the field and to research subjects, the selection of interview participants and the sample. Then, I describe my three main sources of data: interviews, written documents and informal conversations. This is followed by a section on self-reflexivity. I proceed with a section about research challenges, methods and ethics. This chapter concludes with an explanation of the methods used to analyze the data.

The following chapters are dedicated to the research findings and the analysis of the findings. In chapter V, I begin to render my findings with a social portrait of research participants. Chapter VI is the first chapter looking at three variables of reintegration being examined in this thesis. It is dedicated to the experiences of demobilized soldiers on the job market. Chapter VII proceeds with the second variable, ties to former commanders. Chapter VIII is dedicated to stake in the process. In the final chapter, I summarize my findings and make suggestions with regards to the demobilized of the Haitian Armed Forces.
II. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

II.1 A Brief History of Haitian Armed Forces

The Haitian military emerged during the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) when the slaves of Saint-Domingue (now Haiti) created an armed group (l’armée indigene) to fight against their enslavement (Turnier, 1990). By December 1803, they had defeated the colonial forces of England, Spain and France. On January 1st 1804, under the unified command of General Jean-Jacques Dessalines, they took control of the colony and proclaimed the independence of Haiti. In this context, the Haitian military preceedes the Haitian state (Trouillot, 1990).

Immediately after the proclamation of the independence, generals and senior officers were rewarded with lands and privileges. The indigenous army became the army of the new country and remained relatively large throughout the 19th century partly to defend the country against the threats of colonial powers of the time (mainly France, England, Spain and the United States of America). Hence, the country was militarized with the armed forces as the central political actor, producing all heads of state but one, Michel Oreste (Barthelemy, 2000). The Americans dismantled that army when they occupied Haiti in 1915 and replaced it with a gendarmerie of about 2,500 members. Later, the gendarmerie d’Haïti was renamed the Haitian Armed Forces or FAd'H (Schmidt, 1971; Toussaint, 2007; Trouillot, 1990; Dumas, 1996).

In 1994, the Haitian Armed Forces had around seven thousand members assigned to three nominal services and some technical units. The army was the largest and most important service with approximately 6200 members. The other two services were the navy (la marine) and the air corps (aviation). According to the CIA World factbook, the army suffered from antiquated
equipment and inefficient procedures while the navy and the air corps had problems of limited weapons system, low technical sophistication and poor preparedness. Although the Haitian constitutions of 1946 and 1987 called for a separate police institution, FAd’H filled both police and military functions (Dalvius, 1987, 1996). By 1994, FAd’H numbered about 7,000 members in uniforms and about the same number of auxiliaries (rural police and their auxiliaries).

From the departure of US troops in 1934 to their return in 1994, the Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H) was the only legal public force in the country (Toussaint, 2007). According to the Haitian Constitution of 1987, the army’s main function was to defend the Haitian territory against external threats. In reality, FAd’H was mainly a police institution and a power broker (Barthelemy, 2000; Trouillot, 1990; Delince, 1994). Its implicit mission was to protect the Haitian elites and maintain the interests of the United States in Haiti (Farmer, 1994; Goff, 2000; Shacochis, 1999).

From 1934 to 1994, FAd’H was the main political actor and power broker in Haiti. In 1950, one of its officers, Paul Eugene Magloire, broke the cycle of civilian president established during the American occupation (1915-1934) with a coup d’etat and ran the country with an iron fist until 1956. In September 1957, FAd’H conspired to make Francois Duvalier (Papa doc) president following a very violent political transition (Turnier, 1990). Later on, Duvalier mitigated the influence of FAd’H by executing and eliminating some Fad’H officers. In 1959, he created a militia (the tontons makouts) whom he infiltrated into the command structure of FAd’H. With the help of FAd’H and the tontons makouts, Jean-Claude Duvalier (Baby doc) took

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over after the death of his father in 1971 and remained president until 1986 when a massive popular revolt forced Jean-Claude Duvalier into exile (Turnier, 1990)

Immediately after the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier and in response to popular demands, the tontons makoutes were disbanded. FAd’H remained the only public force in the country in charge of everything such as national security, border control, police, corrections, traffic, tax collection, firefighting, etc... Prior to his departure, Jean-Claude Duvalier designated a junta to lead the transition to a new government. The junta was headed by Henry Namphy, a Duvalier loyalist. Having absolute control of state institutions without a legislative body and a weak judiciary, FAd’H became more and more aggressive and repressive. It also became fragmented as its generals and colonels lined up to take over power by coup d’etat or other means.  

This is also the time the criminalization of the institution became scandalous with the involvement of some high rank officers in drug trafficking, contraband and other illegal activities. Some commanders became literally warlords transforming their units into autonomous fiefdom worth defending militarily.

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18 Dumas (1996) describes how each officer class from the Duvalier era their own coup d’etat and shared power once succeeded.


20 In April 1989, a civil war broke between the National palace unit on one side and Casernes Dessalines and Corps des Leopards on the other side. It was the result of a failed coup d’etat attempt by Colonels Himmler Rebu, Leonce Qualo and Philippe Biambi against the government of General President Prosper Avril. Prosper Avril won the hostilities; the leaders of the coup attempt were exiled and their units shut down. (Haiti Deports 3 Leaders of Failed Coup. By Howard W. French, Special to the New York Times. Published: April 5, 1989. Accessed online on 8/19/2011: http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/05/world/haiti-deports-3-leaders-of-failed-coup.html?scp=2&sq=qualo&st=cse )
The post-Duvalier constitution of 1987 prohibits active members of FAd’H from seeking and holding elective office.\textsuperscript{21} However, the first eight years that followed Duvalier were dominated by successive military regimes, mutinies, coups d’état and coup d’état attempts (Dupuy, 2007). Above all, FAd’H sought to maintain the statu quo by using its ressources to prevent the organization of democratic elections. For example, on November 29, 1987 they orchestrated a massacre of citizens waiting to vote in Port-au-prince. They used the massacre as an excuse to call off the elections. FAd’H went on to organize new elections in January 1988. The declared winner, Francois Manigat, took office on February 7, 1988; but he was overthrown by FAd’H four months later.\textsuperscript{22} On 16 December 1990, the Haitian people elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide for president for five years, along with a parliament and local governments. For most observers, these elections were the first democratic elections in Haiti’s history and expressed the desire of the Haitian people to end the cycle of authoritarian political regimes (Farmer, 1994). But, FAd’H toppled President Aristide in a coup d’état on 30 September 1991 (Etienne, 1999; Dupuy, 2007).

After removing President Aristide, FAd’H became very unpopular and increasingly repressive (Etienne, 1999; Dupuy, 2007). Initially, some opponents to the coup d’état attempted to force the restoration of President Aristide by protesting in the streets and in the media. FAd’H reacted violently, killing hundreds of protesters and closing down many news media (Farmer, 1994; Fatton, 2001; Shacochis, 1999; Etienne, 1999). According to Human Rights Watch (1991), at least three hundred civilians were killed in the aftermath of the coup. The Platform of Haitian

\textsuperscript{21}Article 265-267. Also, article 291 of Constitution of 1987 also prohibits former members of Duvalier regime from running for office for a period of 10 years following the adoption of the Constitution.

\textsuperscript{22}Most of the major political parties declined to participate in these elections (Haiti: Security and the Reintegration of the State. Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°12, 30 October 2006. Accessed online on 3/5/12 at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/haiti/b12_haiti_security_and_the_reintegration_of_the_state.ashx)
Organizations for the Defense of Human Rights placed the number of assassinations to at least one thousand (Girard, 2004). Later, FAd’H recruited some civilians (mostly former tonton makouts) to create a paramilitary death squad\textsuperscript{23} (Front pour l’Avancement et le Progres Haitien or FRAPH), whose mission was to provide some appearance of popular support for the military regime (Farmer, 1994).

Despite claiming to be a political party, FRAPH’s activities included forced disappearances, torture, beatings, threats, illegal arrests and detention, extortion, rapes and murders of opponents to the military regime (Shacochis, 1999; Girard, 2004). Its members (they claimed to be number 20,000) were armed and often patrolled the streets with military squads and in military vehicles. They were responsible for many massacres of civilians under the military regime. For example, they allegedly killed at least thirty-six people and burnt thousands of homes in the slums of Cite Soleil on 27 December 1993. And, on 23 April 1994, they massacred at least fifteen people in Gonaives (Human Rights Watch, 1994; Human Rights Network, 1995). In sum, FRAPH and the military committed between three and six thousand assassinations during the three years of the military regime (Human Rights Watch, 2004; Fatton, 2001; Shacochis, 1999; Farmer, 1994; Human Rights Network, 1995). They contribute to make the Haitian state under FAd’H a criminal state.\textsuperscript{24} Yet, they were not included in the demobilization and reintegration program, or submitted to any type of justice.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{23} The encyclopedia of Death and Dying succinctly defines ‘death squads’ as ‘state sponsored terrorist groups’ They are extra-legal groups contracted by government to hunt down and kill political opponents. They are often paramilitary groups, who carry out extra-judicial killings, executions, and other violent acts against targeted individuals or groups of people (Campbell, 2000). Their goal is to maintain the status quo with special reference to power and to terrorize those who are supportive of economic, political, and social reforms. For Hagedorn (2005), the proliferation of the death squad is one more indication of the incapacity of the state to enforce its rules without resorting to extralegal violence.

\textsuperscript{24} Pierre-Raymond Dumas (1996) uses the comments of Rene Theodore (head of Haiti’s communist party) to qualify the 1991-1994 period as three years of “military delinquency”. For a detailed expose of the characteristics of the
It seems that FAd’H was dedicated to prevent the advent of a democratic regime in Haiti by all means including violence. Even when they controlled the political institutions of the country for most of 1986 and 1994, they failed to organized free and democratic elections. Some argue that they were defending their own personal interests and privileges (Dumas, 1996). But Farmer (1994) and Goff (2000), among others, argue that they were just a force dedicated to the interests of the United States.

II.2 The USA and the DDR of FAD’H

This section is important because the demobilization of FAd’H occurred in the context of the second American occupation of Haiti and because FAd’H was created by the USA during its first occupation of Haiti (1915-1934). Fad’H was constructed as an essentially subaltern institution to US interests. The United States government did not support the elections of Aristide in December 1990 and had mostly supported groups opposed to the government of Aristide during the eight months he ruled the country(7 February- 30 September 1991). After the coup, the administration of George H. Bush (1988-1992) reluctantly joined the international condemnation of the coup d’etat and participated in the regime of sanction against the military regime (Farmer, 1994).

\[\text{criminalization of the state, see Jean-François Bayard, Stephen Ellis and Beatrice Hibou 1997,} \text{ La Criminalization de l’Etat en Afrique, Editions Complex}e. Paris}\]

\[\text{25 The founder and leader of FRAP’H, Emmanuel Toto Constant, was an active CIA asset during the coup d’etat period in Haiti. Many people suggest that the CIA founded the creation of FRAP’H as a counter force against Aristide supporters. One of the first acts of US troops when they arrived in Haiti in 1994 was to remove about 160,000 pages of documents containing the activities of FRAP’H in Haiti. US officials have refused to return the documents to Haitian authorities because they argue that they contain the names of American citizens. US have also refused to extradite Emmanuel Constant to stand trial in Haiti. He is currently incarcerated in the USA for non-related offenses of mortgage fraud. The New Times. Accessed online on august 18, 2011 @ http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/c/emmanuel constant/index.html. See also: http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/43a/index-bab.html}\]
The coup leaders and their sponsors must have underestimated the importance of the end of the cold war which made the US less paranoiac about leftist politics in Latin America. The coup d’état occurred almost simultaneously as the end of the cold war. It was a period where liberal democracy was triumphing in Latin America, the former soviet bloc in Europe and parts of Africa. For some, it was the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1992). The elections of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti made Cuba the only country in Latin America without a democratic regime. In this context, the coup d’état leaders and Fad’H were quickly isolated by the international community (Aristide, 1996; Fatton, 2001).

After the coup d’état, the USA joined a coalition of five other countries to form the group of friends of Haiti (Argentina, Brazil, Canada France and Venezuela). Together, they pushed for sanctions against the regime through the UN and the Organization of American States. During the US presidential campaign of 1992, candidate Bill Clinton promised to restore democracy in Haiti if elected. As soon as he was elected, he was put under pressure by pro-democracy activists in the USA to follow through with restoring democracy in Haiti. In addition, the heavy involvement of FAd’H in drug trafficking made them a less than desirable partner for the US due to the war on drugs in the United States. In 1993, the US sponsored negotiations between the exile president and the Fad’H commanders. From the negotiations emerged the agreements of Governors’ Island (New York) which would offer a peaceful return of Aristide without an overall shake-up of FAd’H (except the resignation of coup leader General Raoul Cedras). But, the military regime sent an armed gang to meet the US military ship (USS Harlan County) to

prevent the initial deployment of American trainers to the country.\textsuperscript{27} With the experience of Somalia fresh in their minds, the US administration retreated leaving the Fad’H in control for another year.

In the meantime, human rights organizations in the USA, the congressional Black Caucus of the US House of representatives and some Haitian American groups incremented their pressure on the Clinton administration to restore Aristide in his functions. And when thousands of Haitian boatpeople began to flood the coasts of Florida, the US government finally decided to take actions against the coup leaders to restore democratic governance in Haiti. It is in this context that the USA backed UN Security Council resolution 940 which authorized the restoration of Aristide by force.\textsuperscript{28}

Once the use of force has been authorized, the US began to prepare for the invasion of Haiti. More than 20,000 marines are mobilized for deployment. In the meantime, the coup leaders used their propaganda machine (mostly in the state run media) to raise Haitian nationalism by portraying themselves as defenders of Haitian sovereignty. Because FAd’H claimed that they were ready to fight the US marines, many Haitians feared that Port-au-Prince would be reduced to ashes because FAd’H barracks were mostly located in crowded urban areas. Consequently, I left Port-au-Prince with my family and thousands of others at the beginning of September 1994 when the invasion seemed inevitable. This is when last minute negotiations between the coup leaders and US diplomats allowed for a permissive entry of the US troops in


Haiti to secure the return of President Aristide (Shacochis, 1999; Goff, 2000, Dworken et al., 1997).

Fad’H reigns ended with the US intervention of 19 September 1994. Aristide was effectively restored to power on October 15, 1994 (Dumas, 1996; Etienne, 1999). One of his most significant acts was to dismantle the FAd’H along with the rural police chiefs and their auxiliaries. Initially, the number of active FAd’H was progressively reduced from 7,000 to about 1,500 soldiers as agreed with the Clinton administration (Mendelson-Forman, 2006). Then, on 6 January 1995, Aristide issued a decree which proclaimed the demobilization of FAd’H. Then, the government incorporated those 1,500 soldiers into the Interim Public Security Force, pending the integration of about half of them into the newly created Haitian National Police. Demobilized Fad’H members were disarmed and referred to International Organization for Migration (IOM) for the Disarmament and Reintegration Program (Mendelson-Forman, 2006; Dworken et al., 1997).

The task of handling FAd’H was assigned to the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Within USAID, the Office of Transitional Initiatives (OTI) designed scenarios on how to neutralize the threat of FAd’H for the US troops in Haiti. The initial plan was to reduce FAd’H to about 1500 soldiers and reintegrate the demobilized ones by using them as labor for public works. This plan was modified because last minute negotiations between the US and the coup leaders produced a permissive entry for US troops. When the Haitian

29 According to Laurent Beaulieu, the US administration only agreed for a reduction of FAd’H. But it was Aristide who decided to disband FAd’H. (Laurent Beaulieu, 1996. Comment l’armée haïtienne fut démantelée Revue Volcans, volume 22. Accessed online on 8/19/2011 at http://pauillac.inria.fr/~maranget/volcans/06.96/comment.html

30 This highlights the role played by the USA in the dismantlement of FAd’H despite appearance that it was a decision of Haitian authorities.
government proceeded to dismantle the whole FAd’H, the demobilization plan was modified again to include vocational training for reintegration (Dworken et al., 1997). The final plan became known as the Demobilization and Reintegration Program (DRP).

To implement the DRP, USAID/OTI provided funds for the International Organization of Migration: 5482 demobilized soldiers registered with IOM. 5204 of them accepted the training, but 337 dropped out. Therefore, the Demobilization and Reintegration Program (DRP) provided training for 4,867 former soldiers in fields such as auto mechanics (1790), electricity (681), computers (602), welding (353) carpentry (206), masonry (317), plumbing (531), refrigeration (95), electronics (204) and general mechanics (88). The classes lasted about 6 months and participants received a stipend, equivalent to 100 US dollars (Dworken et al. 1997).

Besides keeping them involved during the transition, the training was intended to ease the reintegration of demobilized soldiers to civilian life and prevent them from falling into criminal violence or threatening the stability of the civilian government. This practice is often recommended by peacekeepers at the end of civil wars (Gamba in Darby and Mac Ginty, 2003: 126). It is worth noting that the DRP did not include officers, rural police chiefs and members of FRAPH, which claimed to count about 20,000 armed members. It was essentially about demobilized soldiers.

II.3 From Power to Marginality

From a design and implementation standpoint, the demobilization and disarmament of FAd’H soldiers was a success (Dworken et al., 1997). But, this success occurred partly because of the deployment of 20,000 US soldiers in the country. The success of disarmament went as far as soldiers returned the weapons that were legally assigned to them. It is not clear how many personal or unregistered weapons they owned. It is possible that the fear of vigilantes played a
role in their conceding demobilization. It would have been too uncertain for them to resort to
guerilla attacks in the short term when they were so hated by civilians. In any case, the presence
of the US troops (later replaced by UN peacekeepers) served as deterrence against an immediate
armed response from FAd’H.

In terms of economic reintegration, the process was complicated not only because of the
poor shape of the Haitian job market but also because most soldiers did not accept the legitimacy
and legality of their demobilization. The official unemployment rate in Haiti was very high in the
years following DRP (about 70 to 80 percent). By 1997, only 6% of FAd’H reported
employment (Dworken et al., 1997). Therefore, ex-FAd’H had employment numbers lower than
the general population even with a higher level of education and qualified training through the
DRP. And despite the fear that they would face difficulties to find economic opportunities, they
were offered no micro-credit to start their new life. Also notice that they were not paid any
pension or severance package despite their service (Fitzpatrick, 2006).

Political reintegration was not even an objective of the DRP despite its importance for
lasting peace (Knight, 2008). There was no settlement or peace agreement between FAd’H and
the government (Dworken et al. 1997; Mendelson-Forman, 2006). Despite being open to
everyone, no officers participated in the training. 31 There were no efforts at reconciliation or
community reintegration. The soldiers who were demobilized never stopped expressing their
resentment toward demobilization.

In terms of public safety and political stability, many observers warn that demobilized
FAd’H could become spoilers (International Crisis Group, 2005). Stedman defines spoilers as
“leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power,

31 Perhaps because the training was not appropriate for them due to their education level, having graduated from the
military academy of Haiti- equivalent to a college degree.
worldview and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts at achieving it (Stedman, 1997:5). As the beneficiaries of the predatory state which existed during their reign, it is arguable that FAd’H could become spoilers of the democratic process instead of reintegrating as civilians.

Indeed, FAd’H soldiers refused the fact of demobilization. Between 1994 and 2000, former FAd’H soldiers articulated their grievances through organizations such as “Organization of Soldiers Dismissed without Cause” (Rassemblement des Militaires Revoques Sans Motifs”) and through pro-military political associations such the Movement for National Development (MDN). And once the UN forces left Haiti in 2000, FAd’H resistance became overtly violent against the government.

Between 1996 and 2004, ex-FAd’H soldiers allegedly participated in armed rebellion and political maneuvers against the governments of Preval and Aristide (Dupuy, 2007). In May 1997, the Immigration Review Board of Canada published an issue paper of 23 pages titled "Political and State Protection since Aristide Return". Using reports from media, human rights and international organizations, the paper chronicled numerous acts of violence since the return of Aristide on 15 October 1994, providing a number of acts where ex-FAd’H members were the primary suspects. These acts include attacks on the presidential palace and former military barracks, killings of police officers and plots to overthrow the government. As a result, many ex-

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32 Stedman (1997) distinguishes three types of spoilers who can derail a peace process. They are limited spoilers or those who are radically opposed to the peace process; greedy spoilers with whom the dynamics of costs and benefits can switch them to either side of the process; and limited spoilers who have concrete goals and can be brought in the peace process. While there is no possibility of successfully accommodating total spoilers, it is possible to bring greedy and limited spoilers in the process through DDR. Because peacekeepers can use DDR to offer concrete alternatives to limited and greedy spoilers, DDR is a key inducement to convince these spoilers. This researcher will probe the arguments in Haiti that the FADH have been spoilers of the democratization process.

FAd’H members were arrested, killed or persecuted by the police or sectors close to government. Many officers have even sought asylum in other countries.

In 2001, the government blamed FAd’H soldiers for a violent attack on the presidential palace, which resulted in many violent deaths and days of unrest in Port-au-Prince (Dupuy, 2007). In 2003-2004, an armed rebellion led in part by some ex-FAd’H contributed to overthrow the government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. As protests against Aristide intensified, armed rebels crossed the border with the Dominican Republic and attacked many local police units in the Northern part of Haiti. Many towns fell under the control of the rebels as they outclassed the Haitian National Police. By February 2004, they joined forces with another armed group based in the city of Gonaives (Ame Kanibal). There, they threatened to enter Port-au-Prince to engage in a civil war with armed gangs allied with President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in the slums of Port-au-Prince. It is in this atmosphere of violent protests against the government, political reprisals by the gangs supported by Aristide (chimeres), the retreat of the Haitian National Police and international pressure that President Aristide was forced out of the country on February 29, 2004 (Dupuy, 2007; Beckett, 2008).34

Immediately after the departure of Aristide, the UN deployed a peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH or Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilization en Haiti) to maintain order and assist with the transition to a permanent government).35 One of the core components of their

34 After his departure, President Aristide declared that he was “kidnapped” by the US government and forced to leave the country. His supporters, including the US congressional Black Caucus, condemned the government of Georges Bush for undermining a legitimate president. Whatever the role of the US might have been, I believe the US government only got involved when Aristide fate was sealed. Indeed, it was Aristide himself who asked for the support of the US and the UN (Beckett, 2008). For an account of this issue, see: “Who removed Aristide? Paul Farmer reports from Haiti in “London Review of Books” V.26, No.8, 15 April 2004, pages 28-31. Accessed online on 7/6/2011 at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n08/paul-farmer/who-removed-aristide

35 Please see MINUSTAH’s mandate at www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/
missions was to implement the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of all illegal armed groups in Haiti. Since, the FAd’H rebels were the most visible armed group; they were the primary targets of the mandate. Upon deployment, MINUSTAH created a DDR section in charge of disarmament (which later became Community Violence Reduction) and the Haitian government created the National Commission for DDR (CNDDR). Even with UN troops on the ground, many former soldiers remained armed and in uniforms as they patrolled some towns and occupied some former FAd’H barracks until mid-2005 when UN troops forced them to dislodge (Dupuy, 2007: 190-191).

In this context, the question of what happened to demobilized Fad’H soldiers after they completed the DRP in 1996 is critical to understanding why FAd’H soldiers continue to be perceived as a threat to democratic governance and security in Haiti. Hence, the purpose of this research is to describe the patterns of reintegration of demobilized FAd’H since 1994.

36 Understanding Security from the Bottom-Up in Haiti. Presentation by Robert Muggah, uploaded by IDRCCRD1 on Nov 8, 2011 on Youtube. Seen on 3/16/2012 at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Un2hFXf8t0Y
III. LITERATURE REVIEW

III.1 Conceptualizing DDR

Although Haiti was not at war in 1994 and in 2004, the UN Security Council sent two peacekeeping missions with a mandate to implement DDR. DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) stands for a post-conflict resolution strategy aiming to reinsert former combatants into society (Knight, 2008). Over the last two decades, the United Nations (UN) has adopted dozens of peacekeeping resolutions in which the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants are mandated. Such emphasis arises as concerns for human security and regional stability emerged as critical objectives of the members of UN Security Council (Berdal and Ucko, 2009).

In February 2000, the UN gathered a panel of experts to advise on the role of DDR in UN peacekeeping and peace-building activities in the resolution of conflict. Upon recommendation of the panel, the UN Security Council endorses DDR of ex-combatants as mutually supportive strategy in its efforts for effective peace in areas affected by armed conflicts. Vadim Potanim (2004:2) summarizes the theory:

“In post-conflict countries the disarmament, demilitarization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants and civilian “fighters” are vital to peace-building actions and regional security, which lead to successful development. If ex-combatants are not properly disarmed, demobilized and integrated, they can retain arms for banditry, violence and uprising, thus causing in-stability and a lack of security, which hampers humanitarian assistance and nation building”.

The demobilization of soldiers involves the process of discharging ex-combatants of all armed duties and the dissolution of military units (Lamb, 2008; Meek and Malan, 2004). It often

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follows military defeat or a peacekeeping agreement between warring factions. It targets all armed factions to show that the conflict is over and that combatants must return home.

To be successful, demobilization is usually done in junction with disarmament. During disarmament, neutral stakeholders collect light and heavy weapons, explosives, small arms and ammunitions from former combatants (Gleichmann et al., 2004). Once the weapons are collected, they are controlled and disposed to prevent their return to non-state actors (Meek and Malan, 2004). Disarmament involves highly publicized episodes when stockpiles of recovered weapons are shown to the public and the media. Such events aim to reduce the fear of renewed violence and increase confidence in the security system of a country (IPA, 2002; Gleichmann et al., 2004).

The reintegration component of DDR involves efforts to reinsert the demobilized combatants (IPA, 2002; Gleichmann, 2004). While demobilization and disarmament are concrete and quantifiable components, reintegration presents challenges that are far more complex due to the difficulty of assessing outcomes. The “lessons learned” literature advocates for a compound process involving the combatants, his or her family, the community of reintegration and the state (Baare, 2005; Lamb, 2008). But, current evaluations of reintegration programs largely focus on the programmatic stage of the DDR program without looking deeply at the political, social and economic aspect of reintegration (Dworken et al. 1997).

Theoretically, the challenges of reintegrating demobilized combatants are comparable to the reentry process of ex-offenders following a prison term (McIvor and Shirlow, 2009). In the criminology literature, these words are often used to refer to the same process (Gideon and Sung, 2011). Like ex-offenders, ex-combatants are often perceived as others in the community they return in a way that they are required to change in order to fit. Sometimes, there is the perception
that they are being rewarded for having been a “bad guy” (hug a thug). And, sometimes, the government creates or enforces laws which impose barriers to reintegration such as the laws limiting the practice of some occupations (McIvoy, 2009). Some ex-combatants do not need any particular assistance or structure because they already have a network of relatives and friends to facilitate their reintegration. But, more often than not, they face difficulties such as disease, disabilities, lack of education and social networks. These difficulties may impede their full reintegration as responsible citizens.

And like reentry programs, reintegration programs often consists of throwing largely unskilled and poorly educated individuals in the streets to fend for themselves (Gleichmann et al., 2004; IPA, 2002:5). In these programs, participants are often treated as passive recipients of vocational training, behavioral interventions or addictions treatments. It is an environment which makes participants feel “deficient, misguided, ineffectual, possibly dangerous and almost certain to get in trouble again’ (Harris, 2005:318).

Much of the literature on DDR places reintegration on a continuum following demobilization and disarmament (Gleichmann, C. et al., 2004; Darby and Mac Ginty., 2003). However, this does not always have to be the case. There are benefits to starting reintegration before disarmament and demobilization are completed. It can be used as a confidence building measure to convince ex-combatants who are pessimistic about the process (IPA, 2002).

Gleichmann et al. (2004) stressed the role of the community for the success reintegration. At the moment of design, reintegration programs must be mindful of community resources and attitudes towards the ex-combatant.\textsuperscript{38} Both ex-combatants and the community must be involved in designing reintegration programs. It is important to survey what skills are needed in the

\textsuperscript{38} Researchers warn about possible resentment of favoritism in the community if ex-combatants are perceived to be treated with preference (IPA, 2002; Darby and Mac Ginty, 2004: 103-113)
community before providing training to demobilized combatants. Too high expectations may cause frustration when the resources are not available. Reintegration efforts should also educate and involve the community members in accepting ex-combatants. This is a long term process that requires commitment at all levels of society (IPA, 2002; Gleichmann et al., 2004).

Even though economic growth and the creation of employment facilitate the success of DDR programs, the reintegration of ex-combatants can, in turn, contribute to economic growth by providing employers with a new pool of labor. Most post-conflict societies have to recover from years of violence and destruction. They often lack the infrastructure a country necessitate to engage in economic recovery. With ready financing from international donors and financial institutions, the government can use the labor of ex-combatants to engage in the construction of infrastructure and generate economic opportunities for ex-combatants and their families. Ex-combatants can also contribute to solve security problems in the country (with adequate training in human rights) if they are hired as security personnel in the prisons or by joining the police. But, again, this depends on outside funding because most post-conflict governments carry a huge economy burden.

Reintegration can be very challenging for ex-combatants when the conditions of their life before the conflict have remained the same or even worsened during the conflict. In cases where the conflict has lasted for decades, the combat life is, in some cases, the only one the combatants have known; thus, discussing re-integration is inappropriate, because there was never integration. In the case of FAd’H, demobilization occurred in the context of security sector reform because it formally disbanded a state apparatus of security and replaced it with another, the Haitian National Police (Mendelson-Forman, 2006).
III.2 Implementation of DDR

Another important segment of the literature deals with the implementation of DDR mandates. The implementation of DDR requires planning, which must precede negotiation of the peace agreement (IPA, 2002). This planning should include a division of labor, an exploration of the conflict, a network of experts, a series of activities to build confidence and a strategy to overcome spoilers. Because of the poor financial status of most post-civil wars countries, international actors are often needed to assist with the financial burden of implementing DDR (IPA, 2002).

DDR cannot begin without a cease fire and negotiation. In addition, the leadership of the belligerent parties must support the process; a timeframe must be established; the procedures must be elaborated; and, the targets of DDR must be specified (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2003; Darby, 2001). To increase public support, implementers must orchestrate public information campaigns before and during the actual DDR campaign. There should be a well-conceived public information campaign that informs people of what DDR is and what they will get from it (IPA, 2002).

In order to facilitate DDR, outside monitors are recommended as long as they are perceived as neutral by the parties. It is important that monitors have an adequate mandate and sufficient financial and human resources to perform their work (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2004). Monitors must have the military capability to enforce compliance like Syria in Lebanon and NATO in Bosnia (Stedman, 2003). Gamba (2003) argues that implementers must have the will to demobilize and disarm, which supposes the establishment of authority over and above that of the parties to a dispute. She believes that such authority allows peacekeepers to extract consent.

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39 Mac Ginty (2001) expresses reserves about the use of forces to attain DDR objectives as DDR is part of the peace process.

While disarmament is mostly a military operation, demobilization and reintegration are mainly civilian tasks. Regardless, cooperation between military and civilians is needed at all levels of the process (Gleichmann, C. et al., 2004). In most cases, the UN is directly in charge of DDR efforts. In other cases (for example South Africa and Northern Ireland), the government takes over the process itself. NGOs can also step up when the UN or the government is lacking. No matter whom the implementers are they must be capable of holding all parties accountable to their part of the process.

Despite the UN supporting international monitoring to execute DDR operations, it seems that DDR has been more successful when it is undertaken as a national effort. South Africa and Northern Island have executed national DDR program largely credited to promote peace in those countries.

Economic incentives may encourage warring parties to cooperate (Stedman, 1997; Baare, 2005). The argument compares South Africa and Angola where the peace process resulted in opposite outcome. South Africa succeeded because its industrial-based economy created a mutually beneficiary atmosphere for the parties, while the more traditional Angolan economy discouraged cooperation between opponents. Another example, of what Stedman (1997) refers to as contextual variable, is the provision of international resources and attention. This variable matters when a case catches the interest of a major international player like the United States or the European Union. In Bosnia, for example, where the European Union and the United States of America committed more than 16 billion dollars ($4200 per Bosnian) to the peace process between 1995 and 2001, DDR succeeded; while in Rwanda, where only 35 million
dollars ($4) per Rwandans where committed between 1993 and 1994 to the implementation of the Arusha accords, violence overtook the process. But, Stedman (1997) also warns against too much international involvement because that can create negative incentives for local actors to take ownership of the process (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2003: 105-106).

III.3 Challenges of DDR

Violence is a top challenge for DDR (Berdal and Ucko, 2009; Gamba, 2003). The reason being, violence has the capability of undermining the peace process of its legitimacy with crime and traumas. Often, this violence comes from “spoilers”. DDR is not possible if spoilers are not neutralized (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2003:101). Spoilers can be managed locally with some success when there is a high economic interdependence among the parties, a tradition of democracy and a vibrant civil society. When such factors are not present locally, Stedman (1997) recommends the involvement of international actors to help overcome spoilers.

Another challenge for disarmament is the case of civilians with arms. The literature covers cases where the weapons have been acquired for personal protection during the war. However, the literature does not cover situations where there was not a civil war, but previous instances of demobilization without disarmament and reintegration. This occurred in Haiti following the disbandment of the tontons makouts in 1986 and continuing with the demise of many other militia groups (attaches) and the Fad’H.40

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40 Armed groups in Haiti behave more like the gangs studied in Neither War nor Peace (edited by Luke Dowdney, 2005) and the armed young men studied by Dr. John Hagedorn (www.gangresearch.net) than like traditional guerillas or militia with well defined ideologies and political goals.
The questions raised by such cases as Haiti are more of a societal disarmament than of DDR. Except for the gangs who claimed loyalty to Aristide and the former military rebels, there are no defined targets for demobilization and reintegration in Haiti. Armed groups are involved in all kind of lucrative criminal activities such as drug trafficking and hijakings (Fatton, 2001). Their political affiliation is about political deals to escape prosecution for their crimes in exchange for their services. There cannot be a peace agreement with these armed groups because they will not benefit from returning their weapons. This is an area that needs more attention in future research.

One more challenge that is illustrated in Haiti is the problem of funding for DDR. As mandated by the UN Security Council resolution 1542, the Haitian government created a national commission for DDR in April 2005. But the government did not provide the projected 20 million dollar funding the commission would need to function. In a case like Haiti, where armed criminals have so little deterrence and almost no economic alternative to crime, no DDR can succeed if the money is not available when the monitors arrived. DDR cannot be an integrated process if adequate funding is not available for all parts of the process (IPA, 2002).

### III.4 Methodological Approaches to DDR

A review of the literature on DDR reveals four main methodological developments. Below, I will present the main approach of each development and outlines some of their weaknesses.

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41 For Stedman and Gamba (2003), society disarmament consists of efforts aiming at reducing the availability of weapons in the civilian population (in: Darby and Mac Ginty, 2003).

42 It seems to me that disarming these require strong economic alternatives to crime such the creation of large infrastructural projects accompanied by strong law and order policies.


1) **Lessons learned**

The most common approach deals with lessons learned (or best practices) from retrospective evaluations of DDR. These lessons emerge from international workshops bringing together policy makers, practitioners and academics (Holguin, 2010). Among the most prominent sponsors and producers of this literature, we find international organizations such: the World Bank, the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), the United Nations Development Plan (UNDP), the International Labor Office (ILO), the Institute for Security Services (ISS), the Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR), the Stockholm Institute on DDR (SIDDR, 2005), the UN Interagency Working Group which produced the integrated DDR standards (IDDRS), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which produced a handbook on DDR in 2007 (Lamb, 2008).

The lessons learned literature offers important theoretical perspectives for the study of DDR. But, there is a lack of specifics about what makes particular programs successful for particular country or armed group. Indeed, the consensus among experts is that there is no blueprint for DDR. These studies are based on official data from the implementation of DDR and are often commissioned by donors (IPA, 2002; Dworken et al., 1997; Mendelson-Forman, 2006). They tend to heavily focus on disarmament and demobilization while neglecting reintegration of ex-combatants (IPA, 2002; Holguin, 2010). There are no statistics or study comparing the impact of particular factors or programs. Rather, this literature prescribes how to better design and implement future programs (Baare, 2005). Because they ignore the combatant, these studies are incapable of producing critical knowledge about the meaning and relevance of reintegration for

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Those who are subject to it. They are too embedded in the political and programmatic framework of sponsors and implementers of DDR to produce innovative scholarship.

2) Country by country comparison of DDR programs

Another section of the literature compares DDR programs across countries. This approach aims at extracting the factors that influence outcomes. One of the first examples of this approach was commissioned by the World Bank and targeted seven countries across Africa in the 1990’s (World Bank, 1993). In another study, Potanin (2004) compares east Timor and Slovenia and concludes that the results in implementation and in success vary according to cases. Such programs have been successful in Eastern Slavonia while they failed in East Timor (Potanin, 2004).

Other cross-country comparisons look at DDR at the regional level. The Multicountry Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), in course since 2002, was designed to implement a coordinated DDR for all the countries involved in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, namely Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the two Congo’s, Rwanda and Uganda. From this program, Guy lamb (2008) outlines four critical aspects that affect DDR outcomes: insightful and compressive planning, the existence of political will, financial and material support, technical expertise, and effective monitoring and evaluation.

The comparative approaches tend to focus on measuring whether programmatic goals have been reached. They are more about technical issues such as program designs and implementation strategies. Like lessons learned studies, they fall short of evaluating the quality and sustainability

of economic and social interventions. While those types of studies stressed outcomes at the national level, they fail to account why particular programs are successful or not.

3) Evaluation of country specific programs

These studies look at the impact of DDR within a specific country on specific population of ex-combatants (Berdal and Ucko, 2009). They include the tracer study model which uses quantitative survey techniques to measure dependent variables such as employment. One such study was conducted in Sierra Leone after the civil war with a sample of 250 soldiers (Stavrou et al., 2003). Another country specific evaluation was conducted in Haiti by Dwarken, Siegel and Moore (1997) for the DRP of 1994-1996. That study describes the DRP and claims that the implementation was a success. That study also shows how irrelevant the DRP was in ensuring social and economic reintegration beyond the implementation phase of the DDR. A major limitation of these studies is the lack of a control group (Muggah, 2009).

4) Program with Experimental Designs

Humphreys and Weinstein (2005, 2007) go beyond the first three approaches by using a randomized experiment to the country specific approach. They sought to identify casual patterns in a survey research of fighters in Sierra Leone following the civil war that crippled that country throughout the 1990s. The DDR program in Sierra Leone has generally been considered a success in UN and international circles because more than 74,000 fighters were demobilized and the country has been largely peaceful since then. Humphreys and Weinstein pointed that there was no evaluation of the effects of the programs at the micro-level. So, they sought to uncover the factors that made the program works, the extent to which individual combatants have been reintegrated and the role of DDR programs in the reintegration of combatants (p.11).
The approach of Humphreys and Weinstein (2005, 2007) is quantitative in nature. They completed 1043 surveys from a random sample of ex-combatants. The main independent variable in their research was “accepted today” defined as whether demobilized combatants gained acceptance from families and neighbors following the reintegration program. Other dependent variables included “accepted initially, broken ties, employment and believe in the democratic process”. Their conclusion suggests that participation in reintegration program did not facilitate the reintegration of former combatants to any significant degree.

Humphreys and Weinstein (2005, 2007) made an important foray into how DDR program works and whether these programs work at all for individual combatants. This is attributed to their methodology in that they compare participants in DDR with non-participants. The weaknesses of their approaches reside in the limitation of survey research to capture the perspectives of the subject. Despite all, their research is the closest efforts so far to study DDR at the micro-level of the subject.

III.5 Summary

In conclusion, there is no lack of expertise in theories, methods and practices of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration. Indeed, there is a plethora of publications by the United Nations and other organizations. For example the International Peace Academy, the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the Small Arms Survey, or the Bonn International Center for Conversion; all produce documents about the strategies for successful DDR.

Researchers at the United Nations Organizations publish “Lessons Learned” after each UN peace operation. The problem with all this expertise is the uniqueness of each peace operations. The experts admit that there is no blueprint for DDR (IPA, 2002); rather, there are
general guidelines that can warn implementers about common mistakes and make suggestions for implementations (Meek and Malan, 2004; Muggah, 2009).

My research uses a country specific approach in that it focuses on the country of Haiti. It differs from Humphreys and Weinstein (2005) approach not only because of site of the research, but also because it uses a qualitative approach. It’s more about the subjects of DDR than the process itself, in contrast to what has been dominant in the literature so far. It contributes to the study of reintegration by using qualitative inquiry for data collection and analysis.

In addition, my research studies the reintegration of former soldiers more than a decade after their demobilization. Researchers rarely study DDR beyond the first few years of implementation even though the literature claims that DDR is a long-term process (IPA, 2002; Pouligny, 2004). Berdal and Ucko (2009) offer an evaluation of the peace process in Rwanda and Sierra Leone among others, but their research is primarily about political reintegration of former armed combatants. In Haiti, there has not been a study of the reintegration of FAd’H soldiers since Dworken et al. (1997) evaluated the demobilization and reintegration program (DRP) in 1997. Yet, that study was sponsored by the implementers of the program, the USAID. Since then, no systematic study has been made despite the recurrence of FAd’H as an actor in the Haitian political landscape.

Finally, this research will contribute to expand criminological knowledge beyond the boundaries of mainstream criminology. During the 2006 presidential address of the American Society of Criminology, Gary Lafree stressed the importance of criminology in nurturing democratic and non-authoritarian regimes. Along those lines, Kennedy and Shirley (2005) plead for a concentration of academic criminology in the area of public security, which is distinct from

45 Although some authors have touched the problem of DDR in Haiti since then: Mendelson-Forman (2006), Muggah, 2009)
current emphasis on policing, corrections, the administration of justice and the causes of criminal behavior. Other researchers highlight the shortcomings of mainstream criminology and produce interdisciplinary works which venture in areas traditionally neglected by criminologists such as genocides and human rights (Lippman, 1998), colonization and slavery (Morrison, 2006; Agozino, 2003), globalization and political violence (Hagedorn, 2007; Friedman, 2003; Ruggiero, 2006), or social exclusion and gentrification (Hagedorn, 2007). But, despite the widespread acceptance of DDR as a public safety and risk management policy, criminology researchers have largely ignored this area of research.
IV. METHODOLOGY

This research uses qualitative analysis to discover patterns of reintegration among soldiers of the demobilized Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H). Despite the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration program (DRP) of 1994-1996, ex-FAd’H soldiers continue to articulate their grievances and to be part of all debates about security sector reform and the rule of law in Haiti. However, there is no research that investigates the trajectory of these soldiers after demobilization.46

I conducted field research in Haiti where most demobilized FAd’H soldiers were to reintegrate. There, I collected data from semi-structured interviews with 32 demobilized soldiers, written sources and informal conversation with former FAd’H. Initially, I intended to conduct all the interviews in Port-au-Prince where most events related to FAd’H occurred. But the earthquake of 12 January 2010 forced me to relocate the site of research to Haiti’s second largest urban center, Cap-Haitien. There, I conducted 26 semi-structured interviews during the month of February 2010. In August 2010, I returned to Port-au-prince where I conducted seven (7) more interviews.47

In this chapter, I describe: 1) the research questions that guided this research; 2) access to the site of research; 3) the selection of participants; 4) sampling; 5) the interview protocol; 5) the use of written documents; 6) informal conversation; 7) participant observation; 8) self-reflexivity and, 9) data analysis.

46 This research is interdisciplinary because it addresses issues relevant to social sciences in general and to specific fields such as sociology, criminology, law, political science, anthropology, peace studies, etc…

47 I was not able to transfer interview number 2 to MP3 format because of codec issue. I realized one more interview, but it was not coded because the participant was no longer an active FAd’H when FAd’H was demobilized. He deserted in 1992.
IV.1 Research Questions

The central question for this dissertation is how FAd’H soldiers responded to their demobilization and reintegrated into civilian life. This question is developed using three variables of reintegration, namely 1) employment status, 2) ties to former commanders and 3) stake in the political process. This section explains how these three variables contribute to answer the central question.

Research question 1: what is the employment status of the participant?

In the DDR literature, employment is assumed to be a major contributor to the reintegration of demobilized combatants (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2005). This question specifically relates to the economic reintegration of ex-FAd’H. Employment contributes to the political reintegration of ex-combattant because it ensures that the ex-combatant is able to earn a living without belonging to an armed group. An employed soldier is seen as having abandoned his military/combatant career and found a legitimate means to respond to his financial obligations. Gainful employment with a living wage ensures that former combatants no longer have an economic incentive to remobilize. In terms of social reintegration, employment affects the degree to which individual soldier gains acceptance from family and community, the main dependant variable used by Humphreys and Weinstein (2005). Hence, employment ensures the economic reintegration and social well being of combatants.

I investigated this variable by directly asking interview participants to tell their experiences with employment and any other income generated activities. In order to assess the relevance of demobilization and reintegration program (DRP) in employment status of former FAd’H soldiers, I attempted to uncover how much of their employment status can be attributed
to the reintegration program, how their current career compared with their military career, and what this means for their reintegration as civilians.

**Research question 2**: Have soldiers maintained ties to their former commanders? What are the relations between former commanders and ex-FAd’H soldiers? Do soldiers turn to their former commanders for leadership and economic support?

This question seeks to assert whether former soldiers maintain allegiance to the former command structure of FAd’H and turn to former leaders for economic assistance. Humphreys and Weinstein (2005) operationalized this variable as “broken ties to factions”. It is an important variable of reintegration because, persistent allegiance of demobilized soldiers to their former commanders implies that the leaders could call on former soldiers to remobilize as a power broker and derail the post-conflict political process. This has happened in Afghanistan where the Taliban leaders continue to exert enough influence to control large parts of the country despite their official removal from office for more than a decade.

**Research question 3**: Do ex-FAd’H have a stake in the success of the current political process?

This question assesses whether demobilized soldiers are vested in the current political process making them less likely to act as spoilers of peace and democracy. Coded as “stake in the process”, it relates to the acceptance of the current political order and the likelihood of soldiers organizing as spoilers of the constitutional political process. This is a critical variable because one of the major challenges of DDR programs consists of reversing “militaristic ideologies and values” where violence is the primary means of conflict resolution (Meek S. and Malan M., 2004: 2). Thus, reintegrated soldiers are those who invest in the success of the political process (Knight, 2008). They are politically reintegrated as citizens.
This last variable is of utmost importance for criminology because one of the ways demobilized soldiers can undermine the political process is by presenting a threat to public safety through crimes, threats of violence, armed rebellion and other spoiling behaviors. If demobilized soldiers are alienated from the power structure, they may resort to sabotage the government (Berdal and Ucko, 2009). This is even more critical in the case of FAd’H because they were in fact a military doing mostly police work.

IV.2  Access

I initiated contacts with demobilized Fad’H in 2007 tprior to writing my research proposal. . The logistics of that trip were handled by my sister who lives in Haiti. She set up contacts with potential participants and accompanied me to the field. From then, she served as my primary contact in Haiti being fully aware of the research subjects and confidentiality requirements. I defended my proposal in May 2008. After the IRB approved the research protocol in February 2009, we began to plan the field part of the research.

As I struggled to acquire financing for the field research, I applied and obtained an assignment with the United Nations as a corrections advisor in Haiti. I arrived in Haiti in late October 2009 with the intent of living in Port-au-Prince and completing my research during my personal time. I had already reserved a few work spaces in Port-au-Prince for the interviews and data management. But in November 2009, the UN relocated my assignment from Port-au-Prince to Cap-Haitien, about eight hours away by road. Thus, I postponed the interviews for January and February 2010 when I could use my accumulated benefit time to begin interviewing in Port-au-Prince. As I prepared to return to Port-au-Prince to begin interviewing, 12 January 2010 happened. A 7.0 earthquake destroyed Port-au-Prince, my primary research site. Over 250,000
people are feared dead. Over 1.5 million people are maimed and homeless. Among the dead and the homeless are many family members and prospective participants to the research. The main spaces I retained to conduct interviews and managed my research are either destroyed or severely damaged.48

I was not injured during the earthquake because I was still in Cap-Haitien where the earthquake left little damage. I had to rethink my research strategy due to the new reality on the ground. First, I relocated my family from the rubbles of Port-au-prince. My primary contact could no longer stay in Port-au-prince due to damages to the family home and the general degradation of the quality of life. For a few weeks, I thought that I might have to abandon the interviews because I could not figure out how to gain access and recruit participants. This is when I reached out to my advisor to explain the situation. He encouraged me to switch the primary research site from Port-au-Prince to Cap-Haitien.

I had no local contact in Cap-Haitien. I identified and attempted to recruit an ex-FAd’H who worked as a security officer at the UN regional headquarters, but I gave up after he did not show up to appointments three times. I began to talk about the recruitment problem to a law student requesting my help with her memoire and who has lived in Cap-Haitien for most of her life. She told me that her stepfather was a FAd’H and that she would ask him for some leads. When she explained the research to him, he said that he was disqualified for having left FAd’H prior to the demobilization. A few days later, she called me to say that she met someone who might qualify, but she warned me that he might not want to talk because FAd’H soldiers generally do not trust civilians or strangers. After a few calls, I set an appointment with the new prospective recruit. We met outside his work site where about eight more ex-FAd’H worked. He

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48 These places include the law office of Gerard Gervais, the campuses of Centre Universitaire Caraibes and Ecole Normale Superieure, the law offices of Gervais Charles and Hotel Villa Saint-Louis.
came with another FAd’H and took me on a side street where we sat on the back of a pick-up truck. We talked for about one hour about the research. They asked very pertinent questions regarding the purpose of the research and the extent of their participation. I read the recruitment flyer and informed consent with them when I noticed that most of their concerns were addressed. I show them my university ID. Prior to leaving, I handed them some phone cards (valued at 2.50 USC) so they can call me for follow-up. I also left some recruitment flyers so they pass around to other colleagues who might be interested. By the time I got home from the appointment, two FAd’H two candidates called me to begin interviewing.

I began interviewing on 13 February 2010 inside the apartment of one participant. From there, it was snowball like some participants told me about former soldiers “depi youn konnen, tout konnen” (if one knows, we all know). At the end of February 2010, I had completed 26 interviews in Cap-Haitien. I received calls came from the entire northern region from soldiers asking to participate in the research, and I continued to receive calls regarding participating in the research well after the UN transferred me to another region in March 2010. Despite reading the informed consent and explaining the research purpose to each recruit, some participants share some of the rumors they hear about the research in a tone that suggest that they believe those rumors. The rumors suggest that the research was an undercover operation for the US government in the objectives of reinstating FAd’H.

Like Duneier (1999) in the streets of New York, I believe these rumors are related to pre-existing assumptions and conflicts that already existed in the field. They raise questions regarding the influence of the USA over FAd’H and beliefs among soldiers that the US government has not forsaken them. FAd’H was created by the United States during the American Occupation of Haiti (1915-1934) to replace the indigenous Haitian military which led Haiti to
independence in 1804. It was dismantled in 1994 during the US intervention to restore President Aristide to power. During its history, FAd’H was generally perceived to be an institution at the service of the United States of America. And many interviewees tell me that FAd’H was a branch of the US military and could not have been dismantled without the approval of the US government. Hence, many FAd’H soldiers believe that it is a matter of time before the US authorities order the Haitian government to restore FAd’H.49

The timing of the research may have furthermore contributed to the misinterpretation of the purpose of the research. In Port-au-Prince, I had established contacts with prospective participants in 2007 and had maintained contacts with them through my assistant in Haiti. But in Cap-Haitien, I had no prior contacts with participants until February 2010. This was just after the US had sent troops to Haiti to support recovery efforts after the earthquake. Many interviewees believe that it would have been their job to respond to such catastrophes had FAd’H not been dismantled. They believe the timing was right for the US to survey former soldiers and restore FAd’H.

Duneier (1999) underlies how those existing conflicts can affect access to research subjects and their relations with the researcher. He warns that:

“Fieldwork can be a morally ambiguous enterprise. This is even though I have never lied to any of the persons I write about. The question for me is how to show respect for the people I write about, given the impossibility of complete sincerity at every moment”. (Duneier, 1999: 336)

As post-earthquake normalcy began to settle in Port-au-Prince, I ask my assistant to contact some of the people she talked to prior to the earthquake. She was able to reach a few of them. Hence in August 2010, I resumed the interviews with participants in Port-au-Prince.

That’s how six additional FAd’H participated in the research to bring the total number of interviewees to 32.

Besides interview participants, I also talked to a number of ex-FAd’H soldiers integrated into the Haitian National Police. No formal interview was conducted with PNH agents and no one was recorded. They were mostly prison officers in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haitien, Fort-Liberté, Grande Rivière du Nord, Les Cayes and Anse-a-veau. They came from all over the country and usually occupied positions of leadership within the prison system.

IV.3 The Selection of Participants

After the first few interviews, most participants were recruited and interviewed using the methods of availability and snowballing. The underlying goal was to interview participants from a variety of perspectives (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). Potential participants would contact me by phone or show up with a colleague who has an appointment. Here, they were screened using two main criteria of eligibility: first, they must have been active with FAd’H at the moment of demobilization\textsuperscript{50}; and second, they must have been soldiers. Consequently, no one above the rank of sergeant was selected or interviewed.

Once screened, eligible participants were informed of the purpose of the research and the extent of their participation. If they agree to participate, they were given an appointment. I did not maintain documentation of eligibility since I did not gather identifying information for safety reasons. The first four participants called me because the first two soldiers I talked to gave them a flyer and told them about the research.

The first four interviewees became my main source of referrals in Cap-Haitien. The first interviewee works as a security officer for a bank in Cap-Haitien. The second participant was not

\textsuperscript{50} One participant who deserted in 1992 was interviewed because he considers himself as an ex-FAd’H, but his information was not coded. He only revealed that he deserted during the interview.
employed and seemed to have had little work experience since demobilization. The third participant did not work, but owns a small business with his wife. And the fourth participant has a college degree and works fulltime. All four of them agreed to refer people with a background close to their own. This allowed me to recruit a sample with maximum variation.

One interviewee learned about the interviews because he works as a security officer at one of the site of the interviews. He recognized some of the interviewees as they entered and left the site. He was also present during a conversation I had with the manager of the interview site. After hearing the conversation, he came to me and told that he liked the way I managed to protect the purpose of the interviews and the identity of the participants. He offered to be interviewed whenever I chose. He was interviewed a few days later.

In Port-au-Prince, interviews were set by my contact. Two of the interviewees were people I knew while they were still active with Fad’H. Two others are brothers, with quite different perspectives. Two participants were strong supporters of Aristide during their time with Fad’H, although they no longer support Aristide and the Lavalas movement. Another spent three years in jail for allegedly plotting to overthrow the government of Preval in 1997. Overall, participants in Port-au-Prince provide a varied enough sample for my purpose.

IV.4 The sample

At the time of demobilization, FAd’H counted about 7,000 soldiers. All participants in this research were active members of FAd’H at the time of its dismantlement. They ranked from soldiers to sergeants. I elected to interview soldiers because they were the primary targets of the DRP.

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51 This number does not include officers and chefs de sections (rural police chiefs)
All interviewees are male because they were no women soldiers in FAd’H. They were between the age of 40 and 62. Most of them live in the Cap-Haitien area, but they came from different parts of the northern region (except the seven from Port-au-Prince). To visualize the characteristics of the sample, I constructed a spreadsheet with the main information.

My main dependent variables being employment status, I attempted to select participants who had worked and those who did not work. My intention was to select participants from a variety of perspectives. But this was not knowable prior to interviewing because there was no survey of FAd’H with the desired characteristics. So, I intended to stop at 10 interviews to sort out the initial characteristics of the sample and to select participants from these perspectives. But, I noticed that participants were calling from all parts of the Northern region and even from Port-au-Prince to tell me that they wanted to meet with me. I decided to let the snowball continue and see what patterns emerge. After interviewing every eligible participants, it resorts that roughly half of the sample was working (18 has some kind of income generating activities, 11 employed, 7 self-employed, 2 employed and self-employed).

IV.5 Interviews

The purpose of conducting the interviewees was to unveil patterns of reintegration of FAd’H soldiers and assess the relevance of the Demobilization and Reintegration program (DRP) for participants. I constructed the interview protocol as an invitation to talk using the methods of reflexive interviewing.\textsuperscript{52} Hence, I could use the flexibility of semi-structured interviews to enhance participant’s autonomy in their narratives allowing them to make their point without the restrictions of survey questions (Silverman, 2001; Lofland et al., 2006; Fontana

\textsuperscript{52} Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) prefer the distinction between standardized and reflexive interviewing to structured versus non-structured because interviews are always structured by both the interviewer and the interviewee.
and Frey, 2000). Each interview question aimed to stimulate the participant’s perspectives about a particular variable of reintegration, allowing the exploration of emerging patterns and issues. To minimize biases, I oriented some questions in the opposite direction of the patterns or ideas I sought to confirm. I also used probing questions throughout the conversation.

As part of recruitment, I conducted an initial screening for eligibility. Specifically, I asked candidates whether they were active at the time of demobilization and what their highest rank was. If they are eligible, I disclose the purpose of the research and the extent of their eventual participation as outlined in the interview protocol. If they still agree to participate, we set an appointment for the interview. When we met for the interview, I handed each participant a copy of the informed consent, which I read loudly with them. After reading the informed consent, I offered them the opportunity to ask questions and all questions were responded honestly. All those who were read the informed consent agreed to participate. Both they and I signed a copy of the informed consent which I kept for the records. They were given a non-signed copy of the informed consent to better protect their identity. I did not keep documentation of eligibility because I did not want to record identifying information.

In the informed consent, I told participants that each interview would last approximately 60 minutes. But, after the first few interviews, I realized that all had gone beyond 60 minutes, including some that had gone over two hours. So, I began to tell participants that the target time was 60 minutes, but that could go beyond if necessary. They were given the opportunity to stop the interview at any time for whatever reasons. I also told them that I could stop the interviews if I needed to.

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53 This method breaks from previous studies of reintegration, which mainly use statistical methods to test for success or failure of DDR (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2005).
Participants were given the options to use French and/or Creole as primary language for the interviews. They all chose to speak in Creole. With their consent, interviews were recorded with two digital voice-recorders (except two). Each recorded interview was downloaded to a microcomputer, saved on the hard drive of the computer and backed up on a flash drive. Audio-recording were indexed in the form of MP3 files and treated as part of the document. In addition to recording the interviews, I took notes during the interview to record points of emphasis and areas I wanted to explore during the interview that were not included in the protocol. I also jot down field notes to describe the context of the interview and attempt to reproduce non-verbal events. And after each interview, I prepared analytical memos about what transcribed during the interviews. In a few cases, I went straight to my spreadsheet of sample characteristics to fill in whatever information was recorded so far about that particular participant.

As promised, each participant received 250.00 HTG (about 6.00 dollars USC) to cover basic expenses related to their participation in the research. Some participants received a little bit over that amount when I could not come up with the exact change. I do not think that this amount significantly influenced participation in the research although some participants who were not working expressed that they were in need of money. A few participants even tried to return the money to me saying that it was not necessary that I give them money because I was doing them a favor by letting them talk. I told them that I had to give it to them because I indicated so in the informed consent. But, for at least two interviewees, it seems that the interview was conceived as a job on itself because they did not seem to want to say much and asked for the money before I even had time to get it out to him. And in Port-au-Prince, a participant lightly bickered against the modesty of the fee arguing that it could not do much for him. I told him that the
compensation fee was not a payment and must be administered as agreed in the informed consent by the IRB.

In Port-au-Prince, all the interviews were conducted under a tent built over the ruins of the CUC (Caribbean University College), completely flattened by the earthquake on January 12th, 2010. The other location I reserved to conduct the interviews and secure the data prior to entering Haiti were destroyed by the earthquake. My assistant who was a student at CUC and had barely left the campus prior to the collapse, arranged for me to conduct the interviews there in August 2010.

In Cap-Haitien, the interviews were conducted in various locations. I tried to rent a suitable office, but I could not find one that I could afford. The location of the first few interviews was a private residence chosen by the participant. Three of the first five interviews were conducted at participant’s home. The second interview was conducted in the yard of a government building and close to the street (the location was chosen by the participant). A few interviews were conducted at the college of law of Cap-Haitien. As I struggled to find a stable location, I asked the manager of Feu Vert (a cultural venue) to let me use the location to have a few meetings without revealing to him the details. He agreed and let me conduct the interviews when the local was not being used.

Quality of recording and confidentiality were major issues related to the location of the interviews. One could hear all kind of background noise while listening to the tapes. Sometimes, I conducted interviews during band or dance rehearsals at Feu vert. Other times, it rained during interviews. Sometimes, somebody start shouting and yelling at someone else. In port-au-prince, I conducted some interviews during classroom instructions under the next tent.
I struggled to maintain the confidentiality and the privacy of the interviewees because no interview location was really shielded from intruders. At time, I had to stop interviews and move to a different location. One interview was completely stopped when the employer of the participant showed up and sat down a few meters from us. A few interviews were interrupted when people who know the participant exchanged a few words. And almost all participants received or answer phone calls during the interviews. However, at no time, did I feel threatened or knowingly spied upon during the interviews.

IV.6 Written Documents

I use written documents as reference to locate important events in relation with my interviews and informal conversations. They increase the validity of the research by offering another angle of the representation (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997). They mostly consist of media reports and opinions regarding Fad’H and its members. I accessed those media primary through the websites using the name of the media. Among the mostly used media are Radio Metropole, Radio TeleCaraibes, Signal FM, DefendHaiti, Le Nouvelliste, Le Matin, Haiti Observateur and Haiti en Marche and The New York Times. On their websites, I browsed for texts containing key words such as FAd’H, forces armées d’Haïti, armée d’Haïti, lame d’ayiti, l’armée. I include information from the media as footnotes instead of cited references because I treat them as part of my data.

A first group of documents contain reports of ex-FAD’H activities. For example, FAd’H participation in parades, marches, and media events etc… these accounts are important because they present their public demands as they want to be portrayed. A second group contains the

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54 Le Nouvelliste and Le Matin are based in Haiti and have the reputation being “neutral”. Haiti Observateur and Haiti en Marche are edited in the USA. The first is a pro-Duvalier and pro-military newspaper while the later is a pro-Lavalas/Aristide newspaper. Radio Métropole is a private radio station, generally accepted as a “neutral” media.
opinions of commentators and stakeholders (editorialists, bloggers, politicians, former FAd’H officers). Some of these opinions were the subject of Toussaint’s book (2007) about the FAd’H debate in Haitian newspapers. Most of the time, they tend to focus on making an argument in favor or against the remobilization of FAd’H. To this group of documents, I must add the rapport of the three presidential commissions.55

Besides those accounts, I also study the history of FAd’H in the larger context of Haitian history and the micro-context of reintegration.56 During interviews, many participants used the role of FAd’H in Haiti’s foundation to claim there is no Haiti without a military. While these accounts are sometimes filled with nationalism and bias, they are better interpreted when placed in the larger Haitian context. Such an approach was successfully adopted by Hagedorn (1995) during his research about “bureaucracy and reform in the child welfare system” in Milwaukee.

Finally, I study the reports of human rights organizations in Haiti. Those reports often serve as counter arguments whenever someone argues in favor of a return of FAd’H. They contain periodic accounts of human rights violations during the periods of FAd’H domination, notably the coup d’etat periods of 1991-1994. They also contain accounts of the post-FAd’H period like the period of remobilization of some FAd’H of 2003-2006.

IV.7 Informal Conversations

Throughout the year I spent in Haiti and subsequent visits, I have had many informal conversations with former members of FAd’H who were not eligible for the research or not

55 I obtained a copy of the first report from Dr. Greg Beckett: Rapport Final de la Commission Citoyenne de Réflexion sur les forces Armées. (Unpublished document containing the recommendation of the presidential commission in favor of restoring FAd’H). The commission endorsed the restoration of FAd’H because of the role of the army in Haitian history and for questions of national security. Thanks to Dr. Greg Beckett for kindly forwarding this document.

56 The second chapter of this dissertation is dedicated to the history of FAd’H.
available for interviews. They include members of the Haitian National police and some security guards. I observed them at work and talked to them in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haitien, Grande Rivière du Nord, Fort-Liberté, Les Cayes and Anse-a-veau. Those conversations often occurred because they identified as members of FAd’H. They often compared their work as ex-FAd’H versus their colleagues who were recruited as police officer trainees off the street. For the most part, they did not know that I was conducting a research. Therefore, they were not formally interviewed.

IV.8 Self-reflectivity

Besides the examination of written documents and the accounts of former soldiers, this research is informed by my personal experiences. As a resident of Haiti until 1998, I was immersed in the events surrounding the demobilization of FAd’H. I was acquainted to many former soldiers as family friends or neighbors, and befriended many victims of FAd’H violence during the peak of the political repression (1986-1994). I lived under the constant fear of FAd’H led state violence between the ages of 12 and 20. Many members of my family (including my father, my grandmother and my brother) resorted to hiding to avoid FAd’H reprisals. Death squads accompanied FAd’H soldiers to attack my high school during student protests between 1990 and 1994, prompting school officials to shorten the academic year to avoid further attacks. In 1994, I applauded the dismantlement of FAd’H because like many Haitians I believed that the institution was too corrupt and repressive to serve in a democratic state.

Therefore, when I returned to Haiti to conduct the interviews, I was not a complete outsider. I was not either an insider because of my living in the United States for the proceeding 11 years. Other obstacles were education level, age and my civilian status. Many interviewees

57 About 1500 ex-FAd’H were integrated in the HNP at the time of demobilization. Today, most of leadership of HNP are ex-FAd’H. Also, most security companies are run by ex-FAd’H.
claim to still be soldiers and contrasted their status with that of civilians. One interviewee even suggests that he was not comfortable to tell me everything because I was a civilian.

In this context, it was impossible to completely immerse, socialize, observe and participate. This is not to say that there was no trust or interests between me and participants. Indeed, Duneier (1999) reassures that researchers are still able to negotiate some sort of acceptance even if they are not fully trusted by participants. Many participants called me after interviews to ask about how the research was proceeding. One of them came to participate after he heard me negotiating a location for the interview without mentioning that I was targeting ex-FAd’H. The day after I interviewed him, he came back to talk to me without being on tape. Although, I did not have time to interview the first FAd’H who got the snowball rolling, he and other FAd’H kept contact with him long after I left Cap-Haitien regarding the progress of the research.

In the end, I understand that my personal relations with the events and the people who were involved in them may both inform and affect my interpretation (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995:192). For example, a couple of interviewees who were acquaintances exchanged some family news with me prior to the interviews. The same interviewees refer to some personal events that they know I must be aware of. That is why I committed myself to consider the analytical significance of all feelings of discomfort, anxiety, surprise, shock, or revulsion during the course of the research.

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58 Silverman (2001) describe three methodological approaches to interviews: positivism, emotionalism and constructionalism. I do not subscribe to the positivist or emotionalist approach to interviews which assume that the respondent is a passive subject of research. Rather, I believe in the constructionist approach which sees the respondent as actively engaging in constructing meaning.
IV.9 Research Challenges, Methods and Ethics

Prior to signing the inform consent, I asked participant whether they had questions or concerns regarding the research and their participation. The most common question was how the research would be beneficial for them. I answered according to the inform consent, i.e there was no direct benefit to them. When they insisted, I told them that the only benefit would be the opportunity to share their experiences about such an important issue. The majority of FAd’H never had a chance to voice their opinion to a non-FAd’H audience about their experiences of the demobilization and reintegration. When such opinions are needed, journalists and officials often go to officers or to spokespersons of FAd'H. Many interviewees nodded when I mention this as a potential benefit from the research and some of them thanked me for the opportunity to participate.

I am very appreciative of what you are doing right now, and God will bless you. When I talk, it gives me faith and strength. By doing this, more people will hear our message, and maybe we could get our pension, which would improve our lives. We would not have to leave our country. People mostly leave the country because of insecurity. If FAd’H return, there will be security. People will stay in the country (p10:21).

Some participants see more than therapy in their participation. They see the research as an opportunity to send a message. A participant asked specifically for my nationality. I told him that I was American of Haitian origin. Another participant informed me that he heard of the research through a rumor claiming there is an American soldier collection the grievances of FAd’H to reconstitute the army. I tried to dissuade him, but he seemed to cling to his assumptions. A participant even said that he was confident that Obama supported the reinstatement of Fad’H and would make sure that it happens during his term. Others expressed after the interview that they hoped someone heard them this time. Such perceptions indicate that
maybe some participants were trying to send a message to the US government using the interviews as a medium.

A possible origin for this perception may be the misinterpretation of the concept of reintegration. After a few interviews, I discovered that participants were using the concept of reintegration (in civilian life) as meaning remobilization (or reintegration into the army). Despite explaining the concept to participants during the inform consent, many continue to use it as remobilization (*reentegre nou nan lame*). As the interviews continue in Cap-Haitien, participants seem to increasingly believe that I was in secret a mission related to the reconstitution of FAd’H.

Another concern about the sample relates to the role of potential gatekeepers. It is possible that only friends or people from a certain perspective were referred to me. Because some soldiers believe that I might be an agent of remobilization, they might have referred participants who would better carry their message to the American government, as documented by all the good things they had to say about the USA. I do not believe that this effect is strong either because interviewees came from so many different location and Fad’H units. In addition, all interviews claim strong fellowship with other soldiers. They all say that they help recruit others for whatever purpose because once you tell one of them, they all know. I must say that Cap-Haitien is the largest city of the Northern region of Haiti (including the Departments of Nord, Nord-est, Nord-ouest and part of Centre and Artibonite) and that everything that happen in Cap-Haitien has resonance in the rest of the region.

IV.10 Data Analysis

The analysis of data proceeds as an ongoing process from collection to writing. During the research, I kept a journal where I recorded feelings and events surrounding data collection
(Richardson, 2000). In the journal, I recorded factual events such as dates, location, people, intruders, weather conditions, etc... I also recorded feelings of discomfort, anxiety, surprise, shock, or revulsion. The journal provides a vehicle to “retrace and explicate the development of the research design, the emergence of analytic themes, and the systematic collection of data” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995:192).

For each interview, I attempt to decode the context, settings and identities or social locations of both the participant and the researcher in describing perspectives and making inferences. Each interview is approached as a social event engaging both researcher and participants in participant observation. I did not trouble about potentially misleading accounts because I do not look for the truth in what the informants say. Instead, I treat each account as a source of information and seek to discover patterns, discursive practices and perspectives of the participant in the context they occur (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: 131, 156, 226). Therefore, the interaction with participants is also of analytical significance (Silverman, 2001). I incorporate them in the analysis to minimize threats of validity.

After each interview, I prepared an analytical memo to record the development of analytical ideas and the emergence of new research questions, to reflect on each interview as to how it is contributing to the overall research process question. In subsequent interviews, I checked emerging analytical insights by introducing the particular points (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995:205). I follow the same approach when new analytical insights emerged through new texts.

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59 Social locations refer to the ‘patterns of social relationships’ in which people are enmeshed (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995:226)

60 Silverman (2001) refers to this approach as constructionism because both the “interviewers and the interviewees are engaged in constructing meaning.”
The formal analysis involved the audition and transcription of the tapes. I initially struggled with the need to transcribe all the interviews considering the time and energy required to transcribe about 40 hours of audio. This problem was complicated because the interviews were conducted in Haitian Creole while the dissertation was being written in English. Because of the foreign language issue and the time constraint, I hired my Haitian contact to help transcribe the interviews and a Haitian-American to translate the quotes I use in the dissertation.

I gradually transcribed the interviews while listening to the tapes repeatedly. I read the transcripts while listening to the tapes to ensure that the transcription is correct. When I spot something in error or something problematic, I pause the tape to review and/or correct. I have also carried the audio with me (as itunes on my ipod) since the dates the interviews were conducted. I have listened to them over and over again on a random basis. In my home, I made a habit listening to tape while conducting house chores.

As I read the transcripts and listened to the tapes, I marked the texts and created a codebook where I recorded relevant and recurrent themes. Depending on the theme, marked texts could be a single word, a phrase, sentence, paragraph or chunks of texts. In the margin of the marked texts, I inserted a code (as a comment). I organized the data in terms of descriptive and analytic categories. Descriptive categories demographics or employment status were transposed to an excel spreadsheets. Analytical categories were coded using a ground theory

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61 My iTunes count show that I have listened to interviews at home computer between 4 and 16 times (as of December 2011). This excludes the listening to the tapes on my IPOD on the road (driving, travelling, jogging, etc...). I was only able to listen to interview number 2 once or twice because the tape was corrupted due to a codex issue. This interview was not transcribed. Hence, I could only use the notes I took during that interview and the resulting analytical memo.

62 The tapes were downloaded to my personal computer and imported to my iTunes library. To protect the identity of participants, no identifying information was recorded in iTunes or my personal computer.
approach of looking for processes, actions, assumptions and consequences (Lincoln and Denzin, 2003:274).

I paid particular attention to cases that allow for variation in the data. Within each case, I identified themes that are common in the literature and those emerged through coding the data. For example, I found that the word ‘travay’ (work) did not capture the full meaning intended in the interview protocol. I had to readjust it to include all income generated activities such as farming small business, or a part time job. I went through a similar process with the concept of reintegration which participants interpret mostly to mean “remobilization”.

I considered the facts that the purpose of the research was misinterpreted by some participants. Some interviewees told me that they heard rumors and seemed to believe that the research was intented as a preparation for the return of FAd’H. This misperception of the research might have explained certain behavior and patterns present throughout the research. For example, in Cap-Haitien, all 26 participants in Cap-Haitien showed up on time on the date of the interview. They were neatly groomed and professionally dressed. They all claimed to be in good physical and mental health. None of them admitted to participate in the rebellion of 2003-2004 that overthrew Aristide and brought the country on the brink of civil war. They also denied having any self-destructive habits such as drinking alcohol or smoking. In other words, they all appear to be ready for a call to remobilization.

I analyze my interviews as a story told by actors intended to construct a positive view of theirselves. I argue that interviewees construct a story to present FAd’H as a model institution dedicated to the service of the nation, particularly the rule of law. Accordingly, their narratives

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63 I offer more details about the ambiguities of the concept of employment in the chapter on employment.

64 I provide more details on this observation in the previous section on research challenges

65 Holstein and Gubrium (1995) recommends that interviews be analyzed as storytelling
challenge accusation of human rights abuse, defend the legitimacy of FAd’H, challenge the
demobilization, demands payments for the years since demobilization, pit soldiers vs. former
commanders and accentuate the identity of demobilized Haitian soldiers regardless of their
individual success at reintegration. These are what Silverman (2001) refers to as “cultural
stories” or narratives that are ‘deployed’ to make “actions explainable and understandable” to
those who otherwise may not understand.

These collective stories contribute to cement the identity of former Haitian soldiers as a
group. Group identity theory suggests that there is dual conception of the self as both individual
and member of a particular group. When group membership becomes salient, there is a process
of depersonalization or self-stereotyping which may imply that only the satisfying of the “group
claims” would reduce the risk of spoiling behavior and remobilization. In other words,
reintegration will not be successful if it fails to consider the “group” claims instead of the
individual soldier. (Geisinger, 2004:643)

Finally, I use the method of analytic induction to strength, reframe or reject partial
interpretations (Ryan and Bernard, 2000). For example, analytic induction method allows me to
assess for each case whether reintegration occurred and whether that reintegration was the result
of the DRP program.

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– Sa’ w fe pou mwen la, enteviou sa ou fe pou mwen la, m’ka di si e bonDye ka ede w kanmem. pase chak m we se pale n’ap pale se ede l ede’m viv plis. Pandan w la pare midi a mesaj la ka pase tout peyi ka ede nou pase peyi-a mante lame menm si se pa mwen si m’gen yon pansyon m’ap viv si lot gen on pansyon y’ap viv si peyi-a gen on lame anpil moun pap bezwen pati laba pou yo ta va viv pase anpil moun la ba gen mwayen pou yo ta va viv se sekiite ki pa genyen ki fe pi fo moun pati kite peyi-a m kwe si gen yon bagay nan peyi-a k’ap pase, gen travay m’kwe tout moun ap viv alez (P10)
V. SAMPLE PROFILE

This chapter presents a profile of FAd’H soldiers using data from my interviews. As I began to code the data, I created a spreadsheet which contains recurring qualitative and numerical themes. For the first few interviews, I coded my field notes and entered the relevant data as variables. Then, I listened to the interviews and read the transcripts for relevant information. Some of the themes respond directly to questions from my research assumptions. But others such as farming, government payments or the role of women (or significant others) emerged during coding. Once my spreadsheet was completed (to the extent possible), I transposed the data to an SPSS page for descriptive statistics. In the end, I included in the dataset 54 variables (themes and subthemes) and 32 cases (participants).

V.1 The Age Factor

According to Mendelson-Forman (2006), the largest group of demobilized soldiers who took part in the DRP training were between the ages of 30 and 34. And the second largest group was between the ages of 25 and 29 years old. Considering that the DRP lasted about two years (1994-1996), the two groups would roughly be respectively between the ages of 41 and 60 years old in 2010. In my sample, the 32 respondents were between the ages of 40 and 62 with the average age being about 48.5 years old. Most reported that they were recruited in their twenties, with the exception of two recruited at the age of 18 and another at the age 31.
Chart 1: Age of Participants (2010)\textsuperscript{66}

Age is an important factor in the debates regarding remobilization of FAd’H. Is it conceivable to restore FAd’H by remobilizing aging former soldiers? Or are opponents to remobilization counting on time to diminish the influence of demobilized soldiers and shift the debate in their favor? Interviewees did not think that their age could turn against them. Despite their age, only five soldiers reported to have had serious health issues since demobilization and only two specified what the issue was. Although a few did not think they would be able to handle the rigors of physical training, most of them anticipate a role in training and mentoring new recruits. In any case, age is likely to play a role in the future of FAd’H soldiers with respect to remobilization or spoiling behaviors.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{66} Source: my data

\textsuperscript{67} Life expectancy in Haiti is about 62.51 years in 2011 (CIA, the World Factbook. Accessed on 3/30/2012 at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html
V.2 Years of Service

The sample includes 14 first class soldiers, 7 corporals and 11 sergeants.\(^{68}\) Eleven (11) served between 10 and 10 years, 13 served between 10 and 15 years, and three for more than 15 years. This distribution is compatible with the data collected during the DRP (Mendelson-Forman, 2006).

All interviewees demand credit for an additional 16 years of service (1994-2010).\(^{69}\) They claim those years because they say that Fad’H was not legally demobilized. Because Fad’H required 30 years of service to collect pension, no one in my sample was eligible for pension at the time of dismantlement (it was not offered to them either). When they add these “16 years”, they believe that they would be immediately eligible for pension or meet eligibility within a few years of service. They also want back pay for those years.

V.3 Family Life and the Role of Women

The literature on DDR outlines the importance of family for successful reintegration. (Farr, 2003; Knight, 2008). Humphreys and Weinstein (2005) use acceptance by families as a key component of their dependant variable “accepted today”. Combatant with supportive families tend to fare better. During my interviews, I collected marital data for 28 respondents. The variable “married” was combined with the variable “cohabitated” due to the practical difficulty to distinguish between these two types of family relations beyond their legal definition. The combined “married/cohabited” relationship refers to any committed relationship where the respondent refers to his mate as his wife (madanm mwen) regardless of the legal status. It is a

\(^{68}\) Because I was primarily concerned with the perspective of soldiers, I did not interview anybody higher than sergeants.

\(^{69}\) Sixteen years was the number of years since demobilization when I conducted my interviews. This number increases with each passing year.
code for any stable long-term relationship. Seventeen (17) of twenty eight (28) interviewees said they were in this type of relationship at the time of their research. A few said they were widows. After removing missing cases (4) and the participant who has only one child, 20 participants report to have children with more than one woman. One participant reports to have fathered 8 children with 5 mothers. Two other participants report four mothers for 5 and 8 children each. But no participants admit they were involved with more than one mate, which is surprising considering how prevalent such arrangements are in Haiti. Indeed, it is estimated that about one third of Haitian men live in polygamous relationships.\textsuperscript{70} These relationships are even open, with all parties being civil about it. I asked participants why they only have one mate. Their responses range from religious objections to not having enough money to take care of more than one family. It does not seem that this information is accurate. I argue this is part of participants attempt to represent themselves in a positive manner to the researcher.

Every interviewee reported to have children. The number of children ranges from one to ten with the average of 4.81 children per participant. One participant reports to have one child and two participants report having 2 children. They have both adult and young children. They all say their kids supported their career as FAd’H and would approve them remobilizing. They also claim having kids as one reason why they would not participate in guerilla type warfare or any other type of violent actions against the government.

I agree that family relationships may be a deterrent against armed rebellion against the government. It is also a factor of reintegration because it allows the participant to take roots in the community. Indeed, many participants report that they have survived demobilization thanks to the support of their significant other. For instance, eight participants report that their main source of income is their wife’s small business (even though they claim to have given her the

\textsuperscript{70} Gender and Social Equality in Haiti. Accessed online on 1/8/2012 at \url{http://genderindex.org/country/haiti}
start up cash). Some of the relationship started while the soldier was active and other relationships started afterwards. A few participant report that their significant others left them after the demobilization.

V.4 Community

One of the most difficult aspects of reintegration is the rebuilding of their relations with their community (Gleichmann, 2004). In their study of reintegration in Sierra Leone, Humphreys and Weinstein (2005) found that combatants who have been abusive in their community had the most difficulties to reintegrate. This was even the only significant variable of reintegration they found in their mostly quantitative research.

As a regular (legal) army, FAd’H soldiers were recruited throughout Haiti. After a six month training at the camp d’application, they were deployed throughout the country including to places where they had no personal connections. Hence, they were often not from the region they were living and working. Consequently, the only relations they had with those communities were from their positions as state agents (military police officers). Their relations with their community were heavily damaged in the context of the coup d’état against a popular president and the violent reprisals that followed.

I asked FAd’H to describe their return to their community after demobilization. Many FAd’H reported that they did not return to the community where they used to live because of fear of vigilante and reprisals. Some of them returned to the community they live prior to enrollment. One participant immediately migrated to the Dominican Republic to avoid falling victim. Five soldiers report to live at the same address where they lived during their career with FAd’H. Sixteen (16) participants owned their home and 12 are tenants.
Among the interviewees, nine soldiers report some form of physical aggression against them after their demobilization due to their status as ex-FAd’H. One interviewee shows me scars on his body, which he says are the result of a beating by a Lavalas gang. Another one was captured by a gang of Lavalas vigilantes and was only freed by a rival gang who knew him as a good guy when he was a soldier. And a third one claimed that he was arrested illegally by a local gang and taken to the leader of the gang, the local mayor. He was freed because the mayor/leader recognized him as a former school classmate. In sum, soldiers generally describe the first eight years following their demobilization as a period of fear and terror for demobilized soldiers.

V.5 Education

At the time of their recruitment to FAd’H, no interviewee completed a high school education.⁷¹ Two had just completed elementary school, the minimum education required (Mendelson-Forman, 2006). Because FAd’H allowed soldiers continue their education, a few participants completed a few more grades while serving. Others have continued their education after the demobilization, included two who completed professional degrees.

The level of education reported by interview respondents must be analyzed in the Haitian context. At the time of recruitment of these soldiers, about 65% of Haitians did not attend school. And for those who attended, multiple obstacles prevented them from ever graduating (here the term ‘drop out’ does not really make sense). For most Haitians, having a grammar school means literacy. It was enough to get a factory job or a job as a state employee. About four Haitian heads of state (generals) are reported to have been illiterate (Dessalines, Guerrier, Nord Alexis and Antoine Simon). In sum, school is a privilege in Haiti (even though the constitution calls it a right). The few who completed high school or university get all the privileges of the state.

⁷¹ In Haiti, high school or secondary school is a seven-year cycle. Altogether, a holder of a secondary high school education has completed seven years of primary school and seven years of high school.
including the privilege of going directly to the school of officers of the Haitian Armed Soldiers (académie militaire) without ever being a soldier.

V.6 Trades and Skills

Most participants attest they did not have a profession when they began their career with FAd’H. They enrolled in FAD’H because it was a job opportunity. Indeed, most of them claim that their profession is “métiers des armes” (marskman). Those who were assigned to FAd’H technical units (engins lourds, corps du genie, aviation, hospital militaries, etc…) learned trades such as mechanics or radio operator. But, they were not able to translate their skills to the civilian world after demobilization (except one participant who was a truck driver). The first interviewee told me that he would have loved to apply some of the skills he learned as a mechanic of heavy equipment, but the opportunity never came.

After the dismantlement of FAD’H, 28 of 32 participants completed the demobilization and reintegration program (DRP). They learned trades such as mechanics (6), electricity (6), plumbing (5), computer (2), electronic (1), masonry (1), refrigeration (1). After the dismantlement, one interviewee went to university to become a lab technician and another one to become a lawyer. But neither was working in these professions at the time they were interviewed. Instead, they were both working as part of the security details for a bank. They were recruited to these positions in 2004 when the interim government was negotiated a settlement with Fad’H following the overthrowing Aristide.

Among my 32 interviewees, 20 reported working in professions they did not learn during the DRP: Security officers (11) (4), carpenter (1), cabinet-maker (1), masons (3), mechanics (3), lab technician (1), tailors (3), notary public (1), others (5). This raised the question of the
inadequacy of the training and the irrelevance of the DRP to reintegrate former soldiers.  
(Mendelson-Forman, 2006)

V.7 Social Life

Because of the fluidity of these concepts, many participants were ambiguous about their socio-economic status. Twenty participants provided defining information for their social economic status. They were given the options of poor, middle class and rich. Nine soldiers say they belong to the middle class. Eleven self-identify as poor and six as being of the lowest class. Many were not satisfied of these concepts and offered to be placed in the lowest class whatever it is. Others did not want to use the concept of poor because of their religious belief that they are rich in God.

The self-portrait of FAd’H is that of a middle age man struggling to make ends meet in a country where their only hope is the reinstatement of FAd’H.
VI. EMPLOYMENT STATUS

V.1 The Ambiguities of Employment

In this research, I code for employment any occupation that generates a wage or income. I collected data about employment by asking combatants to tell about their work experience since demobilization. But employment is a tricky data considering its whole range of interpretation. Interviewees admit to work only when they are employed and receive a satisfactory remuneration from a company in the form of a monthly check. Many soldiers who say they do not work later concede to be farmers, small business owners or security guards. Others perform sporadic work from a profession or a part time job. They often say this was not really a job likely because they feel underemployed at these jobs. Some of these soldiers perform works that they may not qualify as regular employment, even though those activities help them provide for their family. This includes nine (9) participants who help their wives set up and manage the family's small business such as reselling phone cards and used clothes or driving a cab or tap-tap (vehicles used for public transportation). A similar pattern was observed in Sierra Leone where Weinstein and Humphreys (2005) had to recode the variable "employment" into occupation to better account for activities that bring income, but that participants did not consider as formal jobs ("ti degaje in creole"). I do not believe that this observation is unique to FAd’H considering the high level of unemployment in Haiti.

Unemployment is a very recurring theme in my research. Among the respondents, 21 initially reported they were not employed at the time of the interviews. Some have not worked at all since demobilization. Others have had some short time employment, mostly in the private security sector. Unemployed soldiers claimed that they have supported themselves without a job.
through family small business, farming, remittance from emigrated relatives and a stipend from the government.

Self-employment is coded for any income generated activities other than salaried labor. Seven of 32 interviewees admit to be self-employed. Self-employed include electricians, plumbers, mechanics, public transportation drivers, public notaries, farmers and vendors (of items such as cell phone cards, groceries, wood charcoal). Some professionals work intermittently because of the poor shape of the Haitian economy and the lack of professional regulations in Haiti. Small business owners mainly participate in family business with the wife.

No FAd’H admits to have been involved in illegal activities of any kind. Indeed, they all claim that no Fad’H has ever been arrested for a property crime since demobilization. I attempted to confirm this information through the records of the prisons. But my efforts were not successful because the prison archives are almost inexistent and in any case incomplete (they only contain basic identifying information). In the course of informal conversation with some prison agents, they told me that they did not know any FAd’H currently incarcerated.

VI.2 Farming

Five (5) participants from Cap-Haitien report farming as their main occupation or as a supplemental occupation. Because most farmers in Haiti use their products for their own use, participants did not consider farming as work. Haitian farmers produce at small to medium scale. Most of harvests are consumed in the household. Only the excess production is sold. As a matter fact, two of them hold another fulltime occupation, while a caretaker farms the land for a portion of the harvest (an arrangement known in Haiti as “demwatye”).

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72 My interview protocol includes many questions to probe for criminal activities. But, in both Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien, participants insist they were not involved in crimes.
In the DDR literature, land access and agriculture are recognized as important avenues for reintegration of former combatants (Baare, 2005). After the emergence of farming as an occupation, I began to ask participants whether they have considered farming as a path to their reintegration. Participants said that they could not farm because they had no access to land.

VI. 3 Security Officers

My research shows that private security was the most common employer of former soldiers. Eleven (11) participants admit that they work as security officers, the most for any particular activity. And almost every one admits to have worked in the private security sector at some point since demobilization. But few express satisfaction about this type of employment. Indeed, some participants who were working as security officers did not admit to have a job until I specifically asked about it. Some interviewees say that they would never work as a security guard because that occupation diminishes them. They complain that the general working conditions are not adequate.

I interviewed three ex-FAd’H soldiers who work in the security set up of a bank in Cap-Haitien. They were recruited in 2005 during an attempt by the interim government of Francois Latortue to settle with the rebels who overthrew Jean Bertrand Aristide. Although happier with their current social economic situation, they all express support for FAd’H and believe that FADH should be reinstated. They were the best paid workers on my sample and the most highly educated (including the two with college level education).

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73 Another officer from the same bank was my access point, although I did not formally interview him.

74 They told me that 18 of them were recruited by the bank.
VI.4 Police and Corrections Officers

I did not formally interview FAd’H soldiers recruited into HNP because most were not subjected to the challenges of reintegration, particularly the challenges of employment. This group includes those FADH who were transferred from the interim police force. Under the interim government of Gerard Latortue (2004-2006), about 400 FAd’H integrated the ranks of HNP as part of the government’s settlement with the group that was brought to the ecole de magistrature in Route de Freres. A lot of them work in the prisons as corrections officers (8 of 34 in Cap-Haitien) while others work for the Haitian National Police. Most of the leadership of the HNP since its creation has been made of ex-FADH, including the current commander Mario Andresol. Some of the senior officers of the prisons are also ex-FAd'H.

In March 2010, I met a correctional officer at the prison of Les Cayes who proudly affirmed that he was an ex-FAd’H soldier. He was one of many ex-FAd’H soldiers working in that prison, including the inspector and his two assistants. Later, he introduced me to another man who was a low ranked officer of FAd’H, proudly displaying his FAd’H credentials. They were both affected at the military barracks of Les Cayes while serving with FAd’H. Like their colleagues in Cap-Haitien, they would not stop telling me that ex-FAd’H were recognizable for their superior sense of responsibility, their ability and their discipline. It is worth noting that both ex-FAd’H soldiers look in top physical shape. The correctional officer said that he was doing his job professionally despite not being treated very well.

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75 The interim police force was created in the transitional period between the dismantlement of FAd’H and the set up of PNH.

76 I did not tape my conversations with police and correctional officers. I jot down notes regarding the conversations after they occur. No identifying information was recorded.

77 This officer said that he was paid about 18,000 gourdes (about 450 dollars/month) which is quite above what most Haitians earn monthly. When he was employed with FAd’H, he said that his salary of 382 gourdes allowed him to live decently with his family.
FAd’H soldiers working as correctional officers complain about differential treatment by the prison administration (DAP). They resent not having the same benefits as those recruited as civilians. They say they have had no promotion since their insertion into PNH. They also lamented that service with Fad’H was not transferred for retirement and pension eligibility. According to the prison administration, this unequal treatment is due to the fact that these officers did not complete the regular police certification from the police academy.

I asked my interviewees whether they would consider working for Haitian National Police (PNH or HNP) if the opportunity is offered. Participants have ambiguous attitudes toward joining FAd’H. Some said that they were never given the opportunity. Others said that they have tried to join PNH, but were rejected. They are also those who say that they never consider working for PNH due to the poor reputation of PNH.78

VI.5 Migrant Workers

It is not known how many FAd’H have migrated after demobilization instead of trying to reintegrate in Haiti. My interview respondents asserted that many FAd’H left the country after demobilization. Participant 21 migrated illegally to the Dominican Republic and worked there for in the construction industry. He participated in the DRP training and graduated a mechanic. He said that he could not find a job with the DRP profession. “lavi a te vin enposib pou mwen (life was impossible for me)”. He calls the DRP a bluff. He had been back to Haiti since 2004, but has not worked since then. He claimed that he does not like the work conditions in Haiti. He expressed very strong objections to work conditions in Haiti. He seems to have some serious

78 It is also possible that most ex-FAd’H are disqualified for PNH due to the physical and educational requirements of PNH.
complex. He claims to have no income since 2004 (other 2/3 of the indemnity of 35,000 Haitian dollars) when he returned to Haiti. He immediately went to the Islands of Turcs and Caicos where he was deported back to Haiti for being undocumented. Another interviewee migrated to the islands of Turcs and Caicos and worked there for 8 years until his deportation for being undocumented. Since their return to Haiti, they both say that they have not found employment.

Some interviewees claim that they love Haiti too much to leave for work aboard. But, I believe that they may have not had the opportunity to migrate considering how difficult it is for the average Haitian citizen to legally migrate. The countries they have been are border countries with some demands for Haitian labor. While the labor market is better in those countries than in Haiti, they do not offer a significant attraction compared to the US, Canada or the European Union. That’s why no interviewee has ever visited or lived in these countries while claiming to know FAd’H who did. Hence, there might be a significant number of ex-Fad’H residing in North America and Europe.

VI.6 Conclusion: The DRP and Employment

My research asserts that the DRP training was largely irrelevant for the long term reintegration of soldiers. There was no clear link between participation in DRP and employment. Participants give various reasons why DRP did not lead to a job. The reasons include the lack of opportunities in the profession they were trained during the training, the poor quality of the training linked to short duration of the training.

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79 His return to Haiti coincided with the overthrow of Aristide in 2004. He denied being one of the rebels who crossed the border to participate in the overthrow of Aristide although he was one of the soldiers that was invited to the Academy in Port-au-Prince. He said that he had not worked and had no income since 2004.

80 Mendelson-Forman (2006) draws similar conclusions. Although, the DRP succeed in neutralizing FAd’H in the immediate aftermath of their demobilization (Dworken et al., 1997)

81 This is in accordance with Humphreys and Weinstein findings in Sierra Leone.
The soldiers only participated in the program because they were paid and had nothing else to do at the time. Many of them were so disappointed that they keep their hope alive. Some say that they receive a letter from the government indicating they were just being on leave for a few weeks. But, the successful reintegration was less of a goal than keeping the soldiers under control until the Haitian National Police was to take over (Dworken et al., 1997).
VII. TIES WITH COMMANDERS

This chapter examines ties between ex-FAd’H soldiers and the former command structure of FAd’H, the level of organization and leadership to sustain a self-remobilization as well as the problematic of violence. For the purpose of this research, former commanders are FAd’H members above the grade of sergeant. The command structure of Fad’H included eight officer ranks in the army; six in the air corps; and six in the navy. For enlisted personnel there were eight grades in the army, seven in the air corps and five in the navy.\(^{82}\) The goal of this chapter is to determine whether former commanders exert enough influence over demobilized soldiers to initiate, enable, implement and sustain a remobilization of former soldiers without legal authority of the government\(^{83}\).

VII.1 Personal Contacts with Former Commanders

In my analysis, ties with former commanders were coded as strong, weak and no ties. The general pattern of relationship tends toward ‘weak ties’ and ‘no ties’. Interviewees generally deny maintaining formal ties with their former commanders. They claim they do not really know where the former commanders are or what they do. They say that those they encounter are usually those who are struggling and those they do not see are usually working in Port-au-Prince or have left the country.

**Interviewer:** Do you maintain any kind of relations with former FAd’H commanders?

**Participant:** They are all over the world. Most of the commanders have left the country...They left. Some of them work for security companies as supervisors. All the G3, G4, G7 working in the banks are former FAd’H

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\(^{83}\) This understanding of leadership is consistent with the LAMPE theory of organizational leadership of Kenneth Mackenzie (2005)
officers. Some of them also work in the presidential palace and phone companies such as Haitel or Voila.
P31

No interviewees admit to have relied on their former commanders for economic support at any moment since demobilization. When probed, they say that they do not have that type of dealings with the former hierarchy of FAd’H.

**Interviewer**: Do you have any personal or close relationships with former FAd’H commanders? For instance, if you are facing some hardships; let’s say, you can’t afford your children school tuition. Would you reach them out to a former commander for help?

**Participant**: I do not do anything like that. I would rather call my cousin (who lives in the USA) instead of calling my former commanders.

**Interviewer**: Has any commander ever helped out financially?

**Participant**: No. It has never happened. And it’s better like that.ii

Instead, FAd’H soldiers report that their relationship is limited to formal greetings. They did not suggest any type of paternalism, loyalty or mentorship between them and their former commanders. This is not to say that former soldiers do not acknowledge their former commanders. For the most part, they still respect the hierarchy and ranks of their former leaders.

**Interviewer**: Let’s say a former captain from FAD’H shows up here, would you greet him accordingly?

**Participant**: Yes, I will salute him as a captain

**Interviewer**: Even if it is Cedras?

**Participant**: Yes, I have to salute him.a

Despite their acknowledging the former hierarchy, there is strong animosity towards the leaders directly involved in the events preceeding the dismantlement of FAd’H. They blame those leaders for leading Fad’H towards its demise.

**Interviewer**: If some commanders like (general) Cedras or colonel Biambi summon all former soldiers to a meeting, what would you do?

**Participant**: Cedras has not returned to Haiti… If he did, we would take him down
Interviewer: How about (general) Duperval?
Participant: No, Colonel Josaphat is the only one who has always stood up with us. Cedras, Biambi, (colonel) Michel Francois... are not welcome. We do not have anything against Regala, though.
Interviewer: Is (General) Namphy still alive?
Participant: Yes, he is living in Dominican Republic. He has never returned either. iv

VII.2 Leadership

This section addresses the role of former commanders in directing the actions of demobilize soldiers. I asked demobilized soldiers to describe the involvement of former commanders in their protests and other activities. They all say that former commanders do not take any significant part in their efforts to restore FAd’H. I interviewed many soldiers who claimed to have led demonstrations, press events and rebellions. Some organizers say that they usually inform former commanders, but former commanders prefer to stay away from any type of political activities with them. The few officers who accompany FAd’H in their movements are low-level officers, and they rarely lead. Newspaper reports confirm that former commanders rarely show up in public with former soldiers. And when they do it, it is only as spectators rather than participants.84

It is not that former commanders are excluded. Soldiers regret that former their commanders take a back seat in publicly defending former soldiers (except for a few politicians). For example, soldiers blame former colonel Joseph Jeudy for the slow and irregular distribution of the indemnity the government approved for them in 2004.

Interviewer: How about the armed rebellion of Ravix Remissainthe), were any high level commanders involved?
Participant: Ravix called himself colonel, but he was just a sergeant...Many of us agreed with the rebellion, but we did not fully support him. I did not support him. I did not agree with this methodss... I do not know him as a General, I could not follow him. He was not an educated person. He just auto proclaimed himself General. Most of us did not follow his lead.

Interviewer: Do not you believe that some officers were following him?
Participant: Some of them were with him, mostly the ones looking to make easy money... like Lieutenant Apollon and some others... but there were no high ranking officers. I did not participate because I had the feeling that it was not going to work out.

Interviewees offer many reasons to explain the withdrawal of former FAd’H commanders from leading the political activities of former soldiers. Some interviewees say that commanders are afraid of being the target of government reprisals and pro-government gangs (chimeres.).

According to a participant, a former low-level officer (adjudant) who was involved with organizing the Deroncerai group in 1996 was arrested and killed in police custody. Former general and president Prosper Avril (1988-1990) was arrested and incarcerated without due process for three years between 2001 and 2004 under the accusations of plotting a coup d’etat. He was only released after Aristide was forced out of office despite many court orders to free him. Due to their high profile, any former commander leading or organizing former soldiers would have attracted the attention of the police and pro-government gangs (chimeres).

85 About 50 ex-FAd’H were arrested on charges of subversive activities against the government in 1996 (Political Violence and State Protection since Aristide's Return. Accessed online on 3/17/2012 at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IRBC,COUNTRYREP,HTI,,3ae6a867c,0.html)

The withdrawal of the former leaders could also be due to different class interests between former commanders and the soldiers. It is important here to highlight the social make-up of former officers of FAd’H and the soldiers. Commanders generally did not come through the ranks as soldiers, except for a few sous-officers (low level officers). While soldiers rarely complete high school before enrolling, the officers were usually recruited among high school graduates through a competition (corrupted by nepotism). The training for soldiers was usually completed in six months (at the camp d’application) while the training for the officer usually lasted 3 years at school of officers (academie militaire). Hence, the class of officers was traditionally from the traditional dominant classes of Haiti in contrast to soldier classes were from the people. This is why one participant thought that FAd’H deserved to be dismantled:

In my opinion, it was a good thing that Fad’H was dismantled. There were discrimination between high ranking officers and soldiers. What kind of discrimination I am talking about? High-ranking officers were well paid, they had plenty to eat, and they were living a glamorous life while soldiers could not make ends meet. They were using the soldiers for their own profits. Can you believe 40% of the national budget was allocated to Fad’H, and a soldier was not paid more than 300.00 Haitian dollars a month It was unacceptable, that is the reason why I said it was a good thing it was dismantled. (P28) "

Another participant made the following statement in regards to his relation with former commanders (P20:7)

Most of them are living outside of the country. Some of them are part of the government, when we see them, we salute them." "

The same social distance that existed during active military service continues after demobilization. Soldiers told me that the socio-economic cleavage has not closed. The following is a statement related to this issue:
There was a rule that soldiers do not socialize with officers. There were not the same rank, thus there were no relationships. P31:16

The dearth of support from former commanders is evident in the leadership of the different attempts by ex-FAd’H to defend their interests. In general, their movements are headed by people no higher than sergeants. During their activities, demobilized soldiers usurped officer titles like colonel even though they did not reach those ranks during their service. I asked a former rebel leader about these titles. He said that the title reflects his de facto position because higher ranked officers were not available to lead them. Hence, a sergeant in charge of a department would be designated as a colonel. Even a former (fired) sergeant like Ravix Remissainthe called himself colonel Remissainthe during the 2004 events.

In the face of the poor management of such events, it is unlikely that former commanders have planned these events. For example, in 2008 some soldiers invaded a former barrack in Cap-Haïtien and barricaded themselves there. According to interviewees (including a leader of the group), their intention was to attract public sympathy and force the government to settle. But, they quickly ran out of food and water because they did not factor these items as necessary to sustain a siege and defend the takeover.

VII.3 The Rhetoric of Organization

Since the demobilization of FAd’H in 1994, commentators, bloggers and newspapers have suggested the existence of some formal organizations dedicated to defend the interests of FAd’H. But in Cap-Haïtien, most interviewees deny relationships with a formal political party of

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a community organization. They resort to the argument that it is inconsistent with being a soldier. Even when I use multiple understandings of the concept of community organization, they reject all affiliations. They do not even see their collective efforts in favor of remobilization of FAd’H as evidence of themselves participating in organization.

A possible origin of this dismissal of the idea of organization may be FAd’H own’s history with political organizations and ‘oganizasyon popile’ (grassroots organization). Throughout the history of Haiti, these organizations were often the targets of FAd’H repressions. FAd’H was responsible for the assassination of many political leaders and human rights activists.89 Belonging to an organization is like something derogatory and vulgar. “Nou pa nan bagay konsa” is a common response.90 They even say that they were not aware of the existence of the “Rassemblement des militaires révoqués sans motifs” that was so present in the news media after the demobilization.

Regardless of their denial, further analysis provides evidence that FAd’H soldiers are involved in some sort of network or fraternity whose goal is linked to the reinstatement of FAd’H. I looked beyond what interviewees said about their own involvement with organization. Specifically, I looked for evidence of patterns of social interaction. For example, I analyzed ties among soldiers to see how they interact with each other. These ties are facilitated through working at the same place. In Cap-Haitien, most FAd'H who held a fulltime employment works with another FAd’H. At the prison of Cap-Haitien, 8 corrections officers are ex-FAd’H. At the prison of Grande Rivière du Nord, the warden, the record keeper and many other correctional staff are ex-FAd’H. The same trend was found at the civil prisons of Port-au-Prince, Fort-

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89 The US state department is one of many organization to report the involvement of FAd'H in human rights abuse. For more, please see: http, accessed on 4/2/2012.

90 My translation: “we do not get involved in this type of business”.

Liberté, Les Cayes and Anse-a-Veau. At the Central Bank of Cap-Haitien, interviewees told me that the security of the bank is almost entirely assigned to ex-FAd’H. It even seems that most security companies regroup clusters of ex-FAd’H in their staff. Regardless, no FAd’H soldier was shy about his relations with other FAd’H soldiers.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that soldiers have been able to stay on message and displaying collective actions without some level or organization. For example, the takeover of the barracks Cap-Haitien in 2008, the yearly military parades of November 18 to celebrate the FAd’H day, the press conferences and the armed uprisings of 2003-2005 are just a few collective efforts aiming at satisfying the collective claims of ex-Fad’H soldiers. A participant in Cap-Haitien told me of a group meeting every week in the neighborhood of Haut du Cap to discuss FAd’H matters. I asked him for the name of the organization. All he would say is the generic term “oganizasyon milite demobilize” (organization of demobilized soldiers).

Every interviewee acknowledges some involvement in organized actions to reinstate FAd’H. They acknowledge the existence of a network of communication whereby getting a hold of all of them is as easy as getting a hold of one of them (“depi youn konnen, tout konnen”). This may be due to the existence of an informal network of communication, but may also point to them identifying themselves as being legally constituted group which needs no further organizing. For example, in Cap-Haitien, a participant told me of a group that meets every week in the neighborhood of Haut-du-Cap to discuss issues related to FAd’H. Many interviewees told me about active groups of soldiers in Ouanaminthe, Les Cayes, and Hinche. And recently (2012), many groups of individuals claiming to be demobilized soldiers invaded former FAd’H barracks in anticipation of the government ordering their remobilization (Radio Metropole, 11 May 2010).
In Port-au-Prince, interviewees were more willing to talk about their involvement in political parties and community organizations. An interviewee admits to have been involved in organized politics before the dismantlement of FAd’H. He claims to have learnt from reading Churchill that a soldier who was not politically active was not patriotic. He was a partisan of the Lavalas Party and supporter of Aristide. In 1997, another interviewee in Port-au-Prince was jailed without a trial for three years for his involvement with a political party of the opposition.91 A third soldier admits to have financially supported the rebels of 2004 while saying that he would have joined them if he could. One participant even claimed to have been the commander of the Southern region during the rebellion of 1994. It was from interviewees in Port-au-Prince that I learned about the group of Ruelle Nazon. An interview even admitted to have been a rebel commander in 2004

Beyond the discourse of interviewees, media reports suggest the existence organized groups of FAd’H scattered throughout the country. A YouTube search (keyword: forces armées d’Haiti) shows multiple videos, images, testimonies and reports regarding former FAd’H training, marching and making their grievances heard.92 For example, a recent organization named CONAMID (National Coordination of Demobilized Military) marched in Port-au-Prince in September 2011 to call for the reinstatement of FAd’H. CONAMID’s spokesperson, Jean Fednel Falaise, told the media that they were not rebels, but soldiers waiting for orders from the president to remobilize.93 In his blog, Jeb Sprague reports that FAd’H soldiers maintain training

91 A soldier from PAP (who was not included in the interviewees because he deserted in 1992) claimed to have deserted because he supported the Lavalas regime while President Aristide was in exile. He claims to be a support of RDNP, the political party which finishes runner-up in the presidential elections of 2011
camps throughout the country.\textsuperscript{94} The article includes photos and a video from the television network Aljazeera documenting a training camp in the Port-au-Prince area (at Lambi 12 Grande Saline).

\textbf{VII.4 The Logic of Violence}

Interviewees admit to contribute in a number of ways to efforts to force the government into a settlement. Some contribute with money, logistics, leadership, transportation and communication. However, when it comes to armed rebellion, only one soldier admits to have been involved. And they all deny owning weapons. While not admitting to own weapons, interviewee did not think it was illegal for them to have a weapon (considering that they still think they are soldiers). I

In Cap-Haitien, one solider told me (with the digital recorder off) that soldiers buried their weapons in 1994 instead of turning them for DDR. He added that they could dig them out anytime if needs be. This soldier did not say whether he himself owned a personal weapon, although he carried a company handgun for his security job. I tried to verify this information with subsequent interviewees, but they all claimed it was not true. In Port-au-Prince, a self-admitted commander of rebels told me FAd’H can have as many weapons as they want without committing a crime because the Haitian Constitution authorizes them to have weapons. The same


information was more or less deducted from recent newspapers reporting regarding the threat of FAd’H.  

This denial of participation in violence against the state seems inconsistent to the apparent role of FAd’H in the overthrowing of Aristide in 2004. Unless the participation of former soldiers in armed rebellion has been overstated! According to internal reports from the CNDDR and MINUSTAH, of the estimated 1500 armed rebels of 2004, only a third were part of FAd’H in 1994. The others were either revoked FAd’H and policemen or civilians. These include the three leaders Guy Philippe (revoked police officer), Jodel Chamblain (revoked soldier and former tonton makouts) and Ravix Remissainthe (revoked FAd’H sergeant). About the same proportion was reported for the occupation of the former prison of Cap-Haiti in 2008. Even those who march in favor of remobilization are said to be mostly civilians. That is why my interviewees showed up with their military as authentification of their identity.

As for their support for an armed rebellion, only two participants express that an armed rebellion could be a good strategy to bring Fad’H back or to force the government into a settlement.

We do not want to pressure the government to bring FAd’H back. If we were to pressure them, we would have used armed violence. Finding weapons would be easy because we can disarm police officers and take their weapons. P31

Like the majority of interviewees, P31 was not swayed that armed violence was a good alternative to advance the collective interests of soldiers in the current context (2010). He feared

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96 CNDDR is Haiti’s National Commission for DDR.
that an armed rebellion and spoiling behavior would cause bloodsheds in the country and result in their own demise.

**Interviewer:** If there is a call for an uprising, do you think the former soldiers would show up?

**Participant 31:** They would not come out like that. They do not know what the call is all about; they might think it is an ambush. Besides, with all the UN forces in Haiti now, it would be a big defeat for us. There is no possible uprising for now, it is just too risky. P31

Participant 10 (P10) expressed the same cautions in the following statement:

We would be defeated if we were to initiate an uprising. We could have initiated some kind of revolt a long time ago, but we prefer not to do so. We believe in God, and we strongly believe Justice will be served one day. Having an uprising now would result in killing our own brothers and sisters. P10

In final analysis, FA’d’H soldiers preferred a political solution to their grievances. This is a tactical decision dictated by the reality of UN troops on the grounds. After the military defeats of all their violent uprisings since 2004, many understand that violence is not the best option for their grievances. Indeed, many FA’d’H soldiers suggest they could have rebelled against the government had it not been for the presence of the UN. And the UN seems to be aware of this fact when a UN senior security personnel told me that the situation was not calm, but under control.

**VII.5 Summary: Broken Ties and Reintegration**

This chapter shows that demobilized soldiers have not maintained significant ties with their former commanders. They indicate a disinterest on the part of former commanders to lead or help soldiers with their grievances. There is no evidence of commanders being involved in

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97 Since 2004, the UN have maintained a peacekeeping force of 8000 to 12000 military and police officers in Haiti (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml)
leading or organizing soldiers. Indeed, it seems that commanders have been more successful in their own reintegration as civilians, considering their higher education level and wider social capital. They may have moved on to other occupations, including successful careers in politics and public administration (Danny Toussaint, Youri Latortue, Rodolphe, Joazil Roland Chavannes, Himler Rebu, Mario Andresol, Joseph Jeudy etc…). But, this rupture of the ties between former commanders and demobilized soldiers has not prevented soldiers from developing a new leadership and carry on promoting their interests. They do so through a network of communication, a certain level of organization and strong sense of identity.

With respect to the DDR model, this finding challenges the assumption that the leadership of former commanders is necessary for an armed group to persist following DDR. This finding is somewhat parallel to findings in the gang literature which shows that the incapacitation of leaders (through death, incarceration, mature-out) does not end institutionalized gangs (Hagedorn, 2008). What often happens is a fragmentation of the armed gang (or armed group), leading to the emergence of new leaders and internal conflicts.

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iMen sa ou pa gen trop relasyon ak neg yo kounye’a la ?
- Neg telman epapiye. Anpil nan yo lotbo dlo. yo pati....voye pran yo nan gran chef la yo kelke grenn ki la a ou ...genyen ki nan konpayi sekririte. Genyen ki sipevize. le w paret labank tout neg ou we ki nan g3, g4, g7, se ansyen ofisye. gen nan pale. Pi fo nan neg sa yo nan tout konpayi pou asire sekririte. Le w paret nan Haitel, nan Voila.

iiOu menm pesonelman, eske w gen bon relasyon avek moun sa yo ? Si pa egzanp ou bezwen o si pa egzanp ou gen on pwoblem la-a, pitit ou pa ka al lekol, eske jan de moun sa yo ap ede w ?
- Monche, sa se on bagay m pa fe.kote ke m ta rele yon kouzen mwen di l konsa men tel bagay, men m pa adrese yo m’te nan lame ou te nan pozisyon
Pa vreman gen nan neg, kom si m ta di w, ki tcheke avek ou ?
- Non yo pa tcheke avek m pase sa pa enterese m tou pou yo tcheke ave’m. Pase m’pa viv konsa.
iii Ann di ke yon ansyen kapitenn paret la ; a ou konnen se yon kapitenn misye ye, eske w’ap salye’ l?
  - Wi. M sipoze salye l militerman ?
Cedras paret la-a w ap salye?
  - M sipoze salye l

iv Si pa egzanp, neg yo ta mete yon kominike. Ann di Cedras, Biambi, ansyen kolonel yo ansyen neg sa yo. Yo ta mete yon kominike yo di yo bezwen tout ansyen milite pou yo ransanble.
  - Cedras li menm pa janm met pyel nan peyi a menm, depi anle neg yo tap keyi l
An’n di Duperval neg sa yo ?
  - non non neg sa yo kolonel Josaphat, sel misye se sel neg vre ki toujou solide sel kolonel Josaphat. Apre sa, Cedras, Biambi neg sa yo paret la a w’ap tande Michel Francois...yo ap kouri deye neg sa yo. Regala ou wi nou pa gen pwoblem ak neg sa yo
Namphy la toujou?
  - wi li ...... Sendomeng. Li pa nan bagay sa yo neg pa janm vin isi li menm.
Avril?
  - Avril pa kapab neg sa yo pa kapab.
Ou vle di’ m gen nan neg yo si yo ta di tout neg rasanble on kote neg ap ale, men gen nan neg yo neg pa ap fe on pa ?
  - non yo pa ap fe pa

v Men nan mouvman Ravix la, eske te gen neg ki pi wo?

Ou pa kwe te gen ofisye ki te avek misye bagay sa yo ?
  - Non men non men bon te gen kek ofisye anba kek adjidan bagay ki deye fe ti kob ki avek misye te gen lyetnan Apollon te gen on paket lot ti ofisye men wograde pat nan bagay konsa. Pat nan bagay misye menn pat nan bagay mysye a paske neg yo te konnen bagay la pap rive nulle part bagay la pap rive nulle part.” (P31)
- Pou mwen menm, et tant que dans le fond, li byen
demantle. Te gen yon sot de diskriminazyon entre les
hauts grades et enrolles jusqu’aux derniers soldats.
Discriminasyon nan ki sans ? neg la li menm lap byen viv,
l ap byen touche l ap byen fonksyone. Enrole ya li menm l
ap touche yon pitans monnen. Epi l kreye yon mwayen li
sanse li zonbifye w... oubyen li animilize enrole a epi li
menm pou l ka tire pwofi. Paske koman ou trouve w on
enstitisyon militer ki te absobe 40% nan bidje leta a,
jisko denye solda paka touche 300 dola le mwa ? sa se yon
krim kont limanite..., wi li pa mal demantle.

E ansyem chef yo ki relasyon ou gen ansanm avek yo? -
Ansyen chef yo relasyon nou gen ansanm avek yo kom gen
anpil nan yo se moun ki te gen viza y o ye, apre
Demobilizasyon lame a gen nan yo ki pati e gen nan yo kap
travay nan gouveman an tou. Le nou jwenn yo, nou toujou
salye yo tou.

Men lame a te gen yon bagay ladan l. Solda pa annafe ak
ofisy paske ofisy a depi... li lwen li pa jan nan ...ave w...
kole neg sa yo pase neg la li sou tet ou epi li pa zanmi
w.

- Nou menm milte nou pa nan fose gouveman si nou tap fose
gouveman bagay la tap ....Nou tap pran nou tap pran
lezam. Pran lezam on moman la a ou ka ame. Ou pa bezwen
zam pou ame non. Ou ka dezame on polisy rapid la, epi
ak on zam nan men w epi tout zam wap fe zam.

Men si yon le, yo di tout nèg rasanble. Ann di tout nèg pran
lezam, nou pral fe on mouvman. Si yo di yon bagay bouch an
bouch?
- Neg yo pap kouri ale. Yo pap kouri ale pote tet yo al nan
bouchri konsa tou. Pou neg ki pral fe mouvman epi san w
pa konn pye mouvman ak tet li, ou pa konn de ki fason neg
la pral fe mouvman-an. Kounye’a, yon neg, ann pran egzanp
blan-an nan peyi a ak tout gwo zam le yo pap di w anyen
yo pap bay peyi-a sekirite le’w fe on mouvman yo ap vle
detouen mouvman pase yo se milite ou se milite ou ye
tou. Taktikman sa yo konnen-an, ou konnen’l tou. Eske w
konprann kounye a ou pa ka al fe on mouvman ak neg yo la.
Sinon, w’ap echwe. Cedras paret la a li di li pral fe on
mouvman tout neg ap boude’l Cedras ak mouvman’l. men ki mouvman posib?

- Pran lezam se nou ki pral tonbe, piti yo ki pral tonbe. Gen on seri de bagay si nou tap pran lezam nou ta pran lontan. Men nou konnen gen on bondye nan syel jou ou ta gen on gouvenman kap di nou men ti kob nou an ke fre nou mouri memm se piti ou ap jwen li kanmem paske pran lezam se pwop fre nou ki mal ke nou memm se yo ki prale tonbe.(P10)
VIII. STAKE IN THE PROCESS

According to the theoretical assumptions of the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) model, demobilized combatants are unlikely to be spoilers if they are committed to the success of peace and the ongoing political process (Stedman, 1997; Zahar, 2003). In other words, spoiling behavior is reduced when former soldiers have something at stake in the post DDR reality of the country.\textsuperscript{98} In 2005, International Crisis Group identified FAd’H as one of the group standing to benefit from “fomenting violence, insecurity and political instability”. This assertion continues to be relevant considering the history of FAd’H as a power broker in Haiti and the weaknesses of the Haitian National Police as the only state apparatus of security in Haiti.

Essentially, this chapter addresses the issue of political reintegration of demobilized FAd’H soldiers. I account for this variable by using opinions of participants regarding their military status, their political grievances and their engagement in the political process I look for statements that express whether soldiers believe that the current political process offers them a legitimate outlet to air their demands. In sum, I will show how soldiers military outlook, their investment in the current political process affect their perceptions and the likelihood of spoiling behaviors.

\textsuperscript{98} For Stedman, spoilers are “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts at achieving it (Stedman, 1997:5).
VIII.1 Military Outlook

This section presents soldiers’ outlook about their military career and perceptions of themselves since demobilization. I coded military outlook for statements indicating interests in remobilization. Three categories were considered for this variable: strong, neutral and weak.

Chart 2: military outlook

Weak military outlook was coded for statements indicating marginal or negative interests in remobilization. When asked whether they would remobilize if Fad’H were legally remobilized, only two (2) interviewees were definitive that they would not remobilized. They fully understood what reintegration entailed and provided a rationale for their responses. For example, an interviewee in Cap-Haitien said that he moved on and would not give up his civilian life for a return to FAd’H.

I will always consider myself a soldier... Even though I am reintegrated as civilian, I will always be a soldier. P4†

The majority of interviewees manifested a strong military outlook (18 participants). They were explicit in terms in their interests to remobilize. They express nostalgia for their military

99 Source: my data
career. They unequivocally say they would resume their career if Fad’H return and they are reactivated.

I had a great experience while serving in the military. It was a beautiful experience amazing. Serving my country was an honor. I will always have great memories of my time as a soldier. Still, I would not want my career to end the way it did. I would refer to continue my career and have a proper retirement. P29

The twelve (12) participants with neutral outlook were a bit ambivalent about pros and cons of remobilization. They include those who were working and earning a wage superior to what they earned during their service with FAd’H. There is also the issue of age for some interviewees who do not feel physically capable of undergoing rigorous military training and discipline.

In sum, sixteen years after demobilization (in 2010), the majority of interviewed soldiers maintain a strong military outlook. They cling to their military culture not only because of financial reasons, but also because FAd’H offers them a sense of identity. Every one talked about the ‘beautiful’ days of FAd’H when they feel ‘respected’ by the population "pep la respeke w". They contrast their culture with that of civilians whom they refer to as “sivil la”. They show their attachment by performing parades on patriotic holidays such as Flag’s Day (May 18th) and Vertieres day (November 18\textsuperscript{th}). Some still have their uniforms which they wear during parades and demonstrations.

Interviewer: Do you still consider yourself as a soldier?
Participant: I am not an active soldier, but I think of myself as a soldier and I will till I die.
Interviewer: What do you mean by that?
Participant: I mean I am a soldier for life. Being a soldier is something very important. I truly appreciate the fact that I was a part of it. I received a good training; it
helped have great discipline and courtesy. Additionally, I built up my experiences. P20

VIII.2 FAd’H Grievances and the Rationale of Remobilization

Regardless of their military outlook, demobilized soldiers claims clearly that “lame pa kraze” (FAd’H is not disbanded). Throughout this research and through the media, they assert that they were not fired, but placed on administrative leave. They also refer to the constitutional mandate and the role of the military in the foundation of the country to reject any argument against the need for a military in Haiti.

All interviewees portray FAd’H as guarantors of national security and of the rule of law in Haiti. All but one thinks that security can exist in the country without FAd’H. They see FAd’H as the primary force to establish and maintain security in the country. They credit MINUSTAH for the improved security situation that exists in the country, but assert that FAd’H must be restored when MINUSTAH leaves the country.

They perceive themselves as soldiers doing mostly police work such as crime prevention, crowd control, peacekeeping and public safety. This is evident in their insistence that Fad’H is needed to solve the problems of public safety in the country despite the existence of the Haitian National Police. They generally deny human rights violations committed under FAd’H and attributed all excess to the unpreparedness of the Haitian people for democratic rule. Every interviewee professed how FAd’H was efficient in maintaining law and order in Haiti. This is an example of soldiers representing themselves in a positive light, telling collective stories to make
themselves look good.\footnote{Miller and Brunson (2000) show female gang members told collective stories.} They reproduce stories that portray FAd’H as the missing link to solve all of Haiti’s problems, be it political, economic or social.\footnote{These arguments are often advanced in the media by supporters of FAd’H, including some members of the three presidential commissions which were appointed to assess the matter for the Haitian state.}

FAd’H rationale for remobilization can be found in the rapport of the three presidential commissions created to study the problematic of Fad’H. In 2004, the interim government of Francois Latortue (under president Boniface Alexandre) created “la commission citoyenne de reflexion sur le devenir de l’armee” as part of its efforts to deal with the Fad’H rebels who occupied many parts of the country after the departure of Aristide. That commission released its rapport in January 2006 with the recommendations to restore Fad’H with an initial list of about 2750 men (Le Nouvelliste, 9 January 2006). Ignoring the recommendations of that first commission and responding to public pressure, the government of Jacques E. Alexis (under President Rene Preval) created another commission in 2007 (Radio Metropole, 10 October 2007). On 6 August 2009, this commission recommended the return of a public force of military nature (AlterPresse, 6 August 2009). Finally, after promising to reinstate Fad’H during his electoral campaign, President Michel Martely created a third commission in December 2011 (Radio Metropole, 7 December 2011). Within a month, this new commission recommends that FAd’H be reinstated (Radio Metropole, 3 January 2012). All these three commissions weight the pros and cons of a military before concluding that Haiti needs a national military force.

The recommendations of the three presidential commissions have been debated widely in the Haitian media (Toussaint, 2007). Interviewees were very articulate with these arguments, particularly the arguments related to public safety, national security and the constitution. But, whatever good a reinstatement of the military could do for Haiti, when probed, interviewees
admit that their key demands are economic in nature. They want remobilization because it would lead to a regular paycheck, possibly a financial settlement for lost wages and the payment of government pensions for those who are eligible. For example, one soldier says that if they pay him and give him his pension, they can recruit new soldiers to make a new FAd’H.

**Interviewer:** What if they decide to create a new Fad’H, but without recalling demobilized soldiers?

**Participant:** I think they would have to give us some sort of compensation first. The government owes us money... not only they would have to pay us back salaries, they would have to give us a retirement paycheck. P10

I think that the enthusiasm of demobilized soldiers to participate in my research was a result of some of them thinking the word reintegration in the presentation of my research refers to reintegration of ex-FAd’H into a new FAd’H. This enthusiasm did not diminish even after explaining the purpose of the research and the fact that the researcher has no relation with any project to reinstate FAd’H. Even a soldier who said that he was reintegrated claims that he would remobilize if FAd’H is reinstated.

**Interviewer:** Do you feel that you have been reintegrated as a civilian

**Participant:** Yes, I have. I do not have a choice. However, if I would have been call one day, I would go. I do not forget who I am. P33

**VIII.3 The Democratic Process**

This section examines the stake of FAd’H soldiers in the current political process in Haiti. I will analyze the legacy of authoritarian attitudes toward democratic governance and its bearing on their stake in the political process. This includes their commitment to democracy,
their perspectives on political parties and the electoral process, and the institutions of rules of law such as the police.

VIII. 3.1 The Authoritarian Legacy of FAd’H

This section addresses whether FAd’H see the current process in Haiti as a legitimate outlet to address their political grievances. I use the concept of legitimacy in its weberian sense, referring to an essential element of state domination (Weber, 1919/1947). An entity is said to be legitimate when its authority is generally accepted by those who are subject to it. Accordingly, illegitimate domination produces coercive power, relying on fear and the use of force to produce obedience. When applied to nation-state, illegitimate power often produces authoritarian regimes that rely heavily on state violence to maintain power.

In Haiti, political domination has mostly been authoritarian with glimpses of liberalism (Turnier, 1990) Most Haitian governments were issued from coup d’etat or fraudulent elections organized by the military. Prior to the American occupation (1915-1934), 25 of the 26 Haitian heads of states were military officers. After the occupation, presidents could usually claim electoral legitimacy even though these elections involved very few voters and were generally arranged by FAd’H. It was Duvalier who stopped the election cycle in 1963 when he proclaimed himself president for life. Under the Duvalier authoritarian regime, all Fad’Hofficers became allies of the regime despite the creation of the tontons makouts militia by Duvalier. After the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier, the junta that replaced him was made up loyalists to Duvalier. They maneuvered to prevent elections and clung to power for five years until the inauguration of Aristide in February 1991.

By the time of the coup d’etat against Aristide in September 1991, FAd’H could no longer publicly reject democracy as an appropriate regime for Haiti. Instead, they attempt to
appropriate the discourse of democracy by presenting themselves as saviors of democracy. They claimed that the coup d’état was performed to protect democracy because the elected government of Aristide had lost legitimacy for allegedly turning authoritarian. They performed a coup d’état, but they did not officially take over the government. They appointed civilians to run the interim government according to the constitution and claimed they would hold presidential elections within 90 days (which they never did). They even organized parliamentary elections in 1993. In summary, the military leaders claim to believe in democracy and elections even when their actions were authoritarian.

During my interviews, President Rene Preval was in the last year of his (second) five-year term. He was the prime minister of Aristide at the time of the coup d’état of 1991. He was elected president in the 2006 presidential election with about 50 percent of the votes. In general, interviewees did not question the electoral legitimacy of his government. However, they see the government of Preval as inefficient and corrupt. They were very critical of the regime, even more following the government’s response to the earthquake of January 12, 2010.

One interviewee interprets legitimacy in terms of keeping electoral promises. Although he voted, he thinks the president and the congress was not legitimate because they did not reinstate FAd’H or responded to the need of the Haitian people. This may due to the fact that the Preval regime did not support or address his most important grievances such as the return of FAd’H and the payments of benefits or back pay.

While they did not question the legitimacy of Preval, interviewees were mostly supportive of the autocratic regime of Duvalier, which they evoke with nostalgia. They also think that Haiti was better under the military regimes of Namphy, Avril and Cedras. I probed the question of support for democracy by asking them which political regime they would have preferred for
Haiti among socialism, communism, liberal democracy, duvalierism, militarism, lavalas. They all expressed strong opposition to communism arguing that it was the enemy of the USA and therefore theirs.\footnote{Many FAd’H say that FAd’H was the child of the USA and would do whatever the USA orders, including reinstatement or demobilization. While justifying FAd’H with nationalist arguments, most soldiers explicitly admit that FAD’H was subordinate to the US military. A soldier says that he regularly saw Haitian military officers given reports to their US counterparts.}

**Interviewer:** Which political regime do you think will favor FAd’H?

**Participant:** I believe the right sector, the Duvalierist regime would be the best for Fad’H. We already know that regime. They know how important the military is for Haiti.

In sum, participants did not fundamentally question the legitimacy of the civilian government of Preval. They criticized the government in a very partisan way since the government did not address to their most outstanding grievances. FAd’H soldiers did not show any optimism or enthusiasm about the future of the country or their own future. This is not to say that they give up on a reinstatement of FAd’H. It’s just that the government of Preval did not show any interest in advancing their interests. Indeed, they believe that the Haitian people are nostalgic of FAd’H strong stance on public safety and would mostly support a reinstatement of FAd’H to deal with crimes.\footnote{The determination of soldiers for a reinstatement of FAd’H was bolstered after the election of Michel Martelly in 2011. They stepped up their rhetoric for remobilization and began training in uniforms at different locations. This an ongoing headlines in Haitian news (Radio Metropole Archives. Accessed online on 4/12/2012 @ http://www.metropolehaiti.com/metropole/archive.php)} Although a recent survey of 2,800 Haitian households shows that 95\% of Haitians do not wish a return of FAd’H (Muggah, 2011).

VIII.3.2 Commitment to Democracy

On 29 March 1987, a year after the departure of Duvalier, the Haitian people voted a new constitution which establishes the framework of a democratic regime in Haiti. One of the

\footnote{Many FAd’H say that FAd’H was the child of the USA and would do whatever the USA orders, including reinstatement or demobilization. While justifying FAd’H with nationalist arguments, most soldiers explicitly admit that FAD’H was subordinate to the US military. A soldier says that he regularly saw Haitian military officers given reports to their US counterparts.}

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main opponents to the materialization of democracy in Haiti was FAd’H. Between 1986 and 1994, FAd’H used violence, coup d’etat and fraudulent elections to obstruct the democratic process. For those who supported the dismantlement of FAd’H, the main reason was that FAd’H was unable to tolerate democratic governance. Since there was no peace agreement or power sharing scheme with demobilized members of Fad’H, I expected little support for democracy among interviewees.

My participants were very cautious when talking about democracy. A majority of participants (16) accepted democracy as the best form of government, but they did not believe that Haiti was a democratic country. They did not think that it was an appropriate political regime for Haiti. One soldier said that Haitians need two things in life: manje ak baton (food and stick). That's how they assume that the Fad’H was able to maintain law and order under their regime. In their words, a largely illiterate population cannot sustain a democratic regime.

**Interviewer:** What do you think about democracy?

**Participant:** Democracy does not mean you can do whatever you want. You have to behave according to the rules. It does not mean you can say whatever you want to whoever you want.

**Interviewer:** Do you think democracy is good for Haiti?

**Participant:** I would say Haiti is not ready for democracy.

**Interviewer:** When do you think Haiti will be ready for democracy?

**Participant:** Haiti will be ready when all or the majority of its citizens can write and read. Then, they will understand what democracy. vii

Interviewees claim that the Preval/Aristide lavalas regime did not lead the country to democratic governance as they promised. No interviewee embraced Lavalas, associating it with
the regime of the urban gangs (chimeres). They blamed democracy for every social evil striking the country. Their understanding of democracy is that of lawlessness and social disorders.

VIII.3.3 Political Parties

The period of democratic transitions in Haiti (1986-present) has seen the emergence of a number of political parties, community associations, trade unions and human rights organizations. To some extent, all these organizations claim a stake in the political process through their active participation. Whileguaranteng these rights to civilians, articles 265 and 267 of the Haitian constitution of 1987 prohibits active members of FAd’H from “being part of any political group or party” and establishes that they “must observe strict neutrality” with regards to the process. These articles were intended to prevent FAd’H from acting as a power broker during elections and other political events. Once detached from the institution, ex-FAd’H soldiers or officers regain the same political rights as civilians.

Few interviewees claimed significant participation in politics. They said a soldier should not be (legally) involved in politics. During my interviews in Cap-Haitien, none of the 26 participants admitted to belong to a political party. Most said that soldiers should be apolitical as stated in the constitution.

Most interviewees contend that FAd’H should have never been involved in coup d’etat or political maneuvering. Generally, interviewees understand that FAd’H should not be governing Haiti as it did in the past. But, some of them insist on a role for the military in governing Haiti. Referring to the historical precedence of the military to the Haitian state, an interviewee said that

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104 Chimeres are urban armed gangs loyal to Aristide and often implicated in violence of Aristide opponents.
Haiti cannot exist without the military. Hence, some interviewees suggest it should be a requirements for all Haitian presidents to have a military background.

Some responses regarding democratic governance reflect a cynicism common among all Haitians. Without comparative data, it is difficult to say that former soldiers are more or less favorable to democratic governance. Here again the rhetoric does not always reflect the actions of participants. For example, P31 runs a neighborhood association in Port-au-Prince. He clearly expresses that the goals of the organization is community development. His organization involves advocating and lobbying in favor of development projects for the community. But, he claims that he does not believe in democracy or trust the government. He also says that he does not believe that it would make a difference whether the military or civilians run the country. In sum, the same soldier who shows so much cynicism towards the democratic process is also very much involved in the process.

VIII.3.4 Elections

Between the dismantlement of FAd’H and the time of the interviews, there were three presidential elections and many more legislative elections. Since elections are a critical component of the Haitian political process, participation in elections would be seen as buying in the political process according to the theoretical framework of DDR. Twelve of twenty-nine participants say that they did not vote or participate in any elections since demobilization. The extent of participation in elections varies per interviewee. Some claimed that they never voted because being a soldier or believing that the vote would not make a difference. No soldier admits either to run for offices either. I do not believe that non-participation in election was a statement against democracy or part of a concerting political strategy to spoil democracy. At least, it is not articulated as such and also the level of participation is quite elevated for some who voted in all
elections. When I insist on this issue, participants express the same apathy as non-FAd’H. In any case, the number of FAd’H is proportionally too small to make a difference in a general election in Haiti.

Even those who participated in elections do not necessarily see elections as a road to democracy. P31 participates actively in elections, but does not even believe that democracy is possible in Haiti. Both attitudes are expressed below.

**Interviewer:** What do you think of the electoral process?

**Participant:** I always cast my vote. And I am usually one of the supervisors at the poll. I only missed the elections of John Joel.

**Interviewer:** Are you a member of political party?

**Participant:** Yes, I am a member of a political party. I was with PDCH. I worked with them. I helped them during the elections in 2006.

**Interviewer:** What about community organizations?

**Participant:** Yes, I am a board member of an organization called ODDC.

**Interviewer:** Are there a lot of former soldiers who are members of an organization or political party?

**Participant:** Yes, there are...

**Interviewer:** Do you think Haiti is a democratic country?

**Participant:** Haitian people are not ready for democracy. This is a savage people. They will never be really ready for democracy. Never.

**Interviewer:** For you, democracy is not even possible?

**Participant:** There is no chance, it is not possible

**Interviewer:** What kind of regime do you think is best for Haiti? Military or civilian?

**Participant:** It does not matter which kind of regime. No one sees country when they are in office. They only see their own personal interests.P31

VIII.3.5 The Rule of Law

The Haitian National Police (PNH) was created in 1995 after the dismantlement of FAd’H. At the time of its creation, it was seen as a substitute for FAd’H although the Haitian constitution establishes the parallel existence of both institutions. The idea was to have a
professional police force that would support the rule of law in a democratic Haiti. Hence, since its creation, PNH is the only legally armed institution in Haiti. As a result, ex-FAd’H have had to deal with PNH every time they try to organize a public event because they must obtain the prior permission of the police prior to organize any event in accordance with the law.

In terms of police contact, no interviewees admit to have been involved in crimes or been arrested for such. They categorically denied knowing any colleague who was arrested for common crimes and incarcerated in Haitian prisons. But a few reported having been targeted by PNH during the Lavalas governments of Aristide and Preval (1995-2004) because of their status as FAd’H. For example, one FAd’H reported having been arrested in 1997 for attending a meeting with other former soldiers at the home of a prominent political leader. He said that he was arrested and kept in custody for three years without due process. Another participant said that the police arrested him in Cap-Haitien, only to free him once his case was brought to the local police commander.

FAd’H soldiers engage PNH every time they took arms against the state. For example, during the uprisings that preceded and followed Aristide demise in 2004, former FAd’H attacked and took over police districts throughout the country. Throughout 2004 and 2005, they occupied some towns and refused to lay down their weapons. In the areas they occupied, they forced PNH to flee and assumed police functions de facto (Beckett, 2008). UN troops (MINUSTAH) and the Haitian National Police were engaged in fighting with both the armed militias close to former president Aristide and FAd’H rebels. At least two UN soldiers were killed during crossfire.

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105 For Example, Grenn Sonnen was a former FAd’H member who later joined the armed groups sponsored by Aristide. He was allegedly responsible for the killing of several former FAd’H in 2003-2005 and was wanted by the police in connection with the February 2005 deaths of four policemen in Port-au-Prince (Radio Metropole Archives. Accessed online on 4/12/2012 @ http://www.metropolehaiti.com/metropole/archive.php)
with rebels and many more PNH officers have been killed (International Crisis Group, 2005).

Although the rebels were ultimately defeated, most of the credits went to the UN troops and not to PNH. At the time of the interviews, PNH were back in the former occupied regions, but were always seconded by the UN police and military officers.

Interviewees generally view PNH with contempt. They did not believe that PNH has the capability to secure the country and guarantee law and order. They did not reject the legitimacy of PNH because like FAd’H, PNH has a constitutional mandate. But when they compared the work of FAd’H with that of PNH, pointed to a dearth of lack of ideas and determination by PNH to tackle the problems of public safety such as hijacking, home invasion or armed robbery. They do not believe the Haitian National Police inspire enough fear in people to make them respect the law. They also claim that PNH has not secured the border with the Dominican Republic. Again, these arguments are prominent in the reports of three presidential commissions.

When it comes to joining the PNH, there is ambivalence in the opinions of FAd’H. A number of those who work for PNH were transferred from the interim police force in 1994 and are assigned to the penitentiary system. I had informal conversations with a few of these former soldiers, but I did not interview them. Some interviewees admit they would join PNH if given the opportunities. Such opportunities were offered to them in 2004 by the interim government of Latortue as part of a political settlement with those who overthrew Aristide and remained armed.

Some are those who took the PNH entry test, but failed. Regardless of their opinions, a

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106 The rebel leaders rejected the government offer, but some soldiers accepted it and took the test to enter PNH. According to WikiLeaks, about 800 soldiers were invited to the academy in 2004. About half of those soldiers eventually joined PNH (WikiLeaks Reveal: US and UN Supervised Integration of Coup-Making Ex-Soldiers into Haiti’s Police. by Jeb Sprague. Accessed online at http://www.haiti-liberte.com/archives/volume5-4/U.S.%20and%20UN%20Supervised.asp on 12/05/2011).
VIII.4 The Spoiler Question

In this section, I want to address the issue of spoiler looking at the statements and activities of Fad’H soldiers since their demobilization. When FAd’H first reemerged as armed rebels in 2003, the US secretary of state Collin Powell referred to the rebels as a “band of thugs” with whom the US government could not negotiate (Carey, 2004). Indeed he was echoing the Haitian government and many other observers who saw FAd’H as one more group of armed young men threatening the security of the country and the stability of the region (Beckett, 2008). Some people even talked of some political parties paying ex-FAd'H soldiers to create unrest. Others saw the rebels as drug traffickers who use the political turmoil they created to their own profit. Along these lines, demobilized soldiers were seen as spoilers of democracy and peace in Haiti (Muggah, 2005; International Crisis Group, 2005).

The theoretical assumptions of the spoiler argument supposed that a demobilized armed group could organize itself to engage in (illegal) actions detrimental to the peace process (Stedman, 1997; Zahar, 2003; Hoddie and Hartzell, 2010). According to the theoretical model of Stedman (1997), spoilers are defined in terms of their goals as limited, greedy and total. Limited spoilers have limited goals such as a share of power; greedy spoilers are opportunistic in their ambitions; and total spoilers want all-or-nothing. Zahar (2003) advances the perspectives of Stedman by arguing that the goals and tactics of goals can change during the course of a peace process. Tactics can change if either the objective of the group changes or the costs of actions change. It comes down to weighing the costs of spoilage activities against the benefits of peace dividends.
Most participants in my research admit to have tacitly supported the rebels of 2003-2005. With the exception of one interviewee in Port-au-Prince, they claim that they were not directly involved. They allege that the rebels were mostly civilians, former tonton makouts, and fired police officers. These individuals professed to be ex-FAd'H in order to benefit from the constitutional legitimacy of FAd'H. I verified that the leaders of the rebels (Guy Phillipe, Chamblain, Remissainthe) were indeed not part of FAd'H at the time of demobilisation. The main leader of the rebels Guy Phillipe was recruited as a FAd’H, but never served as in FAd'H due to the dismantlement. Instead, he was hired as a police officer when PNH was created. Another known leader, Louis Jodel Chamblain, was a former tonton makouts who led the paramilitary group (FRAPH) during the military regime of 1991-1994, a group which acted as the death squad of FAd'H. The other high profile leader, Ravix Remissainthe, was a FAd’H sergent who was fired prior to demobilization. Newspaper accounts and informational conversation also confirmed that most of the people in FAd’H events are civilian sympathizers, not demobilized soldiers.

Regardless of the degree of participation in anti-government efforts, Fad’H is capable of causing trouble. The name FAAd’H can provide legitimacy for armed groups with very little connection to the former institution. For example, in 2004, the rebels teamed with a rogue chimere gang ‘Lame Kanibal” in Gonaives to attacked police officers and ultimately force Aristide out. In 2012, two men in twenties were arrested and charged for illigal possessions ofa weapon. They were confirmed as being members of a group claiming to be FAd’H even though by their age, they could not have been members of Fad’H. And there is always the risk of

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individuals with special interests or non-state actors to use former soldiers and name on Fad’H to accomplish their own agenda.

From the end of 2011 to the middle of 2012, many groups claiming to be Fad’H have occupied former Fad’H barracks and took on the streets to demand the restoration of Fad’H. They wear military fatigues and are reportedly armed. They refused to lay down their weapons and go home despite multiple commands from the government. Many officials from the government have made statements indicating the rebels would be judged if they fail to follow the government order to retreat home. The rebels had become such a treat for public tranquility that UN troops had to intervene along HNP to dissuade them from continuing their movement.

The likehood of Fad’H engaging in spoiling behavior is enhanced considering the legitimacy of some of their grievances, as recognized in the rapports of the three presidential commissions that look at the issue. Soldiers generally maintained a strong military outlook and may be convinced to join smaller but more radical groups ready to engage in spoilage activities. Another risk factor is the fact that Haiti is a failed state with very weak institutions of law and order (Beckett, 2008). For example, some observers interpret the recent uprisings of soldiers as a tactic by the current government to force the international actors in Haiti (mainly the UN, USA, Canada, France) to accept its project to reinstate Fad’H by exposing a fait accompli demobilization (Chanoine and Martelly, 2012). But, President Martelly has rejected these allegations.

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111 Martelly nie son implication dans le mouvement des militaires demobilizes, Radio Metropole 3 May 2012
Despite their recent burst into the headlines, there are a few factors capable of mitigating the likelihood of spoilage activities. Here, I present seven factors linked to the cost of demobilized soldiers engaging in violent activities against the state.

1) The hope that FAdH would be reinstated. This hope is real because at least three different presidential commissions recommend that FAdH be reinstated. Current president Michel Martelly (2012) states that he is committed to restore the Haitian military during his mandate. And many members of parliament support a return of Fad’H. The current government includes a Minister of Defense (Rodolphe Joazil, a former Fad’H). Soldiers may think that reinstatement will happen sooner or later. So, they do not want to deligitimize themselves by getting embroiled in organized violence against the state.

2) The role of religion. Many FAdH claim to be actively involved in religion. They are catholics, baptists, adventists, etc… Two of them are Sunday school teachers. Three others claim to be preachers. During at least two interviews, passerbies called interviewees pastor and other religious terms. Many of them call Jesus their best friend. They credit God for their survival and express that God will reestablish FAdH in his own terms. Beyond the influence of faith, the informal social control of fellow churchgoers may discourage some from openly engaging in violence against their fellow citizens.

3) MINUSTAH. Since 2004, Minustah is the most important armed force in Haiti. Throughout, it has maintained a well equipped peacekeeping military force of at least 6,000 troops. When ex-FAd’H and their associates occupy half of the country in 2004, it was MINUSTAH who dislodged them from their stronghold. For example, in 2004, they occupied the home of deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and refused to leave until the intervention of

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MINUSTAH. The same scenario occurred in the city of Petit-Goave and many other towns occupied by ex-FAd’H throughout 2004 and 2005. Even more significant, in PAP in 2005, Minustah forces helped the HNP to track down and killed the leader of the rebels Remissainte after he was accused of involvement in the death of some PNH oficers (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2005). Many interviewees told me that they understood that they are no match for MINUSTAH forces.

4) Partial settlement. In 2004, the Haitian government agreed to pay ex-FAd’H an indemnity in three installments. Most of the interviewees have received at least one installment with some of them receiving two. Others have received nothing and none has received all three installments. These funds are managed by the "comite de gestion des militaires demobilises" and is led by former colonel Joseph Jeudi. One soldier has accused him of playing favourite with the distribution and some others say he just does not care because he is a former officer. Another source of income could be the check of 1,400 Haitian dollars (every three months) some ex-FAdH received for reporting to the police academy in 2004. Interviewees say that only those who reported received this monthly without having to perform anything for it. The fear of loosing these financial benefits may be a deterent to a violent uprising by ex-FAd’H.

5) The lack of leadership and organization. It seems that the former oficers are not involved in organizing and leading the soldiers. And I did not find evidence of any organization with national reach. Interviewees told me they would need to get the order to remobilize from the president himself before reporting to any command structure. They do not seem to have much contact with the former commanders. Without the leadership of former commanders, the organization skills of former soldiers may not be enough to engineer a national movement to harm the country.
6) **Fatigue.** So many attempts to force a resurrection of FAd’H have failed. Ex-FAdH may be tired of protesting, marching and rebellions. After the events of 2004, many of them supported the rebels hoping they would help them to remobilize. Although president Martelly openly supports a reinstatement of Fad’H, they have been forced to retreat in their recent attempts to force a restoration of Fad’H.

7) **Age and family life.** The last recruitment of soldiers was in 1989. Since the recruitment age was 18, the youngest soldiers are at least in their forties. A few are already in their 60s. Most of these have wives and children. They may be too old or involved in daily family life to get to join a rebellion. Even during the 2004-2005 rebellion, a relatively small number of ex-Fad’H took part in those attacks and occupied the public opinion. In petit-goave, there was about a hundred in the attack against the police station on 8/27/04 (Radio Métropole 30 August 2004). In Cap-Haitien, there were about 30 soldiers among the 150 people who occupied the former FAd’H barracks in July 2008. Even the group led by Guy Phillipe only comprised of about 100 people. Among the participants in those attacks were many civilians and many people who were not active at the time of demobilization.
sa. Men m ta toujou renmen we kom si se karye’m. Se on karye m pa ta renmen fini jan ke la a. Si tankou yo ta rele m pou m al kontinye karye m, pou m pran pansyon m, m tap santi m pi alez. Antouka, se on bel karye.

iii Eske w toujou konsidere tet ou kom on solda?
- bon m’pa yon solda ki aktif, ki nan sevis aktif. Men m konsidere tet an’m kom milite. e map mouri militerman.
Sa sa vle di ?
- sa vle di sa m’aprann nan, m’aprann li pou lavi. Sa lakoz m’respekte tet mw en tou. Paske lame-a se yon bagay, yon moun ki se yon manm milite se pa yon moun nenpot kijan. Kijan men mw en m se yon moun m’apresye deske m te nan lame. Lame a ban’m bon fomasyon, disiplin. Li fe’m gen koutwazi. Anpi, l bay anpil esperyans apre se sa.

iv E si yo refe lame yo deside yo pap pran ansyen milite ladan l?

v E reentegrasyon’w kom sivil, eske’w santi ou reentegre kom sivil?
- Bon, pou reentegre m’reentegre kom sivil. Paske ou pa ka goumen ak on fos pou bay fos la menm...yo rele w konye a la, m’abiye. Se menm jan avek yon blan ameriken la-a. Paske m sa m te konnen an m’pa bliye.

vi Dapre ou menm ki rejim politik ou we ki tap pi an fave lame?

vii Sa w panse de demokrasi?
- Bon, la demokrasi pa vle di mentnan ou ka fe sa ou vle. Donk w’ap aji selon prensip. La demokrasi pa vle di ou ka di moun nenpot ki mo. Si ou gen lide pou tiye moun nan ou ka tiye l ou byen ou pran moun nan ou fe nenpot ki bagay... Setadi moun nan gen volonte pou l eksprime sa l vle di men dan lod e la disiplin.
Men eske w panse se yon bagay ki bon pou Ayiti?
- Bon, ayiti poko, m ta di w li poko nan sans pou l resevwa
la demokrasi.

Ki le w panse lap nan sans lan?
- Ah bon, toutotan m ta ka di ta gen on nouvel comment
dirais-je, bon on nouvel strateji kite ka fet metnan pou
on devlopman pou tout om metnan sanse pou yo pa analfabet
pou yo konprann sa sa vle di la demokrasi donk yo pap ka
resevwa’l.(P18)

viii Dapre ou menm ki sa w panse de prosesis elektoral yo eske w
janm vote ?
- M toujou vote. M toujou nan biwo, monche. Mwen sipevize,
mandate. m konn mandate. m pa janm pa la nan eleksyon...
Sel eleksyon John Joel ki te fet la a m pat ladan apre sa
m toujou nan eleksyon.

Eske w janm patisipe nan on pati politik ou byen?
- Wi m konn patisipe nan pati politik. M’té nan PDCH. M’
travay...m’al nan eleksyon aven yo an 2006.

E oganizasyon popile yo...?
- Wi mw kontrole jeneral yon oganizasyon. M’ nan
oganizasyon ODDC.

Eske gen anpil milite ki nan oganizasyon konsa nan pati politik?
- wi genyen...

Eske w panse jan Ayiti ye kounye a li se on peyi demokratik?
- Ayisyen poko janm pre pou demokrasi a. Pou jan se on pep
ki sovaj li ye, Ayisyen poko janm pare pou demokrasi. E
pap janm gen demokrasi nan peyi d’Ayiti vre. Jame.

Ou pa kwe ke demokrasi posib ?
- Non pa gen bagay konsa, bagay konsa pa egziste

E gouvènman sivil, ki gouvènman ou ta prefere an Ayiti?
gouvènman sivil ou byen gouvènman milite?
- Bon kelkeswa gouvènman sivil la ni gouvènman milite se
toujou menm bagay yo. Neg yo se entere pesonel yo yo ap
defann. Yo pa ap defann peyi vre. Ou konprann ? Depi neg
la prezidan, ke li te sivil e milite, se entere poch li
li ap defann. Pase pa gen prezidan gouvènman la ki defann
pep ayisyen vreman. Jame. (P31)
IX. CONCLUSION

Since their demobilization in 1995, demobilized FAd’H and DDR proponents have pursued opposite objectives with regards to the status of the Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H). For the most part, the United Nations, the United States and the Haitian government engaged in a logic of reintegration of former soldiers. But, demobilized soldiers never accepted the legitimacy of their demobilization. Instead, they have embraced a logic of remobilization which in turn hampers any efforts to reintegrate them as civilians. In this conclusion, I will discuss the relevance of the Demobilization and Reintegration program through these two opposite logics: reintegration and remobilization. In the end, I will outline the policy implications of my findings.

IX.I The logic of reintegration

Throughout this research, I studied reintegration around general objectives of DDR as endorsed by United Nations policy makers and academics. Mainly, I investigated the reintegration of FAd’H by assessing three main variables of reintegration, namely employment status, ties to former commanders and stake in the political process.

My research shows that the majority FAd’H soldiers had been either unemployed or underemployed during most of the first 16 years following their demobilization (1994-2010). Few were satisfied with their current occupation and most did not even consider their occupation as a job. Mostly, demobilized soldiers work in the private security sector. Others were reintegrated in the Haitian National Police. Both security and police jobs provide them access to weapons, neutralizing an important component of DDR, the disarmament of demobilized soldiers. Working as private contractors for security companies also give them access to key
infrastructures such as airports, seaports, electrical plants, etc… Even MINUSTAH hires security officers who are demobilized FAd’H.

In terms of the relations between employment and the DRP, my research did not find any significant correlation.\(^{113}\) Although some interviewees reported to have used the skills taught during the DRP training, few have found and maintained employment using those skills. Indeed, most of my interviewees who have worked have occupations in trades not taught during the DRP.\(^{114}\) Generally, interviewees did not think that what they learn from the DRP training was useful. They complained that the training was an inadequate preparation for the job market. The data did not even show a difference between those who completed DRP and those who did not.

Interviewees did not even understand the DRP as part of their demobilization and reintegration. They thought they were learning a profession as part of the professionalization of FAd’H (a common language in UN mandate). They interpret the stipend they received as a paycheck that would keep coming to training even after they were sent home. They told me that they were not dismissed from the FAd’H because the government gave them a letter stating that they were on leave. Coupled with the fact that the Haitian constitution was never amended to remove the chapter on the armed forces, many FAd’H soldiers believe that they would eventually be recalled to the institution.

It does not appear that former commanders have maintained significant contacts or close ties with their former soldiers. Perhaps, commanders are afraid of political reprisals by the government. They have mostly been spectators of former soldiers’ efforts to make a case for the restoration of Fad’H or assert their grievances of reimbursement of payment of benefits. It is also true that some former commanders have managed to have a very successful public life after

\(^{113}\) This finding is in accordance with Humphreys and Weinstein’s findings in Sierra Leone (2005)

\(^{114}\) Mendelson-Freeman(2006) also found this same outcome
demobilization. For example, former officers Danny Toussaint, Rodolphe Joazil and Youri Latortue have become senators; another officer (Mario Andresol) became the chief of the Haitian National Police; also, a significant number of the high level officers of the Haitian National Police are former officers of the FAd’H. While some of these former officers have openly supported a reinstatement of FAd’H, there is no evidence that they have coordinated or provided leadership to any efforts by soldiers to address their grievances.

In the place of the former commanders, a new informal command structure has emerged with mostly the sergeants as the new leaders. This new leadership uses a network of communication through which strategies and messages are related (*youn konnen tout konnen*). This network is facilitated through co-employment at security companies, police and prisons. Interviewees refer the network as a form of fraternity. Former commanders have access to this network of communication. But there is no evidence of nation-wide coordinated efforts to organize demobilized soldiers.

My research shows that efforts to reintegrate FAd’H soldiers as civilians have failed to produce the desired outcome. Despite my best efforts to delineate the concept of reintegration, interviewees continued to give it the meaning of remobilization because this is the direction they hope the concept would go. This is because FAd’H soldiers do not consider themselves demobilized. They see themselves as an army in waiting of remobilization, in their words “reintegre lame” (reintegrating FAd’H).

### IX.2 The logic of remobilization

Far from being reintegrated, demobilized FAd’H soldiers continue to exert pressure on successive Haitian governments to remobilize them as soldiers. Since 2011, some of them have responded to the promise of new president Michel Martelly to restore the FAd’H by resuming
training, marches, demonstrations, camps, forced takeover of former military barracks. They are ready to return to their barracks as if nothing has changed since 1994.

From their actions and their accounts, I deduct that the risks of spoiling behavior exist. Although interviewees did not advocate for armed rebellion, they maintain a very strong military outlook. They continue to assert that their demobilization was illegal in accordance with the Haitian constitution of 1987. So far, goals remain the same as they were when the DRP program was completed. Essentially, they want remobilization, back pay for the years they were off service, and pensions.

My interviewees manifest a strong identification with the military institutions. From the ease of snowballing and their various statements of solidarity, it is clear there are close ties and communication among soldiers. They all claimed that they are proud to have been members of FAd’H. They like to say how they do things militarily. One of my first interviewees say that they is a FAd’H language that only ex-FAd’H could understand. They enhance their military identify by using contrasting it with that of the Haitian National Police. Identity may be more important to support remobilization and spoiling behavior than the influence of commanders.

Like in their media appearances, FAd’H used the interviews as a means represent theirselves collectively. They present themselves professionally and with discipline because that is the message they want to get through. They deny participating in organization or the political process because they want to be perceived as being apolitical. They all claim to be healthy because they know that only healthy bodies can be part of an army. All 26 participants in Cap-Haitien deny participation in coup d'etat or the events that overthrew Aristide because they do not want to be accused of human rights violation or as spoilers. And they all talk nice about the

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115 Retrieve online on 3/16/2012 at: http://defend.ht/politics/articles/presidential/2727-haiti-presidency-orders-end-to-occupy-army-bases-by-former-soldiers
USA because they supposed I could be an agent from the US government in the country to collect their grievances in the perspective of remobilization of FAd’H. They wanted to make sure that US president Barack Obama knows FAd’H is not hostile to the USA.\footnote{The US government does not officially support the return of FAd’H.}

There is evidence that FAd’H soldiers are organized as scattered groups whether they recognize these groups as former political organizations or just ad hoc groups. These groups are dedicated to expose the main grievances of demobilized soldiers. I do not find patterns of any organization (such as organization of demobilized soldiers and CONAMID suggest) with a national outreach. At best, the existing organizations or groups are fragmented and regional. But, their identifying with FAd’H allows them to maintain some legitimacy. Through their network, they communicate and participate in events of common interests such as my interviews, public demonstrations or trainings.

\section*{IX.3 Policy implications}

My research shows that demobilized FAd’H have maintained a military outlook for two reasons. First, they were not given a realistic opportunity to reintegrate as civilians beyond the training program of the DRP. Their pensions were not paid. The government did not reimburse their savings (Mendelson-Forman, 2006). The indemnity they were promised in 2004 is still not fully paid- including some participants claim they have not been given the first installment while some have already received two installments. Even those who joined the Haitian National Police were not allowed to transfer their time of service as a member of FAd’H for retirement purpose. And, as the poorest country in the western hemisphere, the Haitian job market offered very few opportunities to job seekers (a fact acknowledged by Dworken et al, 1997). Besides, the training provided by the DRP was in skills saturated in the market (Mendelson-Forman, 2006). In this
context, demobilized soldiers want a return of FAd’H more for economic reasons than for ideological reasons. It seems that the payment of pensions combined with a negotiated indemnity would have removed all financial prospects associated with an eventual reinstatement of FAd’H. In other words, a negotiated settlement would have discredited all claims to belonging to the institutions.

Second, the fact the constitution had not been amended to legally abolish FAd’H creates an ambiguity with respect to the intentions of the successive Haitian government\textsuperscript{117}. Title XI of the Haitian Constitution serves as the legal basis for FAd’H claims. Article 276-2 clearly defines the military career as a profession. The existence of FAd’H in the constitution not only legitimizes the speeches in favor reinstatement of FAd’H, but also fuels the hope of remobilization among former soldiers. That is why my interviewees insist they should not be called former soldiers or demobilized soldiers.

Hence, demobilized Fad’H soldiers or people claiming to be Fad’H soldiers maintain the capability to be spoilers, as long as the problem of Fad’H is not decisively addressed by stakeholders in Haiti. Without contesting the legitimacy of the elected government, my interviewees expressed skepticism regarding the legitimacy of democratic governance in Haiti and expressed nostalgia for the past authorian regimes (Duvalier, Namphy, Avril). They did not advocate violence against the government of Rene Preval only because they did not believe that the conditions on the ground favored that tactic like in 2004 when a group of Fad’H soldiers played a major role in overthrowing Aristide. In 2011, they saw an opening when President Martelly declared that he would reinstate Fad’H during his mandate. As a result, armed men in Fad’H fatigues occupied some former Fad’H barracks and marched in favor of remobilization.

\textsuperscript{117}A recent amendment of Constitution maintained FAd’H as a legal institution of the state. However, this amended version has not been made official by the president (through publication in the official journal of the country).
They refused to abandon their strongholds and remained active until May 2012 when UN troops and PNH forced them to retreat.

Therefore, I conclude that a constitutional amendment can delegitimize any political claim that FAd’H must be reinstated. Otherwise, the government should apply the recommendations of the three presidential commissions who recommend the remobilization of FAd’H rather than its abolition. This is not to endorse that demobilized soldiers and commanders should be restored in their functions. Instead, the government should negotiate a financial arrangement with FAd’H representatives in exchange of a complete repudiation of their demands and a return of all weapons.
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APPENDIX A- RECRUITMENT FLYER

University of Illinois at Chicago
Department of Criminology, Law and Justice

Avi

A tout milite demobilize Fad’H
Si ou se yon milite demolize, mwen envite ou pou patisipe nan yon rechech sou reentegrasyon milite demobilize yo. Recheche ya vle pale avek ou pou anviwon 60 minit sou eksperians ak konesans ou sou zafe reentegrasyon. Gen yon fre 250 gourdes pou kouvri depans ou fe kom transpo ak telefonn. Fre sa a sipoze kouvri lajan ou depanse pou voyaje depi lakay ou jiska kote nou ap fe entevie a, menm si ou itilize vwati prive oubyen ou pran tranpo piblik kouwe taptap, bis ak taksi. Fre sa a sipoze kouvri tou depans ou fe pou kominite pa telefonn akoz de rechech sa a.

Si ou bezwen plis enfomasyon, rele nan 1-509-3835 2887 ou 1-509-3454 9811.

To all demobilized soldiers of FAd’H
If you are a demobilized soldier of FAd’H, you are invited to participate in a research about the reintegration of demobilized soldiers. Your participation will consist of a one-hour interview about your experiences and knowledge of reintegration. You will receive 250 Gourdes as reimbursement for transportation and communication fees. These fees are expected to cover transportation costs to travel from your residence to our interview location, whether using a personal vehicle or public transportation such as tap-taps, buses or cabs. They are also expected to cover communication expenses such as phone calls related to this research.

For more information, please call 1-509 38352887 or 1-509 3454 9811
I- Consent Document

My name is Nixon Camilien. I am a graduate student in the Department of Criminology, Law and Justice at the University of Illinois at Chicago. I would like to invite you to participate in an interview for my research about the reintegration of former soldiers of the Haitian Armed Forces because of your unique experiences and knowledge. You may participate if you were demobilized as a result of the dismantlement of Haitian Armed Forces in 1994. Please do not participate if you left the army before the dismantlement or if you were integrated in the Haitian National Police.

You will be reimbursed for transportation and communication fees. The total reimbursement amount is 250 Gourdes. These fees are expected to cover transportation costs to travel from your residence to our interview location, whether using a personal vehicle or public transportation such as tap-taps, buses or cabs. They are also expected to cover communication expenses such as phone calls related to this research.

Your participation will last about one hour. Your interview will be recorded unless you object. I will also take notes while we talk. You may request a copy of your interview when we finish. You may also request that some information be omitted from the transcript. Your participation is voluntary and in good faith. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the researcher or the University of Illinois at Chicago. If you feel discomfort or wish to stop at any time during the interview, please let me know.

The risks anticipated in this research are no greater than those encountered in ordinary life. However, you may feel some discomfort after recounting something that hurt you. If this happens, please let me know if you want to stop the interview or switch to another topic. There are no direct benefits for people who participate in this research. However, your account will contribute to knowledge about demobilization and reintegration of former soldiers.

I am the only person who will know what you say. No information about you, or provided by you during this research, will be disclosed to others without your written permission, except to protect your rights or welfare or if required by law. When the results of the research are published or presented in conferences, no information will be included that could reveal your identity. The recordings and transcripts will be used in this research, but any identifying information about you will be disguised, or removed if necessary. They will be securely stored and rigorously kept confidential to prevent access by unauthorized persons.

Please provide as much information as possible for each question and do not mention your name or the names of other soldiers during the interview. However, you may choose not to answer a particular question. Be aware that I may suspend or withdraw your participation from
this research, if circumstances arise which warrant doing so. Withdrawal or suspension of participation will not affect your compensation/reimbursement.

If you have questions regarding this research, please contact me by phone at 509-454 9811 or by e-mail at ncamill1@uic.edu. You may also contact my advisor, Dr. John Hagedorn at 312-9968361 or huk@uic.edu. If you feel you have not been treated according to the description of this form, or you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may call the Office for the Protection of Research Subjects (OPRS) at 312-996 1711 or e-mail OPRS at uicirb@uic.edu.

II- Interview Consent

I have read (or someone has read to me) the information contained in this consent document. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I voluntarily agree to participate in this research and allow _Nixon Camilien_ to conduct, tape, transcribe and translate this interview. I understand that this interview will be used to describe and explain patterns of reintegration of former soldiers of the Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H). I understand that my identity will be kept confidential and that my name will not be used in recording devices or any form of writing. I am allowed to sign this document with my real name or with an alias to better protect my identity. I have been given a copy of this form.

_____________________________________________
Signature of Participant (real name or alias)

_____________________________________________
Nixon Camilien, Researcher
CONSENT DOCUMENT (Haitian Creole Version) (DOKIMAN KONSANTMAN)

Mwen se Nixon Camilien. Mwen se etudyan nan depatman Kriminolojy, Dwa ak Jistis nan University of Illinois at Chicago. Mwen vle envite ou pou patisipe nan yon interview pou rechech sou reentegrasyon anseyn milite FAd’H paske ou gen anpil experyans ak konesans sou sa. Ou ka patisipe si ou te demobilize le yo te kraze lame ya an 1994. Tanpri pa patisipe si ou kite lame ya a nan demobilizasyon an ou byen si te rantre nan polis nasyonal la.

Mwen ap rambouse depans ou fe pou transpo ak kominikasyon. Montan total fre a se 250 Goud. Fre sa a sipoze kouvri lajan ou depanse pou voyaje depi lakay ou byen si te demobilize le. Fre sa a sipoze kouvri tou depans ou fe pou kominike pa telefon ak de rechech sa a.

Dire patisipasyon ou se anviron 1 e detan. Si ou dako pou ou patisipe, mwen ap anrejistre interview a. Mwen ap pran information ki sa a pou patisipe ou yon bagay ki te blese la. Dire patisipasyon ou se anviron 1 e detan. Si ou dako pou ou patisipe, mwen ap anrejistre interview a. Mwen ap pran information ki sa a pou patisipe ou yon bagay ki te blese la.

Rechech sa a pap mete nan okenn danje ki pi gwo passe sa ou rankontre deja chak jou. Sepandan, ou ka sante ou byen alez le ou rakonte yon bagay ki te blese ou byen si. Si sa passe, fe m konnen si ou vle kanpe oubyen chanje konvesasyon an. Pa gen okenn benefis direk pou ou pesonelman akos patisipasyon ou. Men sa ou di mwen ap amelyore konesans sou koryezon demobilizasyon ak reentegrasyon anseyn milite. Se mwen demobilizasyon anseyn milite. Se mwen demobilizasyon anseyn milite.


Si ou gen kekson konsenan rechech sa a, tanpri kontakte mwen pa telefon nan 509454 9811 oubyen na kourye nan ncami1@uic.edu. Ou ka kontakte direkte tez mwen, Dr. John Hagedorn nan 312-9968361 oubyen nan huk@uic.edu. Si ou panse yo pa trete ou byen dapre sa ki di an fom sa-a, ou byen si vle gen enfomasyon sou dwa ou kom patisipan nan rechech, ou ka kontakte Office for the Protection of Research Subjects (OPRS) nan 312-996 1711 oubyen ekri OPRS nan uicirb@uic.edu
II- Interview Consent Form (Konsantman pou interview)

Mwen te li (oubyen yon moun li pou mwen) enfamasyon ki genyen nan dokiman sa a. Mwen te gen opotinite pou poze keksyon e yo te reponn keksyon mwen yo san gou mwen. Mwen dako volonteman pou patisipe nan rechech sa a e mwen pemet _Nixon Camilien_- pou li poze keksyon, anrejistre, transkri epi tradui interview sa a. Mwen konprann ke interview sa a ap itilize pou dekri epi eksplike jan ansyen milite te reentegre nan sosyete. Mwen konprann identite mwen ap rete konfidansyel e yo pap itilize non mwen nan an anrejistreman oubyen a lekri. Recheche a ba mwen opsyon pou mwen signen dokiman sa a avek vre non mwen ou byen avek yon alias pou pwoteje idantite m. Mwen te resewa yon kopi fo m sa a.

_____________________________________________
Signature of Participant (real name or alias)

_____________________________________________
Nixon Camilien, Researcher
APPENDIX C- Interview Protocol (Research Protocol # 2008-0680)

Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers of the Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H)

Participant # _______
Date of interview _________________ Location _____________________________
Start time: ________________________ End time _____________________________

I- Demographics/Population

I.1- Age _______

I.3- Rank at the time of dismantlement ____________

I.4- What is your current marital status? Has there been any change in your marital status since demobilization? How is your relation with your wife/significant other? What does your wife or significant other think about your military career? Have you and your wife or significant other had any major disagreements over your military career or demobilization? How have they participated in your reintegration?

I.5- How many children do you have? How old are they? Can you tell us about them? Do they live with you? Do their mother live with them? How involved are you in their life? What kind of professional activities are they interested in? Do they seek your advice about their life goals? How do they feel about your military career?

I.6- How would you describe your physical health? Were you ever injured as a soldier? Have you had any major health problems (disease) since demobilization? Has your health affect your ability to get any job? Are you able to do physical work right now?

I.6.1-Probing questions: Have you ever been to the hospital to take care of any serious illness since demobilization? Can you tell me about it? Are you taking any prescribed medications for physical health problems? Does this problem continue to interfere with your life? How does that affect your ability to work?

I.7- Many former soldiers I’ve talked to report to have disturbing emotional responses to things that happened during their military career. Some even had suicidal thoughts and sought medical attention. How has your military career affect your emotional life? How do you feel emotionally right now? Have you experienced any chagrin? Have you suffered any mental health problem since demobilization which requires medical attention? Any suicidal thoughts or attempts? Is there any chronic or ongoing emotional problem which continues to interfere with your life?

Do you have a drinking problem? How often do you drink? Do you smoke? Do you use any illegal drug? Do you gamble? Do you play the lottery?
I.8- How would you describe your living arrangements? Do you own or rent the home you currently live in? How long have you been living at your current address? In how many other places have you lived since demobilization? Are you satisfied with your current living arrangements?

I.9- Can you tell me a little bit about how you grew up? Who raised you? Where you raised by the same person since you were born? How did your parents support your? Did your family approve your decision to enter the military? Do you have any family members who were members of Fad’H?

I.10- (Please tell me about how many languages you speak and write and how well you speak and write them. If you know more than one language, please tell me how and when you learn these languages. What is your preferred language of communication? )

I.11- Have you ever been to a foreign country? Which ones? When and for how long? What was the purpose of your visits?

I.12- What is the highest level of education you completed? How old were you when you completed that level? Did you learn any trade prior to joining FAd’H? Did you learn any trade while being a member of FAd’H?

I.13- Do you consider yourself poor, rich, or middle-class? How satisfied are you with your current socio-economic status? How has that changed since demobilization?

II. Employment status

II.1 Many soldiers have told me about their experiences in trying to find a job since their demobilization. How would you describe your own experience? Can you tell me about your attempts to find permanent employment after your demobilization? What were the main obstacles in securing permanent employment? Can you tell me why your attempts succeeded/did not succeed?

How have you supported yourself since the demobilization of FAdH?

Do you own any land? Any business?

Agriculture? Who the land belongs to? Do you produce enough to support yourself?

Security? Who runs the company?
Bolet (lotto)? Do you own the baink (lotto kiosks) or do you just play?

Sol? Who is the manman sol? How often do you contribute and how often is it paid? When do you get yours and how much is it?

Fighting rosters? Do you own the rosters? Who the arena belongs to?
II.2- Some former soldiers tell me they have to rely on each other and family members in order to support themselves and their family because they have not been able to find a job. What do you think about that? What are the means of support of former FAd’H members? What resources are available for soldiers to reintegrate in civilian society? Have former commanders (état major) provided any assistance to their soldiers? How have you personally support yourself since your demobilization?

II.3- The demobilization was followed by a reintegration program. This program was supposed to train former soldiers to find jobs as civilians. What do you remember about the DRP? Did you participate in their training? Can you tell me about the training? What trade did you choose? Why did you choose that trade? Would you have made the same choice if you had another chance? Can you describe how that training helped you and your fellow soldiers? How could the DRP been more effective?

II.4 - Have you been to any school or vocational training since demobilization? Would you tell me about your experience?

II.5- Are you currently working? Can you describe the work you do? How do you get paid? Cash------- Check---- exchange for favors--- free/volunteer --- self-employed-----

Do you have anybody overseas? How do they help you?

II.6- Have you ever worked for the Haitian National Police or as a security guard? Can you tell me about this job? Did it require you to carry a weapon? Have you made any attempts to integrate the HNP? How do feel about joining the Haitian National Police?

What do you think of demobilized soldiers working for the HNP as detectives, investigators or police auxiliaries?

II.7- To the best of your knowledge, what have most FAd’H soldiers done since demobilization? Where have they worked? How do they get jobs? What else have they been doing? Do you think former soldiers are treated differently when they try to get a job? Can you explain? What should former soldiers do to secure employment more easily?

II.8- Does anybody in your household currently work? Can you describe the work they do? Do they contribute to maintain the household?

III- Networking and Ties with former command structure

III. 1- Who do you go to when you have an emergency? (Family, friends, other relatives, former commanders, former soldiers, politicians, others)

III. 2- Why do you think FAd’H was demobilized? What/who do you blame for the demobilization of FAd’H? Can you explain?
III.3- Do you consider yourself a soldier or a former soldier? What is the difference? Would you remobilize if called to serve your country? Even as a volunteer/for free?

III. 4- Who are your three best friends right now? Can you tell me about your relations with these friends? Did you lose any friend as a result of demobilization?

III. 4. 1- Please describe your relations with other demobilized soldiers? How about your former commanders? And other members of the FAd’H command structure? How important it is for you to be in contact with your former command structure and other soldiers? How does that help you in your everyday life? What role do you think the former command structure can play in favor of former soldiers?

III.4.2- How are you involved in helping your former colleagues to reintegrate? How did you get involved in helping them?

III.5- What do you think are the interests (revendications) of former soldiers? Are there any organizations which promote or support the interests of former soldiers? What are these organizations? Can you describe how they help advance the interests of former soldiers? Do such associations help soldiers find jobs? Do these associations promote solidarity and networking among former soldiers? Do they have any formal organizational structure? How does reinstatement fit in the goal of these associations? How do you assess the success of these associations?

III.6- What have these organizations of former soldiers done for the country? How have these organizations helped you personally? Are you satisfied with the work of these organizations? Can you explain?

III. 7- Have you ever participated in any organization which addresses the interests of former members of FAd’H? What are the goals of that organization? Can you tell me about the people who run the organization? Can you describe how you help the organization? How do you evaluate the effectiveness of the organizations in addressing the interests of former soldiers?

III.7.1- Probing questions: Please tell me about any friendship or association you have had with other members of FAd’H? Are you related to any other former FAd’H? Have you work with any other FAd’H? What kind of work have you done? How would you describe your relationship with them?

III.8- What do you think are the best strategies to promote the interests of former soldiers? How do you feel about demonstrations for the reinstatement of FAd’H? How about armed rebellion? Under which conditions would you participate in an armed rebellion to reinstate FAd’H?

III.9- How would you describe the capabilities of FAd’H to remobilize? Do former soldiers recognize any formal command structure for FAd’H? Is there any current etat major? How unified do you feel former FAd’H are? What would happen if all former soldiers were unified with the same objectives?
IV- Stake in the political process and commitment to peace and democracy

IV.1- How did the demobilization of FAd’H affect security, fear of crime, the economy and law enforcement in the country?

IV.2- What does reintegration (reinsertion, return to civilian life) mean for FAd’H members?

IV.3- After demobilization, did you return to the same community you lived in while you were in FAd’H? How was your relationship with your civilian neighbors after demobilization?

IV.4- Can you describe your experience as a soldier of FAd’H? Were you ever disciplined? What about your experience as a civilian? Under which conditions would you consider your reintegration as a success? Have you considered leaving FAd’H prior to the demobilization? Have you left or considered leaving the country after the demobilization? How have you used your experience as a former military to re integrate since the demobilization?

IV.5- If the army is reconstituted, how would that affect you? Would you rejoin? What would you do if you were not invited to remobilize when the army is reconstituted?

IV.6- What sort of an impact do you think a reinstatement of FAd’H would have in the country? How would that benefit you personally?

IV.7- What do you see as the main obstacles to a reinstatement of FAd’H? Who do you think has the last word? Why? What do you think former FAd’H members can do to influence a reinstatement of FAd’H?

IV.8- Have you voted since the demobilization? Have you voted since the dismantlement of FAd’H? Have you run for any political office since the dismantlement of FAd’H? Have you ever belonged to a political party? What do you think of former military officers who run for political offices? What rewards/satisfaction do you receive from participating/or not participating in the political process?

IV.9- Which political regime can better serve the interests of former soldiers? Communism? Liberal capitalism? Duvalierism? Militarism? Lavalas? Can a democratic and civilian government be in the best interest of former soldiers? How do you think democracy is going in Haiti? How would you describe the current political regime in Haiti? Do you feel the interests of former soldiers are adequately addressed in current political debates?

IV.10- Do you belong to any community association? Can you describe these associations and your involvement in them? Is there any other family member in that association? How involved are they?

Have you ever been a boy scout? What functions have you had?
IV.11- Do you belong to any religious circle (church or others)? Can you describe your level of involvement? Is there any other family member involved with this circle? Can you describe their involvement?

IV.12- What do you think you need to do to get the kind of job opportunities you want? More education? More training? Another reintegration program? FAd’H remobilization?

IV.13- Who can help you get the kind of job opportunities you want right now? Government? Family? Friend? FAd’H network?

IV.14- What kinds of problems have had you with the government (leta) since your demobilization? Have you had any legal trouble with the criminal justice system? Have you ever felt persecuted by the government? Have you been investigated or arrested by the HNP?

IV.15- What do you think about the remobilization of FAd’H? Do you think Haiti needs an army? Can you describe why you think so? Does the military have a role to play in governing Haiti? What would that role be? Do you believe that FAd’H maintain enough strength to take control of the country by force? Can you explain?

Have you received any compensation for the government since demobilization? What was the amount? What did you do with that money?

Are you currently covered by any type of insurance?

Are you receiving pension?

IV.16- How do you feel about the Haitian criminal justice system? (The Haitian National Police, the court system, the judges, the prisons) How do you see FAd’H compared to the Haitian National Police? Can you tell me how the system has improved or worsened since the dismantlement of FAd’H?

IV.17- On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the Haitian government? (The president, the parliament).

How would grade the Haitian school system?

IV.18- What do you expect from the current political process? How do you feel about the arguments about FAd’H? How do you feel about the arguments about security?

According to you, what is the most credible institution in the country?

IV.19- How do you understand the role of foreign troops and MINUSTAH in Haiti? What about the United States of America? What about the other countries in the MINUSTAH? What do you expect from MINUSTAH and the United Nations in Haiti? Can you describe how members of
FAd’H feel about UN mission in Haiti? What would be different if the UN were not in Haiti? For how long should the UN stay? What is the role the UN should play in securing Haiti?

IV.20- What would justice mean for a former FAd’H soldier?

IV.21- What do you plan to do to advance your personal interests? FAd’H goals?

IV.22- What do you plan to do to serve your country?

IV.23- How could FAd’H to be reinstated? Why?

IV.24- How to solve the problem of insecurity in Haiti? Why?

IV.25- How would you solve the problem of drug trafficking? Can you explain?

IV.26- How would you solve the kidnapping problem? Can you explain?

IV.27- What would have to change to solve the gang problem? Why?

IV.28- What would have to happen to solve the unemployment problem? Why?

IV.29- What would have to change to solve the disarmament problem?

IV.30- What would be necessary steps for a successful reintegration program?

IV.31- What do you dream for this country? Why?

V. Conclusion

V.1- Realistically, how do you see the future for former FAd’H soldiers?

V.2- What are the most important things in life for you right now?

V.3- Is there anything important about the reintegration of former soldiers and your life after demobilization that we did not talk about?
VITA

Nixon M. Camilien
University of Illinois at Chicago
1000 W. Harrison St., MC 141, Chicago IL 60607
(312) 927 5226
ncamil1@uic.edu

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Candidate in Criminology, Law and Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago
Dissertation: Reintegration of demobilized soldiers.
Thesis Defense in May 2012

M.A., Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, May 2003

Instituto de Educación Física Dr. Enrique Romero Brest, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Completed first year of B.A degree in Physical Education, April-December 1998

B.A (equivalent) Social Sciences, Ecole Normale Supérieure
(Université d’Etat d’Haïti), Port-au-Prince, July 1997

Université d’Etat d’Haïti, Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Economiques, Haïti
Completed two years of four-year degree in Law, 1994-1996

WORK EXPERIENCE

Illinois Department of Corrections, Chicago, Illinois
Corrections Senior Parole Agent June 2000-June 2012
Research Assignment with Legal Services Division August-December 2008

United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH), Haiti
Corrections Officer (law enforcement specialist) October 2009-October 2010

Chicago Bureau of the Census, Chicago, Illinois
Census Taker March 2000-July 2000

Haitian American Community Association, Chicago, Illinois
Intake (Volunteer) March 1999-June 2000

Ministère de l’Administration et de la Fonction Publique, Haïti
Survey Delegate and Interviewer September 1995- May 1996

Ministère de l’Administration et de la Fonction Publique, Haïti
Public Administration Intern, July 1995- August 1995
COURSES TAUGHT

**Illinois Department of Corrections**, Chicago, Illinois
*Parole cycle training instructor*, 2009-2012

**University of Illinois at Chicago**, Department of Criminology Law and Justice
*Adjunct Lecturer, Law in Society*, CLJ 200 Spring 2009

**City Colleges of Chicago**, HWC/Rassias Institute,
*Lecturer of French*, March - June 2000

**Collège Canado-Haïtien**, Port-au-Prince, Haïti
*Teacher of Social Sciences*, December 1997-April 1998

**Collège Marie Immaculée**, Port-au-Prince, Haïti
*Teacher of Social Sciences*, January 1998- April 1998

**Collège de Christianville**, Port-au-Prince, Haïti
*Teacher of Social Sciences*, November 1996- June 1997

PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC DEVELOPMENT

**Illinois Emergency Management Agency**, ILETSB, Illinois Fire Service Institute
*Certificate of Training*, 2009

**PAE- HSC, A Lockheed Martin Company, International Justice Programs**
*Completed 10-day US Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Training Course of Pre-Deployment Selection, Evaluation and Training (April 19-29, 2009)*

**Illinois Department of Corrections**
*Completed 12-hour Prison Elimination Act for trainers, 2011*
*Completed 40-hour domestic violence training, 2011*
*Completed 40-hour training for Cycle Training trainer, 2009*
*Completed 16-hour Smoking Cessation Coordinator training, 2007*
*Completed 2-hour federal training for Law Enforcement Flying Armed, 2006*
*Completed 80-hour Sex Offender Supervision training, 2006*
*Completed 40-hour training for Train the Trainer, 2005*
*Completed 16-hour LAN Coordinator training, 2001*
*Graduated from the Illinois Department of Corrections Training Academy, 2000*

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**
*Modern Terrorism, November 2008*
American Correctional Association
  • Winter Conference and Training, Grapevine, Tx. (Jan. 11-16, 2008)

National Association of Blacks in Criminal Justice
  • Annual Conference and Training, Fairview Heights, Illinois (October 10-12, 2007)

PRESENTATIONS AND PUBLICATIONS
  • MINUSTAH and UN Expertise in Haiti. Paper presented at the XIV World Congress of Criminology. Philadelphia August 2005
  • Le Criminel est-il un microbe social. In CENEEH en Action, No. 3. 1997. Port-au-Prince, Haiti

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
  • American Society of Criminology, member since 2005
  • American Probation and Parole Association, member since 2007
  • Fraternal Order of Police, member since 2001
  • American Correctional Association, member since 2008

AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS
  • Michael Maltz Award for Outstanding PhD student , 2012
  • International Traditional Karate Association, Black Belt, 2009
  • Diversifying Higher Education in Illinois Fellowship, 2004-2008
  • Richard H. Ward Award, University of Illinois at Chicago, 2001 and 2009
  • Joseph E Ragen Academic Award, Illinois Corrections Training Academy, 2000
  • Firearms Marksmanship Award, Illinois Corrections Training Academy, 2000
  • David C. Watkins Professional Standards Award, Illinois Corrections Training Academy, 2000
  • Becas de Intercambio Cultural, Instituto de Education Fisica No1
    “Dr. Enrique Romero Brest”, Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Argentina 1998

FOREIGN LANGUAGES
  Fluent in French, English, Spanish and Haitian Creole